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ABSTRACT 
Following the idea that human rights are anchored in many cultures and find their support 
in many traditions, the contemporary human rights corpus is a fruit of a long history whose roots 
can be traced back to different societies in addressing the universal questions of injustice. If one 
adopts such a historical evolution of human rights, their universality might be affirmed on the 
assumption that they are coexistent to every human society. This view is, however, challenged 
by scholars who claim that the current human rights regime does not owe anything to other 
cultures, since they are essentially Western.  
The consequence of such an understanding touches the heart of the human rights’ 
perennial question concerning their universality, and it is the source of the Third World’s 
critiques. Indeed, if conceptually, culturally and historically, human rights are Western, how do 
	  
	  
they become universal? This question was first raised by the American Anthropological 
Association in its now well-known 1947 statement, even before the existing human rights 
instruments were framed. Today, it has been taken up by some Third World critics. For them, 
human right movement is an imperialistic swirl of Western liberalism upon other societies under 
the banner of United States of America that has replaced the former European imperialistic 
powers such as France and United Kingdom. According to these critics, there is no other area 
where human rights are imperialistically used by the West than in the so-called humanitarian 
intervention. Usually evoked as an urgent need to protect human rights, humanitarian 
intervention is seen as another name for the neo-colonialism in the Third World, as it is carried 
out by Western Powers against states in the Third World.  
Two challenges arise from these views. On the one hand, because of their Western origin, 
human rights are decried as Western and, therefore, they should not be imposed on other 
cultures. On the other hand, their imperialistic use by the West is an acute difficulty stemming 
from the global political context after the fall of Communism as a competing ideology with 
liberalism in 1990s. These challenges affect the theoretical justification as well as the 
implementation of human rights. For, according to the critics, human rights are purposely framed 
in liberal terms because they have to pursue and advance the Western project of conquering the 
whole world. Therefore, they claim, the actual spread of Western liberalism under human rights 
label is neither incidental nor accidental; it is a continuation of the Western imperialism which 
started long ago with economic exploitation, slavery and colonization of the rest of the world. 
Human rights is only a neutral term to translate the same reality. To those who reply that the 
contemporary human rights regime, starting with Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is a 
fruit of an international group with a diverse background, the critics respond that all of them 
	  
	  
were trained in the Western culture. And if one presents the role of the local human rights 
activists in the non-Western world, the critics consider them as Western mercenaries in local 
colors. That is why, while it springs from the cultural critique, the imperialistic challenge to 
human rights is a serious one because it attacks the human rights regime in its purpose and in its 
practice. It does not reject human rights only because they are extrinsic to the non-Western 
culture –cultural relativism—; rather, human rights are rejected because they are channels of 
oppression and exploitation as was and has always been the Western imperialism.  
The question now is: what do human rights become in this case? Is it possible to rescue 
them from both the cultural critics and imperialistic crusaders? Such a project would aim at 
maintaining and affirming their historicity as Western, yet showing that they are open to the 
possibility of being practiced in other cultures and other contexts. That it is the goal of this 
dissertation whose thesis is that, by domesticating human rights we retrieve the purpose of 
human rights of protecting and enhancing human dignity and, at the same time, it becomes 
possible to satisfactorily address the cultural and imperialistic challenges. Indeed, instead of 
thinking that people adopt and use human rights discourse because they like their individualistic 
side, the domestication of human rights pays attention to the process through which human rights 
as moral norms are incorporated in local cultures. Relying on the anthropological works that 
focus on the way human rights norms are integrated in different cultural contexts, this project 
endeavors to build a normative account of human rights based on these local practices. 
Philosophically speaking, domestication of human rights takes up Beitz’s insight of human rights 
as an emerging practice, and brings it to the beneficiaries of human rights purpose, instead of 
remaining at the legal level where only states are accepted as credible interlocutors, while they 
are the most suspected violators of human rights. 
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0. Introduction 
I 
The idea of human rights seems to be anchored in many cultures and to find its support in 
many traditions. For instance, Paul Gordon Lauren notes that “thoughtful and insightful 
visionaries in many different times and diverse locations have seen in their mind’s eye a world in 
which all people might enjoy certain basic and inherent rights simply by virtue of being 
human.”1 According to him, there is a “historical evolution of international human rights that 
continues to this day [that] started centuries ago with efforts attempting to address … difficult 
and universal questions.”2 He goes even further to ascertain that human rights are inherent to the 
social life of human beings, since this historical evolution “began as soon as men and women 
abandoned nomadic existence and settled in organized societies, long before anyone had ever 
heard the more recent expression, ‘human rights,’ or before nation-states negotiated specific 
international treaties.”3 Following this understanding, human rights as they are framed today in 
different UN instruments, are a fruit of a history whose roots can be traced back to different 
societies, since they respond to the need of addressing universal questions of injustice. In this 
regard, human rights are seen as cross-cultural in Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im’s sense, where 
these norms find legitimacy in different cultures.4 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Vision Seen. (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1998), p. 1.  
2 Ibid., p. 5.  
3 Ibid.  
4 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, “Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards of Human 
Rights: The Meaning of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment” in Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, 
Ed., Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus. (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1992), p. 20. According to An-Na’im, “cultural legitimacy may be defined as the quality or state 
of being in conformity with recognized principles or accepted rules and standards of a given culture.” Abdullahi 
Ahmed An-Na’im, “Problems of Universal Cultural Legitimacy for Human Rights” in Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im 
2	  
	  
	  
Michelle Ishay espouses this view when she says that “human rights are seen as a result 
of a cumulative historical process that takes on a life of its own, sui generis, beyond the speeches 
and writings of progressive thinkers, beyond the documents and main events that compose a 
particular epoch.”5 She, however, recognizes that “our modern conceptions of rights, wherever in 
the world it may be voiced is predominantly European in origin,” although she warns that “to say 
that our current views of universal rights originated in the West…should not imply that Western 
rights are reducible to free-market liberalism.”6 
If one adopts such a historical evolution of human rights, their universality might be 
affirmed on the assumption that they are coexistent to every human society. This view is not, 
however, welcomed by all scholars versed in the human rights debate. Jack Donnelly is one of 
the outspoken scholars who claim that the current human rights regime does not owe anything to 
other cultures. To authors like Adamantia Polis and Peter Shwab who argue that “all societies 
have human rights notions”7 and that “all societies cross-culturally and historically manifest 
conceptions of human dignity and human rights,”8 Donnelly responds that, “to the contrary… 
most non-Western cultural and political traditions lack not only the practice of human rights but 
the very concept.” He adds, “as a matter of historical fact, the concept of human rights is an 
artifact of modern Western civilization.”9 Hence for instance, in his sketchy article that appears 
to survey all non-Western traditions, Donnelly “wonders how the Chinese managed to claim 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and Francis M. Deng, Eds., Human Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives. (Washington: The Brookings 
Institutions, 1990), p. 336. 
5 Michel Ishay, The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era. (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2004), p. 2.  
6 Ibid., 5.  
7 Adamantia Polis and Peter Schwab, “Introduction” in Adamantia Polis and Peter Schwab, Eds., Human Rights: 
Cultural and Ideological Perspectives (New York: Praeger, 1980), p. xiv. 
8 Pollis and Schwab, “Human Rights: A Western Construct with Limited Applicability” in Pollis and Schwab, eds., 
Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives, p. 15.  
9 Jack Donnelly, “Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human 
Rights” in The American Political Science Review, Vol. 76, No. 2, 1982, p. 303.  
3	  
	  
	  
rights without the language to make such claims” since, apparently, “Chinese language lacked 
even a term for rights until one was coined in the late nineteenth century to translate the Western 
concept.”10 Some years later, he softened his position by asserting that “the idea that all human 
beings, simple because they are human, have inalienable political rights was foreign to all major 
premodern societies.”11 Accordingly, “human rights were as foreign to traditional Asian societies 
as they were to their Western counterparts.”12 It might be important to note that Donnelly’s 
definition of human right is part of what Charles Beitz,13 calls naturalistic theories, since for 
Donnelly, “the term human rights indicates both their nature and their source: they are the rights 
that one has simply because one is human. They are held by all human beings, irrespective of 
any rights or duties they may (or may not) have as citizens, members of families, workers, or 
parts of any public or private organization or association.” And because they are held because of 
the fact of being human, “human rights are also inalienable.”14 
Donnelly’s understanding of human rights is taken up by Rhoda E. Howard whose work 
has focused on Africa. According to her, “most known human societies did not and do not have 
conceptions of human rights. Human rights are a moral good that one can accept–on an ethical 
basis—and that everyone ought to have in the modern state-centric world.”15 For her–as for 
Donnelly—human rights is a modern concept developed in the West, based on the evolution of a 
society from its traditional structures to the modern state-centered organization. For that reason, 
the An-Na’im’s project of searching for cultural legitimacy through internal and cross-cultural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ibid., p. 308.  
11 Jack Donnelly, “Human Rights and Asian Values: A Defense of ‘Western’ Universalism” in Joanne R. Bauer and 
Daniel A. Bell, Eds., The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
p. 62.  
12 Ibid., p. 66.  
13 Charles Beitz, The idea of Human Rights. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 48-72. 
14 Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights, 4th ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2013), p. 19. 
15 Rhoda E. Howard, “Dignity, Community and Human Rights” in A. A. An-Na’im, Human Rights in Cross-
Cultural Perspectives, p. 81.  
4	  
	  
	  
dialogues is a futile effort, because “to seek an anthropologically based consensus on rights by 
surveying all known human cultures…is to confuse the concepts of rights, dignity, and justice.” 
Indeed, “the concept of human rights springs from modern human thought about the nature of 
justice; it does not spring from an anthropologically based consensus about values, needs, or 
desires of human beings.”16 In other words, as they might be interpreted, there is no need to look 
for a human rights concept outside the Western world, because it simply does not exist.  
The consequence of such an understanding touches the heart of human rights’ perennial 
question concerning their universality, and it is the source of Third World’s critiques. Indeed, if 
conceptually, culturally and historically, human rights are Western, how do they become 
universal? If there is no need for an anthropologically based consensus that might generate a 
“cultural legitimacy,” how can they be introduced in other cultures without being a vehicle of 
Western cultural and economic imperialism?  
This caution was first raised by the American Anthropological Association (AAA 
hereafter) even before the existing set of human rights instruments were framed. In its now well-
known 1947 statement, AAA asked: “how can the proposed Declaration be applicable to all 
human beings, and not be a statement of rights conceived only in terms of values prevalent in the 
countries of Western Europe and America?”17 Based on the anthropological work and the 
experience of Western colonialism over the rest of the world, AAA was wary that the projected 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ibid. See also her “Group versus Individual Identity in the African Debate on Human Rights” in A. A. An-Na’im 
and F. M. Deng, eds., Human Rights in Africa. Both authors hold that most of traditional societies had the concept of 
dignity which founded their idea of justice, without the connection to the idea of right. However, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (henceforth, UDHR) articulates the link between human rights and dignity when, in its 
Preamble, it recognizes that “the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family is the foundation of freedom,” while in its first article it states that “All human beings are born free 
and equal in dignity and rights.” Isn’t it the same dignity underlying this document that the authors acknowledge in 
all societies?  
17 American Anthropological Association, “Statement on Human Rights” in American Anthropologist, Vol. 49; No. 
4, 1947, p. 539.  
5	  
	  
	  
Declaration would carry forward “the doctrines of the ‘white man’s burden’ [which] have been 
employed to implement economic exploitation and to deny the right to control their own affairs 
to millions of peoples over the world, where the expansion of Europe and America has not meant 
the literal extermination of whole populations.”18 Although the legacy of this statement is rather 
negative because it is taken as having ushered in a cultural relativism about human rights,19 its 
worries were founded on living and lived experiences, to the point that it begs the question even 
today whether human rights are not being used by the West for its imperialistic goals.  
The latter is the conviction of Makau Mutua20 who sees the human rights movement as an 
imperialistic swirl of Western liberalism upon other societies. Under the banner of the United 
States of America that has replaced the former European imperialistic powers such as France and 
United Kingdom, the Western imperialism is spreading over other cultures under the cloak of 
human rights. The situation has been exacerbated by the fall of the Berlin Wall which signed the 
definitive end of communism, leaving liberalism as the sole dominant ideology leading the 
course of world’s history. As Mutua states it, “the European powers of yesterday have, as it 
were, passed the torch to the United States. The United States has renewed and revitalized the 
Age of Europe. The domination of the globe exercised by European powers for the last several 
centuries has been assumed by the United States.”21 This new world’s responsibility of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Ibid., p. 540. 
19 See Arvind Sharma, Are Human Rights Western? A Contribution to the Dialogue of Civilizations. (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 2006); Fidèle Ingiyimbere, “Spreading from the West: Rethinking the Universality of 
Human Rights” in Hekima Review, no. 43, Dec. 2010, pp. 153-165. From anthropological perspective, references to 
this statement in the literature abound. See for instance, Ellen Messer, “Anthropology and Human Rights” in Annual 
Review of Anthropology, Vol. 22, 1993 where she calls the Statement “the ‘burden of cultural relativism,” p., 224; 
Sally Engle Merry, “Human Rights Law and the Demonization of Culture (And Anthropology Along the Way)” in 
PoLAR, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2003, where she responds to Karen Engle’s article “From Skepticism to Embrace: Human 
Rights and the American Anthropological Association from 1947-1999” in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3, 
2001. 
20 See Makua Mutua, Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2002).  
21 Ibid., p. 6. 
6	  
	  
	  
United States relies on human rights discourse to justify its imperialistic motives, especially 
when addressing the non-Western world. This was –and is—also the case with European 
countries especially vis-à-vis African nations. Since the 90s, after the so-called La Baule’s 
speech by the then French President François Mitterrand, any economic aid to Africa was 
conditioned by the adoption of human rights and initiation of democratic processes. Once more, 
human rights discourse was used as a way of “imposing” economic rules and political changes 
through economic pressure.  
According to critics, there is no other area where human rights are imperialistically used 
by the West than in the so-called humanitarian intervention. Usually evoked as an urgent need to 
protect human rights, humanitarian intervention is taken as another name for the neo-colonialism 
in the Third World, since it is carried out by Western Powers against states in the Third World. 
For authors like Mahmood Mamdani, there is no doubt that the humanitarian order “draws on the 
history of modern Western colonialism.”22 Moreover, since the humanitarian intervention brings 
in the so-called Responsibility to Protect (R2P), one needs “to ask: Who has the responsibility to 
protect whom under what conditions and toward what end?”23 Jean Bricmont captures the issue 
at stake here and answers Mamdani’s question when he calls humanitarian intervention a 
“humanitarian imperialism” in which the West is “using human rights to sell war.”24 
Following these comments and paying attention to recent political events (Iraq; Libya), 
one is tempted to conclude that the AAA’s prophecy of doom has been proven true and, 
unfortunately, the proponents of human rights as specifically Western and yet universal do not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Mahmood Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror. (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 2009), p. 276. 
23 Ibid.  
24 See Jean Bricmont, Humaniterian Imperialism: Using Human Rights to Sell War. Trans. by Diana Johnstone. 
(New York: Montly Review Press, 2006). 
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contest the justification of Western imperialism through human rights. Howard does not see 
human rights inevitable for other cultures because these societies are developing as did the West. 
For Donnelly, since human rights are liberal by nature, they have to increase liberalism in 
detriment of ancient or other forms of societal organization. As for Michael Ignatieff, the West 
has the responsibility to propagate and protect human rights in the world.25 He even terms it 
“imperialist” himself, although he contends that it is a different kind of imperialism. He says, 
“America’s empire is not like empires of times past, built on colonies, conquest and the white 
man’s burden…the 21st century imperium is a new invention in the annals of political science, an 
empire lite, a global hegemony whose grace notes are free markets, human rights and 
democracy, enforced by the most awesome military power the world has ever known.”26 Yes! it 
may have changed, but it is imperialism nonetheless. In other words, the AAA’s fears and the 
Third World critics’ assessments have a strong basis.  
Two challenges arise from these views. On the one hand, because of their Western origin, 
human rights are decried as Western and, therefore, they should not be imposed on other 
cultures. Understood as parochial to the Western world, they face the cultural relativism 
challenge and this issue has received much attention, as it underlined the debates on Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (henceforth, UDHR) already during the drafting time. On the other 
hand, however, the imperialistic use of human rights by the West is an acute difficulty stemming 
from the global political context after the fall of Communism as a competing ideology with 
liberalism in 1990s. The worry is raised by Third World critics, but it has not received the 
seriousness it deserves. Yet, it affects the theoretical justification as well as the practice of 
human rights. For the critics, human rights are purposely framed in liberal terms because they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 See his Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry. (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001).  
26 Cited by Bricmont, p. 41. 
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have to pursue and advance the Western project of conquering the entire world. Thus, the actual 
spread of Western liberalism under a human rights label is neither incidental nor accidental; it is 
a continuation of Western imperialism that started long ago with economic exploitation, slavery 
and colonization of the rest of the world. Human rights is only a neutral term to translate the 
same reality. To those who reply that the contemporary human rights regime starting with 
UDHR is a fruit of an international group with a diverse background, the critics respond that all 
of them were trained in the Western culture. And if one presents the role of local human rights 
activists in the non-Western world, the critics consider them as Western mercenaries in local 
colors. That is why, in my view, while it springs from the cultural critique, the imperialistic 
challenge to human rights is a very serious one because it attacks the human rights regime in its 
purpose and in its practice. It does not reject human rights only because they are extrinsic to the 
non-Western culture –cultural relativism—but rather human rights are rejected because they are 
a vehicle of oppression and exploitation as was and has always been Western imperialism.  
The question now is: what do human rights become in this case? Is it possible to rescue 
them from both the cultural critics and imperialistic crusaders? Such a project would aim at 
maintaining and affirming the historicity of human rights as Western, yet showing that they are 
open to the possibility of being practiced in other cultures and other contexts. That it is the goal 
of this dissertation whose thesis is that, by domesticating human rights, we retrieve the purpose 
of human rights of protecting and enhancing human dignity and, at the same time, it becomes 
possible to satisfactorily address the cultural and imperialistic challenges. Indeed, instead of 
following Ignatieff by just saying that millions of people adopted human rights because they like 
their individualistic side,27 or espouse Rainer Forst’s view that the critics have a static view of 
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culture28 –because these views are contentious!—the domestication of human rights pays 
attention to the process through which human rights as moral norms are incorporated in local 
cultures. Relying on the anthropological works of scholars like Engle Sally Merry and Mark 
Goodale, as their work has focused on how human rights norms are welcomed in different 
cultural contexts, my endeavor seeks to build a normative account of human rights based on 
these local practices. Philosophically speaking, domestication of human rights takes up Beitz’s 
insight of human rights as an emerging practice, and brings it where it belongs; that is, to the 
beneficiaries of human rights purpose instead of remaining at the legal level where only states 
are accepted as credible interlocutors, while they are the most suspected violators of human 
rights. I believe that this perspective will cast new light over human rights challenges and allow a 
different normative approach.  
The following section describes succinctly how this project will be brought about through 
three main parts.  
II. 
The first part of the dissertation is consecrated to the elaboration of the challenges 
identified as the most urgent, namely, the consideration of human rights as an imperialist project 
implemented through humanitarian intervention. The goal of this elaboration is to situate the 
imperialistic claim in a historical perspective, in order to highlight its patterns and see how they 
apply to the human rights project. Hence, this part is essentially descriptive because the aim is to 
expose the problem.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See his The Right to Justification: Elements of a Constructivist Theory of Justice. Trans. Jeffery Flynn (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 
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Thus, the first chapter deals with the claim of human rights as an imperialist ideology. 
When Third World critics associate human rights with Western imperialism, they want to link 
them to the memory of the imperialism of the past. They stress that human rights are a 
continuation of a practice that started many years ago. That is the reason why this chapter 
situates the claim of human rights understood as imperialist ideology in the course of the history 
of Western imperialism itself. By trying to understand imperialism before the contemporary 
human rights movements, I delineate the distance between an imperialist project and the human 
rights movement, with a possibility, however, of singling out some signs of imperialism in 
certain understandings of human rights norms.  
Chapter two then embarks on elaborating the practical challenge, which alleges that 
humanitarian intervention is another form of imperialism. While the first chapter constitutes a 
theoretical and historical elaboration of the contention that human rights are an imperialist 
project, the second chapter takes up the correlative challenge to human rights, that is, the 
humanitarian intervention in the name of human rights. Human rights in their conception are 
about protecting individual’s dignity and collectivity’s rights. In other terms, the frame of the 
contemporary human rights regime presupposes the means to implement them, with the state 
assumed to be the main entity to enforce them. In this sense, Beitz is correct to note that, in 
human rights instruments, the state plays an irreplaceable role, and when the state cannot fulfill 
its responsibility, the “international community” is to take over and intervene even inside the 
borders of the failed state. That is the logical consequence of the reading of human rights texts 
and even the intention of the drafters. However, that is where the critics see the imperialistic 
ambition and even the neocolonial goal, since most of the time the states evaluating and 
enforcing the protection of human rights are Western powers whose military capabilities are used 
11	  
	  
	  
to intervene in non-Western states, whereas they do not apply the same rules to themselves when 
they fail to implement certain rights.  
Although this critique is fair and has an empirical foundation, it would nevertheless be 
unfair to reduce the whole history and the entire intuition of humanitarian intervention to that 
sole view. Therefore, the chapter traces the historical background of humanitarian intervention, 
in the hope that this historical perspective will allow underlining the limits of the critiques and 
exposing, at the same time, the justification of the critique of seeing humanitarian intervention as 
neocolonialism.  
Having elaborated and exposed the problem in the first part and believing that they 
deserve a philosophical account, the second part resorts to some philosophical discourses, in 
order to examine if we can satisfactorily address these challenges to human rights from their 
perspectives. In this regard, I present efforts by John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas because they 
are the most influential thinkers in the contemporary political and social thought.  
Chapter three is consecrated to John Rawls, whose major part of his work was devoted to 
the question of domestic justice (A Theory of Justice, and Political Liberalism, hereafter 
respectively, TJ and PL). In 1993, he presented a paper on Law of Peoples29 where he developed 
a theory of justice for the international community. In his own words, “by the law of peoples I 
mean a political conception of right and justice that applies to the principles and norms of 
international law and practice.” His paper was “to sketch … how the law of peoples may be 
developed out of liberal ideas of justice similar to but more general to the idea [of] justice as 
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fairness.”30 The paper would evolve into the book known today under the same title, The Law of 
Peoples, where Rawls gives more space to the same subject. It is in this context of elaborating a 
theory of justice for “international norms and practice” that Rawls evokes human rights. 
Chapter three, therefore, focuses on this work of Rawls in order to study (1) the Rawlsian 
conception of human rights so that (2) I can examine whether, with it, we can respond to the 
challenges highlighted in the first part. The outcome of this confrontation cannot be decided in 
advance, but by following the role that Rawls assigns to human rights, namely that “they restrict 
the justifying reason for war and its conduct, and they specify limits to a regime’s internal 
autonomy,”31 one can readily see that human rights are conceived through the evolution of 
international law and international relations since World Word II, which are the target of the 
imperialist and neocolonialist critiques of human rights. The question is then to know whether 
this view of human rights playing a role in relations between states would address the challenges 
as previously stated. Chapter three has to answer this question.  
In chapter four, I turn to Habermas. Being not only a leading intellectual in debates on 
social and global justice but also a prolific academician, it is without surprise that one encounters 
expressions such as rights, human rights, human dignity in his writings. However, contrary to 
Rawls whose work on human rights comes as an extension of his political liberalism from a 
domestic society to the international community, Habermas does not have a specific work 
dedicated solely to the subject. Human rights appear in relation to other topics such as law and 
morality, democracy, dignity, etc., but they are especially invoked in the global and international 
law context. Thus, his complex conception of human rights combines a doctrine of what he calls 
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a system of rights and the current human rights regime. The former portrays human rights as (a) 
socially constructed; hence (b) intersubjective and (c) they are justified through the discourse 
principle which leads to the democratic principle. The system of rights is framed for a 
democratic political community, while the international human rights are considered from a 
cosmopolitan point of view.  
The goal of this chapter is to deepen this Habermasian understanding of human rights in 
order to measure how far it can help to deal with the challenges that animate the whole project. 
Once more, I will not predict the result before studying thoroughly his complex view on human 
rights. However, a glance on his writings on the evolution of international law after WWII 
reveals that he adopts a positive view of it, as it embodies the Kantian idea of cosmopolitan law, 
even if there might still be some practical problems.32 And when he confronts the accusation of a 
Western imposition of human rights on other cultures, he takes an apologetic position, arguing 
that “the standards of human rights stem less from the particular cultural background of Western 
civilization than from the attempt to answer specific challenges posed by a social modernity that 
has in the meantime covered the globe.”33 From this point of view, it can already be projected 
that it is not an easy task to respond to the critics who contend that modernity itself is the vehicle 
of Western imperialism, now disguised in these “a-cultural” human rights standards. Once again, 
however, this chapter works out the whole argument, and shows how far Habermas’s theory of 
human rights can or cannot be used to respond to critics.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Jürgen Habermas, “Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace: At Two Hundred Years’ Historical Remove” in The Inclusion 
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Pensky (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), p. 121.  
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If the two philosophical discourses examined in Part II do not give a satisfactory way of 
responding to the identified challenges, the purpose of a third part will be to construct another 
philosophical discourse which can address them. To restate what I have already said, these 
challenges are very serious because they are founded on some palpable empirical data and 
historical events, and they are raised in the context where the respect and protection of human 
rights are the most needed –although I believe that there is not yet a historical society that fulfills 
all the aspirations enshrined in the human rights corpus. Therefore, the goal of this dissertation is 
to construe a conception of human rights based on local practices, which would then allow a 
philosophical justification of the said practices. When this effort is completed, it is then possible 
to address both the imperialist prophets who encourage the ideological use of human rights and 
the cultural critics who reject the normative content of human rights because of their possible –if 
not actual—abuse and their historical origin.  
Hence, in chapter five, instead of assuming Beitz’s statist model, I pay a closer attention 
to the actors who are involved in the practice of human rights, who try to reach out to the victims 
of human rights abuse. In this analysis, the state as the only credible agent for protecting, 
respecting and fulfilling human rights is incorporated in a broader web of actors, and the focus is 
shifted from human rights as “imperatives for foreign policy”34 to their instrumental role in 
protecting and respecting the human dignity of the victim. Consequently, the battle for human 
rights is no longer –and should not be—limited to the international scene; rather it is delivered at 
the local level where human rights are needed and can make a difference. Methodologically, 
there are two assumptions and some consequences follow. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Erin Kelly, “Human Rights as Foreign Policy Imperatives” in Chatterjee, D. K., Ed. The Ethics of Assistance: 
Morality and the Distant Needy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
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As a first assumption, I take the existing human rights corpus in its evolution from the 
end of World War II until today as a starting point and I suspend the judgment for awhile about 
moral character. I do not make judgments such as human rights are an imperialist ideology or are 
moral norms. Such normative judgment is a result of the analysis of their local implementation. 
The second assumption, which is a fact, takes human rights historicity as Western for granted. 
Although I acknowledge that a diverse group from different countries drafted the UDHR and that 
the Covenants and consecutive conventions involved different nations, even the recently 
independent ones, I give the benefit of doubt to the critics who argue that all these processes did 
not include other cultural backgrounds. For while it is generally understood that, by Western 
rights, it is meant the classical liberal ones, the so-called social, cultural and economic rights also 
were fruits of the socialist system that derived inspiration from philosophies developed in the 
Western. In this sense, the ideologies underlining human rights are Western.  
As these facts are assumed, I then look at the local practices and see who are the actors. 
Here the first difference catches the eye: instead of the state alone assuming the monopoly of 
protecting, respecting, fulfilling human rights, it is rather a web of actors involved in the practice 
of human rights: local activists, international activists, the state, the regional bodies and 
international community and finally and most importantly, the beneficiaries themselves. The 
practice is made through the interactions of these different actors and during this process, human 
rights get a new meaning –if not meanings—and different justifications. They are translated –not 
only literally but also metaphorically—into new languages and into new situations, and at each 
time, they acquire new meanings and new justifications. Hence, this model of local practice 
assumes a pluralistic justification of human rights. There is no one single foundation on which 
different actors rely for calling upon human rights. It is rather a constellation of justifications, 
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which share, however, the same goal: to make human rights effective to the beneficiary, the 
individual or group of individuals in need of them. Furthermore, that practice of human rights 
takes into account local contexts in their contingencies and their values. That is why it is not 
always through a smooth transition/translation that human rights are incorporated into local 
realities. However, through the tension generated by the practice of human rights into local 
contexts, human rights are domesticated to the point that local activists and beneficiaries call 
them theirs. This is where the analysis of the practices reveals that the local actors –activists and 
beneficiaries—do not see a human rights corpus as only legal texts—even for those with a legal 
character like Covenants and Conventions—but also, and even especially, as a moral source of 
inspiration for action.  
Two consequences follow this outcome. First, the debate about the imperialistic use of 
human rights is no longer between–and should not involve—external actors and the critics. The 
reason why the external should not intervene is the fact that, being from the suspected side of 
perpetrating imperialism, their moral stand is theoretically compromised. Rather, it would 
confront local actors to their critics, sharing the same concern of their situation, justifying to each 
other the relevance or the nullity of invoking human rights in their context. This discussion 
benefits both sides in reforming the elements –both from within and without—that harm human 
dignity and save those that are judged consonant with a dignified life. The second consequence is 
that the metaphor of savage-victim-savior, (SVS)35 famously used to describe the framework of 
the practice of human rights does no longer apply because the practice and its justifications are 
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carried out by the affected persons themselves. In such a context, the identity of the SVS is 
blurred, at least in the current understanding as developed by Mutua. In addition, as the practice 
reveals human rights as empowering moral norms consistent with a pluralistic foundation, the 
imperialist crusaders lose their ground because to embrace human rights does not mean to 
embrace liberalism, and even less so to adopt the individualistic interpretation of human rights. 
Peoples adopt human rights because they find them meaningful to their contexts without 
renouncing their comprehensive doctrines—to use Rawls’s terminology—and they incorporate 
them in their narratives and value systems, taking those rights responding to their most urgent 
needs.  
As this chapter five constructs a normative understanding of human rights that redeems 
human rights discourse from the tyranny of imperialistic goal and the risk of total rejection, then 
space for a concluding chapter is opened to assess how this new conception allows responding to 
challenges that motivated and animated my whole project.  
Thus, in addition to being a way of concluding, chapter six reexamines the debate 
between the universalists and relativists with regard to human rights practice, and to reconsider 
the question of human rights universality through the lenses of the fruits of the fifth chapter. In 
this sense, instead of taking human rights as already universal in their framework because they 
can be found in every culture –which is disputable, because if it were the case, why would 
cultures resist them?—or looking for a thin core that can be assumed to meet universal 
agreement, leaving aside many important other human rights needed for enhancing human 
dignity, or justifying universality through the reading of terms like “everyone, everybody” which 
might be the intention of the drafters and not the effective universality, or even to assume the 
legal universality by the fact that many states have signed human rights instruments because it 
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does not ensure the effectiveness of their impact, the chapter presents a practical universality 
which can identify the process of domestication as a process of universalizing human rights. In 
this sense, universality of human rights is to be understood as underlying the practice of human 
rights and not as a prerequisite for adopting and practicing them. 
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Chap. 1. Human Rights as an Imperialist Ideology 
 
…human rights corpus is seen purely as a liberal 
project whose overriding goal, though not explicitly 
stated, is the imposition of Western-style liberal 
democracy, complete with its condiments. 
Makau Mutua 
 
1.0. Introduction 
Most of the Third World critics of human rights underscore the fact that human rights are serving 
an ideological purpose for Western imperialism, replacing the ancient ideologies, in a world 
dominated by the United States replacing former imperial powers. In Makau Mutua words,  
today the presence of the United States—which has succeeded France and the United Kingdom as the 
major global cultural, military, and political power—is ubiquitous… In a sense the United States chief 
executive sits atop a global empire. It is an empire governed by cultures, traditions, and norms of the 
Europeans West. The European powers of yesterday have, as it were, passed the torch to the United State. 
The United States has renewed and revitalized the Age of Europe. The domination of the globe exercised 
by European powers for the last several centuries has been assumed by the United States.1 
Three points come out strongly from this critique. First, there is a continuation from what has 
been happening from centuries up to now. Only the actors have changed. Yesterday it was 
France and United Kingdom; today, it is the United States, but they serve the same master: 
Western empire. Second, the content of this project is the domination of the rest of the world by 
the West. Third, this domination permeates several spheres: political, cultural, traditions, 
military, economic and so on.  
One can wonder then how human rights are involved in this new Western imperialism 
under a United States’ banner. Makau Mutua once again observes that “increasingly, the human 
rights movement has come to openly be identified with the United States, whose chief executive 
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now invokes human rights virtually every time he addresses a non-European nation.”2 This being 
the case, it follows that the Western global empire led by the United States to dominate the non-
European world is justified through a human right rhetoric. Hence the title of this chapter: human 
rights as an imperialist ideology. However, to unpack what this title contains, will requires us a 
detour through the understanding of the ideology behind European imperialism before passing 
the torch to the United States. We hope that it will only be then that we will be able to grasp how 
human rights is being ideologically used by the West to justify its continued domination of the 
rest of the World.  
To carry out this goal, three main points will structure this chapter. In the first place, I 
look at the imperialist ideology, focusing on the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning 
of the twentieth century for reasons that this period corresponds to the formal imperialism which 
consecrated the domination of the rest of world by the West. It now appears that the formal 
imperialism period thrived because of the work of international law. That is the reason why the 
second point pays attention to the relationship between international law and the imperialist 
ideology. Hoping that after these two first points will have highlighted the content of imperialist 
ideology, the third and last point then will analyze how human rights are incarnating this 
imperialist ideology. But, before I set out, there is a need for clearing the ground by delimitating 
the definitional scope of the concept of imperialist ideology (I leave the intricacies of 
imperialism to the first heading).  
As a compound expression, imperialist ideology is composed of imperialist and ideology. 
Imperialist is an adjective derived from the noun empire. According to Henry Laurens, Raymond 
Aron distinguishes between imperialist and imperial especially when applied to politics. An 
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imperialist politics would mean “the constitution of an empire in a juridical or effective term, it 
means to subdue foreigner populations to its law,” while the imperial politics “consists in aiming 
at spreading its influence in a function of its interests considered vital in terms of security, access 
to raw materials and markets, and the constitution of alliances and military bases abroad.”3 
Would it be the same when ‘imperialist’ is applied to ‘ideology’? Before attending to this 
question, the latter is another very commonly used concept which needs to be delimited.  
As can be expected, ‘ideology’ has been defined in many ways and by many different 
scholars. For instance, Justin Jennings states that “an ideology can be defined as a set of ideas 
and behaviors that promotes a social system that benefits some classes or interest groups more 
than others….Ideologies are embedded in the structure of all societies that exhibit some degree 
of social inequality… and the élite who benefit from these social systems endeavor to present a 
vision of the world that appears natural and timeless.”4 Herfried Münkler defines ideology from 
a Marxist perspective as “the (necessary) self-deception of political and social players regarding 
their own goals and purposes.”5 From a communicative perspective, Dennis Mumby treats 
ideology in “a pejorative sense,” viewing it as “both socially located and as constitutive of social 
reality.”6 The Frankfurt Institute for Social Research lists ideology in the themes of its Aspects of 
Sociology, noting that the critique of ideology should not lead to forgetting its long history. 
Stemming again from a Marxist view, the Institute states that ideology is linked to the rise of the 
bourgeois society. It is stated, “if one disregards those oppositional countercurrents in Greek 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Henry Laurens, L’empire et ses ennemis. La question impériale dans l’histoire. (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2009), p. 
129. The translations are ours. 
4 Justin Jennings, “The Fragility of Imperialist Ideology and the End of Local Traditions, an Inca Example” in 
Cambridge Archaeological Journal, Vol. 13, No. 1, April 2003, p. 108.  
5 Herfried Münkler, Empires: The Logic of World Domination from Ancient Rome to the United States, trans. by 
Patrick Camiller. (Malden: Polity Press, 2007), p. 84.  
6 Dennis K. Mumby, “Ideology & the Social Construction of Meaning: A Communication approach” in 
Communication Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4, 1989, p. 294.  
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philosophy which have fallen into disrepute due to the triumph of Platonic-Aristotelician 
tradition and which are being reconstructed with great difficulty only today, then, at least since 
the beginnings of modern bourgeois society at the turn of the sixteenth and the seventeenth 
centuries, the general conditions of false contents of consciousness began to be noted” and it 
goes back to Francis Bacon’s critique of “idols”.7 
All these excerpts concur to Paul Ricoeur’s observation that “the most prevalent 
conception of ideology in our Western tradition stems from the writings of Marx.”8 Our working 
definition of ideology will, therefore, be reconstructed from Ricoeur’s lectures. The latter go 
through some important figures on ideology, such as young Marx’s writings, Louis Althusser, 
Karl Mannheim, Max Weber, Jürgen Habermas and Clifford Geertz. All along, Ricoeur wants to 
maintain positive and negative sides of ideology; the former starting from the eighteen century 
French school, while the latter stems from Marx. As he puts it, “my hypothesis is that there is a 
positive as well as negative side to both ideology and utopia.”9 The negative side of ideology is 
its dissimulation of reality, while its positive side is in its constitutive role of what Weber calls 
legitimation. Reading it from Marx’s writings, the negative role of ideology is the distortion of 
reality; it “means this reversal of reality.”10 For Ricoeur, however, the negative role of ideology 
does not exhaust its meaning. He remarks, “the concept of ideology will not be complete as long 
as we do not know to what we oppose it, to what we have to contrast it.”11 And here is where he 
brings in the positive role of ideology of legitimating authority. He highlights it in his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The Frankfurt Insitute for Social Research, Aspects of Sociology, with the preface by Max Horkheimer and 
Theodor W. Adorno, trans. by John Viertel. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), p. 183.  
8 Paul Ricoeur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, Ed. by George H. Taylor. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1986), p. 3.  
9 Ibid., p. 2, but it is a recurrent theme throughout the first part on ideology. See for instance, p. 77; 156; 161; 204; 
259.   
10 Ibid., 30. See also the same idea on his p. 8; 10; 12; 70; 78; 156; etc.  
11 Ibid., 31.  
23	  
	  
	  
interpretation of Weber, saying, “ideology functions to add a certain surplus-value to our belief 
in order that our belief may meet the requirements of the authority’s claim. The Marxist notion 
of distortion makes more sense if we say that it is always the function of ideology to legitimate a 
claim of legitimacy by adding a supplement to our spontaneous belief. The function of ideology 
at this stage is to fill the credibility gap in all systems of authority.”12 In other words, in the very 
process of dissimulating and distorting reality, there is an active function of rational justification 
of a certain social order. The negative side is concealed (dissimulated) through this process of 
legitimation of “our spontaneous belief.” From a Marxist perspective, this view seems to espouse 
the Frankfurt Institute’s position that “ideology is justification.”13 
Coming back then to the object of grasping imperialist ideology, I conserve the two 
moments and say that it means the justificatory process of legitimating imperial and imperialist 
politics as defined by Aron, while, at the same time, concealing/dissimulating its true reality. 
Thus, human rights as imperialist ideology means that human rights are being used to positively 
justify a negative practice of domination. As a moral discourse, they serve a positive role of 
ideology of legitimation; but as they legitimate a negative practice, they serve the negative side 
of ideology. This is then a working definition whenever I use this expression of human rights as 
imperialist ideology. 
1.1. On Imperialist Ideology 
In the introduction above, I delineated the contour of this expression imperialist ideology. The 
issue at hand is to know what kind of ideology was behind the rise and the propagation of 
imperialism. But before getting to that ideology, we need to know what imperialism is and how it 
came about.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ibid., p. 183.   
13 Frankfurt Institute, Ibid., p. 189. Italicized in the text.  
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a). From Empire to Imperialism 
Empire is a known vocabulary in political history. Deepak Lal notes that the oldest of empires 
“go back to the origins of civilization” and he documents them from about 4000 B.C. with 
Mesopotamia,14 and as examples of imperialism in practice, Joseph Schumpeter chooses 
Egyptian, Assyrian and Persian empires.15 Furthermore, Robert Aldrich remarks that, around the 
same period, we could also find examples of empires in Asia, South America and sub-Saharan 
Africa.16 With such ancient roots, Greek and Roman empires, without mentioning Ottoman, the 
Spanish and Portuguese empires are just of yesterday, and empire becomes so familiar, 
especially that it seems to have been a worldwide experience. Yet, as Robert Aldrich puts it, 
“asked about ‘empire’,… many would immediately think of the colonial empires…Interrogated 
about what ‘empire’ means, respondents—especially those not of European heritage—might also 
speak of slavery, indentured labour, transported prisoners, conquest and war, and genocide.”17 
Aldrich’s nuance underlines the difficulty of defining what empire and its derivative imperialism 
mean.18 However, the question is not only to define them; it is also about how we passed from 
empire to imperialism and from the latter to its ideological justification.  
In his study on the evolution of the concept empire, James Muldoon shows that the term 
imperium underwent different meanings in the West from the ancient Roman World to its 
modern use through the middle Ages. He notes, “in the ancient Roman World, the term 
imperium meant power, specifically ‘the legal power to enforce the law’… thus, originally, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Deepak Lal, In Praise of Empires: Globalization and Order. (New York: Palgrave, 2004), p. 9. 
15 Joseph Schumpeter, Imperialism, Social Classes: Two Essays. Trans. by Heinz Norden (New York: The World 
Publishing Company, 1971), p. 23.  
16 Robert Aldrich, “Introduction: Imperial Overview” in Robert Aldrich, ed., The Age of Empires. (London: Thames 
& Hudson Ltd, 2007), p. 8.  
17, Ibid., p. 7. 
18 As Laurens puts it, “au fond, l’empire et sa doctrine—impérialisme—sont peut-être les notions les moins bien 
comprises de l’historiographie moderne, et cette incompréhension est due tout autant à la complexité de leur histoire 
qu’aux critiques de leurs contempteurs,” ibid., p. 13.  
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imperium had no territorial connotation.” He adds that “the related term imperator, however, 
could include something of a territorial connotation because this title was granted to a successful 
general who had won a significant victory at a particular time and place.”19 This conception 
would evolve as time went by, to the point that “by the time of Augustus… the Romans appear 
to have begun to understand imperium not only in terms of power over other people, but also in a 
territorial sense to describe newly acquired lands, lands that has become ‘subjected to the 
imperium of the Roman people’.” He then concludes: “such use of imperium bridged the 
traditional use of the term and its modern use, that is, to describe specific territory or collection 
of territories.”20 
It is this understanding of empire that is underscored by scholars. For instance, after 
recognizing that the term “empire” is not easy to figure out, Aldrich states that “it may be seen at 
its most basic as the rule by a particular group in a political center over a diverse and different set 
of other, often distant countries and peoples, generally as a result of military conquest.”21 As for 
Laurens, he first links the conception of empire to its roman origin, but extracts its abstract 
definition as a domination that spreads over a plurality of peoples, religions and territories with 
different status. For this author, philosophically speaking, empire implies a system of domination 
of the might over the weak.22 
This exploration of the term empire shows that it carries with it a negative content 
because it implies a negative experience of conquest and domination. Laurens even contrasts 
empire to the positive notions of kingdom or nation. This negative experience can, of course, be 
positively interpreted by the conqueror and even by the conquered. Nonetheless, empire is still 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 James Muldoon, Empire and Order: The Concept of Empire, 800-1800. (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), p. 18.  
20 Ibid., p.18-9.  
21 R. Aldrich, ibid., p. 7.  
22 H. Laurens, ibid., p. 14-5.  
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stained by its negative origin of conquest and domination. This negative connotation becomes 
clear when one looks at imperialism—another derivative closely linked to empire.  
Laurens asserts that the word “imperialism” appeared in French language to designate 
those favorable to imperial power (already used in 1525 and 1825), but such meaning would be 
quickly superseded by a second one, that of constituting an empire by subduing other states, 
politically, economically and culturally.23 He argues that this meaning would win over the first 
one, due to its English use in 1878, before being applied again to the French empire in 1893. 
Many authors concur with this observation, although not necessarily agreeing on dates. For 
instance, Jennifer Pitts contends that “the term imperialism was, like most of political –isms, a 
coinage of the mid-nineteenth century. Since its earliest usage it has tended to be a term of 
opprobrium and one that emphasizes not only the extent but the unaccountability of the power 
exercised.”24 In her earlier work, she had affirmed that the word imperialism appeared during a 
discussion on the French occupation of Algeria in 1830, saying that “the very term impérialisme 
began at this moment [1830s and 1840s] to express aspirations for a renewal of the sense of 
national greatness the French had enjoyed with Napoleon conquests.”25 Pitts relies on the work 
of Richard Koebner who consecrated a whole chapter on the way the word got into the English 
language, “as a gloss on a regime which had been established in France.”26 That is why, “in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Ibid., p. 14. 
24 Jennifer Pitts, “Political Theory of Empire and Imperialism” in Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 13, 2010, 
p. 214. Henceforth, “Political Theory…”  
25 Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005), p. 167. Henceforth, A Turn to Empire 
26 Richard Koebner and Helmut Dan Schmidt, Imperialism: The Story and Significance of a Political Word, 1840-
1960, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), p. 1. Trevor R. Getz and Heather Streets-Salter hold a 
different opinion as to the origin and the first appearance of the word imperialism. While agreeing that it takes origin 
in the Latin word imperium, they, however, contend that “it first appears in documents emanating from the court of 
French King Louis-Philippe, who applied it to express his power.” Trevor R. Getz and Heather Streets-Salter, 
Modern Imperialism and Colonialism: A Global Perspective. (Boston: Pearson, 2011), p. 6.  
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early stage of its career the word imperialism was unequivocally understood by Englishmen to 
refer to the Empire of Louis Napoleon.”27 
While these authors explore the birth of the word imperialism and situate it into its 
historical context, the question as to its meaning is still to be answered, and many theories have 
been developed, all depending on political ideologies and economic interests. Wolfgang 
Mommsen had studied the main theories of imperialism, from the classic theory to the theories of 
neo-colonialism and under-development, through Marxist and other western theories.28 It appears 
that imperialism is understood differently according to different schools. For instance, the first 
study on imperialist by John A. Hobson distinguishes imperialism from colonialism, and views it 
as a result of “a debasement of [the] genuine nationalism, by attempts to overflow its natural 
banks and absorb the near or distant territory of reluctant and unassimilable peoples.”29 For him, 
imperialism is intrinsically connected with expansion beyond national borders. For Lenin, 
imperialism is the highest stage of capitalism. It is synonymous with the domination of finance 
capital. As he puts it, “imperialism is capitalism at that stage of development at which the 
dominance of monopolies and finance capital is established; in which the export of capital has 
acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world among the international 
trust has begun, in which the division of all territories of the globe among the biggest capitalist 
powers has been completed.”30 As if responding to Lenin’s view, Joseph Schumpeter refutes that 
capitalism is intrinsically imperialist. “In a purely capitalist world, he argues, what was once 
energy for war becomes simply energy for labor of every kind. Wars of conquest and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Ibid., p. 27.  
28 Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Theories of Imperialism; trans. by P.S. Falla. (New York: Randon House, 1980). 
Henceforth, Theories. 
29 John A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (London: James Nisbet & Co., 1902), p. 6.    
30 Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism: A Popular outline. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 
83. It was first published in 1917.  
28	  
	  
	  
adventurism in foreign policy in general are bound to be regarded as troublesome distractions, 
destructive of life’s meaning, a diversion from the accustomed and therefore ‘true’ task.” He 
therefore infers, “a purely capitalist world therefore can offer no fertile soil for imperialist 
impulses.”31 This defense of capitalism as anti-imperialist is founded on—if it does not found—
his definition of imperialism as “the objectless disposition on the part of a state to unlimited 
forcible expansion.”32 
Although it is not easy to reconcile these ideological backgrounds, one outstanding 
character that permeates all the definitions of imperialism is expansion. Hence Hannah Arendt 
gets is right when she affirms that “expansion as a permanent and supreme aim of politics is the 
central political idea of imperialism.”33 However, expansion was not new because, as we already 
saw, empire implies the domination over other peoples, since the Roman period. Moreover, 
Spain and Portugal, just to mention few cases, expanded their territories when they invaded the 
Americas. Yet, when we talk about imperialism and as the history of the word shows, we seem to 
designate a different reality that happened later. Hence, some scholars call it “new 
imperialism”.34 What is then the difference between these two forms of imperialism? Getz and 
Streets-Salter respond to this question saying that “despite the obvious continuity with the 
preceding century, this New Imperialism arguably did represent something new in terms of an 
expanded capacity and will to acquire new formal colonies as well as spheres of influence.” The 
authors nuance, however, that the capacity was not the biggest driving force behind the New 
Imperialism. Rather, “it was also the result of a new will to dominate others, representative of 
fierce cultures of imperialism that were emerging in industrialized and industrializing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 J. Schumpeter, ibid., p. 69.  
32 Ibid., p. 6. 
33 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism. (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1958), p. 125.  
34 One of them is Hobson, ibid., Part. I, chap. I.  
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societies.”35 Talking about British, Hobson distinguishes colonialism from imperialism, where 
the former represent an establishment of a colony, where Britons settle in foreign lands but 
follow the law and custom of the mother country. He gives the examples of Australia and 
Canada. “Our other colonies, he notes, are plainly representative of the spirit of Imperialism 
rather than of colonialism. No considerable proportion of the population consists of British 
settlers living with their families in conformity with the social and political customs and laws of 
their native land: in most instances they form a small minority wielding political or economic 
sway over a majority of alien and subject people, themselves under despotic political control of 
the Imperial Government or its local nominees.”36 In other words, the new imperialism is a 
despotic domination of non-European peoples by Western powers. Some scholars call it the 
formal imperialism,37 and for others it is simply the true imperialism,38 while for some others it is 
“the high imperialism”.39 Whatever way they call it, they agree that this new imperialism roughly 
corresponds to the period between 1870s and 1914. Concretely, it was materialized by “the rapid 
acquisition of formal colonies in Africa, Asia and the Pacific by both existing and new imperial 
powers based in Europe, North America and Japan.”40 Basically, except Japan, the New 
Imperialism is characterized by the domination on the rest of the world by the West. However, 
the benchmark of this period was the formal colonization of Africa through the Berlin 
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Conference of 1884-5, to the point that, for Mommsen, it became the igniting factor for the West 
to expand beyond their borders. In his words, “‘the scramble for Africa’ which began in the mid-
1880s initiated a process of accelerated land-grabbing throughout the world which marked the 
age of ‘high imperialism’.”41 Laurens is of the same opinion: the modern concept of imperialism 
was forged during the subdivision of Black Africa.42 
At this point, we understand why we needed to go through all of this process of grasping 
the meaning of the concept of imperialism so that we can nail it down historically. Indeed, the 
goal of this chapter is to elaborate the claim from the Third World critics that human rights are 
another ideology to justify the continuation of Western imperialism. Now that we know during 
which period this Western imperialism was developed, we can now study what the ideology 
behind this Western expansion was, so that in the end we can compare and see if human rights 
do indeed play the same role. Hence, my next point is exactly about the imperialist ideology. 
b). Ideological Justification of Imperialism 
The New Imperialism corresponds to the industrial development in the West which allowed 
demographic growth and exacerbated the hunger for raw materials but also the market for the 
manufactured product. It is therefore certain that economic, political and demographic reasons 
lay behind the imperial expansion. It is true that, as Philip Curtin notes, “the role of economic 
motives behind the European drive for empire is still one of the most hotly debated of all 
historical problems concerning imperialism,”43 and one of the leading scholars, Hobson, argues 
that imperialism was detrimental to the British economy.44 Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 W.J. Mommsen, Theories, p. 339. For T.R. Getz & H. Streets-Salter, “perhaps the most astonishing element of 
this formal imperial expansion was the division and conquest of almost all of Africa—the so-called scramble for 
Africa.” Ibid., p. 214.  
42 Laurens, ibid., p. 88.  
43 Philip D. Curtin, ed., Imperialism. (New York: Walker and Co., 1972), p. 132.  
44 Hobson, Part I., esp. chap. I. 
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economic motivations played a major role in the imperialist expansion. To quote Ronald 
Robinson, “the imperialist at least, imperialism was not simply something that Europe did to 
other countries, but also something they were persuaded or compelled from unequal economic 
partnerships and political alliances with sub-imperial contractors in other parts of the world.”45 
Hannah Arendt also argues that “imperialism was born when the ruling class in capitalist 
production came up against national limitations to its economic growth.”46 In any case, the 
imperialists themselves justify their undertaking in economic terms. For the Belgian King 
Leopold II, “no country has attained historical greatness without colonies.”47 Therefore, he “will 
be happy to see Belgium trade with and exploit colonies in general but [he feels] that, in the 
interest of the country, it should have its own outside possession.”48 Cecil J. Rhodes, the 
imperialist who exploited the South African part, justified his enterprise in economic interests 
and as a solution to problems arising in England.49 Jules Ferry, the French Prime minister, also 
defended the French imperialism by appealing to economic argument, as one among other main 
reasons—others being political and civilizational: “the need for an export market”. Before the 
French national Assembly he said, “what is lacking to our great industry, drawn irrevocably on 
the path of exportation by the [free trade] treaties of 1860, what it lacks more and more is export 
markets.”50 It was in similar terms that Germany justified its imperialism. “We consider it one of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Ronald Robinson, “The Excentric Idea of Imperialism, with or without Empire” in Wolfgang J. Mommsen and 
Jürgen Osterhammel, eds., Imperialism and After: Continuity and Discontinuity. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), p. 
271. 
46 Arendt, ibid., p. 126.  
47 Cited in Ralph A. Austen, ed. Modern Imperialism: Western Overseas Expansion and Its Aftermath 1776-1965. 
(Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath & Co., 1969), p. 60. 
48 Cited in ibid., p. 61.  
49 Cited in ibid., pp. 64-67. 
50 Ibid., p. 71. 
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our most solemn duties to forward and to nourish the interests of our shipping, our trade, and our 
industry,” argued von Bülow.51 
In light of what precedes, it is clear that economic reasons were definitely one of the 
engines driving imperialist expansion. The latter might not have provided the expected results, 
but that does not exclude the fact that economics reasons were behind it at the beginning. 
Concerning the political motives, it is needless to mention that acquiring more colonies and 
having a growing economy increased the power and prestige, and therefore caused the 
competition among powers. The same German official—just to mention only him—is 
emblematic in that regard when he proclaimed that “the time has passed when Germany could 
abandon the land to one of its neighbors, the sea to another, and reserve for herself the heavens, 
where pure doctrine is king.”52 But there were also internal political problems as Arendt rightly 
points out. “All governments, she argues, knew very well that their countries were secretly 
disintegrating, that the body politic was being destroyed from within, and they lived on borrowed 
time.”53 The solution to this disintegration was imperialism. As to the demographic factor, 
suffice to quote Leopold II saying, “for those peoples whose working class does not emigrate but 
whose middle class lacks employment, such domains are precious.”54Here again, Arendt holds 
the same view with a sharper sting that imperialism helped to export the surplus of the bourgeois 
society. In a very condensed paragraph, she sums up all of the three motives, making them work 
for the same purpose. She writes,  
Older than the superfluous wealth was another by-product of capitalist production: the human debris that 
every crisis, following invariably upon each period of industrial growth, eliminated permanently from 
producing society. Men who had become permanently idle were as superfluous to the community as the 
owners of superfluous wealth. That they were an actual menace to society had been recognized throughout 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Cited in ibid., p. 76. 
52 Ibid., p. 76. For a more detailed account of the political side of imperialism, see Hobson, ibid., Part II.  
53 Arendt, ibid., p.147.  
54 Ibid., p. 60.  
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the nineteenth century and their export had helped to populate the dominions of Canada and Australia as 
well as the United States. The new fact in the imperialist era is that these two superfluous forces, 
superfluous capital and superfluous working power, joined hands and left the country together. The concept 
of expansion, the export of government power and annexation of every territory in which nationals had 
invested either their wealth or their work, seemed the only alternative to increasing losses in wealth and 
population. Imperialism and its idea of unlimited expansion seemed to offer a permanent remedy to a 
permanent evil.55 
Arendt’s analysis ties together the economic factors with the political and the demographic ones 
and, at the same time, it underlines an important point that imperialism was conceived as a 
“permanent remedy to permanent evil” that was gnawing away at Western society. Imperialism 
came as a solution to problems created by industrial growth that imparted the economy and 
demography. As usual, to deal with such problems was a political matter, both internally and 
externally. That is where the question of justification came in and the problem of ideology 
emerged as a possibility of moral justification of the imperial domination. What could be such an 
acceptable moral discourse that could legitimate imperialism and conceal the claim to the real 
motives at once? Sure enough, imperialist expansion was thought to resolve the internal trials of 
Western society. But, what kind of discourse existed to make it acceptable at home and sound 
positive for those who would endure the consequences? To recall Robison’s words, which 
discourse could translate the belief into a claim that “imperialism was not simply something that 
Europe did to other countries, but also something [imperialists] were persuaded or compelled to 
do to themselves?”56 
As he was developing the order of ideas that could justify imperial expansion, Jules Ferry 
evokes “the humanitarian and civilizing side,” cautioning that it was not politics or history, but 
rather “political metaphysics.”57 The latter is blatantly stated, although it seems to come from “a 
higher and more truthful plane. It must be stated openly that, in effect, superior races have rights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Arendt, ibid., p. 150.  
56 Robinson, ibid. 
57 Cited in Austen, p. 71.  
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over inferior races.” To a left wing MP who objects that such a language is scandalous “in a 
country which has proclaimed the rights of man,” Ferry just repeats that “superior races have a 
right, because they have a duty. They have the duty to civilize other races…”58 Here was openly 
professed the famous “mission civilisatrice.” And it is indeed a “political metaphysics!” The 
instrumental dimension of imperialist expansion as “a permanent remedy to permanent evil” –to 
reuse Arendt’s words –is dressed into the moral language of right-duty, where the self-interest 
becomes benevolence. Through and with this language, the invasion and domination of other 
peoples in Africa, Asia and the Pacific have nothing to do with economic, political and 
demographic challenges that we saw. Rather, expansion springs from a moral right founded on 
an ontological duty almost à la Levinas, i.e., inescapable responsibility of the superior races to 
civilize the inferior ones. In a way, the history is repeating itself. We are back to the language of 
natural law that was used to justify the subjugation of Native Americans. In his argument against 
Bartholomew Las Casas’s defense of Indians, Juan de Sepúlveda asserted that “it shall always be 
right and in accordance with natural law that these people should be subjected to the rule of more 
cultivated and human princes and nations…. If they refuse this rule, it may be imposed upon 
them by means of arms…. In conclusion: it is just, normal and in accordance with natural law 
that upright, intelligent and virtuous and human people should have dominion over those who 
lack these virtues.”59 Indeed, as for Ferry it is a duty for superior races to civilize, likewise it is in 
Sepúlveda’s language: virtuous nations should have dominion. It is a categorical imperative. In 
this way, all the real interests have disappeared, only moral duty remains. As A.P. Thornton 
would say, that was the ruse of Great Powers. “Insisting on their privileges, setting their margins, 
and calculating their options, [they] built a framework within which the world of the nineteenth 
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59 Cited in Sophie Bessis, Western Supremacy: The Triumph of an idea? Trans. by Patrick Camiller. (New York: 
Zed Books, 2003), p. 16. Emphasis added. 
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century grew and prospered. It did this so spectacularly that intelligent people everywhere 
believed they were the masters of the age of progress and the servant of a civilizing mission.”60 
Sophie Bessis thinks that the confession of this supremacy finds roots in the 
Enlightenment. According to her, “throughout the nineteenth century, those who claimed to be 
following Locke and Montesquieu made a decisive contribution that helped to root in Western 
minds a conviction of their superiority and of the legitimacy of their supremacy.”61 She is not 
completely wrong. Figures of Enlightenment par excellence such as Hegel claimed that some 
cultures—such as Africa—did not have any history (Hegel), while “Kant not only failed 
explicitly to condemn that ‘peculiar institution’ [of slavery] but constructed one of the most –
some would argue the most –systematic accounts of ‘race’ prior to the flood tide of racial 
thinking accompanying the late nineteenth-century imperialism.”62 
As it is clear at the outset, the civilizing mission presupposed a racist theory. There are 
superior races and inferior ones. Nevertheless, Ferry did not tell us who were superior races and 
who were inferior ones. As the “civilizing idea” is expressed in a “political metaphysics,” it is 
too abstract to give concrete answers. Only natural sciences that were developing at the same 
time would come to the rescue. For instance the founder of paleontology, Georges Cuvier 
classifies human species into three groups: “Caucasian or white, the Mongolian or yellow, and 
the Ethiopian or Negro.” These three races are not only geographically separated and 
morphologically different; they are also situated according to their civilizations. Thus, “the 
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Caucasian, to which we belong63[emphasis added] is distinguished by the beauty of oval formed 
by his head, varying in complexion and the colour of the hair. To this variety the most highly 
civilized nations, and those which have generally held all others in subjection, are indebted for 
their origin.” That is the first category. The second, “the Mongolian is known by his high cheek 
bones, flat visage, narrow and oblique eyes, straight black hair, scanty beard and olive 
complexion. Great empires have been established by this race in China and Japan, and their 
conquests been extended to this side of the Great Desert. In civilization, however, it has always 
remained stationary.” And finally, “the Negro race is confined to the south of mount Atlas; it is 
marked by a black complexion, crisped or woolly hair, compressed cranium, and a flat nose. The 
projection of the lower parts of the face, and the thick lips, evidently approximate it to the 
monkey tribe: the hordes of which it consists have always remained in the most complete state of 
utter barbarism.”64 With such classification, needless to say that all the positive qualities, 
sciences and virtues belong to the Caucasian, without much information about the rest. “It is by 
this great venerable branch of the Caucasian stock, that philosophy, the arts, and the sciences 
have been carried to the greatest perfection, and remained in the keeping of the nations which 
compose it for more than three thousand years.”65 
Now that we know for sure what the superior and inferior races are, we can deduce from 
it the subject and object of the right to civilize. But since this right is constructed on a racial 
basis, instead of being of a moral right, it becomes a physical might that Robert Knox would sing 
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apologetically. “From the earliest recorded times, might has always constituted right, or been 
held to do so…. By this kind of right, that is, power or might, we seized on North America, 
dispossessing the native races, to whom America naturally belonged; we drove them back into 
their primitive forests, slaughtering them piteously.”66 From might-right, Knox infers the nature 
of dark races. He writes, “since the earliest times, then, the dark races have been the slaves of 
their fairer brethren…. I feel disposed to think that there must be a physical and consequently a 
psychological inferiority in the dark races generally.” And he explains: “this may not depend 
altogether on deficiency in the size of the brain en masse, nor on any partial defects…but rather, 
perhaps, to specific characters in the quality of the brain itself.”67 Once more, the civilizing 
mission is enveloped into metaphysics, since the defects of the dark races in congenital to the 
quality of the brain itself. It is useless to try to educate them unless there is possibility of 
recreating the brain. No wonder that Benjamin Kidd despaired of any viable political institutions 
in the Tropics. “We cannot look for good government under such conditions; we have no right to 
expect it.” Rather, “the tropics in such circumstances can only be governed as a trust for 
civilization.”68 Trust of civilization was the English version of the French “mission 
civilisatrice.”69 Historians differentiate the British practice as indirect rule from the French one 
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which was assimilation; but both presupposed Ferry’s “political metaphysics” of superior races 
endowed with the ontological duty of uplifting the lower ones. Kipling’s white men’s burden is 
consumed.70 
Thus the ideological justification of imperialism transformed the self-interested enterprise 
of Western powers trying to solve their internal problems into a moral duty to civilize the low 
races. In doing that, the imperialist ideology fulfilled the double role of ideology of legitimating 
a practice, and at the same time dissimulating the real motives. The Berlin Conference on the 
occupation of Africa is an illustrating case, where political and economic interests are covered by 
the humanitarian mission to Africa.71 Yet, even at this level, the civilizing mission becomes 
another imperialist project, justified by the same prejudices of ontological inequalities between 
races and peoples. As Brett Bowden puts it, imperialism becomes “the extension of civilization 
to societies that are deemed less than civilized by modern standards of economic civilization, 
legal civilization, cultural civilization, and or [sic] sociopolitical civilization.”72 In other words, 
not only does the imperialist ideology function negatively by concealing the real reasons of 
Western imperialism, but also it is based on the negative relation of inequality between races and 
civilizations. Only then can it play its role of legitimation of imperialist practice positively as a 
moral duty.  
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The Third World Critics, however, do not only identify human rights with imperialist 
ideology, but also they precise the propagation of liberal imperialism. The question now is: was 
liberalism involved in the elaboration of this civilizing mission? That is our next topic.  
c). Liberalism as Vehicle of Imperialist Ideology 
According to Jennifer Pitts, “whether we apply the term liberalism strictly to theories developed 
after the 1810s, when “liberal” became a political category, or more broadly but conventionally 
to the languages of subjective rights and self-government stemming back to the early-modern 
period, the evolution of liberal thought coincided and deeply intersected with the rise of 
European empire.”73 This historical coincidence between liberalism and European imperialism 
make us weary about their relationship. Many critics have hit on of human rights as a 
continuation of liberal imperialism that was started during this period we are dealing with. Again 
Makau Mutua is the leading voice in this stream. For him, “the human rights doctrine is an 
ideology with deep roots in liberalism and democratic forms of government…the cultural biases 
of the human rights corpus can only be properly situated within liberal theory and philosophy. 
Understood from this position, human rights are an ideology with a specific cultural and 
ethnographic fingerprint.”74 Now, if human rights are an ideology rooted in liberal theory, and if 
it can be shown that liberalism was enmeshed with imperialism, then the hypothesis that human 
rights movement is a continuation of imperialist ideology will be solidly grounded. 
Many scholars contend that indeed liberalism has been a big source of inspiration for 
European imperialism. According to Pitts, “liberalism arguably remains marked by features that 
rendered it often supportive of imperial domination, including commitment to progress and a 
teleological view of history, a suspicion of certain kinds of cultural or ethical particularism, and a 
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40	  
	  
	  
hospitable stance toward capitalism and the economic exploitation of nature.”75 This view is 
shared by many other authors who claim that “the imperialistic ‘urge is internal to’ liberalism 
(Mehta) that inherent in the very structure of liberal rationalism and abstraction is ‘a propensity 
for colonial domination’ (Sartori).”76 Thomas McCarthy shows how John Locke was involved in 
the companies that were exploiting Native Americans and condoned slavery. James S. Mill was 
another defender of British imperialism in India. Furthermore, not only were the theorists 
defending imperialism, but they also held official positions and shares in those companies.77 All 
those examples support the opinion that, effectively, liberalism is congenital to imperialism. 
However, McCarpthy and other authors observe that there were other liberal voices opposed to 
imperialism. For that reason, “given this diversity of views, it seems to me an oversimplification 
to argue…that imperialism is constitutive for liberalism as such, especially since the critiques 
advanced by anticolonial liberals have typically appealed to liberal values. On the other hand, it 
is undeniable that mainstream of liberal thought, running from Locke through Mill to 
contemporary neoliberalism, has continually flowed into and out of European-American 
imperialism, and that ideas of sociocultural development have been integral to that 
connection.”78 Andrew Fitzmaurice asserts the same tension within liberalism, when he says, “in 
the second half of the nineteenth century, opposition to empire was nothing new, although it 
found new material.” He continues, “what was remarkable about this late-nineteenth-century 
critique of empire, however, was that it found a place at the heart of liberalism at a time when it 
had reached the high-water mark of pro-imperial sentiment. It therefore underlines the fact that, 
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76 Ibid. Andrew Sartori states that “Mehta’s core proposition [is] that liberal abstraction contains within its basic 
argumentative structure an immanent propensity for colonial domination” in “The British Empire and Its Liberal 
Mission” in Journal of Modern History, Vol. 78, No. 3, 2006, p. 623.  
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even at its most pro-imperial, liberalism was characterized by conflict over empire, rather than 
doctrine.”79 Put otherwise, although, as McCarthy remarks, the tension within liberalism shows 
that the doctrine itself cannot be incriminated for imperialism and that there were liberals who 
were against imperialism, those who link liberalism and European imperialism have sound 
reasons. Indeed, those who were pro-imperialism used the same vocabulary and followed the 
same imperialist ideology undergirded by racial prejudices.  
In her studies on liberalism and imperialism, Jennifer Pitts argues that the Mills (James 
and his son John) all –the father maybe more radically than the son –developed views based on 
the dichotomy between European and non-European societies. Talking about James Mill, Pitts 
says that “in short, James Mill’s discussion of non-European cultures followed a persistent 
pattern. He recognized no differentiation among these peoples, so that all non-Europeans, from 
the South Sea island nomads to the peoples of the Chinese empire, were essentially ‘rude’ or 
‘barbarous,’ whatever might be said about their particular means of subsistence, forms of 
government, or arts and practices.” She adds, “he wrote as if every aspect of these cultures that 
might show them to be inferior to European civilization was telling, whereas anything that might 
suggest refinement was either trivial or misleading.”80 With such an opinion on non-European 
cultures, one is not far from Cuvier’s racist views. It is from the same perspective that James 
Mill justifies the colonization of India, inasmuch as he characterized the “Indian society as 
barbaric” and “the Indians as incapable of self-government.” Consequently, “the imposition of 
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80 Pitts, A Turn, p. 131.  
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British rule on backward India was then justified in terms of tutelary duty to assist it, through 
colonial administration, in passing from its social childhood to social maturity.”81 
The son would follow the father’s footsteps not without tension,82 using the same 
vocabulary of “rude,” “savage life,” “uncivilized”, “superiority-inferiority,” and so on. For 
instance, he writes that “a rude people, though in some degree alive to the benefit of civilized 
society, may be unable to practice the forbearances which it demands.”83 And of course, for him, 
“rude people” or “uncivilized races” as he calls them cannot have the same kind of institutions as 
those fit for “civilized peoples”. The latter deserve a democratic government that respects 
individual’s rights, while the former needs a dictatorship. In his own terms, “a people in a state 
of savage independence, in which every one lives for himself, exempt, unless by fits, from any 
external control, is practically incapable of making any progress in civilization until it has learnt 
to obey.” That being the case, “to enable it to do this, the constitution of the government must be 
nearly, or quite, despotic.” 84 In this formulation, one can read the subtext of the myth of 
progress. The despotism is only a means for moving from barbary to civilization. This is even 
clearer in his On Liberty. “Despotism, he says, is a legitimate mode of government in dealing 
with barbarians, provided the end be of their improvement, and the means justified by actually 
effecting that end.”85 Through the same myth of progress, Mill is able to justify personal slavery 
in such a context of “savage independence”. In his words, “even personal slavery, by giving a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 McCarthy, ibid., p. 168. 
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puzzle to be sorted out, however, how the axiomatic hostility to ‘custom’ that Mill expressed in On Liberty fits with 
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83 John S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, in On Liberty and Other Essays. Ed. John Gray. 
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84 Ibid., 232. He comes back to this point in many other instances. See p. 260; 284.  
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commencement to industrial life, and enforcing it as the exclusive occupation of the most 
numerous portion of the community, may accelerate the transition to a better freedom than that 
of fighting and rapine.”86 Once more, the hope of civilizational improvement allows any form of 
government and reciprocal treatment. The end justifies the means; slavery and despotism are not 
evil in themselves; it depends on the stage of civilization and their end!  
With such a position, we are not far from Jules Ferry’s “political metaphysics”, because 
while these considerations are still abstract, seeming to apply to an evolutionary theory, they get 
consistence when he applies them to historical contexts of what he calls British “dependencies”. 
He subdivides the latter into two categories: “some are composed of people of similar 
civilization to the ruling country; capable of, and ripe for, representative government: such as the 
British possessions in America and Australia. Others, like India, are still at a great distance from 
that state.”87 Now we get to the heart of the matter: those who deserve a representative 
government are those similar to British civilization! In other words, the measure is the British 
civilization. He does not even mention the non-British peoples living in America and Australia. 
He couldn’t because the latter are part of the “savage tribes” in need of despotic government, 
which superior civilizations are benevolently ready to bestow to them, because “under a native 
despotism, a good despotism is a rare and transitory accident.” Not only the legitimate form of 
government for natives is despotism, but they cannot even afford a good despot. Hence, not 
being fit for a representative government and not being able to find a good despot in their ranks, 
they have to “be governed by the dominant country, or by persons delegated for that purpose by 
it,” and the justification is the same: to improve their civilization. And “when the dominion they 
are under is that of a more civilized people, that people ought to supply it constantly… Such is 
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the ideal rule of a free people over a barbarous or semi-barbarous one.”88 Apparently, although 
he justifies the British despotism over non-British in order to improve their civilization, he does 
not envisage their progress to happen that soon, since he urges the dominant country to 
constantly supply “good despots”! 
While many other liberal voices were against imperialism, support such as Mill’s 
compromises liberalism vis-à-vis imperialism. And since the latter happened, it becomes difficult 
–if not impossible—to discharge the former. Therefore, the critics of human rights as an 
imperialist ideology have strong reasons to suspect its influence on imperialism. However, 
before I embark to that critique of human right as ideology, human rights regime has an 
international human rights law that Allen Buchanan qualifies as the heart of the whole human 
rights enterprise.89 Yet, international law itself developed during the same period of European 
imperialism. Aren’t we, as with liberalism, on the verge of another important factor of the 
spreading of imperialism? Hence, my next subject is about the relationship between international 
law and the imperialist ideology.  
1.2. International Law as Legal Form of Imperialism Ideology 
a). The Imperialist Origin of International Law 
Relations between nations existed long before the period of the New Imperialism that is of 
concern in this part; they were regulated by certain practices and patterns among political 
entities. However, some scholars contend that positive international law emerged during imperial 
era, and therefore was framed to justify imperialism. After the positivism of John Austin 
challenged international law as not being a real law since it was not emanating from one 
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sovereign and hence could not be backed by physical force in case of disobedience,90 
international lawyers started to battle in order to affirm the positive validity of their subject. 
Martti Koskeniemi has shown that this endeavor started in Brussels, by the creation of the 
Association internationale pour le progrès des sciences sociales whose first ambition was to 
spread liberal ideas and values.91 “The Association internationale, he observes, advocated liberal 
ideas, religious tolerance, freedom of opinion and free trade, as well as the development of 
contacts between peoples.”92 We see already that from its inception, international law is 
embedded in liberal culture and has a liberal mission of spreading liberal ideas. Made of lawyers, 
the Association’s intention would evolve into the Institut de droit international whose purpose 
was to further the progress of international law among civilized nations.93 We encounter again 
the dichotomy now familiar that animated the whole imperialist ideology of the civilized-
uncivilized. As we will see later, it would be become a corner stone of positive international law.   
Antony Anghie goes even further back, to show that the emergence of international law 
itself is intrinsically connected with colonialism. He argues that, without the fact of what he calls 
“cultural difference”,94 there would not have been international law. Parting from the now 
accepted opinion that Francisco de Vitoria is the founder of international law, he shows that the 
Spanish scholar was the first to articulate the principles of international law developed in order to 
promote European imperialism, by confronting the fact of cultural difference. “Vitoria’s attempt, 
he says, to address the problem of difference demonstrates the complex relationship between 
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culture and sovereignty, for Victoria’s jurisprudence decrees that certain cultures—such as that 
of the Spanish—are universal and enjoy the full rights of sovereignty, whereas other culture 
practices—like those of the Indians—are condemned as uncivilized and non-sovereign.”95 As he 
studies Vitoria’s work, Anghie highlights the positive dimension of Vitoria’s theory, as Vitoria is 
able to defend Indians as rational beings, with public and private property rights as for 
Christians.96 From this perspective, Vitoria cannot be accused of promoting an oppressive 
jurisprudence as he is, rather, defending Indians. However, what he gives with one hand, he takes 
it away with the other, when he starts to defend the right to travel under jus gentium. Spanish 
have right to travel wherever they want and establish trade relationships with, yet without 
consent with Indians, and the latter do not have rights to stop them as long as there is no harm. If 
they obstruct their travelling, then the Spaniards have right to wage war against Indians. As 
Anghie remarks, “the Indian who enters the universal realm of commerce has all the acumen and 
independence of market man, as opposed to the timid, ignorant child-like creatures.”97 But when 
it comes to defending their territory, Indians are excluded from being rightful subjects to engage 
in a just war, because only Christian subjects have such a right. As such, Vitoria does not 
recognize sovereignty to Indians. “The Indians who inevitably and invariably violate jus gentium 
are denied the status of the all-powerful sovereign who administers this law.”98 In Anghie’s 
words, “Vitoria’s insistence, in his analysis on just war, that only Christian subjectivity is 
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recognized by the laws of war, ensures that the Indians are excluded from the realm of 
sovereignty and exist only as the objects against which Christian sovereignty may exercise its 
power to wage war.” 99 
Anghie argues that, by refusing sovereignty to the Indians, not only did Vitoria change 
the content of sovereignty, but also effectuated a “paradigm shift” in international law. The 
“sovereignty” that was its cornerstone was no longer operating. He replaced it rather with the 
concept of society which would play a seminal role in the development of imperialist ideology. 
That is how the cultural difference becomes the driving force of international law, challenging 
the traditional understanding of international law. “Vitoria’s work suggests that the conventional 
view that sovereignty doctrine was developed in the West and then transferred to the non-
European world is, in important respects, misleading. Sovereignty doctrine acquired its character 
through the colonial encounter.”100 This study of Vitoria’s work as the origin of international law 
becomes a source of questions—such as: why were non-Europeans refused sovereignty? how did 
European ideas become universal in opposition? How did the resistance to imperialism become 
its source of justification, etc.—questions whose examination would lead “to write a different 
history of the relationship between colonialism and international law, and thereby, of 
international law itself.”101 
This is to say that international law is intrinsically linked to the colonial fact, but it is 
even clearer with the positive international law which developed during the apogee of 
imperialism. International lawyers who were building up the discipline were imbued with the 
same distinction between civilized and uncivilized, and they lent their services to the imperialist 
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powers by providing a legal justification of the imperial practice which had, once more, 
confronted Europe with non-European world. The questions asked were whether such an 
encounter would be regulated by the same principles that operated between European nations. As 
Koskenniemi formulates it, “penetrating deeper into the colonies—Africa in particular—
Europeans come into contact with societies and cultural forms that seemed to share little of what 
they felt was the common core of their civilized identity. How were they to think such societies 
and Europe’s relationship to them?” 102 This question supports Anghie’s argument that 
international law was fundamentally defined by the fact of cultural difference.  
We have already seen that the racial theories developed in justification of imperialist 
ideology of civilizing mission and we have mentioned the liberal origin in the development of 
international law. Moreover, taking John Stuart Mill as an example, it was illustrated that 
liberalism was pro-imperialism as long as the goal was the progress of civilization. As 
Koskenniemi puts it, “by the 1870s the assumption of human development proceeding by stages 
from the primitive to the civilized had come to form the bedrock of social anthropology and 
evolutionary sociology that provided much of the conceptual background for cultivated 
European reflection what Europeans often sweepingly termed the Orient.” 103 In such a context, 
there is little chance that international law would not be informed by the same ideology, and that 
was indeed the case. “Like much of nineteenth-century social reflection, international law 
imagined itself in terms of progressive, or pedigree history.”104 Thus being the case, international 
law found itself to be deeply involved in imperialism although it might not have been its first 
goal. As was the case of Vitoria who ended up founding international law on imperialism 
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expansion after defending the rights of Indians, the same happened with the founders of 
international law. They “were liberals who supported the turn to formal empire in order to 
protect the natives from the greed of companies and ensure the orderly progress of the civilizing 
mission. They were imperialist not irrespective of their liberalism but as a consequence of it.”105 
Backing the civilizing mission required the belief in the categories of civilized and uncivilized as 
normative ground to recognize or deny sovereignty. I now go through a few examples to 
illustrate how international law supported imperialism under the same ideological 
presuppositions. 
b). The Challenge of the Uncivilized to International Law 
One of the leading figures of international law106 during this period of new imperialism is James 
Lorimer. He confronted the “fact of cultural difference” as an issue to the theory of 
recognition—which is instrumental to international law. Touching the question of race, Lorimer 
acknowledges that it was a thorny problem for Britain, because it would determine the kind of 
relationship to establish between Britain and certain countries, but more importantly with the 
British Indian empire. “It is on the views which we form of it [race], he argues, that must depend 
not only our future attitude to such countries as Russia, China, and Japan, but the ultimate 
destiny which we attempt to shape for our great Indian empire.”107 However important is the 
subject of race, Lorimer quickly dismisses it as non-important problem for international law, 
because it is not ethnic groups that are recognized as such. Rather, “it is only when, by the action 
of historical geographical factors, these have crystallized into political bodies, that they come 
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within the scope of a treatise of the law of nations.”108 That is how he gets to the problematic of 
recognition.  
Lorimer is right to underline that international law is concerned with political bodies and 
one might think that he has discarded the racial card from his theory. However, one is quickly 
disenchanted, because his theory of recognition is built on the same ideological presuppositions 
that I have been highlighting thus far. He gets there by subdividing humanity into three groups 
which would then determine the degree of recognition. Depending on which category a part of 
humanity falls in, recognition will be different. Thus his theory: “as a political phenomenon, 
humanity, in its present condition divides itself into three concentric zones or spheres—that of 
civilized humanity, that of barbarous humanity, and that of savage humanity.”109 On the outset, 
questions prompt one’s mind: what are the criteria used to determine these “concentric spheres”? 
He seems to offer a phenomenological description, but it would have been helpful to know the 
normative basis of his classification. Instead of providing such grounding reasons, he asserts that 
“to these, whether arising from peculiarities of race or from various stages of development in the 
same race, belong, of right, at the hands of civilized nations, three stages of recognition—plenary 
political recognition, partial political recognition, and natural mere human recognition.” 110 Three 
consequences derive from this Lorimer’s criteria for recognition. First, he attributes a plenary 
right to “civilized nations” to recognize and not to others. In other words, there is no reciprocity 
between the subjects involved in this process of recognition. Recognition comes from “civilized 
nations” and is extended to the other two parts of humanity. And of course, “the sphere of 
plenary political recognition extends to all existing States of Europe, with their colonial 
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dependencies, in so far as these are peopled by persons of European birth or descent; and to the 
States of North and South America which have vindicated their independence of the European 
States of which they were colonies.”111 The supremacy of European origin is stated without 
hesitation. Unless one belongs to Europe or is of European origin, he or she is uncivilized. And 
this is decreed by Europe and it does not need to be recognized by others. It is a one-way 
movement. Second, by founding his theory of international law on recognition without 
reciprocity, he confirms the imperialistic goal of international law that excludes non-Europeans 
from the spheres regulated by it. Third, whereas he excludes the race as factor of international 
law, it is definitely playing a key role in his theory, inasmuch as all right of recognition are 
granted to Europeans, while some others are simply excluded from political recognition on racial 
basis. They are humanly recognized, but politically negated. That is especially true for the third 
category of humanity—savage—which is not even plenary human but “the residue of humanity.” 
This one can only be granted natural recognition. In his own words: “the sphere of natural, or 
mere human recognition, extends to the residue of mankind.”112 The following long excerpt 
summarizes Lorimer’s view of international law in its relationship with non-European people, its 
racist foundation and its imperialistic tone. He asserts: 
It is with the first of these spheres alone that the international jurist has directly to deal; but inasmuch as 
jural progress consists not merely in perfecting the relations which arise within the sphere of political 
recognition, but in its gradual expansion, he is brought into continual contact with the external spheres, and 
must take cognizance of the relations in which civilized communities are placed to the partially civilized 
communities which surround them. He is not bound to apply the positive law of nations to savages, or even 
to barbarians, as such; but he is bound to ascertain the points at which, and the directions in which, 
barbarians or savages come within the scope of partial recognition. In the case of the Turks we have had 
bitter experience of the consequences of extending the rights of civilization to barbarians who have proved 
to be incapable of performing its duties, and who possibly do not even belong to the progressive races of 
mankind.113 
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This paragraph is clear by itself, but one cannot resist a few comments. First, three categories of 
humanity are strongly affirmed: civilized, barbarous, and savage. Second, international law is 
concerned only with Europeans and their descents living overseas. Third, it is brought to deal 
with other parts of humanity because of the imperial expansion which confronts it with “external 
spheres.” Fourth, “rights of civilization” are extended to others from their ontological source! 
Fifth, the experience seems to confirm that there are some races that might be progressive! With 
these facts at our disposal, we can only side with Emmanuelle Jouannet that “if we understand 
imperialism to mean domination and the imposition on others of one’s own legal and economic 
systems, it cannot be denied that classical, Eurocentric international law both accompanied and 
legitimated this imperialism.”114 
Lorimer was not alone in this endeavor of serving imperialism through international law. 
Pasquale Fiore is another international lawyer who contributed in the evolution of international 
law in the contact of the “uncivilized.” Fiore constructs his theory by first challenging the 
existing belief that international law is only concerned with states. For him, this theory is not 
accurate. International law goes beyond the reciprocal relations between states. He distinguishes 
Magna civitas defined as “society of societies” from state, the former being the domain of 
international law. The first subject of this Magna civitas is “l’homme” (human being).115 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Emmanuelle Jouannet, “Universalism and Imperialism: The True-False Paradox of International Law ?” in The 
European Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2007, p. 382.  
115 Pasquale Fiore, Le droit international codifié et sa sanction juridique. (Paris: Pedone, 1911), first Ed. 1890, p. 
33. As he puts it, “D’après leur doctrine, il faudrait supposer que, dans la société internationale, il n’existe que les 
Etats, qu’il ne peut naître et se développer aucun rapport qu’entre les Etats, et que par conséquent la loi qui doit régir 
cette société ne peut intéresser que les Etats. En réalité, dans la grande société des sociétés, que nous qualifions de 
Magna civitas, on trouve avant tout l’homme, avec la personnalité et les droits qui lui appartiennent en sa qualité 
d’homme et indépendamment de sa condition de citoyen.” Fiore seems to have been the precursor of some 
understanding of human rights as not depending on citizenship but rather on “humanness”.  
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Following this argument, Magna civitas is constituted by three subjects, individuals, states and 
collectivities,116 and as such international law is concerned with the whole of humanity.  
However, this general conception itself will be challenged by the encounter with non-
European civilization, inasmuch as Magna civitas is coined in order to include those that 
European states do not consider as political bodies. It is true that his aim was to build a rational 
argument against the omnipotence of the arbitrary and the politics of states.117 Nonetheless, his 
argument is built on the assumption of civilized-uncivilized dichotomy, civilized nations versus 
barbarous tribes, encountered through colonial expansion. Thus, if international law were 
maintained at a states level, it would limit its sphere of influence. But by extending its scope, 
Fiore achieves an international law that covers every segment of humanity, yet with different 
rights. For instance, “barbarous populations” can claim their rights although they are not 
recognized as states.118 They are qualified as non-civilized “peuplades”, who cannot stand on the 
same plane with peoples and nations.119 
Under this science invented to defend them against the arbitrary and politics of states, 
Fiore ends up excluding the non-civilized populations from international law, since they cannot 
enjoy a juridical personality although they enjoy some rights, such as the property right of land 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Ibid., p. 52.  
117 Ibid., p. 53.  
118 In his own terms, “la science du droit international, qui doit étudier le problème complexe de l’expansion 
coloniale, ne doit-elle aussi fixer les principes juridiques qui doivent régir les rapport entre les Etats civilisés 
colonisateurs et les races indigènes et barbares? Même en admettant la nécessité d’étendre la civilisation en 
colonisant, et la faculté d’occuper les terres superflues pour parer aux besoins impérieux des moyens de subsistance, 
peut-on soutenir que les populations barbares puissent être dépouillées violemment et traitées avec cruauté, et qu’on 
puisse leur porter la civilisation sur la pointe des baïonnettes, en les considérant comme en dehors du droit de 
l’humanité? N’appartient-il pas à la science du droit international de rechercher et d’établir les principes juridiques 
des rapports entre les peuples civilisés et les races indigènes, de façon à prévenir les spoliations au préjudice de ces 
dernières et toute forme de conquête arbitraire?” ibid., p. 52.   
119 Ibid. 121.  
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they effectively occupy.120 However, they do not have right to resist the imperial land-grabbing 
project.121 In other words, Fiore’s theory of international law is based on the same ideological 
prejudices, is informed by “the cultural difference”—to use Anghie’s term—and is meant to 
accommodate the imperialist project. Fiore, however, raises an important question. He pleads for 
non-violent means in relating to non-civilized and requires their consent for occupying their 
territories. How can there be consent when there is no reciprocal recognition between contracting 
parties? This question recalls Anghie’s reading of Vitoria, who recognized Indians as rational 
trade partners, yet denied political legitimacy of sovereignty. 
The last example—John Westake—to illustrate the imperialist role of international law 
will help answer this question. As Casper Sylvest notes, Westlake is one whose arguments 
“fittingly represent the imperial bent of much international law in Britain at that time.”122 In his 
Chapters on the Principles of International Law, only states are subjects of international law—
contrary to Fiore—but this is only true for European states. “The result of the foregoing is that 
the states between which the rules of international law prevail are, First, those which are 
sovereign and independent constitutionally as well as internationally, such as France and the 
United Kingdom; Secondly, those which other states accept in their dealings with them as being 
sovereign and independent, although they may be nominally hampered by a weak constitutional 
tie.”123 For Westlake, statehood is based on European civilization and sovereignty is understood 
through European prism. He states, “the international law…is based on the possession by states 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Ibid., p. 124.  
121 He says, “On ne saurait refuser aux Etats civilisés la faculté d’occuper les terres dont les sauvages ne peuvent 
tirer profit; mais il leur incombe d’opérer cette occupation par l’emploi des moyens les moins nuisibles pour obtenir 
de la part des sauvages les terres qui leur sont sans utilité." Ibid., p. 125.  
122 Casper Sylvest, “‘Our Passion for Legality’: International Law and Imperialism in the Late Nineteenth-Century 
Britain” in Review of International Studies, vol. 34, No. 3, 2008, p. 405.  
123 John Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1894), 
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of a common and in that sense an equal civilization.”124 This common civilization is European 
since even when applied to other countries such as Turkey, “her admission to that benefit cannot 
react on the statement of that law, which is what it is because it the law of the European 
peoples.”125If international law is so strongly affirmed to be European, it can relate with non-
European cultures either by imposition, or by exclusion.  
Westlake relies on the now very familiar distinction between civilized and uncivilized, 
and for him international law is not concerned with the “uncivilized”. “The form which has been 
given to the question, namely what facts are necessary and sufficient in order that an uncivilized 
region may be internationally appropriated in sovereignty to a particular state? implies that it is 
only the recognition of such sovereignty by the member of the international society which 
concerns us, that of uncivilized natives international law takes no account.”126 In other words, for 
Westlake, international law does not recognize the uncivilized, but rather he subsumes them 
under European states, and their rights are to be claimed under this tutelage. As he puts it, “this is 
true, and it does not mean that all rights are denied to such natives, but that the appreciation of 
their rights is left to the conscience of the state within whose recognized territorial sovereignty 
they are comprised, the rules of the international society existing only for the purpose of 
regulating the mutual conduct of its members.”127 He excludes the natives from the international 
law on his understanding of civilization. The latter is no longer understood from developmental 
perspective, both psychological and social, but rather from a political point of view. Hence, from 
international point of view, only a government is a sign of civilization. I have, nonetheless, 
hasten to mention that it is the European understanding of government. The traditional political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Ibid., p. 102-3. 
125 Ibid., p. 103.  
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structures are not recognized as forms of government, and therefore they do not deserve to be 
recognized as subject of international law. Defining civilization, he says: 
We have nothing here to do with the mental or moral character which distinguishes the civilized from the 
uncivilized individual, nor even with the domestic or social habits, taking social in a narrow sense, which a 
traveler may remark. When people of European race come into contact with American or African tribes, the 
prime necessity is a government under the protection of which the former may carry on the complex life to 
which they have been accustomed in their homes, which may prevent that life from being disturbed by 
contests between different European powers for supremacy on the same soil, and which may protect the 
natives in the enjoyment of a security and well-being at least not less than they enjoyed before the arrival of 
the strangers. Can the native furnish such a government, or can it be looked for from the European alone? 
In the answer to that question lies, for international law, the difference between civilization and the want of 
it.128 
Westlake makes clear that civilization is defined in the imperialist terms. It concerns the 
protection of Europeans occupying non-European lands from the attack of rival powers. He 
wants the African and American cultures to play the same battle for supremacy, or then be 
expelled from civilization. The Europeans are not even required to inculturate and learn about 
these new cultures. It is rather a civilization test for the latter to offer the context where the 
former can continue to live their “complex life”. He wants a conducive context for Europeans so 
that they can pursue their imperial goal without impediment. For “the inflow of white race 
cannot be stopped where there is land to cultivate, ore to be mined, commerce to be developed, 
sport to enjoy, curiosity to be satisfied.” 129 And since Africans and Americans are not Europeans 
and therefore cannot provide the European style of government, “international law has to treat 
such natives as uncivilized.”130 As such, international law has nothing to do with them. Rather, 
“it regulates, for the mutual benefit of civilized states, the claims which they make to sovereignty 
over the region, and leaves the treatment of the natives to the conscience of the state to which the 
sovereignty is awarded, rather than sanction their interest being made an excuse the more for war 
between civilized claimants, devastating the region and the cause of suffering to the natives 
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themselves.”131 Here Westlake makes it more than clear that international law is a child of 
imperialism and the father of colonialism, because its role is to regulate the interests of European 
powers and their ambitions over the non-Europeans territories; and the natives’ security is a 
byproduct.  
At this point, Westlake responds to the question raised by Fiore about the consent needed 
for expropriating the natives. For Westlake, since natives do not have rights under international 
law, “it follows that no documents in which such natives are made to cede the sovereignty over 
any territory can be exhibited as an international title.” The reason he gives is that “a stream 
cannot rise higher than its source, and the right to establish the full system of civilized 
government, which in these cases is the essence of sovereignty, cannot be based on the consent 
of those who at the most know but a few of the needs which such a government is intended to 
meet.”132 Without a European kind of government, imperialist international law excluded non-
European peoples as its subjects, and yet they would try to conclude treaties with them for 
economic purpose. 
c). Internal Contradiction in International Law 
Being neither subject nor object of international law, the Natives would be conquered at the point 
of the gun, like the “exploit” of Carl Peters who narrates with satisfaction how he killed the 
Wagogo people in his expedition of building the German empire in East Africa. He says that his 
“gun had become so hot from frequent firing that [he] could scarcely hold it.”133 When they 
surrendered under the Maxim gun power and paid him a heavy tribute, Peters “consented to enter 
into a treaty with him [the chief of Wagogo], by virtue of which he was placed under German 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Ibid.,  
132 Ibid., p. 144.  
133 Cited in Curtin, ibid., p. 85. 
58	  
	  
	  
authority.”134 It was the same case with Burundi whose king signed a treaty in 1908, conceding 
Burundi to Germany as colony. But these examples were not isolated cases and some did not 
even need to be signed under the power of the bullet. Bonny Ibhawoh gives a Nigerian example 
of a treaty between the British crown and King Docemo of Lagos (the current Nigeria), whose 
Article 1 reads, “I, Docemo, do with the consent and advice of my Council, give, transfer, and by 
these presents grant and confirm unto the Queen of Great Britain, her heirs and successors for 
ever the Port and Island of Lagos, with all the rights, profits, territories and appurtenances 
whatsoever thereunto belonging…freely, fully, entirely and absolutely….”135 We can leave out 
the issue of customary law, which might nullify the treaty since “in strict West African 
customary law, tribal land was corporatively owned; the chiefs, as protectors of the tribal 
heritage, could not sign away lands of which in reality they were merely trustees.”136 The 
question rather lies on the part of the British crown which could deem King Docemo to have 
juridical personality to enter into a treaty. Another example is the Agreement signed between the 
Maasai of Kenya in 1904 and 1911, in order to take over their land. As James Thuo Gathii notes, 
“under the 1904 Agreement, Lenana, together with other signatories on behalf of the Maasai—
who did not participate in writing the agreement and who did not read the agreement itself since 
they themselves could not read—agreed that the Maasai could not be moved from the Laikipia 
reserve ‘as long as the Maasai as a race shall exist.’ However, in 1911, the British administration 
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in Kenya, under enormous pressure from settlers, sought to move the Maasai again, clearly in 
contravention of the 1904 Agreement.”137 
These examples are evoked in order to highlight the ambiguity in the application of 
imperial international law. How could these powers enter into a treaty with entities which they 
did not recognize as sovereign? What was the value of such treaties and Agreements, especially 
when signed under constraint conditions? On the one hand, there is the illusion that the colonial 
powers were recognizing the sovereignty of the political institutions, as they sought Agreement 
with the representative of the people—although sometimes through manipulation as in the 
Maasai case. If it was not a delusion, the consequence would have been that it obliged both 
parties. On the other hand, however, the truth is that all these “legal instruments” were construed 
for the advantages of the imperial powers. For instance, in “one of the most celebrated cases over 
land rights, of Amodu Tijani v. the Secretary of Southen Nigeria in 1914”, when Chief Oluwa 
demanded compensation for the land of Lagos, the colonial state argued that the land had been 
ceded through Docemo’s treaty, and yet it recurred to the customary right in order to refuse any 
compensation for Chief Oluwa.138 In other words, the treaty could work only when conferring 
rights to the colonial power, but not the other way around. The same was the case with Maasai 
who were not able to plead their case of breaching the 1904 Agreement.139 As explanation, the 
Court said that “treaties are the subject of international law which is a body of rules applied to 
the intercourse between civilized states….The protected states or communities are not subject to 
a law of which they never heard, their relations to the protecting state are not therefore 
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determined by International Law.”140 Similarly to Tajini case, “on the one hand, the court found 
that the Maasai were capable of entering into a treaty, and on the other hand the court also found 
that the relation between the Maasai and the British government could not be governed by rules 
of international law.”141 That being the case, one can only wonder with Gathii: “if Maasai-British 
relations could not be governed by international law, how could Maasai enter into a treaty which, 
by definition, is a creature of, and is governed by, rules of international law? How could 
international law only be available for the purpose of establishing that the Maasai could enter 
into a treaty but not for the purpose of establishing if the treaty had been observed in accordance 
with rules of international law?”142 
These rhetorical questions underscore the contradiction that guided the imperialist 
international law. Conceived to further the imperialist project, it served imperial powers to 
justify legally their practices and manipulated at will in the disadvantages of the non-European, 
under the imperialist ideology of civilizational progress. As Anghie would say, “jurists using the 
conceptual tools of positivism postulated a gap, understood principally in terms of cultural 
differences, between the civilized European and uncivilized non-European world: having 
established this gap they then proceeded to devise a series of techniques of bridging this gap, of 
civilizing the uncivilized.”143 International law was one of those tools at the service of imperialist 
ideology, and the Third World critics claim that human rights movement is playing the same 
role. It is time now to look closely to this claim. 
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1.3. Human Rights as Ideology through a Metaphor 
Many scholars, especially from the Third World criticize “the human-rights wave of the 
twentieth century…as an international agenda pursued by the major powers in order to satisfy 
strategic goals, rather than as motivated by humanitarians such as Eleanor Roosevelt.”144 As 
such, they insist, it is the continuation of Western imperialism under the leadership of the United 
States of America, in which human rights play the ideological role of legitimation and 
dissimulation at the same time, replacing the ancient civilizing mission. According to Münkler, 
“the United States has also followed in the footsteps of the great empires by offering a guarantee 
of extensive peace as the central justification for its claim to supremacy—except that, in the case 
of a democratic empire, the peace is measured by the assertion and preservation of human rights, 
which have replaced the claim to civilizing mission that empires frequently used to declare. At 
the same time, the promise of future prosperity, which also has a long tradition, continues as 
before.”145 Put in other words, human rights have become the new ideology masking the Western 
democratic empire. Other scholars go even deeper to accuse the human rights movement of 
being a repetition of the imperialist pattern of ideology. One of them is Mutua who framed 
human rights as ideology through a metaphor. Through the following, I explore the so-called 
metaphor and its content, and then analyze how it fits into the imperialist ideology pattern.  
a). SVS Metaphor 
Mutua characterizes the human rights movement146 as a continuation of the imperialist project 
through a three-dimensional metaphor of savages-victims-saviors (SVS henceforth). As he puts 
it, “the human rights movement is marked by a damning metaphor. The grand narrative of 
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human rights contains a subtext which depicts an epochal contest pitting savages, on the one 
hand, against victims and saviors on the other.”147 Not only is the metaphor descriptive, but it 
also depicts the normative foundation of human rights regime in its justification as well as its 
practice. That is radical and therefore challenging the human rights project, and needs to be taken 
seriously. As he declares, “the human rights corpus is driven –normatively and descriptively—by 
what I have called the savage-victim-savior metaphor, in which human right is a grand narrative 
of an epochal contest that pits savages against victims and saviors.”148 
Before explaining the metaphor itself, the author underscores the flaws that permeate 
human rights corpus constituting its bedrock. The underling subtext is that the human rights 
corpus is essentially Eurocentric. Mutua contends that “first, the corpus falls with the historical 
continuation of the Eurocentric colonial project, in which actors are cast into superior and 
subordinate positions.”149 By this sentence, Mutua implies that human rights carry the same 
imperialist and colonial project, and are undergirded by racist prejudices. And in terms of their 
normativity, it challenges human rights universality. This last point is strongly emphasized since 
the author claims that human rights movements ignored non-Western cultures and human rights 
activists. “These historically important struggles, he says, together with the norms anchored in 
non-Western cultures and societies have been either overlooked or rejected in the construction of 
the current understanding of human rights.”150 Second, not only is the corpus Eurocentric, but 
also it does not allow, he alleges, any “cross-contamination of cultures” because it “promotes a 
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Eurocentric ideal.”151 Although this is a goal of human rights project, its ideological dimension 
allows it to dissimulate it, since “the subtext of human rights is a grand narrative hidden in the 
seemingly neutral and universal language of the corpus.”152 It remains a fact, nonetheless, that 
human rights corpus with its Eurocentric origin and purpose poses the problem of cultural 
legitimacy—third flaw—and the question of power is raised as one wonders why the European 
culture should be the source of norms that claim to be universal—fourth flaw. However, the big 
blow to the human rights project—fifth flaw—is its racial underpinning. According to Mutua, 
“in the human rights narrative, savages and victims are generally nonwhite and non-Western, 
while saviors are white.” Its ideological role allows the transformation of the racial relationship 
into an imperialist narrative and a psychological soteriology “in which whites who are privileged 
globally as a people—who have historically visited untold suffering and savage atrocities against 
nonwhites—redeem themselves by ‘defending’ and ‘civilizing’ ‘lower,’ ‘unfortunate,’ and 
‘inferior’ peoples.”153 
Human rights project is Eurocentric through and through; in its inception, its formulation, 
its practice and even in its results. The nonwhites are just tools. In clear terms, human rights are 
an undercover of the “emergence of European and American senses of global predestination and 
mission to civilize by universalizing Eurocentric norms.”154 We retrieve the imperialist ideology 
of civilizing mission, this time under a human rights cloak. In David Holloway’s terms, “here, 
the idea of ‘human rights’ substitutes for, and becomes indistinguishable from, older terms such 
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as ‘progress’ or ‘civilization,’ and the gamut of racialized ideologies depicting white Anglo-
Americanism as the engine of these values that first became part of the dominant US culture’s 
explanations for its own domestic hegemony during the nineteenth century.”155 For, according to 
Mutua, it is indeed the history repeating itself and this is what his metaphor aims to underline.  
As already alluded to, the metaphor is construed on three terms, each one being another 
metaphor on its own. Hence the first metaphor is the savage. Now, the state is the cornerstone of 
human rights instruments as it is in charge of protecting and fulfilling them. At the same time, 
however, human rights are to protect the individual from a state that is viewed as predator of the 
same rights it is supposed to guarantee. Ishay observes that “we find ourselves pondering the role 
of the state as both the guardian of basic rights and as the behemoth against which one’s rights 
need to be defended.”156 Mutua deciphers the classical savage in this ambiguous role of the state 
vis-à-vis human rights. “Underlying the development of human rights is the belief that the state 
is a predator that must be contained. Otherwise it will devour and imperil human freedom. From 
this conventional international human rights law perspective, the state is the classic savage.”157 
However, as “state in itself is simply a construct that describes a repository for public power, a 
disinterested instrumentality ready to execute public will, whatever that maybe,” the author 
thinks that the savage has to be beyond the state as such. It is to be looked for in that which gives 
birth to state and that, for Mutua, is culture. “The state, he says, should be unmasked as being a 
mere proxy for the real savage.” Consequently, “that leaves the historically accumulated 
wisdom, the culture of a society as the only other plausible place to locate the savage.”158 
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Once the real savage is identified, few consequences follow. First, Mutua seems to not 
agree that one can criticize a valid cultural norm as a local truth by an external standard. For him, 
such an initiative “is extremely problematic, if not altogether an invalid exercise.” Second, he 
acknowledges however that a culture is dynamic due to the confrontation within different 
variables composing it or in contact with other cultures.159 Third, the state is not representative of 
the entire culture, but rather the expression of a “particular cultural vision” of the “dominant 
class or political interests,” so much so that “the state is more a conveyor belt than an 
embodiment of particular cultural norms.” The conclusion follows: “when human rights norms 
target a deviant state, they are really attacking the normative cultural fabric or variant expressed 
by that state. The culture, and not the state, is the actual savage.” In almost Huntingtonian terms, 
Mutua says, “from this perspective, human rights violations represent a clash between the culture 
of human rights and the savage culture.”160 
Following what we have been saying that human rights movement is essentially 
Eurocentric, it is needless to precise then that the human rights culture is the Western culture 
clashing with non-Western ones. From this perspective, human rights manifest their ideological 
color because the state, “the classical savage,” scourged by human rights corpus is simply an 
ideological code to designate the non-Western culture, and the state in question is not every state, 
but rather the non-Western state. To illustrate this fact, Mutua resorts to different examples such 
as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 
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and other International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) that channel cultural 
savagery in their reports by targeting Third World countries. “Images of practices such as 
“female genital mutilation,” dowry burnings, and honor killings have come to frame the 
discourse, and in that vein stigmatize non-Western cultures.”161 There is also the political 
savagery, fruit of the West states and INGOs that demonize non-Western political structures that 
do not fall into the Western-liberal democracy, leading to the pleading by INGOs for banning 
financial aid, especially asking that the West conditions its cooperation on the adoption of this 
Western political style. “When it rejects non-Western political culture as undemocratic, the 
human rights corpus raises the specter of political savagery.”162 Through all these examples, 
especially those related to the Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), human rights project has 
“picked up where European colonial missionaries left off. Savagery in this circumstance acquires 
a race—the black, the dark, or non-Western race.”163 In other words, cultural and political 
imperialism continues through human rights movement.  
The second metaphor is that of the victim. According to Mutua, this metaphor is the pillar 
of the human rights ideology condensed in this three-dimensional metaphor. As he declares it, 
“without the victim there is no savage or savior, and the entire human rights enterprise 
collapses.”164 Mutua substantiates his statement by arguing that the whole human rights project is 
a response to “potential and actual victim” and the solution for a victimless society is Western 
liberal democracy. He then analyses how the victim is presented at international level, in human 
rights law and in human rights literature.  
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On the international scene, the United Nations is the main actor that “ostensibly seek to 
prevent conditions that create human victims.” For that purpose states are engaged, through 
human rights treaties, “to avoid depriving, to protect from depriving and to aid the deprived.” As 
such, “human rights law protects against the invasion of the inherent dignity and worth of the 
potential victim.”165 
While the United Nations and human rights law set normative context to protect the 
victim, they do not identify who is the victim nor do they name or show the visage of the 
perpetrator. Human rights literature fills the gap by presenting the victim “as a helpless innocent 
who has been abused directly by the state, its agents, or pursuant to an offensive cultural or 
political practice.”166More than just being innocent, however, the image of the victims is that of 
powerlessness in front of the brutality of the perpetrator, be it the state or the culture, which are 
not without recalling the savage metaphor. They are described in such terms that are at the 
antipodes of the “civilized”. “The usual human rights narrative generally describes victims as 
hordes of nameless, despairing, and dispirited masses. To the extent they have a face, it is 
desolated and pitiful. Many are uneducated, destitute, old and infirm, too young, poorly clad, and 
hungry: peasants, the rural and urban poor, marginalized ethnic groups and nationalities, and 
lower castes. Their very being is a state of divorce from civilization and a large distance from 
modernity.”167 This is the main characteristic. But there is also the language used by the victims 
themselves to call for outside help. They are also presented as sympathetic innocents whose plea 
cannot be ignored without feeling morally guilty. Above all, “the face of the prototypical victim 
is nonwhite.”168 This is where the second metaphor joins the imperialistic project of human 
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rights because, for Mutua, since the movement took off after World War II, “the major focus of 
human rights advocacy by both the United Nations and INGOs has been in the Third World in 
Latin America, Africa, and Asia.” This attitude has reinforced the sentiment that “human rights 
problems afflict people “over there” and not people “like us”.” We are brought back to the 
colonial era, where the civilized nations had to bring civilization to backward or stagnant 
cultures, especially when one notices the similarities in the vocabulary of “the weak and poor 
native” of the imperial era with powerless and helpless victim of human rights literature. The 
author cannot help to conclude that “there is a colonial texture to the relationship between human 
rights victim and the West.” For that reason, human rights regime is a continuation of the 
imperialist international law project of “ordering the lives of non-European peoples” by 
imposing on them “European norms, values, ideas and cultures.”169 Once more, the imperialism 
project continues under the disguise of human rights movement.  
Finally, there is the metaphor of savior. As the term indicates, it has a religious 
connotation. While the victim metaphor is the bulwark of the human rights regime, the third 
metaphor translates better the imperialist project of imposing Eurocentric values and norms on 
non-Europeans through human rights ideology. It is “constructed through two intertwining 
characteristics—Eurocentric universalism and Christianity’s missionary zeal.”170 The 
Eurocentric universalism stems from Western Enlightenment, but it developed through the 
assumption of double standard for evaluating cultures, some deemed superior and others inferior, 
with the moral duty of bringing the lower ones to the higher level, as already seen. The same is 
operating in the human rights movement. In addition to this Eurocentric universalism, the project 
also has a similarity with the Christian missionary zeal, because the universality is sustained by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 Ibid., p. 31. 
170 Ibid.  
69	  
	  
	  
the belief in the inequality between cultures. Indeed, “inherent to any universalizing creed is an 
unyielding faith in the superiority of at least the belief of the proselytizer over those potential 
convert, if not over the person of the convert.”171 In other words, the savior metaphor highlights 
the ideological push that was behind imperialism, which was realized through imperialist 
expansion and colonialism. The imperial project to conquer and exploit the non-European world 
was covered by this positive project of saving the “primitive and savage” from the state of 
backwardness. To engage in such an enterprise requires a belief in the possibility of improving 
from an uncivilized to the civilized, from a damned to the saved state.  
Mutua contends that “human rights law continues this tradition of universalizing 
Eurocentric norms by intervening in the Third World cultures and societies to save them from 
the traditions and beliefs that it frames as permitting or promoting despotism and disrespect for 
human rights.”172 While both imperialism-colonialism and human rights might be conceptually 
different, they both aim at westernizing non-Western cultures. Moreover, one has to remember 
that even the imperialist mission was never professed in the open; rather it was presented under 
the civilizational mission umbrella. Likewise, human rights discourse is a positive cover of the 
same mission of westernizing the non-Western world, through the universalizing process. To the 
proponent of the universality of human rights who celebrate the fact that “All states in the 
contemporary world have accepted that human rights are a legitimate subject of international 
relations,”173 Mutua responds by doubting the legitimacy of some Third World states to represent 
their peoples and asking whether they are free to reject human rights. “Do non-European states 
really have a choice of rejecting in any sustained manner any doctrine of international law, 
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particularly human rights, which represent the ultimate civilizing project of international law? 
Why should credence be given to states here when many, if not the majority, do not even speak 
for their peoples or cultures? Might states not just be acting cynically because they want to be 
seen to belong among the ranks of the “civilized?” These questions add weight to the argument 
that the savior metaphor wants to bring home: “human rights are part of the cultural package of 
the West, complete with an idiom of expression, a system of government, and a certain basic 
assumptions about the individual and his relationship to society.”174 That is what is promulgated 
while claiming to save the victim of savage cultures.  
The question now is: who is/are the savior(s)? The answer to this question seems easy 
because it is the West that is spreading its culture through human rights. But Mutua goes beyond 
this general characterization to offer concrete faces of saviors-crusaders of this new campaign. 
The first of these identified by Mutua is United Nations. As it is the guaranteeing body of human 
rights, UN activities and machineries to protect and enforce human rights, focus on non-Western 
states “to ensure the incorporation, dissemination, and enforcement of human rights norms.” 
From that perspective, “the United Nations is, in a sense, the grand “neutral” savior, and Western 
liberal democracies treat it as such.”175 The second actors involved in the saving mission of 
human rights are “Western states and Western or Western-controlled institutions.” As already 
mentioned, these states condition their financial aid and their diplomatic ties with non-Western 
states by the adoption of human rights. They “usually employ a horizontal state-to-state 
enforcement of human rights in which their foreign policies become the conveyer belts of 
“civilization”.”176 Finally, there are the INGOs. For Mutua, they “constitute perhaps the most 
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important element of the savior metaphor.” Claiming to be ideologically neutral and applying the 
law, they, however, “promote paradigmatic liberal values and norms.” The most powerful of 
these INGOs are based in the Western world, where they enjoy an unfailing support both morally 
and financially, and their “staffs are mostly well educated, usually trained in the law, middle 
class and white. They are very different from the people they seek to save. They are modern-day 
abolitionists who see themselves as cleansers, singlehandedly rooting out evil in Third World 
countries and culture by shining light where darkness reigns.”177 In other words, INGOs embrace 
human rights project without reservation, and as such they actively participate in propagating and 
spreading its ideology. They “are human rights movement’s foot soldiers, missionaries, and 
proselytizers.”178 
b). The Content of the Metaphor 
So far, it has been question of explaining the SVS metaphor which is used by human rights 
discourse to dissimulate its real goal of continuing the Western domination of other cultures. In 
that sense, human rights operate as an imperialist ideology in its double role of legitimating and 
dissimulating. We now can define that ideology and determine its content, a task that raises such 
questions as: what is the metaphor hiding? What is the content of this cultural and political 
imperialism promoted through human rights?  
For Mutua, saying that human rights are Eurocentric and incarnation of European values 
and ideas, he specifically means that human rights are embedded in the Western liberal culture. 
The latter is formulated in terms of human rights and when these values and norms are 
universalized, it is synonymous with the universalization of liberal culture, in theory and 
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practice. He repeatedly asserts that “the human rights regime is rooted in liberal theory.”179 It is 
because of this Western liberal origin that human rights cannot claim universality without being 
ipso facto imperialism, because it is universalizing a set of norms of a particular culture. Thusly, 
the saviors –UN, Western states and Western Institutions and INGOs –which make human rights 
claims on behalf of victims of human rights violations –non-Western—by the savage culture –be 
it states or its agents, or other cultural practices—are simply liberal crusaders. They are 
instrumentalizing human rights, making the whole regime “part of the Western conception of 
modern society and its ubiquitous domination of the globe.”180 
One of the obvious examples of this ideological use of human rights by liberalism is 
pushing the agenda of democracy in non-Western world. Democracy as participation in political 
processes that institute political institutions is congenital to the liberal tradition of guaranteeing 
“formal autonomy and abstract equality.”181 That is the kind of liberal democracy that has been 
the focus of human rights law, and yet this political conception evolved “from the domestic 
jurisprudence…over several centuries in the West.” It cannot even be argued that the states that 
adopted the UDHR were representative, because “in 1948, most African and Asian states were 
absent from the United Nations because they were European colonies.”182 When they got their 
autonomy and tried to impart human rights corpus by insisting on development, economic and 
group rights, these efforts were either ignored or simply thwarted.183 That is the reason why the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 Mutua, “The Iraq Paradox: Minority and Group Rights in a Viable Constitution” in Buffalo Law Review, Vol. 54, 
2006, p. 940. See also his “The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: an Evaluation of the Language 
of Duties” where he declares that human rights movement roots are in Western liberal traditions. In Virginia Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 35, 1994-95, p. 344; “Human Rights in Africa: the Limited Promise of Liberalism” in 
African Studies Review, Vol. 51, No. 1; 2008, p. 19, 22; etc. “Human Rights and Powerlessness: Pathologies of 
Choice and Substance” in Buffalo Law Review, Vol. 56, 2008, p. 1027-8; “Standard Setting in Human Rights: 
Critique and Prognosis” in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2007, p. 550-1, 575, etc.  
180 Mutua, Human Right, p. 34.  
181 Ibid., p. 44, 45.  
182 Ibid., p. 46.  
183 Ibid., p. 47. See also Anghie, Imperialism, especially chap. 4.  
73	  
	  
	  
right discourse as it has been developed thus far becomes problematic and limited outside the 
European context.184 From these facts, Mutua infers that “the postwar elaboration and 
codification of human right norms has been the process of the universalization of liberalism and 
its outgrowth, Western political democracy,”185 producing what he calls “a holy trinity: 
liberalism, democracy and human rights.”186 That is the content of the metaphor and its goal: 
spreading liberalism and liberal democracy. A world created by such a trinity “would in reality 
be governed by free market principles, political democracy, and a minimalist guarantee of core 
civil and political right.” 187 
From this point of view, human rights movement is an ideology because it does not admit 
its real content. Rather, it is presented “as nonideological, universal and noncontentious.” Yet, 
“the human rights movement is not post-ideological.” It is rather “a proxy for a political 
ideology” founded on the ideological prejudices of cultural superiority-inferiority. “In Western 
lore, Mutua says, the native –defined as the non-European –has always been the savage. But in 
history, his savagery has been a function of his racial or ethnic ancestry, native mind, and 
culture. The civilizing mission, which is central to both international law and human rights, 
requires the definition of the native in particular language in which he is stripped of full 
humanity to justify the ‘othering’ process, or the re-creation of the non-European in the image of 
the European.” 188 The metaphor operates to allow human rights discourse to play the same role 
of civilizing mission in the current international law. In creating the native savage, it retrieves 
and endorses the classical imperialist stereotypes about non-Europeans, and legitimates the 
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salvific endeavor. That is why “the native savage has always been racialized in human rights 
discourse and international law.”189 
Mutua is not alone in diagnosing human rights as ideology. For instance, David 
Holloway states that “the new hegemony of state-sponsored human rights discourse” is 
connected to “its specifically economic functions, enabling us in turn to view the state’s new 
enthusiasm for human rights as an ideology produced by capitalist—and thus class-histories and 
conflicts.” He adds, “human rights has become ‘the ideology after the end of ideologies, the 
ideology at the end of history’,”190 surely alluding to Fukuyama’s “end of history.” This is 
another way of affirming that human rights are a Western device to advance liberalism in its 
economic, political and cultural forms. Brett Bowden proceeds in the same sense, although he 
broadens the spectrum. The West has set standards that have to be met if a state is to be 
recognized as member of international community. All of these standards are drawn from 
Western liberalism and one of them is human rights, carried under the label of liberal democracy. 
If they are not met, states are ostracized and stigmatized as uncivilized and rogue states. And 
most of these states—if not all—are non-Western, espousing Mutua’s claim that human rights 
are playing a Western liberal game. Bowden’s text is worthy citing:  
Today the term “modern liberal democracy” has much more riding on it than just electoral democracy; it 
entails issues of human rights, globalized free markets and free trade, and economic and cultural 
globalization. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is increasingly the case that in order to 
measure up to the revised standard of civilization, a growing set of criteria must be met. While it is an 
evolving standard, at present for a state to be considered a full member of the international society of 
civilized states, it must commit itself, at minimum, to the following principles: human rights and the rule of 
law, representative democracy in governance, economic liberalism and free markets open to international 
trade and foreign investments, religious and cultural pluralism, and the efficacy of science and technology. 
If, in the process of becoming globalized and liberalized, a state can claim to promote and adhere to these 
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principles, then it is deemed to have arrived at that exalted condition known as modernity, or more 
accurately, Western modernity. In contrast, states like Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia and much of sub-
Saharan Africa, among others, are said to have “failed the modernity test.” These failed or rogue states are 
characterized as uncivilized by comparison to the civilized liberal democratic states of the West. 
Furthermore, for some, the only hope they have of reaching modernity is “with a proper teacher—the 
west.”191 
Although it exceeds the scope of this chapter that is mostly focused on human rights, Bowden’s 
point rightly highlights the same process under which the non-Western world is imposed 
standards to be met in order to be recognized. Moreover, the non-Westerners do not have a say in 
the setting of those standards, and cannot have their own list to impose to the West. In other 
words, it is a one-way relationship, and if it does not work, it is the fault of the loser. Now, since 
liberalism, democracy and human rights form a trinity from Mutua’s jargon, it follows that what 
is said for “liberal democracy” can be attributed to human rights. Another way of stating the 
same: human rights movement is an ideology to cover up the liberal goals.  
However, there is no area where human rights are ideologically manipulated than in what 
Anghie calls “imperialism as self-defense” where human rights are invoked as reasons for 
invading one of those rogue states. Through the pretext of national security, a Western state can 
unilaterally decree a state as a threat and consequently invade it in the name of human rights. In 
this context, “human rights is deployed as both an argument for invasion and then, the invasion 
having been completed, as an argument for transformation, in which international human rights 
law…stands for the norm that must be achieved in order to bring about a “civil state” thus, 
supposedly, bringing about international stability.”192  This manipulation of human rights in the 
hands of great powers sheds new light on the ideological role of human rights. As the same 
author underlines it, “it is in this way, through the invocation of human rights, that what might be 
seen as an illegal project of conquest is transformed into a legal project of salvation and 
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redemption.”193 There could not, therefore, be a clearer assertion of the ideological dimension of 
human rights using Mutua’s metaphor. 
Although –or perhaps because it is—framed into a metaphor, human rights regime 
becomes itself imperialist in that it seeks to impose itself over other cultures. As it is presenting 
something other than itself, it ends up being resisted. That is how Peter Erlinder qualifies the 
NATO invasion of Kosovo as “human rights imperialism,”194 and that is how it will always be 
perceived as long as it does not enter into dialogue with the receiving cultures. To do so would 
require renouncing the imposition of itself as universal and appreciate the value of other cultures. 
In this case, however, human rights movement would have dropped its ideological mask. But as 
long as it is still the metaphor, human rights movement is imperialistic because it is imposed and 
it might become irrelevant to the context. Talking about the African context, Mutua notes that 
“to be useful to Africa’s reconstruction, human rights cannot simply be advocated as an 
unreformed Eurocentric doctrine that must be gifted to native peoples.” He adds, “I am afraid 
that this is how many in the West imagine what for them is a human rights crusade toward 
Africa. So far, this law-and-development model has not—and will not—work. Not only is it an 
imposition, but it would also deal mostly with symptoms, while leaving the underlying 
fundamentals untouched.”195 In conclusion as “even the international law of human rights, 
arguably the most benign of all the areas of international law, seeks the universalization of 
Eurocentrism,”196 there is no other way it will be received by other cultures than as being 
imperialist because it will be imposed, especially that this will happen in conjunction with the 
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human rights ideological role of translating “an illegal act and conquest” into an act of 
redemption—to use Anghie’s words.  
Having explored how the human rights movement is a metaphor for ideology and 
presented the content of that metaphor, I conclude this section by analyzing whether this 
metaphor is definitely an imperialist ideology.  
c). Human Rights as Imperialist Ideology 
I have already touched on this topic up, but I want to now systematize it. The first section 
elaborated what is an imperialist ideology by showing that it is the civilizing mission that was 
used to justify and hide at the same time the imperialism project of conquering and exploiting the 
non-Western world in order to respond to West’s internal problems. In the process, the 
imperialist ideology of civilizing mission benefited from the liberal belief in the progress of 
civilization and the work of international law in general, but particularly the positive 
international law. All three were based on racist presuppositions which conceived humanity or 
cultures into hierarchical orders. The reason why to go through this detour was that Third World 
critics of human rights, Mutua in particular, argue that human rights constitute a continuation of 
the same imperialist project. Thus, not only are human rights an ideology, but they are precisely 
an imperialist ideology. Still, the West is dominating the rest, although the leading powers have 
now changed. The role formerly played by Britain and France is assumed today by the United 
States. Comparing the two, can we confirm that human rights as SVS metaphor is an imperialist 
ideology?  
To answer that question, I first consider the internal reasons that encouraged the 
imperialist expansion that would lead to the imperialist ideology. We have identified four main 
reasons: economic, political, demographic and industrial motives. Obviously, human rights 
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movement has different internal motives that Mutua himself acknowledges. Although there had 
been a lot of work to build an international human rights body since the dawn of Western 
modernity, it was the atrocities of the WWII that activated the process that would produce the 
actual human rights movement in question today. In his own words, “the human rights 
movement originated in Europe to curb European savageries such as the Holocaust, the abuses of 
Soviet bloc communism, and the denials of speech and other expressive rights in a number of 
Western countries. The movement grew initially out of the horrors of the West, constructing the 
image of a European savage.”197 In this sense, it cannot be argued that the human rights and 
civilizing imperialist ideology had the same internal reasons. However, all these reasons were 
particular to the West. Why did they then have to be imported to the non-Western world without 
any expressed demand from the receiver? Furthermore, other atrocities had happened to non-
Europeans without creating the same human rights movement. That is how the Eurocentrism and 
even racial dimensions of human rights are manifest since its inception. Indeed, “neither the 
enslavement of Africans, with its barbaric consequences and genocidal dimensions, nor the 
classic colonization of Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans by Europeans, with its bone-
chilling atrocities, was sufficient to move the West to create the human rights movement. It took 
the genocidal extermination of Jews in Europe—a white people—to start the process of the 
codification and universalization of human rights norms.”198 Put otherwise, human rights were 
not meant for non-Europeans; had it been the case they could have been codified well before 
1948. What could then be the good reason for imposing them to other cultures, if not the “deep-
seated sense of European and Western global predestination?” Simply put, although they do not 
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have the same origin in terms of internal reasons, civilizing mission and human rights imperialist 
ideologies share the same goal of allowing the West to dominate the non-Western world. 
Secondly, there is the language used in justifying that domination. We saw that the 
civilizing mission was justified by “a political metaphysics”—to recall Ferry’s philosophy—
which stipulates that superior races had a right springing from the moral duty of being superior, 
to civilize the lower races. I will not repeat what was said above (in section 1. 3. b) where it was 
noted that the SVS metaphor assumes the racial distinction between whites and non-whites, the 
former identified with the culture of human rights that has to be brought to the latter portrayed as 
savage cultures. Moreover, in many instances, Mutua uses human rights as civilizing mission, 
and the whole SVS metaphor is about that, like when he says, “in this civilizing orgy, human 
rights [are] often employed interchangeably with political democracy.”199 Therefore, on this 
level, the civilizing mission and human rights are in accord as imperialist ideologies.  
Thirdly, the civilizing mission relied heavily on the liberal belief in the progress of 
civilization, and therefore condoned any despotic and colonial government as long as the goal 
was to uplift the natives. This of course, was based on the hierarchical anthropology, positing the 
civilized nations with a duty of bringing civilization to the uncivilized. On the other hand, 
however, it is not clear whether the human rights imperialist ideology relies on the liberal belief 
in the progress of human kind. Rather, from liberal point of view, while being used as a channel 
for liberal values and ideas, as the SVS metaphor has strongly emphasized, human rights 
imperialist ideology is built on double negativity. And this is new vis-à-vis the civilizing mission 
of imperialist ideology. The first negativity is that of the uncivilized native. During the civilizing 
mission, the liberals did not blame the native for his uncivilized situation. It is only that he had 
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not had a chance to improve his faculties, and that is why they believed civilization could be 
brought to him. The new civilizing mission through human rights assumes this first negativity, 
but has also to face the resistance of the uncivilized native to be civilized.  
These two negativities are highlighted by one of the leading liberal scholars, Jack 
Donnelly, who celebrates liberal origin of human rights200 and points out how it is also the 
continuation of imperialist ideology as they set new standards. In an article in which the glories 
of the West for using human rights in their foreign policy against non-European states—lending 
an unneeded help to Mutua’s critique!—he declares that “despite the fatal tainting of the 
language of ‘civilization’ by abuses carried out under (and by the exponents of) the classic 
standard of civilization, internationally recognized human rights share a similar legitimating 
logic.”201 He does not seem to be concerned with the atrocities committed and justified by the 
civilizing mission. Rather, the latter sets a standard of civilization that offers legitimacy logic to 
human rights, that is, human rights can be imposed to spread liberal values and norms as the 
civilizing mission justified European imperial expansion. This is not a deduction, but rather a 
paraphrase of his own terms. After praising “west European states” to operated “from a moral 
high ground” as “in the 1980s and 1990s they increasingly emphasized human rights in their 
foreign policies,” Donnelly also states, “European human rights initiatives have been missionary 
in the best sense of the term, seeking to spread the benefits of (universal) values enjoyed at 
home.”202 No comment is needed to underscore the imperialist tone of this sentence. Suffice only 
to notice that he seems to not recognize—unless he does so purposely—the contradiction in the 
terms. If indeed those values are universal and are being enjoyed at home, why do they need 
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missionaries to spread them, since being universal supposes to exist everywhere? If it is not the 
case, maybe it is true that they are not that universal, and the missionary proselytism is simply an 
imperialist mission. Notwithstanding this contradiction, he continues, “fear and historic guilt, 
arising from the moral blindness and abuses of missionaries operating under earlier standards of 
civilization, should not immobilize us in the face of abuses of power by murderous dictators 
hiding behind the legal norm of sovereignty or a claim to radical cultural difference.”203 Mutua 
couldn’t be that right! Donnelly has just proven him so! He sets the “us” saviors who cannot 
stand immobilized in front of those savages “murderous dictators” who abuse power. At this 
point, the messianic soteriology has to happen. Something must be done. “Something like a 
standard of civilization is needed to save us from the barbarism of a pristine sovereignty that 
would consign countless millions of individuals and entire peoples to international neglect.”204 
And that is when human rights intervene: “at the present historical juncture, only the idea of 
internationally recognized human rights, as expressed in authoritative documents such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the international human rights covenants, seems 
capable of playing such a role.” Eureka! we have found the panacea against the barbaric 
precipice of state sovereignty! The problem, though, is that some states resist against this new 
standard of civilization.205 This is the second negativity constitutive of human rights imperialist 
ideology: the presupposition of “us” having to confront “others” resisting “our” civilization. As 
Mutua says, the redemption of the SVS metaphor springs from this “othering” process.  
From that perspective, civilizing mission and human rights imperialist ideologies do not 
rely on the same liberal premises. Add to that the facts that the civilizing mission grew up from 
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the liberal jingoism, the pride of exporting something new and positive to the natives who did 
not have it, but could learn it. Human rights, on contrary, were codified to prevent the repetition 
of the horror that had befallen Europe in the WWII. That is why Donnelly recognizes that the 
new salvation is for “us” all and not only for “them.” The problem is that the means for that 
salvation is only particular to one part of the world and is imported to the other. And that is why 
and how human rights become an imperialist ideology.  
In sum, these arguments infer that liberalism played a role in both imperialist ideologies, 
but based on the different premises.  
In the fourth place, it was seen how international law was born from liberal ideas and 
developed to give a scheme to the imperial enterprise. It assumed and gave legal legitimacy to 
the racist assumptions which, as I have already noted, were covered and justified by the 
civilizing mission. In other words, international law was born and sustained by this imperialist 
ideology of the civilizing mission. On the other hand, the human rights movement did not remain 
on the moral legitimation of liberal imperialism, but rather it took the form of international law, 
inspiring one scholar to call it “the heart of human rights.”206 As such, human rights imperialist 
ideology is not different from the civilizing mission. Even those—like Emmanuelle Jouannet—
who believe that human rights law has revolutionized international law, they still caution that 
human rights as humanist values are “originally those of liberal democracies, be they European 
or American; and may, on this basis, be perceived as the fruits of a policy of imperialism or 
Western hegemony, liberal in nature, which merely repeats in another form the ‘civilizing 
mission’ of the past.”207 In other words, that human rights have been incorporated into 
international law did not purify the latter from its imperialist stain. Therefore, “at the very least, 
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it is essential to realize that we cannot simply act as if the issue of the imperialism of the legal 
values embodied in international law had been disposed of by virtue of the transcription of 
human rights into positive international law, their general acceptance through the ratification of 
international instruments, and thus their near-universalization at a textual level.”208 Legal 
scholars such as Mutua and Anghie, among others, do not use so much of a precaution. They 
rather strongly affirm that human rights law is a legal embodiment of liberal imperialism 
legitimated and dissimulated by human rights discourse. The whole SVS metaphor is based on 
this assumption that human rights movement has been encoded into a legal system, which 
becomes the instruments of Western states and institutions as well as the UN. As Mutua puts it, 
“even the international law of human rights, arguably the most benign of all the areas of 
international law, seeks the universalization of Eurocentrism. The human rights corpus is driven 
by what I have called the savage-victim-savior metaphor, in which human rights is a grand 
narrative of an epochal contest that pits savage against victims and saviors. In this script of 
human rights, democracy and western liberalism are internationalized to save savage non-
Western cultures from themselves and to ‘alleviate’ the suffering of victims, who are generally 
non-Western and non-European.”209 In this sense, it is clear that both imperialist ideologies 
were/are theoretically and practically connected to a legal mechanism of international law, which 
assures them their efficacy. Now, seeing how human rights movement as ideology is framed in a 
similar pattern as the civilizing mission, the Third World critics such as Mutua have a solid 
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ground to criticize it as an imperialist ideology, playing the same role as that of the civilizing 
mission vis-à-vis European formal imperialism. In a way, it is because the civilizing mission has 
been outdated as a term that the human rights movement has been invented; and otherwise, the 
reality is the same: Western imperialism continues under the umbrella of human rights 
movement. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter examined the foundation of the alleged claim that human right movement has 
assumed the imperialist ideology of the civilizing mission. To do so, I have been obliged to go 
through a defining process, in order to understand what imperialism and ideology are, so that I 
could elaborate my working definition of imperialist ideology as a legitimating and dissimulating 
discourse at the same time. Three main points helped to structure the chapter. The first point 
defined the imperialist ideology, while the second analyzed the relationship between that 
ideology and international law. The third and last point was the place to elaborate human rights 
ideology in order to see how it corresponds to an imperialist one. Now, from the motivating 
reasons to the international law level, passing through racist language and the liberal bedrock, it 
was shown that the human rights movement, understood through the SVS metaphor, does indeed 
assume the characteristics of the civilizing mission.  
This claim that human rights movement is the new face of the former civilizing mission 
touches the heart of human rights, in that it challenges the universality of human rights norms 
and their normative justification. It destroys the arguments that they were drafted by a diverse 
group from different cultures, by showing that most of the countries affected by this human 
rights ideology were still under Western domination when these norms were adopted. To a 
further argument that now all states have accepted international human rights norms, the authors 
of this claim question the legitimacy of such states to represent their peoples since they were 
post-colonial states installed to perpetuate the interests of the West. In that context, one has to 
agree with John Tasioulas that “to the extent that the [Philosophy of International Law] 
PIL…purports to reflect background moral norms of human rights, the worry is that the latter 
lack the requisite universality needed to confer legitimacy on the former. If so, human rights law 
is a mechanism through which non-Western societies are illegitimately pressured into 
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refashioning themselves along Western lines.”210 This is another way of asserting what Mutua 
has been saying that human rights are Eurocentric, because they “grow out of Western liberalism 
and jurisprudence.”211 This is what many have called parochialism objection to which, “it is not 
enough to point out that most states have ratified the major human rights conventions. The 
question is not whether states have agreed to treat human rights norms as if they were universally 
valid but rather whether they are universally valid. To elide the latter distinction is to assume that 
state consent, under current conditions, is sufficient for legitimacy.”212 A claim that is not 
defendable. Hence, the objection needs another substantial answer.  
The claim, however, is not confined to the scope of human rights; it also reaches its moral 
core. To assert that human rights movement is an imperialist ideology is to assert that it is 
inherently wrong. It cannot be defended morally because it is a travesty in both its presentation 
and its content, as well as in its goal. In being an ideology that hides something else instead of 
presenting itself, the so-called human rights movement is a lie and a liar; by promoting 
imperialist domination (with all the background that we have seen), it is evil. That is why the 
normative justification of human rights is at stake, independently of their universality 
problematic. To be particular is only to limit the scope; it does not necessarily follow that it is 
morally wrong. Likewise, to be universal does not guarantee it to be morally sound. That is the 
reason why to philosophically confront the challenge posed by this claim that human rights 
corpus is an imperialist ideology, it requires one to go beyond the parochialism objection and 
respond to the issue of normative justification of human rights, or at least to think of the 
possibility of ways to normatively justify human rights.  
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Philosophy of International Law. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 95. 
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Human rights are not only challenged normatively; but also practically, because as they 
are being used ideologically for imperialist aims, they are invoked for humanitarian intervention, 
which is once again suspected of furthering a neo-colonialism under the cover of a humanitarian 
blanket. That is why, before trying to see what is/are the philosophical response(s) to the 
theoretical challenge, the next chapter explores this practical part.  
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Chap. 2. Humanitarian Intervention as Neocolonialism 
 
The concept of humanity is an especially useful ideological 
instrument of imperialist expansion, and in its ethical-
humanitarian form, it is a specific vehicle of economic 
imperialism. Here one is reminded of a somewhat modified 
expression of Proudhon’s: whoever invokes humanity wants to 
cheat.  
Carl Schmitt 
2.0. Introduction 
Human rights are one of the purposes on the United Nations, where it is stated that “the 
purposes of the United Nations are…to achieve international cooperation in solving international 
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging the respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”1 That is why as soon as it started working, the 
United Nations initiated a process of elaboration of a human rights bill, culminating with the 
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).2 More human rights 
instruments were to follow, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) both 
entered into force in 1976. Together with the UDHR, they form the Bill of Rights.3 In addition to 
this bill, there are other conventions of what Charles Beitz calls the “Core of human rights 
instruments”4, which are: the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 UN Charter, art. 1 (3).  
2 For the history of the UDHR, see among others, Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (New York: Randon House Trade Paperbacks, 2001); Johannes 
Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent. (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press,1999); John Humphrey, Human Rights and the United Nations: A Great Adventure. (New York: 
Transnational Publishers, 1984); No Distant Millennium: The International Law of Human Rights.(Paris: Unesco, 
1989); René Cassin, La pensée et l’action. (Edition F. Lalou, 1972) 
3 Henry J. Steiner et al., International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals. 3rd Ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 60. 
4 Charles Beitz, The Idea,ix. 
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Treatment or Punishment (CAT, entered into force in 1987), Convention of the Elimination of all 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW entered into force in 1981), Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD, entered into force in 1969), and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRD, entered into force in 1990).  
What these instruments share among themselves and with other international treaties is 
the fact that they depend on the state parties which sign and ratify them. Their promotion and 
implementation depend on the good will of states parties, and that is where the problem arises. 
Indeed, while the “the peoples of the United Nations” were determined to “reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of 
men and women and of nations large and small,” they were, first, “determined to save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in [their] lifetime has bought 
untold sorrow to mankind.”5 These wars to which we owe human rights were waged by states to 
which now is trusted the promotion, protection and the fulfillment of these human rights.6 
Scholars like Micheline Ishay underscore this apparent contradiction, saying that “we find 
ourselves pondering the role of the state as both the guardian of basic rights and as the behemoth 
against which one’s rights need to be defended.”7 Henry Shue makes the same point when he 
writes: “If we do not believe that anyone beyond their own state can reasonably be asked to bear 
the responsibility of protecting these people against the single most serious threat to their lives—
their own states—we do not believe in any practically meaningful way that they have a basic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 UN Charter Preamble. 
6 Cristina Lafont identifies three state’s main actions with regard to human rights: to respect, to protect and to fulfill. 
See Global Governance, Human Rights and the Responsibility to Protect, Paper presented at Boston College Clough 
Center For The Study of Constitutional Democracy, on Nov 1, 2013, 30.  
7 Ishay, ibid., p. 8.  
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rights not to be killed.”8 While espousing Ishay’s view, Shue’s observation brings out three 
important points. First, he singles out the paradox that states are the most dangerous threat to 
human rights, whereas they are, at the same time, their protectors. In a way, it is like entrusting a 
lamb to a wolf. Secondly, he implies an extra-state body that can keep an eye on the state if the 
basic right to life is to have any meaning. The question consequent to this is: what can such an 
extra-state organ be? Finally –and as a consequence—one can infer from his remark that if things 
remain as they are, that is, counting on states to protect human rights, it is a lure and “we do not 
believe in any practically meaningful way” in the “basic right not to be killed.”  
This is another way of expressing the gap between the normative system instituted by 
human rights norms and their enforcement. As Nicholas Wheeler remarks, “as a result of the 
international legal obligations written into the United Nations system, clear limits were set on 
how governments could treat their citizens. For the first time in the history of modern 
international society, the domestic conduct of governments was now exposed to scrutiny by other 
governments, human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and international 
organizations. But the new human rights regime was severely limited by the weaknesses of its 
enforcement mechanisms.”9 
These “weaknesses” in the “enforcement mechanisms” are, in fact, linked to the need 
highlighted in Shue’s remark of an external monitor on how states perform their duties regarding 
human rights, which raises a normative question that goes beyond the practical dimension. 
Indeed, although they are feared to threaten human rights, states are protected by the United 
Nation system, which is built on and affirms the state sovereignty. Although the latter existed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Henry Shue, “Limiting Sovereignty” in Jennifer M. Welch, Ed. Humanitarian Intervention and International 
Relations. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 21. Emphasis added. 
9 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 1.  
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before the UN Charter, since it is believed to stem from the Westephian treaty in 1648,10 state 
sovereignty is codified as a cornerstone of the international system created in 1945. The famous 
article 2(4) asserts that “all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” It insists that “Nothing 
contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which 
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to 
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.” It adds, however, “but this 
principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”11 
Now, enforcement measures in chapter VII are only concerned with “peace and security”, 
and chapter VII never mentions any enforcement measure for violations of human rights. Its 
article 39 reads, “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 
42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” The articles 41 and 42 referred to in 
art. 39 authorize the Security Council to recur to the use of armed force, but the Charter does not 
take the same step for the protection of human rights. The question now is: if states are protected 
by the Charter in whatever is under their domestic jurisdiction and yet they are “the most serious 
threat”—to quote Shue again, and if, at the same time, “the doctrine of human rights is the 
articulation of the public morality of world politics of the idea that each person is a subject of 
global concern” regardless of “what a person’s special location might be or which political 
subdivision or social group the person might belong to,”12 how is this global concern to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See Stephen D Krasner, Power, The State and Sovereignty: Essays on International Relations (London, New 
York: Routledge, 2009). 
11 UN Charter art. 2(7). 
12 Beitz, The Idea, 1.  
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materialized without violating the state sovereignty? If a state is engaged in human rights 
violation, who is to assume this “global concern” for the person’s rights without interfering with 
state’s sovereignty? This is where the tension between state sovereignty and the protection of 
human rights resides, and raises the question of humanitarian intervention.  
Many scholars contend that the Charter does not forbid intervention. One of them is 
Jennifer Welch who argues that “the United Nations Charter does not explicitly enshrine non-
intervention as a rule governing the relations between member states.”13 She illustrates her point 
by “the strong human rights commitments articulated in the Preamble and Articles 1(2), 1(3) and 
55; and the powers given to the Security Council in Article 39-42 both to define what constitutes 
a threat to peace and security and to recommend action to counter such a threat.”14 Welch is right 
on that and Sean Murphy15 corroborates her view. From this perspective, state sovereignty is not 
a barrier to the protection of human rights. However, it has to be interpreted through the 
language of “security and peace”, and not human rights per se, as giving a right to humanitarian 
intervention.16 That is why the question remains, and in order to elucidate it, we need to define 
humanitarian intervention.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Jennifer M. Welch, “A Normative Case for Pluralism: Reassessing Vincent’s Views on Humanitarian 
Intervention” in International Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 5, 2011, 1196. See also Barry M. Benjamin, “Unilateral 
Humanitarian Intervention: Legalizing the Use of Force to Prevent Human Rights Atrocities” in Fordham 
International Law Journal, Vol. 16, No 1, 1993, 141, 149. Benjamin goes further to state that there have been 
resolutions that “have equalized the importance of the protection of human rights with the preservation of state 
sovereignty,” 149; Patrick Macklem, “Humanitarian Intervention and the Distribution of Sovereignty in 
International Law” in Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, 2008, 371; Fernando R. Tesón, 
Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality. (New York: Transnational Publishers, 1988), 131.  
14 Ibid.  
15 Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order. (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 137-8. 
16 Talking about the intervention for the Kurds in Northern Iraq in 1991, Richard Lillich notes that “Resolution 688 
has in fact proved to be ground-breaking in that it was the first time that the Council had characterized severe human 
rights depravations having minimal external effects as a threat to international peace and security” See Richard B. 
Lillich, “The Role of UN Security Council in Protecting Human Rights in Crisis Situations: UN Humanitarian 
Intervention in the Post-Cold War World” in Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 3, No 1, 
1995, 7.  
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According to their study on the history of the word, Brendan Simms and D.J.B Trim state 
that humanitarianism is a quite recent neologism, which acquired its current meaning in the 
middle of nineteenth century. They say: “In the eighteenth century it was used purely 
theologically, in reference to questions about the humanity or divinity of Christ. In the sense in 
which it is most often used today, ‘concerned with human welfare as a primary or pre-eminent 
good’, or ‘with humanity as whole’, and ‘action on the basis of [these] concern[s] rather than for 
pragmatic or strategic reason’, both it and the cognate ‘humanitarianism’ date only to the mid-
nineteenth century.”17 Other scholars recognize this fact as well.18 Simms and Trim, nonetheless, 
contend that humanitarianism can be limited to this recent period only if one considers its 
connection with human rights concerns as they emerged in nineteenth century. But if one looks 
at the practice of states, these authors claim that we discover the same reality called today 
humanitarian, long before the coinage of the concept.19 
Talking about states practices raises the question of intervention. The same authors argue 
that “in practice…actions termed (whether formally or informally) ‘humanitarian interventions’ 
have usually been undertaken in response to only certain kinds of humanitarian tragedy.” They 
add, “When combined with ‘intervention’, ‘humanitarian’ typically refers to a response to 
mortality and brutality inflicted by humans on others, rather than accidentally arising from 
bacterial, viral, meteorological, or climatic caprice.”20 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Brendan Simms and D.J.B. Trim, “Towards a History of Humanitarian Intervention” in Brendan Simms and 
D.J.B. Trim, Eds. Humanitarian Intervention: A History. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 3.  
18 See for instance Jeremy Sarkin, “the Role of the United Nations, the African Union and Africa’s Sub-Regional 
Organisations in Dealing with Africa’s Human Rights Problems: Connecting Humanitarian Intervention and 
Responsibility to Protect” in Journal of African Law, Vol. 53, No 1, 2009, 4; Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, “The 
Customary international Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its current Validity under U.N. Charter” in 
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 4, No 2, 1974, 206, 232; Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just 
Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 3, 8. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid.  
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This historical and analytical definition underscores two important facts. First, it 
distinguishes humanitarian intervention from other kinds of humanitarian action. The latter is 
concerned with natural or accidental catastrophes,21 while the former is concerned with 
“mortality and brutality inflicted by humans on others”. This is a very important distinction, but 
it does not tell who assumes and how these actions are carried out, and yet answers to these 
questions are crucial. Hence, the second important point is the standard definition of 
“humanitarian intervention as the use of force by a state [or group of states] that aims to protect 
innocent people who are nationals of another state from harm inflicted or allowed by that state’s 
government”22 without its consent.23 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 They, however, note that “it is increasingly being argued that, where human failings in responding to so-called 
‘acts of God’ result in considerably increased mortality, then a humanitarian intervention could be justified”, ibid., 
but this kind of intervention is not what we are concerned with. David Rodogno also notes that “Nineteenth-century 
Europeans distinguished massacre from natural disaster, in that the former was understood as an organized process 
of destruction of civilian lives and properties.” See his “‘The Principle of humanity’ and the European Powers’ 
Intervention in Ottoman Lebanon and Syria in 1860-1861” in Brendan Simms and D.J.B. Trim, Eds., ibid., 162. 
Chesterman broadens the scope of “the distinction between humanitarian intervention and other putative legal bases 
for actions that may include a humanitarian component. In addition to self-defense and Security Council authorized 
enforcement actions, these include claims of protection of nationals abroad (arguably a species of self-defense), 
consent of the target state, and authorization by treaty. It is necessary to make clear that the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention as considered here concerns the threat or use of force—over the 1990s the term has sometimes been 
used to refer to less intrusive actions, such as the provision of food, medicine, and shelter. The term ‘humanitarian 
assistance’ will be used for such non-forcible actions” Chesterman, Just war, 3. For more distinctions between 
humanitarian intervention and other related humanitarian actions, see Eric A. Heinze, Waging Humanitarian War: 
The Ethics, Law and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention. (Albany: SUNY Press, 2009), 8-10. 
22 Terry Nardin, “Introduction” in Terry Nardin and Melissa S. Williams, Eds. Humanitarian Intervention. (NY and 
London: New York University Press, 2006), 1, 9. See also Joseph Boyle, “Traditional Just War Theory and 
Humanitarian Intervention” in Terry Nardin and Melissa S. Williams, Eds. Ibid., 32; Simms and Trim, ibid., 4-5. 
However, this chapter limits the scope of humanitarian intervention only to the use of force, contrary to what these 
authors hold on p. 7 that “to confine ‘debates about humanitarian intervention to its military dimensions’ will be too 
often to separate ‘arbitrarily… issues that in practice overlap.” Moreover, many authors rightly limit humanitarian 
intervention to the use of force without consent because the diplomatic and economic measures are still ‘peaceful’ 
means to resolve conflicts. See Jennifer M. Welch, ‘Introduction’ in Jennifer M. Welch, Ed. Humanitarian 
Intervention and International Relations. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 3; James Mayall, “Humanitarian 
Intervention and International Society: Lessons from Africa” in Jennifer M. Welch, Ed., ibid., 121; Michael 
Newman, Humanitarian Intervention: Confronting the Contradictions. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2009), 4; Heinze, ibid., 2, 9; Bhikhu Parekh, “Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention” in International Political 
Science Review, Vol. 18, No 1, 1997, p. 55; Jerzy Zajadlo, “Legality and Legitimation of Humanitarian Intervention: 
Now Challenge in the Age of the War on Terrorism” in American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 48, No 6, 2005, 658, 
660-1; Adams Roberts, “Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights” in International Affairs, Vol. 
69, No 3, 1993, 445; Jack Donnelly, “Human Rights, Humanitarian Crisis, and Humanitarian Intervention” in 
International Journal, Vol. 48, No. 2, 1993, p. 608; Byron F. Burmester, “On Humanitarian Intervention: The New 
World Order and Wars to Preserve Human Rights” in Utah Law Review, Vol. 269, No 1, 1994, p. 270; Jennifer L. 
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This definition highlights the inherent link between human rights and humanitarian 
intervention, and it seems to answer Shue’s concern about taking seriously the threat caused by 
states, inasmuch as humanitarian intervention means vindication of human rights when violated 
by the state that was supposed to protect them. As Thomas Probert puts it bluntly, “for human 
rights to have any meaning whatsoever, other states must be able to intervene in order to protect 
them.”24 From this point of view, human rights violations seem to provide legitimacy to 
humanitarian intervention and a right to other states to intervene within the state-violator of 
human rights and so without its consent. Fernando Tesón is one of the forceful proponents of this 
view, which he grounds in the liberal political philosophy. According to him, “humanitarian 
intervention is morally justified in appropriate cases. The argument centrally rests on a standard 
assumption of liberal political philosophy: a major purpose of states and governments is to 
protect and secure human rights, that is, rights that all persons have by virtue of personhood 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Czernecki, “The Limited Nations’ Paradox: the Battle between Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty” in 
Duquesne Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2003, p. 404; J. L. Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate” in 
J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, Eds. Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 18. 
23 This is also the definition adopted by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS). It is stated, “the kind of intervention with which we are concerned in this report is action taken against a 
state or its leaders, without its or their consent, for the purposes which are claimed to be humanitarian or protective. 
By far the most controversial of such intervention is military” In its Report, (par. 1.38), p. 8.  
24 Thomas J. W. Probert, “The Innovation of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment” in Simms and Trim, ibid., p. 323. This 
link between human rights and humanitarian intervention is very characteristic of the advocates of humanitarian 
intervention, arguing that the violation of human rights by a state forfeits its claim to sovereignty, and consequently 
giving right to other states to interfere in what was supposed to be domestic jurisdiction. See among others, Matthew 
Jamison, “Humanitarian intervention since 1990 and ‘liberal interventionism’” in Simms and Trim, ibid., 365; 
Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, “Humanitarian Intervention: the Lessons Learned” in Current History, Vol. 99, No. 641, 
2000, p. 422; Richard Gueli, “Humanitarian Intervention in Africa: Towards a New Posture” in Scientia Militaria, 
South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol. 32, No 1, 2004, p. 141; Andrew Altman and Christopher Heath 
Wellman, “From Humanitarian Intervention to Assassination: Human Rights and Political Violence” in Ethics, Vol. 
118, No 2, 2008, p. 1; Donnelly, “Human Rights,” 615-6; Allen Buchanan, “Reforming the international law of 
humanitarian intervention” in J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, Eds. Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, 
Legal and Political Dilemmas. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 131; Robert O. Koehane, “Political 
authority after intervention: gradation in sovereignty” in J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, Eds. Humanitarian 
Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 279; Beate 
Jahn, “Humanitarian Intervention—What’s in a name?” in International Politics, Vol. 49, No 1, 2012, 38; Kok-Chor 
Tan, “The Duty to Protect” in Terry Nardin and Melissa S. Williams, Eds. Humanitarian Intervention. (NY and 
London: New York University Press, 2006), 88-96.  
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alone.”25 For that reason, “governments and others in power who seriously violate those rights 
undermine the one reason that justifies their political power, and thus should not be protected by 
international law. A corollary of the argument is that, to the extent that state sovereignty is a 
value, it is an instrumental, not an intrinsic, value.26 Sovereignty serves valuable human ends, 
and those who grossly assault them should not be allowed to shield themselves behind the 
sovereignty principle.”27 Consequently, “Tyranny and anarchy cause the moral collapse of 
sovereignty.”28 
While an argument like Tesón’s is cogent in terms of moral reasoning, it begs some 
questions. First, agreeing that anarchy and tyranny cause moral collapse of state sovereignty, this 
is vis-à-vis to the citizens of the collapsing state. How does humanitarian intervention follow 
from it? Secondly, who is to be responsible for it? Tesón develops a liberal argument based on 
the Kantian understanding of duty and autonomy, and the conclusion is that “the right to 
intervene… stems from the general duty to assist victims of grievous injustice,”29 because “if 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Fernando R. Tesón, “The liberal case for humanitarian intervention” in J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, 
Eds. Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 93. 
26 For the same idea that state sovereignty is not an inherent and absolute value, see also Parekh, Ibid., 63; Frederick 
J. Petersen, “Façade of Humanitarian Intervention in a Community of Sovereign Nations” in Arizona Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, Vol. 15, No 3, 1998, 83; John Davenport, “Just War Theory, Humanitarian 
Intervention, and the Need for a Democratic Federation” in Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 39, No 3, 2011, 520; 
Tom J. Farer, “Humanitarian intervention before and after 9/11: legality and legitimacy” in J.L. Holzgrefe and 
Robert O. Keohane, Eds. Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 55; Pratap Bhanu Mheta, “From State Sovereignty to Human Security (via 
Institutions?)” in Terry Nardin and Melissa S. Williams, Eds. Ibid., 264; Janina W. Dacyl, “Sovereignty versus 
Human Rights: From Past Discourse to Present Dilemmas” in Journal of Refugees Studies, Vol. 9, No 2, 1996, 194.  
27 Tesón, “The liberal case”, 93.  
28 Ibid. Patrick Macklem develops the same argument but from an international law perspective. According to him, 
sovereignty is distributed by international law and therefore, it is not an intrinsic value. In his own words, 
“international law is already present, structuring, defining, distributing, and protecting the territorial and 
jurisdictional dimensions of a legal zone of autonomy that it recognizes as vesting in a sovereign state.” Ibid., 384-5.  
29 Tesón, “The liberal case”, p. 97. There are various moral arguments for a humanitarian intervention from different 
schools of thoughts—see for example Heinze’s consequentialist argument, in Ibid., chap. 2, or Wheeler’s solidarist 
theory of English school in his Saving Strangers, chap. 1—but what is disputed is this “right to humanitarian 
intervention.” Tesón follows Ronald Dworkin in distilling international law from morality, which does not fit into 
the positive international law, although there are also those who think that from the positive international law, there 
is a right to humanitarian intervention. See Francis Kofi Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of 
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human beings are denied basic human rights and are, for that reason, deprived of their capacity to 
pursue their autonomous projects, then others have a prima facie duty to help them.”30 As to the 
question of the agent who is to assume this rescuing role, Tesón responds that it is the duty of 
“liberal governments…to promote global human rights.”31 Tesón is not alone in his view. Allen 
Buchanan also assumes that humanitarian intervention is to be undertaken by “democratic-liberal 
government” in violation of “UN-based humanitarian law,”32 and Thomas Weiss calls on the 
“West to keep its word” on Darfur.33 
At this stage, what was a moral ground for humanitarian intervention becomes a 
perplexing source of interrogation. If the moral norm of assisting victims of egregious injustice is 
addressed to the whole humanity, why only the democratic-liberal governments are to respond to 
this moral call? What is morally specific to them that they have the duty to save the rest of the 
world? Either one assumes a hierarchical moral standing or it is an ideological war to propagate 
liberalism rather than to protect victims of human rights violations, whereby the latter become 
the proxy of a liberal humanitarian imperialist agenda, which uses “human rights to sell war.”34 
Both cases challenge such a moral justification of humanitarian intervention. In the first one, 
liberalism sins against its own principle of equality by assuming that liberals are morally superior 
to others; in the second, it uses liberalism for a hidden agenda. As Carl Schimitt says, one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Humanitarian Intervention. (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999). However, others strongly oppose any 
claim to a right of humanitarian intervention. One of them is Simon Chesterman who goes through all the theories to 
justify humanitarian intervention and practices of states, yet concludes that “there is no ‘right’ of humanitarian 
intervention in either the UN Charter or customary international law.” Chesterman, Just War, 226.  
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 127. See also his Humanitarian Intervention, 92, 121, and his “Ending Tyranny in Iraq” in Ethics and 
International Affairs, Vol. 19, No 2, 2005, 11.  
32 Buchanan, “Reforming International Law”, 139.  
33 Thomas G. Weiss, “R2P after 9/11 and the World Summit” in Wisconsin International Law Journal, Vol. 24, No 
3, 2006, 742.  
34 Bricmont, Humanitarian Imperialism.  
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“invokes humanity” in order “to cheat.”35 It is a way of “denying the enemy the quality of being 
human and declaring him to be an outlaw of humanity” so that “a war can thereby be driven to 
the most extreme inhumanity.”36 
This is even more evident when almost all scholars agree that in every humanitarian war 
there are states’ interests at stake. Talking about the Security Council way of proceeding, Simon 
Chesterman observes that “the Council’s practice of delegating its enforcement powers has 
depended more upon a coincidence of national interest than on procedural legality. I would be 
naïve”, he adds, “to expect complete disinterestedness on the part of states exercising such 
delegated power.”37 At the end, one is brought back to the question: “Who has the responsibility 
to protect whom under what conditions and toward what end?”38 When one remembers that the 
nineteenth colonial enterprise and the Western imperialism were justified by humanitarian goals, 
one is forced to heed those who think that this new humanitarian order is a kind of 
neocolonialism, both as a repetition of the West conquering the non-Western world—the liberal 
dominating the non-liberal—and also the continuation of colonial rule through the postcolonial 
structures which perpetuate economic domination of the West on the rest of the world. Hence, 
for scholars such as Mamdani, “the era of international humanitarian order is not entirely new. It 
draws on the history of modern Western colonialism. At the outset of colonial expansion in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political. Trans. by George Schwab. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2007), p. 54. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Chesterman, Just War, 165. See also D. J. B. Trim, “ ‘If a Prince Use Tyrannie Towards his People’: Interventions 
on Behalf of Foreign Populations in Early Modern Europe”, 43; John Bew, “ ‘From an Umpire to a Competitor’: 
Castlereagh, Canning and the Issue of International Intervention in the Wake of Napoleonic Wars”, 137; Matthias 
Schulz, “The Guarantees of Humanity: the Concert of Europe and the Origins of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877”, 
204; Maeve Ryan, “The Price of Legitimacy in Humanitarian Intervention: Britain, the Right of Search, and the 
Abolition of the West African Slave Trade, 1807-1867”, 243; William Mulligan, “British Anti-Slave Trade and 
Anti-slavery Policy in East Africa, Arabia and Turkey in the Late Nineteenth Century”, 258. All these references are 
found in Brendan Simms and D.J.B. Trim, Eds. Humanitarian Intervention: A History. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). See also Jane Stromseth, “Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Incremental 
Change” in J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, Eds. Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political 
Dilemmas. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 257.  
38 Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors, p. 276.  
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eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, leading Western powers—Britain, France, Russia—claimed 
to protect ‘vulnerable groups’.”39 In other words, humanitarian intervention follows the same 
pattern: the same actors using the same justification for the same end: domination. 
This view of humanitarian intervention as a neocolonialism constitutes the practical 
challenge to human rights project. For if, as Shue has earlier shown, human rights cannot be 
protected against their most dangerous threat, the state, because such an exercise is a 
neocolonialism, then the human rights project fails irremediably. Hence, the goal of this chapter 
is to elaborate this challenge and it is structured by three points. In the first place, since many 
scholars claim that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention originates from the just war theory 
as its moral bedrock, I revisit this theory, touching on key authors such as Thomas Aquinas, 
Francisco de Vitoria, Francisco Suarez and Michael Walzer, to see if they justify any kind of 
humanitarian intervention. The second point will look at the international law before, in and after 
the UN Charter as well as to some cases claimed to be instances of humanitarian intervention. 
Finally, we will see why and how some scholars characterize this practice of humanitarian 
intervention as neocolonialism.  
2.1. Humanitarian Intervention and Just War Theory 
When scholars are searching for the moral underpinning of humanitarian intervention, 
they go back to the just war theory. According to Chesterman, “the classical origins of what 
became known as humanitarian intervention lie in the emergence of a substantive doctrine of just 
war in the Middle Ages.”40 As for Francis Kofi Abiew, he asserts that “the ethical legitimacy of 
criteria for action relates directly to the question of whether the international community does 
have a moral duty to intervene to end egregious human rights violations that are conscience-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Ibid. 
40 Chesterman, Just War, 9.  
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shocking.” He adds, “These criteria are not new, for they are based on the principles of ‘just war’ 
theory.”41 In other words, both Chesterman and Abiew believe that the moral question 
confronted by humanitarian intervention justification is related to those found in just war theory. 
Now, in that tradition, Thomas Aquinas and Francisco de Vitoria are frequently mentioned. 
Francis Kofi Abiew, again, remarks that “St. Thomas Aquinas made references on the basis of 
religious solidarity to the effect that a sovereign has the right to intervene in the internal affairs 
of another when the latter greatly mistreats its subjects.”42 He holds the same opinion on Vitoria, 
saying that “Vitoria…contended that resistance to the heathen princes to the Christian 
missionaries and measures to force the Indians to return to paganism would entitle the Pope to 
remove the Indian Princes and justified war.”43 But what do they really say about humanitarian 
intervention? –noting that this a rereading of their writings under the prism of our current 
understanding of humanitarian intervention, since the concept itself did not exit then. How is it 
integrated into the just war theory they developed? In order to answer these questions, I have 
chosen four authors and I present them in chronological order: Aquinas, Vitoria, Suarez, and 
Walzer. I have taken Walzer because he is a modern author who has reconsidered the question of 
war as first a moral problem that can be argued about through a moral discourse.  
Before I present each author, however, it is important to notice that the just war theory 
can be summarized by two concepts of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, although one can add jus 
post bellum. These three concepts prescribe principles to be followed respectively for, during 
and after waging a war. Jus ad bellum is generally defined by seven principles: just cause, proper 
authority, right intention, reasonable hope of success, overall proportionality, war as last resort 
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Gunmen” in Criminal Justice Ethics, Vol. 29, No 2, 2010, p. 98.  
42 Abiew, The Evolution, 34.  
43 Ibid., 34-5.  
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and peace as the end of war.44 The first three constitute its core. As for jus in bello criteria, they 
are mainly related to the proportionality of means used during war and the immunity of non-
combatants. Jus post bellum does not have fixed norms; it varies according to different authors. 
That is why just war theory is generally concerned with the two concepts of jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello, and those will be our focus here, although we might mention here and there just post 
bellum. It is also worth noting that humanitarian intervention is mostly concerned with jus ad 
bellum, since it is about finding the right cause to use forceful coercion.  
a). Humanitarian Intervention and Jus ad bellum—Aquinas 
It is recognized that the classical just war theory took form with St. Thomas Aquinas. He 
talks about war in the second part of the second part of his Summa Theologica, question 40 (ST 
II-II, Q. 40). While the question is framed in theological terms—is it sinful to wage war?—it is a 
moral inquiry into the legitimacy of warfare. That is why the arguments he gives are moral, 
although they are sometimes justified by theological or biblical quotations. To this question, 
Aquinas gives a positive answer, as long as three criteria –jus ad bellum—are fulfilled and the 
first of them is a legitimate authority. As he puts it, “three things are required for a war to be 
just,” and “the first requirement is that the ruler at whose command the war is to be waged have 
the lawful authority to do so.”45 He justifies this first rule by two negative reasons and one 
positive. First, war has to be commended because a private citizen seeks reparation of injury 
endured through his/her superior. In other words, if he suffers an injury from another political 
authority, he/she is to report the case to his/her political legitimate authority who can then avenge 
him by waging a war against the injuring party. In Aquinas’s words, “it belongs to no private 
citizen to initiate war, since private persons can pursue vindication of their rights through the 
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45St. Thomas Aquinas, On Law, Morality and Politics, 2nd Ed., Trans. by Richard J. Regan. 
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decision of their superiors.”46 Second, a private citizen does not have the moral authority and 
political power to summon people to wage war. Those are the two negative reasons; the positive 
one is the protective role that rulers have to play, both within and without their jurisdiction. 
Hence, in the same way “they lawfully use physical weapons to defend the commonwealth 
against domestic rebels when they punish malefactors,” the same way they are allowed “to use 
weapons of war to protect the commonwealth against foreign enemies.”47 In the line of 
Aquinas’s argument, a just war is a punitive war, and this leads to the second requirement for 
waging a war to be just: it should have a just cause which is to correct a wrong committed. He 
states, “there needs to be a just cause to wage war, namely, that the enemy deserves to have war 
waged against it because of some wrong it has inflicted.”48 According to his reference to 
Augustine, one infers that the wrong inflicted is a failure to rectify a wrong committed or to 
bring back property seized.  
Looking at the way he formulates it, one might think that Aquinas is for avenging a very 
wrong committed anywhere. However, taking this second requirement with the first one, it 
becomes clear that the punitive war is limited by the jurisdictional limitations of the legitimate 
authority. The latter cannot have right to avenge the injury committed outside his/her 
jurisdiction. This clashes with Abiew’s claim that “St. Thomas Aquinas made references on the 
basis of religious solidarity to the effect that a sovereign has the right to intervene in the internal 
affairs of another when the latter greatly mistreats its subjects.”49 At least for now, it is not clear 
how one would justify such a war from Aquinas’s principles.50 But there still is a third criterion: 
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the right intention. According to him, “those waging war need to have a right intention, namely, 
an intention to promote good and avoid evil.”51 
In the eyes of those who suspect humanitarian intervention of neocolonialism, this is even 
harder to fulfill if one wants to justify humanitarian intervention in a liberal manner as Tesón 
does and taking into account the states’ interests that are always involved. Indeed, once more 
using St Augustine, he notes that “desire to harm, vengeful cruelty, insatiate and implacable 
animus, savagery in renewing combat, lust for dominance, and the like are justly condemned in 
the matter of waging war.”52 If anything else, lust for dominance—ideological if not economic 
domination—is definitely part of the humanitarian advocates. Responding to accusation that he 
is promoting imperialism through his doctrine, Tesón, for example, responds that “if being a 
humanitarian imperialist means advocating that the hegemony use its might to advance (by 
appropriate moral means [what are they?]) freedom, human rights, and democracy, then I am a 
humanitarian imperialist.”53 In other words, he does not mind the use of humanitarian 
intervention in order to spread liberal values. Although this is not necessarily evil, it deviates 
from what is supposed to be the first intention: to help the victims of human rights violations. In 
that sense, it becomes evil because it is a lie. That is why he struggles to include the right 
intention into the criteria for humanitarian intervention, preferring to look at the outcome, almost 
in the Machiavellic terms whereby the end justifies the means. In his own words, “what the 
intervener does is the best evidence of its intention… the humanitarian outcome should be a 
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central factor in evaluating the intention of the intervention.”54 This cannot be enough far from 
Aquinas’s view, according to whom “even if legitimate authority declares war, and the cause is 
just, wars may be unlawful because they are waged with a wicked intention.”55 
Thus, a war to be just has to fulfill these three requirements and my few discussions show 
that it would be hard to justify humanitarian intervention from Aquinas’s just war theory.56 
However, there might be another way of looking at his writings for the understanding of 
humanitarian intervention from Aquinas’s writing on tyrant. In his treaty On Kingship, Thomas 
Aquinas characterizes tyranny as “the worst form of government,”57 and therefore he suggests 
that the electoral process should allow selecting a political authority—a king in Aquinas’s 
vocabulary—who will unlikely become a tyrant. But if it happens, there are three venues. First, if 
the tyranny is not extreme, Aquinas recommends to bearing with it, because “it is better to 
tolerate a mild tyranny for a time rather than to take action against it that may bring on many 
dangers that are worse than the tyranny itself.”58 If it “is so extreme that is unbearable”—the 
second venue—Aquinas prefers public authority to the private initiative to remove a tyrant. His 
argument is that a community can appeal to a higher authority to remove him (in case he 
depended on someone else), or to revolt and to remove a political authority because by becoming 
a tyrant he forfeits his legitimacy to rule over them. In such case, “the community should not be 
accused of disloyalty if it disposes a tyrant even if it had previously agreed to obey him forever, 
since he did not rule the community as the office of king requires and thus he deserved to have 
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56 Just to mention that Aquinas does not expand his just war theory to the jus in bello or post bellum. 
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his subjects break their agreement.”59 And finally, “if no human aid is possible against a tyrant, 
recourse is to be made to God.” 60 
From this reading, even when it is a tyranny, Aquinas recommends the political 
resistance by the community,61 but he never suggests that other political communities should 
intervene on behalf of the injured ones. As James Johnson rightly puts it,  
Aquinas and his contemporaries also had a specific word for the oppression of people by their rulers: 
tyranny. Against tyranny, which manifests injustice, there is a right of defense possessed by all those who 
are the objects of the wrong done. But, if we consider Aquinas’s discussion, this right does not extend to 
neighboring temporal rulers to end the tyranny and punish the tyrant, for such rulers have no authority over 
the tyrannical ruler. The neighboring rulers may assist those directly affected by the injustice of tyrants, but 
they must be asked. This was not “humanitarian intervention” in the present-day sense but “intervention by 
invitation,” another category in present-day law.62 
 
In other words, Thomas Aquinas is not a good source for the justification of humanitarian 
intervention neither through his just war theory nor through his views on tyranny. But what did 
the late Scholastics keep from this Thomistic legacy? The next two sections will help to answer 
this question.  
b). Just War Theory When It Encounters the Non-Western World—Vitoria 
Francisco de Vitoria’s discussion on the law of war stems from the need of confronting 
the Spanish expansion in the Americas and its challenge. Hence, he asserts on the outset that he 
wants to defend “the possession and occupation” of the lands of the “so-called Indians,”63 and he 
does so by responding to four questions: “1. Whether it is lawful for Christians to wage war at 
all; 2. On whose authority war may be declared or waged; 3. What may be and ought to be the 
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causes of just war; 4. What Christians may lawfully do against enemies, and to what extent.”64 
These four questions encompass the war theory and I therefore follow it in order to see if there 
can be justification of humanitarian intervention. 
Concerning the first question whether it is lawful for Christians to wage war at all, 
Vitoria holds that “a Christian may lawfully fight and wage a war,”65 both defensively and 
offensively. The defensive war is justified through natural law, “since ‘it is lawful to resist force 
with force’.”66 With regard to the offensive war, it can be initiated to repair or to avenge an 
injury. The goal is to deter the enemy from attacking a second time, thus ensuring peace and 
security for the commonwealth and for the world. 67 
The answer to this first question gives a first condition of just cause for a war to be 
waged justly, which is similar to the classical one from Thomas Aquinas, on which Vitoria 
insists in his third question. According to him, the only permissible reason to wage war is “when 
harm has been inflicted.”68 The next question to this state is about the legitimate authority to 
declare and wage a war. 
On this point, Vitoria distinguishes the private person from the commonwealth and the 
prince. Private persons can only declare and wage a defensive war “without any other person’s 
authority, not only for the self-defense but also for the defense of their property and goods.”69 
However, this self-defense is to be immediate, “a response to immediate danger, made in the heat 
of the moment,” for a private person “does not have the right to avenge the injury, nor even, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., 297 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., 5th, 6th and 7th proofs.  
68 Ibid. 300. 
69 Ibid., 299. 
107	  
	  
	  
indeed, to seize back property which has been taken from him in the past.”70 It is because of 
these limitations that the commonwealth enters the scene. By commonwealth, Vitoria means “a 
perfect community,” i.e. “one which is not part of another commonwealth, but has its own laws, 
its own independent policy, and its own magistrate.”71 Such an entity has the authority to declare 
and wage war because “it has the authority not only to defend itself, but also to avenge and 
punish injuries done to itself and its members,”72 as a way of safeguarding the common good. In 
other words, the commonwealth has the authority to declare and wage both defensive and 
offensive wars through its monarch. 
However, its war-making has to take into account the “law of nations or human law.”73 
By this nuance, Vitoria goes beyond the moral argument to introduce a legal dimension in 
deciding the legitimate authority to declare and wage war. Therefore, according to him, “custom 
may establish the right and authority to wage war.”74 Vitoria also introduces “necessity” as an 
exception to this legitimate authority, which allows lower authorities—even a private individual 
–to wage war, if the higher one fails to defend them.75 From this second criterion of Vitoria’s just 
war theory, it is not clearly mentioned whether a prince can wage a war on behalf of citizens of 
another commonwealth. Therefore, it is not easy to justify the right of humanitarian intervention 
from the right authority criterion.  
Concerning the permissible and just cause of war, Vitoria reaffirms that the injury is the 
sole just cause—rejecting difference of religion, enlargement of empire, personal glory or 
convenience of the prince as sufficient causes to wage war. He also introduces the principle of 
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proportionality, because “not every or any injury gives sufficient grounds for waging war.”76 
Therefore, if it is not “lawful to inflict cruel punishment such as death, exile, or confiscation of 
goods to all crimes indiscriminately,” much caution should be taken to prevent war whose 
“effects are cruel and horrible –slaughter, fire, devastation” when it is for “trivial offences.”77 
These three questions sum up Vitoria’s jus ad bellum of just cause, legitimate authority 
and proportionality. One is to note that he does not include the right intention as did Aquinas. 
The fourth and last question deals with the jus in bello, through which Vitoria concedes to an 
injured party to do whatever it takes “to secure peace and security.”78 However, he strongly 
defends the immunity of an innocent, both in their lives and their property, except when they are 
killed as “accidental effect.”79 He allows the execution of enemy combatants, but the execution 
“must take account of the scale of the injury inflicted by the enemy, of our losses, and of their 
other crimes, and base the scale of our revenge on this calculation, without cruelty or 
inhumanity.”80 As to the fate of the prisoners of war, whether captured or surrendered, Vitoria 
finds that, morally, they may be killed according to the principle of equity. Nevertheless, since 
international law stipulates otherwise, Vitoria endorses that “prisoners taken after a victory, 
when the danger is past, should not be killed unless they turn out to be deserters and fugitives.”81 
Those are some principles he sets for his jus in bello. 
Is it, therefore, possible to justify humanitarian intervention from Vitoria’s just war 
theory? In his first principle, he introduces a very important new element: the scope of the 
purpose of offensive war goes beyond the borders of the commonwealth to include the peace and 
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security of the whole world. In almost similar terms as those of the present-day justification of 
humanitarian intervention, Vitoria asserts that “surely it would be impossible for the world to be 
happy –indeed, it would be the worst of all possible worlds –if tyrants and thieves and robbers 
were able to injure and oppress the good and the innocent without punishment, whereas the 
innocent were not allowed to teach the guilty a lesson in return.”82 He comes back to this 
question under the fourth question, affirming that the world “could not exist unless some men 
had the power and authority to deter the wicked by force from doing harm to the good and the 
innocent” in accord with “the law of nations and the authority of the whole world.”83 The goal of 
providing peace to the world seems to fit into the humanitarian intervention. But who are those 
men in charge to “teach the enemy a lesson”? Where do they get such authority? What is this 
“authority of the world”?  
It looks like, for Vitoria, the world as a whole constitutes a commonwealth granted with 
rights from natural law. Indeed, “if the commonwealth has these powers against its own 
members, there can be no doubt that the whole world has the same powers against any harmful 
and evil men.”84 In other words, Vitoria sees the world as a unity possessing powers, which can 
be exercised through the authorities of different commonwealths, and probably this authority is 
what he understands by “the authority of the world”. As to the manner the princes are to exercise 
the authority of the world, Vitoria states that each prince who teaches “lesson to the enemy” 
according to the “law of nations and authority of the world” serves his own interests and those of 
the world at the same time. From this view, it follows that commonwealths serve the whole 
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world indirectly, and does not clearly affirm a right of a prince to intervene on behalf of citizens 
of another commonwealth.  
A last point important to the topic of humanitarian intervention is whether it is lawful to 
replace the political authority. Vitoria does not enounce a general principle on that, but rather 
suggests the judging case by case.85 All in all, it seems that Vitoria’s just war theory does not 
give a solid source for justifying humanitarian intervention.  
However, one has to remember that Vitoria’s theory is constructed in a Christian context. 
But when talking about “barbarians,” he justifies that Christian princes could attack barbarians 
who practice anthropophagy and human sacrifices, in the name of justice. The victims neither 
need to ask for nor can they refuse the help. In Vitoria’s words, “it is lawful to defend an 
innocent man even if he does not ask us to, or even if he refuses our help, especially when he is 
suffering an injustice (iniuria) in a matter where he cannot renounce his rights, as in the present 
case. No one can give another the right to kill him, whether it be to eat him or sacrifice him;” 
especially that the victims are usually children.86 Vitoria insists on the moral rather than the 
cultural dimension of his justification. As he puts it, “it follows that the reason why the 
barbarians can be conquered is not that their anthropophagy and human sacrifices are against 
natural law, but because it involves injustice (iniuria) to other men.”87 
This is a clear case for humanitarian intervention justified on moral grounds, except that 
it involves what Anghie calls the “cultural difference” factor that influences the application of 
morality itself. Why the same argument does not apply to Christian cultures? Why injustice 
committed here does not occasion humanitarian invasion? Vitoria does not focus on the victims, 
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but on the conquest; he talks of the barbarians being “conquered”. Here is where the frontiers 
between humanitarian intervention and colonial project are blurred, and it becomes manifest 
when, writing “On the Americans Indians,” he considers “the just titles by which the barbarians 
of the New World passed under the rule of the Spaniards.”88 In other words, he is looking for a 
justification of the Spanish invasion and conquest of the American Indians. And one of the so-
called good reasons “could be either on account of the personal tyranny of the barbarians’ 
masters towards their subjects, or of the tyrannical and oppressive laws against the innocent.”89 
In such circumstances, Vitoria states that “in lawful defense of the innocent from unjust death, 
even without the pope’s authority, the Spaniards may prohibit the barbarians from practicing 
any nefarious custom or rite.”90 Put otherwise, Spaniards have the rights to judge the barbarians 
cultures and decide by their own authority whether it is appropriate to invade the “barbarians.” 
There is no reciprocity; the “barbarians” cannot judge the Christians princes and defend the 
innocent suffering under oppressing laws. The righteousness is on one side and it is to impose 
itself on the “barbarians.” Vitoria supports his view by theological and biblical arguments such 
as the fact that “the barbarians are all our neighbours, and therefore anyone, especially princes, 
may defend them from such tyranny and oppression.” And if the “barbarians” resist, the 
Christians princes “may also force the barbarians to give up such rites altogether. If they refuse 
to do so, war may be declared upon them, and the laws of war enforced upon them; and if there 
is no other means of putting an end to these sacrilegious rites, their masters may be changed and 
new princes set up.”91 There is a shift from the moral argument of the defense of the innocent 
toward the apology of a cultural and political imperialism. The end of oppression is called to stop 
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of certain acts judged “sacrilegious”—from a Christian point of view—and the setting of new 
political structures—in the image of the new masters.92 
In conclusion, while it is not easy to justify humanitarian intervention from his just war 
theory, Vitoria has set a precedent of humanitarian intervention in other parts of his work, which 
can serve both the modern advocates for humanitarian intervention and their foes. It remains to 
see if his pace was followed by a later generation of scholastics.  
c). Defense of the Innocent as a Case of Just War Theory--Suarez 
Francisco Suarez was another influential scholastic thinker who wrote on the rules and 
conditions for waging a war. He deals with it in his Disputatio XIII, while writing on Charity. 
The text is subdivided into nine sections, with seven dedicated to war, while the last two are 
devoted to sedition and duel respectively. For Suarez, “an external contest at arms which is 
incompatible with external peace is properly called war, when carried on between two sovereign 
princes or between two states,” while sedition is “a contest between the prince and his own 
states, or between citizens and their states.” As to the duel, it is a contest between individuals.93 
His just war theory is concerned with proper war, which can be both defensive and offensive. 
Like his predecessors, the defensive war is justified by natural law for “the right of self-defense 
is natural and necessary.”94 As to aggressive war, to be justly waged, it has to fulfill a certain 
number of conditions: “first, the war must be waged by a legitimate power; secondly, the cause 
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itself and the reason must be just; thirdly, the method of its conduct must be proper, and due 
proportion must be observed at its beginning, during its prosecution and after victory.”95 The first 
two conditions constitute his jus ad bellum, while the last one is for jus in bello.  
Concerning the legitimate power to declare war, Suarez draws his position from natural 
law and jurisdictional argument, and holds that “a sovereign prince who has no superior in 
temporal affairs, or a state which has retained for itself a like jurisdiction, has […] legitimate 
power to declare war.”96 In contrast to Vitoria, this “license must not be granted to a portion of a 
state or to a private person, save only within the limits of just defense.”97 The most innovative of 
Suarez’s theory compared to Vitoria, is that this principle is valid for both “Christians and 
unbelievers” because “they are founded on natural law.”98 In other words, while Vitoria seems to 
favor the Christian princes vis-à-vis barbarians, Suarez puts them on the same standing with 
regard to this first principle.  
The second criterion for waging an aggressive war is the just cause. First of all, Suarez 
rejects that military power, prestige and wealth are just causes for waging a war. From natural 
reason, a just war must have “an underlying cause of a legitimate and necessary nature,” which is 
“the infliction of a grave injustice which cannot be avenged or repaired in any other way.”99 This 
means that war has to be the last resort. Suarez lists three main injuries of such necessary nature: 
first, “the seizure by a prince of another’s property, and his refusal to restore it”; second, “his 
denial, without reasonable cause, of the common rights of nations, such as the right of transit 
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over high-ways, trading in common, etc.”; third, “any grave injury to one’s reputation or 
honour.”100 
Before turning back to this second requirement, let us look at his jus in bello and post 
bellum, regarding the proper mode of conducting war. Suarez argues for a strong protection of 
innocent persons, both during and after the war. During the period of war, “it is just to visit upon 
the enemy all losses which may seem necessary either for obtaining satisfaction or for securing 
victory, provided that the losses do not involve an intrinsic injury to innocent persons, which 
would be in itself an evil.”101 He emphases this point, adding however that innocent persons can 
be killed incidentally in order to secure the victory. As he puts it, “innocent persons as such may 
in nowise be slain, even if the punishment inflicted upon their state would, otherwise, be deemed 
inadequate; but incidentally, they may be slain, when such an act is necessary in order to secure 
victory.”102After the victory has been achieved, “a prince is allowed to inflict upon the conquered 
state such losses as are sufficient for a just punishment and satisfaction, and reimbursement for 
all losses suffered,”103 and the victorious prince may use all the enemy’s property needed to 
secure future peace, “provided that he spare [sic] the lives of the enemy.”104 Briefly, these are the 
principles he establishes for his jus in bello and post bellum.  
Coming back to the just cause criterion, from the natural law perspective, it does not give 
rise to a justification of humanitarian intervention. This point is emphasized when Suarez 
considers the third kind of injury where he rejects completely any possibility of offensive war in 
the name of humanitarian intervention. He says that “the cause is sufficient if the wrong be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Ibid., 817.  
101 Ibid., 840. 
102 Ibid., 845.  
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid., 850.  
115	  
	  
	  
inflicted upon one who has placed himself under the protection of a prince, or even if it be 
inflicted upon allies or friends.”105 This is what Johnson calls the “intervention by invitation.”106 
Concerning friends and allies, Suarez says,  
But it must be understood that such a circumstance justifies war only on condition that a friend himself 
would be justified in waging the war, and consents thereto, either expressly or by implication. The reason 
for this limitation is that a wrong done to another does not give me the right to avenge him, unless he would 
be justified in avenging himself and actually proposes to do so. Assuming, however, that these conditions 
exist, my aid to him is an act of co-operation in a good and just deed; but if [the injured party] does not 
entertain such a wish, no one else may intervene, since he who committed the wrong has made himself 
subject not to every one indiscriminately, but only to the person who has been wronged. Wherefore, the 
assertion made by some writers that sovereign kings have the power of avenging injuries done in any part 
of the world, is entirely false, and throws into confusion all the orderly distinctions of jurisdiction; for such 
power was not [expressly] granted by God and its existence is not to be inferred by an process of 
reasoning.107 
Suarez seems to reject categorically any humanitarian intervention and Richard Tuck is 
of this opinion. According to him, “the thrust of his argument was consistently against a wide-
ranging right of intervention in the affairs of other states, even where the rulers of those states 
were committing extensive crimes against their citizens, and in favor of the separateness and 
autonomy of states.”108 
However, Suarez considers other just causes beyond the principles dictated by natural 
reason.109 While he rejects most of those opinions—such as teaching true religion, avenging 
God, or the supremacy of Christian dominion—Suarez takes another stand when he considers the 
opinion that war can be waged on the “ground … that unbelievers are barbarians and incapable 
of governing themselves properly; and that the order of nature demands that men of this 
condition should be governed by those who are more prudent.”110 Although he remarks that “it is 
evident that there are many unbelievers more gifted by nature than the faithful, and better 
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adapted to political life,”111 he concedes that there might be grounds for waging war on them, for 
instance when, they are “so wretched as to live in general more like wild beasts than like men, as 
those persons are said to live who have no human polity, and who go about entirely naked, eat 
human fresh, etc.”112 In such cases, Suarez states that “they may be brought into subjection by 
war, not with the purpose of destroying them, but rather that they may be organized in human 
fashion, and justly governed.”113 He restricts this kind of war to the defense of innocent people, 
bringing it back to be a defensive rather than offensive war. As he puts it, “this ground for war 
should rarely or never be approved except in circumstances in which the slaughter of innocent 
people, and similar wrongs take place; and therefore, the ground in question is more properly 
included under defensive than under offensive wars.”114 Suarez insists that it is not the duty of 
Christian princes only, “but also for every sovereign who wishes to defend the law of nature.” 115 
Suarez seems to find a way of integrating humanitarian intervention in his just war theory 
based on natural law, allowing it to be applied to both Christians and unbelievers. He also seems 
to initiate the civilizing missions, since the purpose of such wars is not only to defend the 
innocent, but also to help “barbarians” to organize themselves politically. Finally, although he 
seems to doubt whether such “ground for war…really exists”, it is founded on cultural bias that 
considers “barbarians” as living “like wild beasts than like men.” This bias against non-
Christians is even manifest when it comes to defending innocent Christians under an unbeliever 
prince and missionary work, or natural law. In such instances, Suarez grants Christian princes 
with special permission to wage war: “if a state subject to an unbelieving prince wishes to accept 
the law of Christ and the unbelieving sovereign prevents that acceptance, then Christian princes 
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have the right to defend that innocent people.”116 He adds, “but if the same kingdom wishes to 
submit to the law of unbelievers—for example, to the Mohammedan—and its prince is opposed 
to this submission, the an unbelieving Turkish prince would not have a similar right of war 
against that other sovereign.”117 Here, it is clear that this is a defense of a cultural imperialism 
using the defense of the innocent—humanitarian intervention—in order to spread and defend a 
certain cultural belief. Naturally, such imperialism is rooted in a cultural hierarchy which posits 
Christian cultures superior to others and worthy defending. Actually, that is the explanation 
given by Suarez himself: “the reason for this distinction,” he says, “is that to prevent the 
acceptance of the law of Christ does indeed involve grievous injustice and harm, whereas there is 
no injury at all in prohibiting the acceptance of another law.”118 The same reason holds for 
defending the spreading of the Gospel and natural law, and stopping idolatry. “If any state 
wishes to worship the one God and observe the law of nature, or to listen to preachers who teach 
these things, and if the sovereign of that state forcibly prevents it from doing so, there would 
spring up in consequence a just ground for war to be waged by some other prince, even if the 
latter should be an unbeliever, and guided solely by natural reason; because war would be a just 
defense of innocent persons.”119 
From this perspective, a moral ground is provided for those who want to spread a certain 
cultural view on others, without any reciprocity, in the name of the defense of the innocent. In 
this sense, while Suarez rejects humanitarian intervention as an avenging war, he rehabilitates it 
through natural law as a defensive war, with a moral grounding that accords privileges to 
Christian princes over non-Christian ones. On this point, one is no longer sure that Suarez is 
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different from Vitoria, as Tuck suggests,120 since both advocate for the defense of the innocent 
persons, privileging one culture over others. Suarez, however, differs from Vitoria on tyranny, 
because while the latter justifies an aggressive war to end a tyrannical oppression of the 
“barbarians”, Suarez recognizes only the right to revolt of the state against its king, in direct line 
of Thomistic thinking. To sum up, Suarez’s jus ad bellum allows a humanitarian intervention yet 
one with imperialistic flavor.  
d). A Contemporary Version of Just War Theory--Walzer 
Among contemporary scholars who have reflected on war, Michael Walzer comes in the 
front line, for he retrieves the medieval reflection on war into a current reality of war, weaving it 
with stories and experiences of that sad reality. As he calls it, his reflection is “a moral argument 
with historical illustrations.”121 As a moral reflection on war, Walzer’s argument falls into the 
just war theory tradition. As he puts it himself,  
The moral reality of war is divided into two parts. War is always judged twice, first with reference to the 
reasons states have for fighting, secondly with reference to the means they adopt. The first kind of 
judgment is adjectival in character: we say that a particular war is just or unjust. The second is adverbial: 
we say that the war is being fought justly or unjustly. Medieval writers made the difference a matter of 
prepositions, distinguishing jus ad bellum, the justice of war, from jus in bello, justice in war.122 
His argument being complex, this section will only touch on his reconstruction of just ad 
bellum and on how he justifies humanitarian intervention.  
Walzer’s condition to wage a war is constructed in his theory of aggression from what he 
calls a “legal paradigm”, which he encompasses into six propositions. The first two are as 
follows: “1. There exists an international society of independent states,” and “2. This 
international society has a law that establishes the rights of its members—above all, the rights of 
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territorial integrity and political sovereignty.”123 These first two propositions represent the 
classical positivist understanding of the international society whose members are states 
understood on the model of domestic liberal society, whereby the individual has a right to private 
sphere exclusive of any external interference. Likewise, states as members of the international 
society enjoy rights that cannot be infringed without threatening their very existence. In such a 
system, “men and women are protected and their interests represented by their governments. 
Though states are founded for the sake of life and liberty, they cannot be challenged by any other 
states.”124 At this point, Walzer underscores the tension that can arise between the safeguarding 
of territorial integrity and political sovereignty and the protection of human rights. “The rights of 
private persons,” he says, “can be recognized in international society, as in the UN Charter of 
Human Rights, but they cannot be enforced without calling into question the dominant values of 
that society: the survival and independence of the separate political communities.”125 One 
already senses the difficulty of accounting for humanitarian intervention understood as 
protection of human rights, as it seems that such a practice would destroy the international 
society as the society of independent states, whereas it is the latter that sustain and execute the 
former.  
The affirmation of the first two principles that allows Walzer to define what an 
aggression is (proposition three) and from that to set the only condition for justifying a war 
(propositions 3&4). According to Walzer, “3: Any use of force or imminent threat of force by one 
state against the political sovereignty or territorial integrity of another constitutes aggression 
and is a criminal act.” 126 Because aggression is a crime, it “4. justifies two kinds of violent 
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response: a war of self-defense by the victim and a war of law enforcement by the victim and any 
other member of international society.”127 This criterion means that war is first justified as a 
defensive war, and from it Walzer deduces the sole reason for waging war. “5. Nothing but 
aggression can justify war.”128 Walzer stresses that aggression is the only reason to wage a war 
because the “purpose is to limit the occasion of war.”129 Therefore, “there must actually have 
been a wrong, and it must actually have been received (or its receipt must be, as it were, only 
minutes away).”130 Consequently, he rejects other reasons that might be argued to justify a war, 
such as ideological reasons. “Nothing else warrants the use of force in international society—
above all, not any difference of religion or politics. Domestic heresy and injustice are never 
actionable in the world of states: hence, again, the principle of non-intervention.”131 That is why 
he rejects “regime change” as a just cause for war. He states,  
According to the just war paradigm, resistance to aggression stops with the military defeat of the aggressor. 
After that, presumably, there is a negotiated peace, and in the course of the negotiations, the victims of 
aggression and their allies may legitimately look for material reparations and political guarantees against 
any future attack, but regime change is not part of the paradigm. It is a feature of just war theory in its 
classic formulations that aggression is regarded as the criminal policy of a government, and not as the 
policy of a criminal government—let alone a criminal system of government.132 
Some pages later he adds, “I do not believe that regime change, by itself, can be a just cause of 
war. When we act in the world, and especially when we act militarily, we must respond to ‘the 
evil that men do,’ which is best read as ‘the evil that they are doing,’ and not the evil that they 
are capable of doing or have done in the past.”133 Again, one wonders how it can be possible to 
justify humanitarian intervention from this point of view, if domestic injustice cannot be the 
reason for war in a world society. The last proposition is that “6. once the aggressor state has 
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been militarily repulsed, it can also be punished.”134 This punishment of aggression would be the 
version of the medieval punitive war that was justified by just war theory. But for Walzer, it 
comes as a consequence of defensive war in order “to prevent war.”135 
Compared to the classical just war theory as it has been examined above, Walzer reduces 
it, inasmuch as he only accepts the defensive war that was so obvious for the medieval writers, 
because it was justified by natural law. From a natural law premise, only the offensive war was 
problematic, but now it is completely banned by this contemporary version of the just war 
theory. It is therefore understandable that Walzer does not go through other requirements as did 
the Thomistic tradition. Moreover, Walzer works out his theory in the context of a positive 
international law paradigm, whose core element is a territorially and politically sovereign state, 
in charge of guaranteeing individual rights. Hence the conflict between holding these values and 
the protection of human rights. As Johnson aptly observes, “if we want the triumph of an 
international order in which protection of human rights justifies the interventionary use of armed 
force by third parties, then we need to be aware that it is also the protection of human rights that 
lies behind the system of international order that has produced a conception of sovereignty as 
territorial integrity, so that any armed intervention is by definition aggression that may be fought 
against.”136 Thus, it remains to see how Walzer reconciles his just ad bellum with humanitarian 
intervention.  
Although Walzer holds strongly on non-intervention, following John S. Mill, he concedes 
that there might be some instances in which boundary crossing is required, “but they… don’t 
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arise in every case of domestic tyranny.”137 He recognizes that “the ban on boundary crossing is 
not absolute,”138 and identifies  
three sorts of cases where it does not seem to serve the purposes the purposes for which it was established:  
-when a particular set of boundaries clearly contains two or more political communities, one of which is 
already engaged in large scale military struggle for independence; that is, when what is at issue is secession 
or “national liberation;” 
-when the boundaries have already been crossed by the armies of a foreign power, even if the crossing has 
been called for by one of the parties in a civil war, that is, when what is at issue is count-intervention; and 
-when the violation of human rights within a set of boundaries is so terrible that it makes talk of community 
or self-determination or “arduous struggles” seem cynical and irrelevant, that is, in cases of enslavement or 
massacre.139 
This third case corresponds to the humanitarian intervention inasmuch as it is about 
crossing the borders in order to protect egregious violations of human rights without the consent 
of the state and without it having committed an external aggression. For Walzer, “humanitarian 
intervention is justified when it is a response (with reasonable expectation of success) to acts 
‘that shock the moral conscience of human kind’.”140 This is the moral threshold for 
humanitarian intervention: massacre or enslavement. Walzer observes that, from a legal 
perspective, it is problematic because the legal paradigm recognizes aggression as the only 
legitimate cause for waging war. It is even more complicated when it is a unilateral intervention, 
because “we worry under the cover of humanitarianism, states will come to coerce and dominate 
their neighbors.”141 According to Walzer, however, since the addressee of humanitarian 
intervention is the whole humanity and not necessarily certain political leaders or particular 
political institutions, “morality…is not a bar to unilateral action, so long as there is no immediate 
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alternative,” as was the Bengali case.142 In other words, as long as the intervention is about “to 
rescue peoples threatened with massacre,”143 unilateral intervention is morally justified.  
Walzer uses the same argument to justify regime change, although not as a legitimate 
cause of war, but rather as a consequence of humanitarian intervention. He asserts that “when a 
government is engaged in the mass murder of its own people, or some subgroup of its own 
people, then any foreign state or coalition of states that sends an army across the border to stop 
the killing is also going to have to replace the government or at least, to begin the process of 
replacement.”144 And later he adds, “just wars and humanitarian interventions will often be an 
occasion for forcible and justifiable democratization—and that will sometimes require an attack 
upon tradition hierarchies and customary practices: The exclusion of women from the political 
sphere is an obvious example.”145 Put otherwise, humanitarian intervention whose main aim is to 
rescue threatened people of massacre or enslavement, opens a door to forcible political and 
cultural changes.  
This seems contrary to what he had said earlier that “the intervening forces have a 
mandate for political, but not for cultural, transformation.”146 It is true that Walzer cautions that 
“an authoritarian regime that is capable of mass murder but not engaged in mass murder is not 
liable to military attack and political reconstruction.”147 Nonetheless, he acknowledges that “it is 
not hard to find examples”148 of using humanitarianism to dominate the neighbor, as the Cuban 
case—that he mentions—illustrates it. In this context, what are the moral warrants that his 
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argument offers to quench such fears? In case there are none, isn’t it legitimate to fear that 
humanitarian intervention is going to be used as a way of spreading the liberal democratic 
culture on the non-liberal ones? Moreover, such an attitude brings us back to the cultural 
hierarchy whereby one assumes some cultural values superior to others. Otherwise, what would 
be the moral reasons for using humanitarian intervention in order to forcefully impose 
democratization and demolish traditional customs, unless one assumes that liberal democracy is 
better than any other political ideology? Walzer himself acknowledges it, when he asserts that 
“genuine democracies have not engaged in the mass murder of their own citizens (even if their 
record abroad is less satisfactory).”149 Leaving aside the meaning of “genuine democracies,” 
perhaps that their “less satisfactory” behavior abroad vis-à-vis the citizens of non-genuine-
democracies is the reason why the latter are suspicious of this moral leeway that Walzer accords 
to the former. In any case, the possibility of using humanitarian intervention for neocolonial and 
imperialistic goals is a real danger to the moral argument of humanitarian intervention.  
 
At the end of this section, except for Thomas Aquinas, all other significant writers in the 
just war theory tradition justify a possibility of humanitarian intervention which pertains to 
colonial contexts or “the cultural difference”—to use Anghie’s words, or sounds like a 
neocolonial project. That seems to justify the fears of those who think it is so. The next section 
examines whether this moral justification of humanitarian intervention finds a legal basis in 
international law. 
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2.2. Humanitarian Intervention during the Human Rights Era 
I have noted that humanitarian intervention is linked to the emergence of the human 
rights movement. That is why this section looks at the justification of humanitarian intervention 
during this period of human rights. To that end, I consider the international law view both before 
and after the UN Charter, and also to other forms of moral arguments for humanitarian 
intervention.  
a). Humanitarian Intervention in International Law before 1945 
After recognizing that humanitarian intervention sprung from the classical just war theory 
developed during the Middle Age, Chesterman observes that it “achieved its most 
comprehensive and widely publicized form in the work in of the Protestant Hollander Hugo 
Grotius.”150 Grotius is also recognized as the modern origin of international law. Hence, 
Grotius’s theory follows the just war theory in which he distinguishes private from public wars, 
although they have the same cause,151 which is an inflicted injury. According to Grotius, “there is 
no other reasonable Cause of making War, but an Injury received.”152 In that mode, war is only 
justified for self-defense, recovery of one’s property or for punishing an offense endured,153 and 
kings are the legitimate authorities to punish. Grotius, however, expands the jurisdiction of kings 
beyond their own political entities, allowing an early justification of humanitarian intervention in 
international law. Kings can wage a punishing war to avenge injury inflicted on others and in the 
name of the law of nature and the international law. In his own words, “we must also know, that 
Kings, and those who are invested with a Power equal to that of Kings, have a Right to exact 
Punishment, not only for Injuries committed against themselves, or their Subjects, but likewise, 
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for those which do not peculiarly concern them, but which are, in any Persons whatsoever, 
grievous Violations of the Law of Nature or Nations.”154 This right of punishing beyond kings’ 
normal jurisdictions is a consequence of the institution of civil society and juridical power, 
which stripped away the punishing power invested in every person by natural law. Therefore, 
these civil and juridical powers are in charge of human society “not as they have an Authority 
over others, but as they are in Subjection to none.”155 For Grotius, since the punishing power 
“proceeds from the Law of Nature” and not from the civil jurisdiction,156 any act against natural 
law can be a legitimate cause to wage a war. “For the same Reason we make no Doubt,” he says, 
“but War may be justly undertaken against those who are inhuman to their Parents,” as well as 
“against those who eat human Flesh.”157 He, however, sets some safeguard so that this theory 
might not be used to “disguise their Ambition and Covetousness, under a Pretense of civilizing 
barbarous Nations.”158 
Furthermore, although he dismisses imposition of religion as a just cause for a war,159 
Grotius accepts that “they…who persecute Christians, as such, do make themselves justly 
obnoxious to Punishment;”160 inasmuch as “the Christian Religion… is so far from doing any 
Thing destructive to human Society, that in every Particular it tends to the Advantage of it.”161 
Finally, in addition to taking arms on behalf of one’s citizens, allies and friends, Grotius asserts 
that “the Last and most expensive Reason of all for assisting others is that Relation that all 
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Mankind stand in to each other; and this alone is sufficient.” 162 In other words, the principle of 
humanity puts everyone on moral duty to help each other.  
Above all, however, Grotius poses the very question of humanitarian intervention as 
formulated in contemporary terms, when he asks “Whether we have a just Cause for War with 
another Prince, in order to relieve his Subject from their Oppression under him.”163 The founder 
of modern international law acknowledges that this question is of a different kind from the 
previous ones, because it assumes the existence of state sovereignty. Indeed, “since the 
Institution of Civil Societies, the Governors of every State have acquired some peculiar Right 
over their respective Subjects.”164 What can then be a sufficient reason to override such a right? 
For Grotius, the situation has to be extreme and unbearable to every human being. As he puts it, 
“if the Injustice be visible…as no good Man living can approve of, the Right of human Society 
shall not be therefore excluded.”165 It is clear that the answer is not straightforward, because it is 
a delicate question, especially that he categorically forbids any rebellious act against a Prince.166 
However, he justifies it as the possibility of someone else doing what another person cannot do. 
Following his explanation, there is no need of the oppressed subjects to request for help. “The 
Right of human society” should assume its responsibility wherever a situation of unbearable 
injustice occurs. In his own words, “whenever the Obstacle to any Action arises from the Person, 
and not from the Thing, then what one is not allowed to do himself, another may do for him; 
supposing the Case be such, as one Man may be serviceable in it to another.”167 He gives 
examples of “a Guardian, or any other,” who “may carry on a Suit of Law for a Minor, because 
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he is not capable of doing it himself; and any one may without an Order or Commission plead for 
a Person absent.”168 One has to underline that the incapacity at issue here is not a physical but a 
moral one, because for Grotius, subjects are never morally justified to raise arms against their 
prince.  
Following this reading, it is more than evident that for Grotius, state sovereignty is not 
absolute and therefore boundary crossing may be justified in the name of natural law and law of 
nations, for helping others (king’s subjects, allies, friends or anybody else), and for humanitarian 
reasons.  
However, all international lawyers who followed him did not embrace Grotius’s views. 
One of them to strongly oppose any interference with state sovereignty was Emer de Vattel. For 
Vattel, sovereignty means independence from external interference169 and it is the source of 
security and tranquility among nations. The latter being equal, “the natural society cannot 
subsist, unless the natural rights of each be duly respected.”170 Later he adds, “the laws of natural 
society are of such importance to the safety of all states, that, if the custom once prevailed of 
trampling them under foot, no nation could flatter herself with the hope of preserving her 
national existence, and enjoying domestic tranquility, however attentive to pursue every measure 
dictated by the most consummate prudence, justice, and moderation.”171 In other words, morality 
alone would not be enough to preserve international peace and security, once the non-
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interference principle is not observed. That is why for Vattel, it is the cornerstone of the 
international system.  
Although states are free and independent from each other, they owe each other an 
imperfect duty of mutual help, according to the possibility of each state, but never by force. 
Otherwise it opens the door to imperial goals, like “those ambitious Europeans who attacked the 
American nations, and subjected them to their greedy dominion, in order, as they pretended, to 
civilize them, and cause them to be instructed in the true religion,—those usurpers… grounded 
themselves on a pretext equally unjust and ridiculous.”172 It is in that regard that he criticizes 
Grotius’s view that a state can intervene to help in other states’ internal matters, finding “strange 
to hear the learned and judicious Grotius assert, that a sovereign may justly take up arms and 
chastise nations which are guilty of enormous transgressions of the law of nature.”173 Vattel 
wonders, “Could it escape Grotius, that, notwithstanding all the precautions added by him… his 
opinion opens a door to all the ravages of enthusiasm and fanaticism, and furnishes ambition 
with numberless Pretext?”174 He then gives the example of “Mahomet and his successors” who 
“have desolated and subdued Asia, to avenge the indignity done to the unity of Godhead; all 
whom they termed associators or idolaters fell victims to their devout fury.”175 
To avoid the debacle of international security and stability and to bar the route to 
imperialist ambitions, Vattel affirms a very strong statist model, without any moral right to 
violate it. He states,  
The sovereign is he to whom the nation has instructed the empire, and the care of the government: she has 
invested him with her rights; she alone is directly interested in the manner in which the conductor she has 
chosen makes use of his power. It does not then belong to any foreign power to take cognizance of the 
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administration of that sovereign, to set himself up for a judge of his conduct, and to oblige him to alter it. If 
he loads his subjects with taxes, and if he treats them with severity, the nation alone is concerned in the 
business; and no other is called upon to oblige him to amend his conduct, and follow more wise and 
equitable maxims.176 
In that respect, any state that mingles in another’s business is considered enemy and it 
shall be resisted. Even under treaties, the right of non-interference “cannot, in an affair of so 
delicate a nature as that of government, be extended beyond the clear and express terms of the 
treaties. In every other case a sovereign has a right to treat those as enemies, who attempt to 
interfere in his domestic affairs otherwise than by their good offices.”177 There is a categorical 
prohibition of interfering with state’s domestic sovereignty. But what if, one would ask, a case of 
humanitarian intervention occurs, whereby a prince violates fundamental laws and creates a 
situation of unbearable injustice—to paraphrase Grotius? What is it to be done for the 
persecuted, for instance religious groups? 
Vattel recognizes that such situations might happen and in such cases a state can come to 
help the oppressed party, but only when there is a demand. As he states, “if the prince, by 
violating the fundamental laws, gives his subjects a legal right to resist him,—if tyranny 
becoming insupportable obliges the nation to rise in their own defense,—every foreign power 
has a right to succour an oppressed people who implore their assistance.”178 It is the same case 
when there is a religious persecution.179 In other words, Vattel holds his principle of non-
interference even when there is tyranny; foreign states being allowed to intervene only on 
request, especially that he considers “a violation of the law of nations to invite those subjects to 
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revolt who actually pay obedience to their sovereign, though they complain of his 
government.”180 
If this reading is correct, then one has to disagree with Abiew that “authorities on 
international law considered humanitarian intervention to be in conformity with natural law.”181 
For, while there is a case for humanitarian intervention in Grotius’s writings, it is not so obvious 
with Vattel. For him, it would rather be what Johnson called “an intervention by invitation” 
instead of humanitarian intervention. Vattel himself, however, does not lack ambiguity. In one 
paragraph, he notes that “as to those monsters who, under the title of sovereigns, render 
themselves the scourges and horror of the human race, they are savage beasts, whom every brave 
man may justly exterminate from the face of the earth.” He does not elaborate on this, except 
referring to Hercules who delivered “the world from an Antaeus, a Busiris, and a Diomede,”182 
with a footnote indicating that they were kings “known for owning man-eating horses.”183 One 
wonders what would be the foundation of this assertion except the natural law for which he had 
criticized Grotius. In addition, he uses the same example as did Grotius.184 Perhaps the best way 
to understand him is through Jennifer Pitts’s comment that “Vattel…was deeply critical of 
civilizing interventions and of the presumptions of outsiders to interfere in the efforts of nations 
to direct their common life together, even as he upheld obligations of universal concern.”185 It 
might be also the reason why one would not run to him for a ready justification of humanitarian 
intervention, as one would do with Grotius.  
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The same difficulty of accounting humanitarian intervention in international law before 
the UN Charter is observed in the legal positivism and also in state practice. Fonteyne notes that 
Arntz was a proponent of humanitarian intervention, arguing that 
When a government, even acting within the limits of its rights of sovereignty, violates the rights of 
humanity, either by measures contrary to the interests of other States, or by excessive injustice or brutality 
which seriously injure our morals and civilization, the right of intervention is legitimate. For, however 
worthy of respect the rights of sovereignty and independence of states may be, there is something even 
more worthy of respect, namely the law of humanity, or of human society, that must not be violated. In the 
same way as within the State freedom of individual is and must be restricted by the law and the morals of 
the society, the individual freedom of States must be limited by the law of human society.186 
From the classic liberal understanding of state, its sovereignty is internally limited by 
individual rights and liberties, while it is externally under the law of humanity. At the same time, 
however, other international lawyers contended that there was no such a thing as a right of 
humanitarian intervention. One of them was the French publicist Pradier-Fodéré who held that  
This [humanitarian] intervention is illegal because it constitutes an infringement upon the independence of 
States, because the powers that are not directly, immediately affected by these inhuman acts are not entitled 
to intervene. If the inhuman acts are committed against nationals of the country where they are committed, 
the powers are totally disinterested. The acts of inhumanity, however condemnable they may be, as long as 
they do not affect nor threaten the rights of other States, do not provide the latter with a basis for lawful 
intervention, as no State can stand up in judgment of the conduct of others. As long as they do not infringe 
upon the right of other powers or of their subjects, they remain the sole business of the nationals of the 
countries where they are committed.187 
The same positions were found in Italian188 and German189 schools. In other words, even 
in the positivist international law, the right of human intervention was not unanimously asserted.  
As to the state practice before the UN Charter, the study edited by Simms and Trim 
documents all interventions in Europe since the sixteenth century, in order to show that the idea 
of humanitarian intervention is not as new as it appears. As early as in the sixteen century, 
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“Elizabeth I (r. 1558-1603) intervened in France against its Vallois monarchs and the 
Netherlands against its Spanish Habsburg rulers, on multiple occasions.”190 Similar actions were 
carried by the French Cardinal Richelieu in Germany and by Protestant princes who came to the 
help of minority Protestants in Catholic kingdoms.191 In brief, as Brendan Simms puts it, “the 
historical reality is that states had always intervened in each other’s domestic affairs, either to 
secure strategic advantage, or to protect the rights of co-religionists, or the political liberties of 
the populations, or for the three reasons combined.”192 
Following this observation, during this period, humanitarian motives were mixed with 
strategic, political interests, and religious motivations. That is why for Fonteyne, there were no 
humanitarian interventions until the nineteenth century, with the European powers intervening in 
the Ottoman Empire. According to him, “despite such early precedents as the Crusades, several 
of which could be considered humanitarian interventions, or the 16th and 17th century religious 
war, it seems that the institution of humanitarian intervention is in fact largely a creation of the 
latter part of the 19th century.”193 He adds, “this is certainly true so far as State practice explicitly 
referring to this justification is concerned. Earlier instances of humanitarian intervention are too 
closely tied with a feeling of religious solidarity to allow them to be classified as genuinely 
humanitarian.”194 Furthermore, the same end of the nineteenth century coincides with the 
European expansion, using humanitarian pretexts to colonize the non-Western world. Fonteyne 
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rightly excludes such instances from being humanitarian –contrary to Abiew!195 —because they 
“seem to lack either a clear humanitarian motive or the highly coercive character of an armed 
intervention.”196 That is why, for him, “the analysis of pre-Charter precedents of forceful 
humanitarian intervention must be restricted to the notorious cases in Eastern Europe.”197 From 
this analysis, he wants to ground the existence of the right of humanitarian intervention under 
customary international law.198 The consequence, however, is problematic: all the five cases that 
are considered to be “genuinely humanitarian”199 are instances where European powers 
intervened in the Ottoman Empire. One then wonders whether it is imperialist motives that are 
behind the so-called genuine humanitarian intervention rather than humanitarian reasons, 
inasmuch as where the Ottoman Empire withdrew the European influence grew, such as in 
Middle East. Some scholars concur to this point. Wheeler notes that  
Frank and Rodley make three important rebuttals: first, they point out that the intervention of the nineteenth 
century Concert powers in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire have to be seen in the context of 
‘relations between unequal states…in which “civilized” states exercise de facto tutorial rights over 
“uncivilized” ones’… Secondly, they argue that intervention was legitimated only when it was collectively 
authorized by the Concert of Europe; individual state action was not permissible…Finally, Frank and 
Rodley question how far the interventions in Turkey’s internal affairs were motivated by humanitarian 
considerations.200 
Facing such challenges, even a proponent of the solidarist view of the English school, 
such as Wheeler, has to acknowledge that “the key question is not the purity of motives, but the 
relationship between motives and humanitarian outcomes,”201 confirming Chesterman’s remark 
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that “an analysis of the pre-Charter state practice illustrates the paucity of evidence of a general 
right of humanitarian intervention in customary international law.”202 This, once more, shows 
that even from state practice, the right of humanitarian intervention was not unanimously 
affirmed.  
During the same period, however, humanitarian intervention received a strong moral 
support from John Stuart Mill. Mill is, in principle, against an aggressive war for ideology. 
However, he recognizes that there might be cases where the principle of non-interference can be 
infringed. In his words, “we have heard something lately about being willing to go to war for an 
idea. To go to war for an idea, if the war is aggressive, not defensive, is as criminal as to go to 
war for territory or revenue; for it is little justifiable to force our ideas on other people, as to 
compel them to submit to our will in any other respect.”203 He hastens to add, “but there 
assuredly are cases in which it is allowable to go to war, without having been ourselves attacked, 
or threatened with attack; and it is very important that nations should make up their minds in 
time, as to what these cases are.”204 Mill distinguishes three cases which deserve attention with 
regards to the principle of non-interference: taking part in a civil war, helping a struggling people 
for freedom, and the regime change in a country. Concerning the intervention in internal civil 
war, Mill believes that “intervention of this kind has been repeatedly practiced… that its 
legitimacy may be considered to have passed into a maxim of what is called international 
law.”205 That is why, for him, only the question of people fighting for freedom deserves 
discussion, whose answer will depend on whether the oppressing power is native or foreign 
powers. If it is a native power, Mill upholds a strong non-intervention because people should 
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fight for their own freedom. For Mill, “No people ever was and remained free but because it was 
determined to be so; because neither its rulers nor any other party in the nation could compel it to 
be otherwise.”206 Commenting on this position, Walzer notes that “Mill generally writes as if he 
believes that citizens get the government they deserve, or, at least, the government for which 
they are ‘fit’.”207 And that is exactly Mill’s position. “If a people…does not value it sufficiently 
to fight for it, and maintain it against any force which can be mustered within the country, even 
by those who have the command of the public revenue, it is only a question in how few years or 
months that people will be enslaved.”208 In other words, when the struggle is internal, there 
should be a restraint on intervention unless it is for self-defense.  
It is different when the oppression is from a foreign power or is a native tyranny 
sustained by foreign arms. In this case, not only is the intervention legitimate, but also necessary, 
“the doctrine of non-intervention, to a legitimate principle of morality, must be accepted by all 
governments. The despots must consent to be bound by it as well as the free States. Unless they 
do, the profession of it by free countries comes but to this miserable issue, that the wrong side 
may help the wrong, but the right must not help the right.”209 That is why, in the case at stake, 
“to assist a people thus kept down, is not to disturb the balance of forces on which the permanent 
maintenance of freedom in a country depends, but to redress that balance when it is already 
unfairly and violently disturbed.”210 
From this reading, one infers that Mill upholds the principle of non-intervention save for 
helping a people fighting for its freedom against a foreign power and for humanitarian reasons in 
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a civil war “in which the contending parties are so equally balanced that there is no probability of 
a speedy issue; or if there is, the victorious side cannot hope to keep down the vanquished but by 
severities repugnant to humanity, and injurious to the permanent welfare of the country. In this 
exceptional case it seems now to be an admitted doctrine, that the neighbouring nations, or one 
powerful neighbour with the acquiescence of the rest, are warranted in demanding that the 
contest shall cease, and a reconciliation take place on equitable terms of compromise.”211 
One important point, however, underlines Mill’s theory. The principle of non-
intervention is based on his distinction between civilized nations and barbarian ones, and the two 
categories are not under the same regime. His theory is only for “civilized peoples, members of 
an equal community of nations, like the Christian Europe.”212 And “to suppose that the same 
international customs and the same rules of international morality, can obtain between one 
civilized nation and another, and between civilized nations and barbarians, is a grave error, and 
one which no statesman can fall into, however it may be with those who, from a safe and 
unresponsible position, criticise statesman.”213 The reason he gives is that, on the one hand, there 
cannot be reciprocity between the civilized and the barbarians; on the other hand, the latter are 
still on the stage whereby they should be conquered and kept under foreign subjection. That is 
why, for Mill, “a violation of great principles of morality it may easily be; but barbarians have no 
rights as a nation, except a right to such treatment as may, at the earliest possible period, fit them 
for becoming one.”214 In such a context, since “the barbarians” do not even have a right to be a 
nation and are not reciprocally recognized, the principle of non-interference does not apply and 
“a civilized government cannot help having barbarous neighbours… after a longer or shorter 
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interval of forbearance, it either finds itself obliged to conquer them, or to assert so much 
authority over them…”215 
Mill abolishes non-intervention and institutes conquest and colonialism for the non-
European peoples, and in this context, the question of humanitarian intervention does not even 
arise, because no actions injurious to humanity can be committed against them! In this sense, 
Michael Doyle’s observation that “today, Mill’s most controversial case of disregard would be 
benign colonialism”216 is a euphemism.  
To sum up, before the UN Charter right of humanitarian intervention was not 
unanimously held both from natural law authorities and the positivist legal lawyers as well as in 
state practice . When it was possible to justify it—as with Grotius—there was a risk of opening a 
door to colonialism, and even the moral argument developed by J. S. Mill for humanitarian 
intervention turned out to be an apology for hard colonialism. This conclusion seems to back up 
those who are afraid that humanitarian intervention might be another form of neocolonialism. 
But before getting there, let look at how it is in the period following the UN Charter. 
b). Humanitarian Intervention since the UN Charter 
As I have noted, the UN Charter authorizes the use of force for ensuring peace and 
security but not for the protection of human rights, although they are part of its purposes. “The 
Charter clearly privileges peace over dignity…protection of human rights is limited to the more 
or less hortatory provision of Articles 55 and 56.”217 However, international lawyers do not agree 
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on the interpretation of the Charter’s art. 2(4), and 2(7) which prescribe the non-interference. 
Some affirm that it does not prohibit humanitarian intervention while others hold the contrary 
opinion.  
One of the strong voices interpreting art 2(4) in favor of humanitarian interpretation is 
Fernando Tesón. Defining humanitarian intervention in a liberal sense218 as “the use of 
international force to help victims of government-directed human rights deprivations,”219 he 
argues that art. 2(4) does not prohibit humanitarian intervention if one interprets it through his 
ethical theory of international law, rather than the positivist one. According to his reading of the 
“language and original intent,” art. 2(4) does not prohibit the use of force. “The article requires 
states to refrain from using force only when that is against the territorial integrity and political 
independence of other states, or ‘in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the 
United Nations’.”220 Following his interpretation, the words of this article do not prohibit every 
use of force across borders; rather they “seem to suggest that the drafters established three target 
prohibitions. The use of force is banned: a) when it impairs the territorial integrity of the target 
state; b) when it affects its political independence; or c) when it is otherwise against the purposes 
of the United Nations.”221 Now, since in his understanding, “a genuine humanitarian 
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understanding does not result in territorial conquest or political subjection,”222 his first two 
conditions are verified. 
However, Chesterman responds to this conclusion that any interpretation that claims that 
the use of force does not violate territorial integrity and political independence, “runs contrary to 
numerous statements by the General Assembly and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
concerning the meaning of non-intervention, and is inconsistent with the practice of the Security 
Council, which has on numerous occasions condemned and declared illegal the unauthorized use 
of force notwithstanding its temporary nature.”223 Thus, there is discordance here. 
As for (c), Tesón notes that it does not need discussion because the promotion of human 
rights is part of the Charter’s purposes.224 “Therefore, the use of force to remedy serious human 
rights deprivations, far from being ‘against the purposes’ of the U.N. Charter, serves one of its 
main purposes. Humanitarian intervention is in accordance with one of the fundamental purposes 
of the U.N. Charter. Consequently it is a distortion to argue that humanitarian intervention is 
prohibited by article 2(4).”225 Again, Chesterman replies that an interpretation of the art. 1(3) of 
the U.N. Charter “as in any way justifying a right of unilateral humanitarian intervention would 
stretch even the Orwellian school of interpretation.”226 In other words, even from this point of 
view, humanitarian intervention is not legally justified for all writers. 
But Tesón does not limit his exploration on the original intent only. He also examines the 
Travaux préparatoires and the Nuremberg trials, and concludes that the textual reading of 
original intent cannot respond to questions about humanitarian intervention doctrine. According 
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to him, it is rather to be determined through customary international law, “and that can only be 
determined by examining state practice in the light of an appropriate substantive moral 
theory.”227 Writing in 1988, he considers four cases: the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda in 
1979, The French Intervention in Central Africa 1979, the intervention of India in East Pakistan, 
1971 and the intervention of the United States in Grenada, 1983.228 For Tesón, these 
interventions set a precedent in customary international law, that individual human rights have 
priority over the inviolability of state sovereignty. Any government that violates those rights 
jeopardizes its claim to sovereignty and by the very fact, justifies a right of humanitarian 
intervention to rescue those endangered by the government. Hence, “the four precedents…stand 
for the proposition that governments owe their legitimacy to something more fundamental than 
sheer political power. Governments exist to make sure that human rights are respected. If we 
discount rhetoric, the international community has reacted eloquently toward these apparent 
breaches of international law. It is no longer possible to ignore these cases and dismiss them as 
not counting in the formation of customary rules.”229 
Tesón is not alone to conclude to the existence of a right of humanitarian intervention 
under the customary international law. After studying many more cases of state practice, Abiew 
is convinced that during the cold war, “analysis of state practice…showed the existence of the 
principle of humanitarian intervention in a situation of egregious violations of human rights. The 
examples of state practice discussed here demonstrate that states believe the right of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention is available to them as an option grounded in either the Charter or 
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customary international law.”230 This spirit was reinforced by the end of the Cold War, especially 
with the international community agreeing to intervene in Somalia in 1992. According to 
Catherine Lu, “with the end of the Cold war, some western leaders began to embrace the idea of 
humanitarian intervention…The appeal of the idea, however, was not confined to western 
leaders. In supporting United Nations Security Council resolution 794 authorizing the use of 
force in Somalia in 1992, for example, various African ambassadors talked of ‘the universal 
conscience’ being aroused by the desperate plight of Somalis.”231 
Yet other scholars take a more circumspect position. For instance, Sean Murphy studies 
ten cases from the Hungarian case in 1956 to the Panama’s one in 1989-90, and suggests that in 
order to assert the right of humanitarian intervention, one has to go beyond states’ justifications 
and look at the attitude of the international community.  
If the reason for the intervention was humanitarian and criticism by the international community was muted 
or nonexistent, the incident may stand as an example of acceptance or tolerance by the international 
community of unilateral humanitarian intervention under the UN Charter. If the international community 
was highly critical of the intervention, then even if the intervening state’s primary reason for intervening 
was to protect human rights, it cannot be said that the incident supports the legality of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention under the UN Charter.232 
The problem, however, is that “the action of the intervening state in many of these cases 
was censured by third states and the United Nations.”233 Chesterman proceeds in the same sense. 
Drawing from his study of even more cases from the Belgian one in 1960 to the collective 
intervention in the 90s, Chesterman opposes Tesón’s conclusion of the existence of a 
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humanitarian intervention right. For him, “it seems clear that writers who claim that state 
practice provides evidence of a customary international law right of humanitarian intervention 
grossly overstate their case.”234 Among all those cases, only the East Pakistan (1971), the 
Uganda (1978-9) and Kampuchea (1978-9) cases are “regarded favorably in retrospect by the 
international community.”235 Nonetheless, “in none of these cases was humanitarian concerns 
invoked as a justification for the use of military force.”236 He goes ever further to challenge 
Murphy’s point that if the international community does not oppose the state’s action, it 
condones it and therefore might provide a legal basis under customary international law. For 
Chesterman, “the fact that certain actions appear to have been tolerated by the international 
community is an insufficient basis on which to ground a right of humanitarian intervention. It 
does, however, challenge the bland claim that such actions are illegal.”237 
The result of these different interpretations is that we do not have a unique stand on 
whether there is a legal right of humanitarian intervention. It then begs the question of looking at 
moral grounding of those who defend humanitarian intervention. While there are many schools 
on this subject —solidarist,238 consequentialist,239 just to mention a few!—many supporters of 
humanitarian intervention ground their moral argument on the Kantian argument of perfect duty. 
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One of them is Kok-Chor Tan who defends the duty to protect by the fact of the universality of 
human rights. For this author, “the universality of human rights means that state borders provide 
no immunity from international moral actions when the violations of rights within a country are 
severe enough.”240 According to this view, the universality of human rights overrides the state 
sovereignty, but what makes the humanitarian intervention permissible is their grievous 
violation. He then builds on Shue’s241 construction of the basic right to protect which generates 
the duty to protect. In Tan’s words, “people whose rights are being violated have a right to 
protection, and this right will require that others act in the appropriate ways to provide the 
protection.”242 Consequently, “the force of human rights can…impose a duty on the part of third 
parties to intervene to combat rights abuses where necessary.”243 Such a duty to protect is 
equivalent to humanitarian intervention. This duty to protect, however, “is at best an imperfect 
one—it is a duty that cannot be morally demanded of any particular state.”244 
This is not the view of Carla Bagnoli. Also arguing from the Kantian perspective, 
Bagnoli contends that humanitarian intervention is a perfect duty, that is, “a strict moral duty to 
intervene when fundamental human rights are violated.”245 This duty aims at protecting the 
victims as well as to punish the offenders. She grounds her argument on the Kantian concept of 
humanity, showing that human rights impose on others a perfect duty because they contribute to 
being an autonomous person. According to her, “resisting the violation of basic human rights is 
not simply a duty of charity, or something that one may or may not choose to perform. It is a 
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perfect duty whose performance is morally obligatory. It is a duty that proceeds from respect for 
humanity. Human rights, such as rights to life, liberty, personal safety, social security, and 
membership or recognition are necessary for expressing who are and exercising our rational 
agency.” 246 The consequence of this conception is that this protection does not need local assent 
to be enforced. As Bagnoli argues, “to say that protecting human rights is a moral matter is to say 
that human rights are universally binding, and therefore they are enforceable in those polities that 
do not recognize them. They have a normative force even when they are not supported 
locally.”247 If human rights are to be enforced even where they are not recognized or are locally 
supported, how can such enforcement escape from being seen as an invasion? Moreover, Bagnoli 
contends that humanitarian intervention as a perfect duty does not require the identification of 
the agent who is to perform it. But this is to abstract from an important component of 
humanitarian intervention which relies, in the last resort, on those who carry it out—especially 
that she assigns it a protective and punitive role! 
Tesón takes up this challenge, founding also his theory on the Kantian principle of 
duty,248 but also developing a political philosophy which yields an international law. His political 
philosophy is that states play an instrumental role of protecting human rights,249 and that is why 
they can enjoy their sovereignty. But if they fail their task, especially if they engage in violation 
of these rights, they forfeit their legitimacy to be protected by international law, and 
humanitarian intervention is morally and legally justified. Tesón, however, goes further to 
determine that only liberal democracies are the ones responsible for taking up this role of 
humanitarian intervention in the name of human rights. As he puts it, “while the presumption 
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should be that the oppressed people wish to be liberated from tyrants, democratic governments 
must make sure as best they can before they decide to intervene that such is indeed the case.”250 
In another occurrence, he says that “when intervening for humanitarian reasons, it is preferable 
to have the support of the community of democratic states.”251 And he morally justifies illegal 
intervention, as long as it is executed by democracies. “Sometimes,” he says, “unauthorized 
intervention by democratic governments is morally justified.”252 At the same time, he guarantees 
them immunity from intervention: “strict nonintervention is justified only among states where 
basic civil and political rights are respected—where liberty is given priority.”253 In other words, 
only liberal governments enjoy their sovereignty and we are back in the hierarchical world 
society of unequal states, with privileges for liberal governments. With such a justification of 
humanitarian intervention, those who suspect neocolonialism behind it stand on a solid ground. 
Their suspicion is even confirmed when, in such an unequal moral context, Tesón asserts that 
“the notion that states could intervene to uphold ‘a minimum degree of civilization’ has now 
matured: The ‘uncivilized’ of yesterday are the tyrants of today.”254 The message is passed over: 
the civilizing mission is not finished; it is to be carried through humanitarian intervention. The 
white man burden is transmitted to liberal democracies to uproot all tyrannies—all that are not 
liberals—in the world so that there might be ‘a minimum degree of civilization!’ And in that 
crusade, only civil and political rights count; other rights are of minimum importance!  
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In this context, there are reasons to worry about humanitarian intervention. But today, 
there is an emerging norm called Responsibility to Protect. Is it different from humanitarian 
intervention?  
c). Humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect 
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is much more linked to the Canadian initiative of 
establishing an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). But the 
Canadian government itself was responding to the concerns expressed by Kofi Annan, then UN 
Secretary General. However, the concept evolved from the scholarship of the Sudanese scholar 
and diplomat, Francis Deng, when in 1995, he coined the expression “sovereignty as 
responsibility”.255 It has to be recognized, though, that, while Deng sowed the conceptual seed of 
R2P, Kofi Annan propelled it into the international arena, and the ICISS gave it the theoretical 
framework. In 1999, Annan raised the dilemma in his Two concepts of sovereignty. On the one 
hand, he challenges those who hold onto the legality of humanitarian intervention asking, “Leave 
Kosovo aside for a moment, and think about Rwanda. Imagine for one moment that, in those 
dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, there had been a coalition of states ready and 
willing to act in defense of the Tutsi population, but the council had refused or delayed giving 
the green light. Should such a coalition then have stood idly by while the horror unfolded?”256 
And to those who believe in a humanitarian intervention evolving into a customary norm, Annan 
asks, “is there not a danger of such intervention undermining the imperfect, yet resilient, security 
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system created after the second world war, and of setting dangerous precedents for future 
interventions without a clear criterion to decide who might invoke these precedents and in what 
circumstances?”257 He would come back to these challenges during his annual report to the UN 
General Assembly of 1999 and that is how, in response to them, the Canadian government 
created the ICISS.258 The latter produced a report in 2001 which consecrated and popularized the 
concept as it bore it as a title, Responsibility to Protect.259 In 2005, the outcome document of the 
World Summit integrated the concept and States endorsed it.260 In Resolution 1674 on the 
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts, The Security Council reaffirmed it through the 
endorsing of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Outcome Document, “regarding the responsibility to 
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
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humanity.”261 Today, it has reached regional organizations, as in its Constitutive Act, the African 
Union, although not using the concept of R2P, puts on the lists of its principles, “the right of the 
Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave 
circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”262 
With all these occurrences, the concept seems to have joined world politics and for some, 
it is an emerging norm in international law.263 But what is the content of the R2P? What is its 
relationship with the humanitarian intervention as it has been developed and defended through 
human rights? Does it escape from the suspicion of conveying neocolonialism? Those are some 
questions that this section addresses.  
The R2P is built on three pillars: the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react 
and the responsibility to rebuild. In the words of the Commission, “this responsibility to protect 
has three integral and essential components: not just the responsibility to react to an actual or 
apprehended human catastrophe, but the responsibility to prevent it, and the responsibility to 
rebuild after the event.”264 The responsibility to prevent covers all the efforts and measures taken 
to ensure that a state does not fall into a situation calling for forceful intervention. These may 
include socio-economic programs, analysis of early warning signs and root causes, conflict 
management and support of local initiatives, diplomatic missions both regionally and 
internationally. “In some cases, international support for prevention efforts may take the form of 
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inducements; in others, it may involve a willingness to apply tough and perhaps even punitive 
measures.”265 For instance, preventing root causes might involve “addressing political needs,” 
“tackling economic deprivation and the lack of economic opportunities;” “strengthening legal 
protections and institutions” and sectorial “reforms to the military and other state security 
service.”266 For the Commission, “intervention should only be considered when prevention 
fails—and the best way of avoiding intervention is to ensure that it doesn’t fail.”267 
Nonetheless, it may happen that the prevention fails and in that case, there is the 
responsibility to react and this is the heart of the R2P. This responsibility to react implies many 
sectors such as political, economic and sometimes, use of coercive means. “The ‘responsibility to 
protect’,” the Report reads, “implies above all else a responsibility to react to situations of 
compelling need for human protection. When preventive measures fail to resolve or contain the 
situation and when a state is unable or unwilling to redress the situation, then interventionary 
measures by other members of the broader community of states may be required. These coercive 
measures may include political, economic or judicial measures, and in extreme cases –but only 
extreme cases –they may also include military action.”268 However, the most important element 
for the responsibility to react is the military part and that is where the R2P retrieves the question 
of classical humanitarian intervention. According to the Commission, it has to fulfill six criteria, 
all that are drawn from the just war tradition. The six elements are: “right authority, just cause, 
right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects.”269 The first two are 
the most important, while the other four are prudential criteria in decision making for 
intervention. 
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The just cause constitutes the threshold criteria and the Commission identifies “two broad 
sets of circumstances, namely in order to halt and avert: large scale of loss of life, actual or 
apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, 
or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or large scale ‘ethnic cleansing,’ 
actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or 
rape.”270 Concretely, the just cause threshold touches the “types of conscience-shocking 
situation” such as, genocidal acts, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
state collapse and natural or environmental disaster.271 Only the first four components are 
properly an object of humanitarian intervention, while the last two are rather in the realm of 
peacekeeping and humanitarian action. The Commission excludes from just cause the rescue of 
one’s nationals, any human rights violation other than those mentioned and the defense for 
democracy.272 
Concerning the right authority “to determine, in any particular case, whether a military 
intervention for humanitarian protection purpose should go ahead,” the Commission strongly 
stresses that such authority is invested in the Security Council under the auspices of the United 
Nations and rejects the unilateral intervention. It affirms, “the UN, with the Security Council at 
the heart of the international law-enforcement system, is the only organization with universally 
accepted authority to validate such operations [of humanitarian intervention]. But it does not by 
itself have any operational capacity. For the UN to function effectively as a law-enforcing 
collective security organization, states must renounce the unilateral use of force for national 
purposes. But the corollary, not always as readily accepted, is that states should be willing to use 
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force on behalf of, as directed by, and for the goals of the UN.”273 When the Security Council 
fails, two options are available: “the United for Peace” procedures and the recourse to regional or 
sub-regional organizations.274 The Commission, nonetheless, warns the Security Council that its 
failing to act in face of “conscience-shocking situations,” coalition actions will occur with two 
main consequences: first, they might be used for other goals than humanitarian, second, if carried 
legitimately and successfully, they might discredit the UN system. 
Finally, the responsibility to rebuild is about the actions conducted in a peace building 
process after the military intervention. They include the questions of security, justice and 
reconciliation, and development. Its aim is “returning the society in question to those who live in 
it, and who, in the last instance, must take responsibility together for its future destiny.”275 
After the sketch of the content of R2P, we can show its relationship to humanitarian 
intervention. First of all, it is clear that R2P is broader than the humanitarian intervention as it 
has been defined. Secondly, while it is built on the acknowledgment of state sovereignty, it 
changes its content, “from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility in both internal 
functions and external duties.”276 In explaining this shift, the Commission states that “it is 
acknowledged that sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: externally, to respect the 
sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people 
within the state. In international human rights covenants, in UN practice, and in state practice 
itself, sovereignty is now understood as embracing this dual responsibility. Sovereignty as 
responsibility has become the minimum content of a good international content of good 
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international citizenship.”277 This seems to be a big move from the Westephalian concept of 
sovereignty. Thirdly, the Commission claims that “prevention is the single most important 
dimension of the responsibility to protect.”278 If this were true, it would definitely make R2P 
very different from humanitarian intervention, which would be only a small part of the Report. 
Alas! The reality is that the Commission itself also recognizes that the “report is about the so-
called ‘right of humanitarian intervention’: the question of when, if ever, it is appropriate for 
states to take coercive—and in particular military—action against another state for the purpose 
of protecting people at risk in that other state.”279 Almost a half of the report is indeed on that 
question. 
This leads us to the last question whether R2P escapes from the biases attributed to the 
humanitarian intervention justified through the protection of human rights. It has been already 
mentioned that for some, R2P is an emerging norm in the international arena, legally, morally 
and in international relations. For instance, Tom Kabau observes that “the citation of the 
responsibility to protect concept in relation to the decisive and timely intervention in Libya is an 
indication that the concept’s continued crystallization into a proper legal norm.”280 
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However, not all agree on this assessment. Many scholars contest the emergence of R2P 
as a legal norm, while others see it, maybe, as a moral, but certainly, as a rhetorical tool. As an 
example, Mehrdad Payandeh claims that “the responsibility to protect cannot be understood as a 
norm or even as a potential norm under customary international law.”281 As to Bellamy, he 
argues that “thus far…RtoP is best employed as a diplomatic tool, or prism, to guide efforts to 
stem the tide of mass atrocities, and that it has little utility in terms of generating additional 
political will in response to such episodes.”282 And Jennifer Welch et al. argue that R2P cannot 
“avoid the conundrum surrounding the so-called right of humanitarian intervention by 
substituting the notions of ‘responsibility to protect,” because “it rests its case on a moral rather 
than a legal foundation.”283 Other scholars underline that R2P does not add anything new to the 
humanitarian intervention as it is mainly focused on it and is limited by its ambiguities.284 
If R2P is not different from humanitarian intervention, there is no surprise that it 
undergoes the same critics as a neocolonial paradigm. David Chandler, for instance, sees the R2P 
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as a way of imposing “the ‘liberal’ peace” to the non-liberal world. According to him, “despite 
the Commission’s professed concern to listen to non-Western voices and opinions, the Report 
rejects the view that where there is no consensus in the Security Council the General Assembly 
under the ‘Uniting for Peace’ provisions should have the authority… Instead, the Commission 
favours granting legitimacy to interventions by ad hoc coalitions or individual states acting 
without Security Council or General Assembly approval.”285 And for Aidan Hehir, the R2P is 
nothing else than “the emperor’s new clothes” which “creates an easily abused framework for 
Western states, and indeed powerful states generally, to intervene at will under the pretext of 
humanitarianism.286” As for Frédéric Mégret, R2P reproduces the biases of the humanitarian 
intervention.287 
Following this reading, it is clear that R2P, no more than other traditions to justify 
humanitarian intervention, does not escape from neocolonial suspicion. Indeed, from the just war 
tradition to the era of human rights under the UN Charter through the emergence of natural and 
positive international law, every justification of the protection of the innocent was directed 
against the non-Western world; the civilized against the non-civilized. Even where it was not so 
overtly affirmed, the consequence was evident. Therefore, those who suspect the new 
“humanitarian order” as neocolonial have good reasons. It remains now to analyze why the claim 
is so and how they substantiate their claims as that is the topic of the next section.  
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2.3. Humanitarian Intervention as Neocolonialism 
So far, we have seen that the way humanitarian intervention is justified gives reason to 
those who suspect it as being a new form of neocolonialism. But, how do they account for it?  
a). Humanitarian Intervention as a Moral Problem 
Humanitarian intervention mainly poses moral concerns. On the one hand, there is its 
origin, the reason it is even invoked. Many authors qualify it as “unbearable injustice” (Grotius), 
“acts injurious to humanity” (Mill), “actions shocking the conscience of human kind” (Walzer), 
or “conscience-shocking situations” (ICISS). At this level, both proponents and opponents agree 
that something should be done to alleviate such ills. For example, Mohammed Ayoob, one of the 
acerbic critics of humanitarian intervention, recognizes that “international sensibility regarding 
human rights and their violations have changed quite radically during the past 50 years and this 
reality cannot be ignored. Therefore, a moral case can certainly be made regarding the need for 
humanitarian intervention and the violation of sovereignty that such intervention may necessarily 
entail.”288 Anne Orford expresses the same feeling about the East Timor situation. Commenting 
on a leaflet calling for a rally for East Timor, she writes,  
my desire for intervention was made more urgent by the repeated representation of the Timorese as 
defenceless, powerless, ‘hysterical’ and unprotected, and by the focus on threats to babies, women and 
children… Hearing these reports left me feeling as unbearably and frustratingly powerless and helpless as 
the East Timorese. At the same time, if Australians and the international community were willing to use 
military force in response to this slaughter and devastation, we could be potentially saviours of the East 
Timorese, agents of democracy and human rights able to overpower those bent on killing and 
destruction.”289 
In other words, both spectra of the humanitarian intervention agree that it is a 
consequence of a situation that cannot leave anybody morally indifferent. 
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The question, however, arises when it comes to its justification through human rights. For 
sceptics, humanitarian intervention pretends to protect human rights, but in reality it erodes them, 
because it is built on the helplessness of the victim, who is unable to act by him/herself unless a 
messianic savior comes from away. The only available actors in the situation are the 
killers/slaughterers versus helpless victims. For Orford, such a discourse does not serve the 
revolutionary power of the human rights discourse. “The way in which international law was 
narrated in fact served to confine any revolutionary potential inherent in human rights discourse, 
such that the right of intervention in the name of human rights became profoundly conservative 
in its meaning and effect.”290 It is the same claim by Mamdani who asserts that “the discourse on 
rights emerged historically as a language of resistance to power. Its political ambition was to turn 
victims agents. Today, the tendency is for the language of rights to become the language of 
power. The result is to subvert its very purpose, to put it at the service of a wholly different 
agenda, one that seeks to turn victims into so many proxies.” 291Other writers go ever deeper 
claiming that the humanitarian intervention discourse portrays a victim as an object rather than as 
a political subject. That is the point of view of Mégret who argues that the discourse of 
humanitarian intervention constructs “‘victims’ as essentially passive, depoliticized and in need 
of international intervention. The victim is cause, object, but never actor or subject.”292 As a 
consequence, humanitarian discourse abolishes the political rights that it claims to protect. In the 
words of Mamdani,  
The international humanitarian order… is not a system that acknowledges citizenship. Instead, it turns 
citizens into wards. The language of humanitarian intervention has cut ties with the language of citizen 
rights. To the extent the global humanitarian order claims to stand for rights, these are residual rights of the 
human and not the full range of rights of the citizen. If the rights of the citizen are pointedly political, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290 Ibid., 10-1.  
291 Mamdani, “The Responsibility to Protect or Right to Punish?” in Journal of Intervention and State Building, Vol. 
4, No 1, 2010, 59-60.  
292 Mégret, ibid., 580.  
158	  
	  
	  
rights of the human pertain to sheer survival; they are summed up in one word, protection. The new 
language refers to its subjects not as bearers of rights –and thus active agents in their own emancipation –
but as passive beneficiaries of an external ‘responsibility protect’. Rather than rights-bearing citizens, 
beneficiaries of humanitarian order are akin to recipients of charity. Humanitarianism does not claim 
agency, only sustain bare life.293 
Humanitarian intervention is the promotion of “dependency.” That is why, for Mamdani, 
“humanitarianism heralds a system of trusteeship.”294 What is more problematic is the fact that 
this humanitarian intervention is targeting certain states and not all states. “Looked at closely and 
critically, what we are witnessing is not a global but a partial transition. The transition from the 
old system of sovereignty to a new humanitarian order is confined to entities defined as ‘failed’ 
or ‘rogue’ states. The result is once again a bifurcated system whereby state sovereignty obtains 
in large parts on the world but is suspended in more and more countries in Africa and Middle 
East.”295 
These authors are not without justification, for some proponents of humanitarian 
intervention advance an argument that denies the victim’s rights. In Tesón’s words, “external 
intervention aimed at overthrowing the tyrants and liberating the oppressed do not force men and 
women to fight for their rights because those rights are being denied by their government in the 
first place. They have no rights to fight for.”296 If this is the case, one can ask: if victims do not 
have rights to fight for, what are the rights the external intervention is fighting for? Either they 
bring their own rights to the victim –in which case, their intervention is unjustified –or it is 
fighting for something else–in which case, victims are only proxies. That is why this issue of 
humanitarian justification is its core moral problem.  
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Still on the rights concern, the proponent of humanitarian intervention discriminates some 
rights deserving defense over others which do not get international attention. Only political rights 
can motivate the international community and not others such as socio-political rights. For 
Tesón, “rights against the state, human rights, are the primary rights. Other types of rights, and 
particularly the right to a nation-state, are derivative.”297 And later, he adds, “qualitatively, only 
the violation of basic civil and political rights warrant humanitarian intervention.”298 While the 
focus on some rights might appear trivial to the subject, it bears heavy consequences in the 
context of humanitarian intervention. For instance, Orford remarks that the “institutionalized 
commitment to a narrow range of civil and political rights as the end of military and monetary 
intervention has shut out other opportunities for dissenting from the established order or 
achieving emancipatory ends.”299 As a consequence according to Mamdani, the crimes that 
justify external intervention become particular to a non-Western. Commenting on the case of 
International Criminal Court (ICC), he states that, “if the ICC is turning into a Western court to 
try African perpetrators of mass crimes, genocide too is becoming a non-Western crime. The 
official genealogy of genocide excludes the crimes perpetrated against Native Americans, against 
Africans in the course of modern trans-Atlantic slavery and the colonial era that followed it, as 
well as those perpetrated by the US in the course of the Indo-Chinese and Iraqi wars and counter-
insurgencies.”300 Because humanitarian intervention is oriented toward crimes that are only 
observed in other parts of the world but the West and focuses on the political and civil rights, it 
serves a biased purpose. 
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All these worries touch the heart of the humanitarian intervention, and bring into the 
forum other normative questions. One of these is the deconstruction of state sovereignty. Both 
the liberal, moral and R2P justification of human rights challenge the classical understanding of 
sovereignty. The justification from the contractual theory conditions the legitimacy of state 
sovereignty to the respect and protection of individual rights. As to R2P doctrine, I noted that it 
shifts the conception of sovereignty from control to responsibility both internally and externally. 
For those questioning humanitarian intervention, despite the claim that R2P strengthens 
sovereignty,301 intervention language destroys the concept of sovereignty. According to 
Chandler,  
rather than the traditional view that sovereignty implies non-interference, the redefined concept of 
‘sovereignty implies non-interference’ implies the right of interference if the ‘the community responsible 
states’ decides this to be in the interests of protection. The background report spells out that ‘sovereignty 
then means accountability to two separate constituencies: internally, to one’s own populations; and 
internationally, to the community of responsible states’. This shift in ‘accountability’ clearly has major 
implications for sovereignty because a power which is ‘accountable’ to another external body clearly lacks 
sovereign authority.302 
In other words, R2P, instead of strengthening sovereignty, destroys it. Yet, this is the cornerstone 
of the international system.  
This denial of the classical sovereignty under the form of responsibility is threatening the 
existence of non-Western states since this understanding of sovereignty was the source of their 
creation. Bricmont observes that international law based on non-intervention “is the paper shield 
that the Third World believed could protect it from the West at the time of decolonization.”303 
Now that it is being challenged, there are concerns that those who had robbed it in the past might 
repeat it. According to Ayoob, “during the past 50 years, following the emergence of post-
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colonial states in large numbers, the notion of sovereignty and its corollary of non-intervention 
had forced the strong to make at least mildly credible cases for intervention into the affairs of the 
weak. Sovereignty had thus acted as a restraint on the former’s interventionary instincts.”304 In 
other words, state sovereignty as control was less an impeachment for states to intervene in 
domestic affairs –“strong states have routinely intervened, even forcibly, in the affairs of weaker 
ones”305 –than the protection of weak states against the stronger ones. That is why Ayoob raises 
many concerns for removing such a barrier. First, he remarks that, “given the disparity in power 
among states, humanitarian intervention has the strong potential of becoming a tool for the 
interference by the strong in the affairs of the weak, with humanitarian considerations providing 
a veneer to justify such intervention.”306 This means that sovereignty was playing a moral barrier 
to the expansion of political realism. Now that humanitarian intervention dilutes it, authors such 
as Ayoob fear that any strong state will take humanitarianism as a pretext to advance its political 
interests, and this will disrupt the international order. That is why the second concern for Ayoob 
is that “the selective derogation of state sovereignty by the use or misuse of humanitarian 
intervention may end up detracting from the most essential instrument, the principle of 
sovereignty, that has been used for the maintenance of international order during the past four 
centuries.”307 Understandably, such a situation will be detrimental to weak states which might 
fall into more chaos than they were. In this sense, state sovereignty is also source of domestic 
stability. Once it is distracted because of the humanitarian intervention, it becomes the source of 
disorder of the international order and also the non-respect of human rights domestically. In 
Ayoob’s words,  
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State sovereignty, as a legal and normative concept, acts as the cornerstone for the only institutional 
architecture capable of providing order within territorially defined political communities. It goes without 
saying that the preservation of domestic order is essential for the maintenance of international order. But 
preserving domestic order is also essential for the attainment of other values, including human rights, that 
most people hold dear. By eroding the legal basis of sovereign authority, humanitarian intervention, 
especially as practiced during the past decade, may be opening the floodgates for domestic disorder. This, 
in turn, could negatively affect international order as well as the individuals’ most basic requirements for 
civilized existence.308 
These points show that, by changing the essence of sovereignty and diluting it, humanitarian 
intervention is rather creating a world of domination of strong states over weak ones, and 
through that, it has become a source of internal disorder and it disrupts international order.  
Another normative question derived from the justification of humanitarian intervention is 
the conception of an international community. In the language of humanitarian intervention, an 
international community is to take over the protection of human rights when a state fails to fulfil 
it, or when it engages in their violation. In general terms, the international community seems to 
designate all other states but the one concerned. According to Payandeh’s observation, 
“international community [consists] of states, regional organizations, civil society, and the 
private sector.”309 Yet, as we have already seen with some proponents of humanitarian 
intervention –such as Tesón —only liberal democracies are the legitimate authority to carry it 
out. In that case, as Ayoob observes, “a major problem emerges from the fact that the new 
interventionary logic ‘presupposes the existence of a meaningful international community in 
whose name intervention may be carried out’,”310 because it begs the question of what is then the 
so-called international community, beyond the general terms.  
From the challengers of humanitarian intervention, “international community” is an 
acronym for the West, and is conceived as the antithesis of the Third World. According to 
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Orford, “The Third World has long been imagined as the double or other of the ‘the West’, now 
the international community.”311 The international community is that of “ordered world” with the 
mission to bring order to a troubled one; it is that of stable states determined to fix the rogue or 
failed/failing states. This is consonant with the construction of the victim as helpless, which 
provides a heroic character to the intervener. In a way, we retrieve the colonial stereotypes of 
civilized-uncivilized and Mill’s argument that a civilized nation cannot stand a barbarous 
neighbor. Drawing from feminist and postcolonial literature, Orford sums up what is an 
international community and how it is operating. She says,  
The values of the new world order are defined through actions taken against just such secondary character –
those disordered or evil rogue states, whose leaders need to be taught that the hard body of the international 
community can impose its will on them. Identification with the potent character of NATO or the Security 
Council is facilitated through the creation of a character lacking power and authority. The heroic narrative 
depends upon the constitution of that second passive character which the hero is able to shape or act upon 
in order to make his mark upon the world. International organizations and major powers are imagined as 
the bearers of human rights and democracy, while local peoples are presented as victims of abuses 
conducted by agents of local interests. The people of states in Africa, Asia, South America and Eastern 
Europe are portrayed as childlike, primitive, barbaric or unable to govern themselves. Those peoples are to 
be refashioned as an extension of the self of the hero. Through the deployment of such colonial stereotypes, 
the international community is ‘defined in and through the white male body and against the racially marked 
male body’.”312 
Following this discussion, it is evident that those who doubt the good faith of humanitarian 
intervention do not do it only from a realistic point of view, but also have some solid moral 
arguments against it. Thus being the case, it leads us to look closely at the practice of 
humanitarian intervention.  
b). Humanitarian Intervention in Practice 
Following the conception and the content of the so-called international community, one 
wonders whether it intervenes for the rights of the victims or rather for their own interests, both 
geo-political and psychological. Moreover, it raises the question of who decides what state is 
failing and that the intervention is justified. Supposing that we follow the general standard that 
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only the UN Security Council is the legitimate organ to deal with these questions, UN itself does 
not have a military force. Therefore, states providing these forces have to decide it at the national 
level.313 That is why Ayoob is right on the target when he says that “it is… impossible to prevent 
considerations of national interest from intruding upon decisions regarding international 
intervention for ostensibly humanitarian purposes,” which “complicates the problem of 
deciphering the international will.”314 This cannot not fail to recall the colonial expansion, which 
used “anti-slavery and slave trade policy… to justify imperial expansion to an electorate which, 
until the 1880s at least, was sceptical about the acquisition of colonies.”315 
The proponents of humanitarian intervention such as Nicholas Wheeler responds that 
“the key question is not the purity of motives but the relationship between motives and 
humanitarian outcomes.”316 But, since normally, humanitarian intervention is justified by human 
rights, it becomes difficult to see how an intervention is going to have a “humanitarian 
outcome”, when human rights are not its motivating cause. For according to Orford, “the practice 
of military intervention and post-conflict reconstruction limited the opportunities to make use of 
the radical potential of human rights to subvert the established order of things.”317 She continues, 
“in this sense, we are not now at the end of the human rights era. A commitment to human rights 
has long ceased to be the foundation of the work of the UN and other international organisations 
[that is the international community], if it ever was. Human Rights activists and scholars were 
aware well before 11 September 2001 that human rights and self-determination were not the 
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priorities of powerful states.”318 In this context, it is hard to convince the skeptics that 
humanitarian intervention can have a humanitarian outcome.  
This leads to the questions of the authors of humanitarian intervention, from the level of 
evaluating to the execution through the decision-making. Even when scholars such as Bagnoli 
claims that the legal duty for humanitarian intervention should be an organ with supranational 
authority,319 questions as “who decides whether a situation has risen to the level of such crisis? 
Who defines the crisis is truly one of extreme necessity? Who decides whether the force 
deployed is appropriate and commensurate with the necessity? Who decides whether the motive 
of the intervener is humanitarian, as distinct from self-aggrandizing?”320—these questions 
remain unanswered until we look at the practice of humanitarian intervention.  
From Vitoria to R2P through Mill and Tesón, humanitarian intervention has been carried 
by powerful states against weak ones, those civilized against those uncivilized, the West against 
the non-West world. Concerning the nineteenth century, Trim states that “it is notable that 
intervention has typically been undertaken against weaker states.”321 He continues, “to some 
extent it reflected a double standard among European liberals: civilised states and peoples might 
be guilty of excesses from time to time, but intervention ought not be practised against them, 
since all civilised polities were at a roughly equal stage of development. Uncivilised peoples and 
kingdoms, however, were not full members of the international system (invented and self-
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defined by European states!); they were thought to be at a more primitive stage of development, 
which meant they were inherently likely to commit acts of appalling barbarism, brutality and 
cruelty.”322 He completes his argument saying, “intervention by civilised, enlightened polities 
against uncivilised peoples or rulers was perceived as almost natural.”323 This shows that the 
justification of humanitarian intervention in the nineteenth century fits into the colonial scheme 
both in its language and its goal. 
In the era of human rights, humanitarian intervention doctrine is also based on the 
distinction between the liberal West which champions it against the non-liberal part of the world 
which suspects it at best, or rejects it at worst.324 As Pitts notes, “debate around humanitarian 
intervention often occupy the perspective of those powerful states that regard themselves as 
liberal and democratic, asking what ‘we’ liberal democrats should do about the problems out 
there.”325 Humanitarian intervention is another expression of paternalism, and that is why those 
concerned states repulse it. They resent it as a continuation of the Western civilizing mission. 
Already at the beginning of the 90s, a Zimbabwean official had expressed his “apprehension 
about who will decide when to get the Security involved in an internal matter and in what 
manner,” asking, therefore, that “great care…be taken to see that the domestic conflicts are not 
used as a pretext for the intervention of big Powers in the legitimate domestic affairs of small 
States, or that human rights issues are not used for totally different purposes of destabilizing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 Ibid. 
323 Ibid.  
324 According to Priyankar Upadhyaya, “weak states have apprehensions about the possible misuse of humanitarian 
intervention; however, this is not the issue with the powerful countries. For them the critical concern is how to 
ensure the effective implementation of such intervention.” see Priyankar Upadhyaya, “Human Security, 
Humanitarian Intervention, and Third World Concern” in Denver Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 
33, No 1, 2004, 87. One might argue that the three cases of humanitarian intervention during the Cold War were 
discharged by non-Western states, but we have seen that they never justified their actions by humanitarian purposes.  
325 Pitts, “Intervention and sovereign equality”, 133.  
167	  
	  
	  
other Governments.” 326 As for Welch, she observes that “the Non-Aligned Movement… and the 
Havana Group of 77 Summit…categorically rejected the so-called rights of humanitarian 
intervention.”327 China, one of the leading voices in that trend, commented that “The Chinese are 
very familiar with such ‘humanitarian intervention’ in their past and see it as a tool that was 
often used by advanced countries to conquer so-called ‘barbarous ones’ and to impose ‘civilized 
standards’.”328 In other words, most non-Western governments are against humanitarian 
intervention because they are convinced of its susceptibility to political manipulation.  
It is also the opinion of many scholars who believe that the international humanitarian 
order practically targets non-Western states. Ayoob, for instance, explains that these states are 
still in their unfinished state-making process which, inherently, implies some violence. 
Moreover, being economically poor and socially unstable, “these political and socioeconomic 
attributes, which make such states acutely vulnerable to internal dissention and external 
interference, greatly influence their attitudes toward humanitarian intervention and international 
administration.”329 Consequently, “they are apprehensive of the new international activism and 
the developing norm of humanitarian intervention that could potentially threaten their status.”330 
Mamdani goes in the same line, arguing that the language of humanitarian intervention “justifies 
interventions by the big powers as an antidote to malpractices of newly independent small 
powers.”331 Today, humanitarian intervention is even supported by an international justice that is 
at the service of great powers. As he puts it, “the emphasis on big powers as the enforcers of 
rights internationally is increasingly being twinned with an emphasis on big powers as enforcers 
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of justice internationally.”332 Jennifer Pitts gets the whole point when she states, “in the decades 
following decolonization, many liberals in powerful states, distraught at widespread of human 
rights abuses in postcolonial states, concluded that sovereignty could not enjoy the sacrosanct 
status it had hitherto apparently enjoyed, but instead must be circumscribed in the interests of 
human rights.”333 She continues, “while this debate is generally couched in universal terms—
sovereignty as such must be limited in the new global order –what is centrally, if often tacitly, at 
issue is the supposed sovereignty of third-world states, and the right to intervene by the liberal 
powers of the global north and by the international institutions these states dominate.”334 
As already observed, R2P also reproduces the same biases of humanitarian intervention. 
Therefore, it follows that scholars show it as also targeting the global south. For David Chandler, 
“the central area of R2P concern is the regulation of sub-Saharan Africa and, in this guise, the 
policy practice has not lagged behind the declaration of R2P intent.”335 Even Michael Ignatieff –
also one of the ICISS’s Commissioners whom Orford calls ‘human rights warrior’336 admits that 
R2P reproduces empire’s benefits in a postcolonial context. Explaining the different points 
constituting R2P, he concludes that “all of these exercises in nation-building represent attempts 
to invent, for a post-imperial, post-colonial era, a form of temporary rule that reproduces the best 
effects of empire (inward investment, pacification, and impartial administration) without 
reproducing the worst features (corruption, repression, and confiscation of local capacity).”337 
And of course, this is done by “rich countries through an intervention continuum that begins with 
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prevention and ends with sustained follow-up.”338 Ignatieff confirms what Pratap Mehta observes 
that “using ‘human rights,’ ‘democracy’ or ‘people’s sovereignty’ as a justification for 
intervention is too broad because it seems unduly to narrow the range of regimes that might be 
thought of as having a legitimate place in the international order.”339 The consequence is that “it 
runs the risk of giving legitimacy to a few powers to shape societies in light of their own values 
and images,” which is “a form of colonialism.”340 For the sceptics of humanitarian intervention, 
it is no longer a risk; it is a fact. 
All these elements prove sufficiently that both humanitarian intervention and R2P are 
suspected because they reproduce structures through which the liberal West wishes to impose the 
‘liberal peace’ –to use the expression of one of the authors. But there is another element that 
taints the practice of humanitarian intervention. It is the selectivity of the place where to 
intervene. As Ayoob once more puts it, “the problem becomes more acute when these 
‘representatives’ of the ‘international community’ choose targets for intervention selectivity 
while ignoring human rights violations of equal or greater magnitude elsewhere.”341 Edward 
Luttwark underscores that the humanitarian intervention is only for “easy cases” of weak states. 
In his words, “Kofi Annan’s real problem is not with the hard cases like China, but rather with 
the many places where his new rule could be applied all too easily: weak states in which 
‘massive’ human rights violations are a persistent reality.”342 
Talking about selectivity, the example of Rwanda immediately comes into one’s mind, 
whereby the so-called international community stood by as the genocide unfolded. However, 
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there are also other cases. Ayoob gives the example of the intervention in Northern Iraq, saying 
that “the decision in 1991 to create a safe haven for the Kurds in Iraq but not in Turkey, where 
human rights of Kurds were being violated with equal severity, cast grave doubt on the sincerity 
of the intervening powers.”343 But for Ayoob, the Palestinian case is the paradigmatic example of 
the selectivity of humanitarian intervention, because of “Israel’s continuing occupation of 
Palestinian lands in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions and its blatant violation of 
provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention, prohibiting demographic and territorial changes in 
occupied land.”344 Hence, this “has made both [humanitarian intervention and the installation of 
international administration] suspect not only in the eyes of Middle Eastern peoples but also in 
much of the rest of the third world.”345 
This selectivity creates a double standard in the practice of the humanitarian intervention, 
since some states even outside the liberal West can violate human rights and even as the UN 
Security Council passes resolutions, actions are never taken. The habit seems to be that as long 
as you are one of the big powers or a friend to one of them, you shouldn’t worry. It is what Brun 
and Hersh call the “interventionism of choice” through which there is the “so-called Western 
humanitarian intervention and regime change in some countries, while the same Western 
democracies maintain excellent relations with other tyrannical regimes… or refrain from military 
intervention in countries that are accused of violating human rights and of being 
undemocratic.”346 
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345 Ibid.  
346 Ellen Brun and Jacques Hersh, “Faux Internationalism and Really Existing Imperialism” in Monthly Review, Vol. 
63, No 11, April 2012., 45-6. These authors continue to raise the same questions as Ayoob does, saying, “connected 
to the selectivity argumentation other fundamental questions arise: why does the Western alliance under the 
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This perpetuates “the impression that the national interests of majors determine decisions 
regarding humanitarian intervention.”347 It also highlights the importance of what Mamdani calls 
“labelling.” The latter is the process through which an act is qualified as crimes warranting a 
humanitarian intervention. It has been already shown that the non-intervention in Rwanda was 
due to the influence of big powers unwilling to use the word “genocide” because then, it would 
have put burden on the international community to intervene.348 However, “labelling” also works 
in shielding the big powers and their friends from being targeted for humanitarian intervention.  
Mamdani stresses this issue, for it ends up making the crimes only non-Western. He takes 
the example of Iraq and Darfur to show the importance of naming through which, “the 
distinction between war, counter-insurgency and genocide is blurred in practice,” because “all 
three tend to target civilian populations.” 349 In his narrative, Iraq and Darfur were both “counter-
insurgencies,” the Iraqi one “grew out of war and invasion,” while the Darfuri one was “a 
response to an internal insurgency.”350 In Mamdani’s evaluation, “if you were an Iraqi or a 
Darfuri, there was little to choose between the brutality of the violence unleashed in either 
instance. Yet, much energy has been invested in how to define the brutality in each instance: 
whether as counter-insurgency or as genocide.” He continues, “we have the astonishing spectacle 
whereby the state that has authored the violence in Iraq, the United States, has branded an 
adversary state, Sudan, one that has authored violence in Darfur, as the perpetrator of genocide. 
Even more astonishing, we have a citizen’s movement in America calling for a humanitarian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
leadership of the United States accept the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory and the suppression of that 
people’s national aspirations? Considered to be the ‘only democracy in the Middle East,’ Israel gets economic, 
political, and military support from the United States and the European Union without consideration of its 
oppressive policies and occupation being in contravention to international law! Double standard is crying out loud 
for those willing to listen.” Ibid., 46.  
347 Ayoob, “Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty”, 87.  
348 Pogge, ibid., 161. 
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intervention in Darfur, while keeping mum about the violence in Iraq.”351 This comment sheds 
light to two important points. First, the victims are not the ones determining what is happening to 
them. This is determined outside, far from their reach and decided by those who might be 
accused of the same crimes. Second, as a consequence, those determining the crimes find better 
terms for their own misconducts, so that they might escape from the fate of humanitarian 
intervention. That is why Mamdani’s conclusion on the effects of the labelling is without 
ambiguity: 
Labelling is important, most obviously for legal reasons. Where mass slaughter is termed genocide, 
intervention becomes an international obligation; for the most powerful, the obligation presents an 
opportunity. But if genocide involves an international obligation to intervene, war and counter-insurgency 
do not… for they are understood as part of the exercise of sovereignty of states. They give expression to the 
normal violence of the state, the reason why states are said to have armies and armed forces. Labelling 
performs a vital function. It isolates and demonizes the perpetrators of one kind of mass violence, and at the 
same time confers impunity on perpetrators of other forms of mass violence.352 
This partiality in the assessment of humanitarian intervention signs another blow to the 
legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. It condemns some and absolves others for political 
interests rather than moral reasons. That is why, for those challenging humanitarian intervention, 
the doubt about its moral foundation and the fairness in its practice are clear signs that 
humanitarian intervention is another form of colonialism. 
c.). Humanitarian Intervention as Neocolonialism353 
Generally, neocolonialism is a concept that is generally used to designate the political, 
social, economic and security structures that were implanted by the colonial rule in order to 
perpetuate itself under local new bourgeoisie that secures the interests of the colonial powers. 
Hence it is frequently used in the postcolonial studies. As Guy Martin remarks, “in essence, neo-
colonialism is ‘the survival of the colonial system of the colonial system in spite of formal 
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352 Ibid., 59.  
353 Having shown that R2P does not change much about humanitarian intervention, “humanitarian intervention” is 
used here as a generic term. 
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recognition of political independence in emerging countries which become the victims of an 
indirect and subtle form of domination by political, economic, social, military or technical 
means.”354 He continues, “this new strategy has been devised by the European powers in order to 
allow them to carry on the economic exploitation of their former colonies, while relinquishing 
political power to a national bourgeoisie.”355 In this sense, the political independence so much 
hailed at its acquisition wasn’t a real one, since the subjection continues. It is just a formal 
independence which does not yield any concrete benefice for the citizens since it is a tool for 
their political domination and a colonial venue for their economic exploitation. “The essence of 
neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it, is in theory independent and has all the 
outward trapping of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political 
policy is directed from outside.”356 This new domination is maintained by the West through the 
international institutions, justified and sustained by a discriminatory international law, and which 
are designed to that effect. In this sense, when coercive means are used in these states, they are 
rather for protecting Western interests rather than the rights of the victims as it is usually alleged. 
As Bricmont observes, “the policies pursued since 1945… have given imperialism its 
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African Studies, Vol. 20, No 2, 1982, 22.  
355 Ibid. James Fearon and David Laitin call it “neotruteeship, or more provocatively, postmodern imperialism. The 
terms refer to the complicated mixes of international and domestic governance structures that are evolving in 
Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and, possibly in the long run, Iraq.” They then compare it to 
the classical imperialism, saying, “similar to classical imperialism, these efforts involve a remarkable degree of 
control over domestic political authority and basic economic functions by foreign countries. In contrast to classical 
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neotrusteeship want to exit as quickly as possible, after intervening to reconstruct or reconfigure states so as to 
reduce threats arising from either state collapse or rogue regimes empowered by weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD).” See James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States” in 
International Security, Vol. 28, No 4, 2004, 7. 
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neocolonial form. Countries remain formally independent, but every form of coercion is brought 
to bear to keep them under Western domination.”357 
This is the common view of neocolonialism. But there is another one, derived from what 
I would call an ‘etymological’ sense, whereby neocolonialism is the repetition of the 
mechanisms of the classical colonialism. The two are not opposed to each other, but rather they 
are mutually reinforcing, and it is important for the subject of humanitarian intervention. Indeed, 
when scholars qualify humanitarian intervention as a neocolonialism practice, both conceptions 
are represented, that is, the repetition of the nineteenth colonial expansion,358 and the 
consolidation of the existence of the neocolonialism inherited from decolonization. While the 
new international institutions and international law that legalizes and legitimizes them work for 
the postcolonial neocolonialism, they resort to vocabulary, means and technics reminiscent of the 
nineteenth-century colonialism.  
Most of the scholars underline the similarity between the practice of humanitarian 
intervention and the practice of imperialism and colonialism, which “acquired a ‘humanitarian’ 
gloss.”359 According to Fearon and Laitin, “there is indeed a valuable analogy between 
contemporary developments and nineteenth- and early twentieth-century classical 
imperialism.”360 They illustrate this analogy saying, “as with classical imperialism, we 
increasingly see the strongest states taking over, in part or whole, the governance of territories 
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where Western-style politics, economics, and administration are underdeveloped.”361 They 
continue, “their actions generally have had international legal authority behind them, in parallel 
with international legalization of the former German and Italian colonies (as League of Nation 
mandates) after World War I.”362 Mamdani goes in the same direction, arguing that “the era of 
international humanitarian order is not entirely new. It draws on the history of modern Western 
colonialism. At the outset of colonial expansion in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
leading Western powers... claimed to protect ‘vulnerable groups’.” He adds, “when it came to 
lands not yet colonized, such as South Asia and a large part of Africa, they highlighted local 
atrocities and pledged to protect victims against rulers.”363 This focus on the victim is also a 
permanent feature of humanitarian intervention discourse. For instance, one of the conditions to 
legitimize humanitarian intervention is that “the victims of human rights violations welcome the 
foreign invasion.”364 And many other proponents of humanitarian intervention highlight how it 
takes the victim’s point of view. 365 To take the victim’s position, however, is not the issue. The 
problem is that this victim’s position is rather a pretext to justify the intervener’s interest rather 
than the victim’s. As in the nineteenth century, European powers used humanitarian motives to 
justify and consolidate their colonial strongholds; likewise the humanitarian discourse is used to 
justify an external intervention for the purpose of great powers’ interests.  
This is not deduced only from the liberal defense of humanitarian intervention, like Tesón 
who, in Nardin’s words, shifts the “the focus of debate from concern for the interests…of those 
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363 Mamdani, Saviors, 276. De Jonge also notes that “armed intervention for humanitarian purposes developed a bad 
reputation in the nineteenth century, when military interventions by European powers were frequently justified on 
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364 Tesón, Humanitarian Intervention, 119. 
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who are to be rescued to concern for the interests of the intervening state and its citizens.”366 It is 
also affirmed by Western leaders. Talking about NATO’s intervention in Kossovo, Tony Blair, 
then British Prime Minister, stated 
As we address these problems at this weekend’s NATO Summit we may be tempted to think back to the 
clarity and simplicity of the Cold War. But now we have to establish a new framework. No longer is our 
existence as states under threat. Now our actions are guided by a more subtle blend of mutual self interest 
and moral purpose in defending the values we cherish. In the end values and interests merge. If we can 
establish and spread the values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights and an open society then that is in 
our national interests too. The spread of our values makes us safer. As John Kennedy put it “Freedom is 
indivisible and when one man is enslaved who is free?”367 
Blair recognizes that self-interests are mixed with moral purposes, and it was the same position 
for Bill Clinton, the former US President, who stated that “where our values and our interests are 
at stake, and where we can make a difference, we must be prepared to do so.”368 Most 
importantly, however, Blair acknowledges that humanitarian intervention is also a means to 
spread a certain ideology. Three years later, he would make even clearer that “global 
interdependence requires global values commonly or evenly applied. But sometimes force is 
necessary to get the space for the values to be applied.”369 Blair’s statement is not so different 
from what the first chapter showed that colonialism expanded through bullet and blood in the 
colonies, while it was wrapped into humanitarian intentions at home. In this sense, when Blair 
claims that force might be used to create space for Western values, he confirms what the 
opponents to humanitarian intervention suspected, that is, a new colonial enterprise. Those who 
view humanitarian intervention as neocolonialism would insist that it is not only moral and 
ideological interests that are behind humanitarian practice, but also economic interests.  
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But before proceeding with that idea, it is worth highlighting that humanitarian 
intervention employs colonial vocabulary of bringing civilization to barbaric cultures and setting 
a standard for civilization for the whole world. Ayoob, among many others, is adamant on this 
point. Commenting on the shift from the Westphalian concept to sovereignty as responsibility, he 
cannot avoid finding it similar to the nineteenth civilizing mission. Ayoob writes,  
without denying the considerable moral force of the ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ approach, one cannot 
help but notice echoes of the ‘standard of civilization’ argument in this proposition. According to this latter 
thesis… only those countries that had reached a certain standard of civilized behavior had the rights to 
attain sovereign status and interact with each other on the basis of mutual recognition of sovereignty. The 
others, being barbarians if not savages, were to remain subject to, or under the tutelage of, sovereign 
(European) powers… The resurrection of the “standard of civilization” assumption in the late twentieth 
century, and their application under the guise of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ thesis, once again raises the 
spectre of a return to colonial habits and practice on the part of major Western powers. It also has the 
potential to divide the world once again into zones of civilised and uncivilized states and legitimate 
predatory actions by the former against the latter.370 
 Thus, like in the time of colonialism, humanitarian intervention opposes the stable states 
whose sovereignty is still understood as control and therefore to whom the principle of non-
interference is upheld, and those labelled tyrants or rogue states that have become, in Tesón’s 
terms, today’s uncivilized cultures who need a minimum of civilization. We are back even to the 
use of the imperialist era and the “othering” process –to borrow Mutua’s vocabulary. For 
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instance, Clifford Orwin states that “We Westerners no longer aspire to rule other peoples and 
have lost most of our optimism that we can teach them to rule themselves. We made trade with 
them, which profits us and may also be deemed to benefit them. In the realm of politics, we leave 
it to international organizations to patrol the interface between ourselves and the barbarians.”371 
Orwin clearly asserts that humanitarian intervention is between “We Westerners” and “the 
barbarians” not for the interest of the latter, but rather for the ensured economic profits for the 
former and only a probable positive consequence for the latter. “It is the white man’s burden 
purged of its inconvenient whiteness. Precisely because it passes for nonpolitical, the relief of 
suffering affords a uniquely noncontroversial ground for political action.”372 From such a view, 
the manipulative side and disguise of humanitarian intervention can no longer be disguised. 
Moreover, the just cause for humanitarian intervention is to be judged by the “conscience of all 
civilized peoples.”373 The bedrock of such a statement presupposes the existence of civilized and 
uncivilized, on the one hand, and on the other hand, it assumes that the judgment of the 
“uncivilized” does not count in determining the humanitarian intervention. That is why the 
crimes committed are more “uncivilized acts” than anything else; consequently, humanitarian 
intervention is conceived as a protection of “civilization” rather than the protection of victims of 
human rights abuse. Writing on the solidarist English school, Welch notes that “at the core of 
solidarism is the notion of collective punishment for infringement of the community’s norms of 
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‘civilized’ behavior.”374 In other words, it is the protection of the civilized group/community that 
is at stake and not the members of the “barbarous” society. Before the humanitarian intervention 
order, “the core crime…was… that of aggression by one state against another. But in our society 
of states, as it is, the list of crimes has expanded to include acts of individuals against 
individuals. And states can no longer use the shield of sovereignty to deny accountability for 
such uncivilized acts.”375 Again, state sovereignty as control is abolished because it shields 
“uncivilized acts”, which supposes a certain civilization that sets standards. At this point, one can 
only agree with Hehir that “in terms of the discourse of intervention it is evident that a perceived 
schism between civilized and uncivilized states is being proliferated both consciously and 
unconsciously,”376 and it strikes at the heart of humanitarian intervention legitimacy. 
By resorting to force to impose a certain ideology and by using the colonial vocabulary, 
humanitarian intervention gives a free ride to those who suspect it as neocolonialism. But it is 
not only them, because even the supporters of humanitarian intervention agree that it may be 
used for a neocolonial end. According to Heinze, who defends humanitarian intervention on 
consequentialist grounds, asserts that “after all, impulses in favor of humanitarian intervention 
are not terribly different from those that justified some of the most unjust and brutal undertakings 
in human history, the civilizing mission of colonialism being one example.”377 As to Roberts, he 
notes that “in the UN, as in other fora, representatives of states have put forward numerous 
justifications for a sceptical stance toward ‘humanitarian intervention’… Even if a US-led 
intervention has its origins in genuine concern about atrocities, it may be perceived by other 
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states as an act of expansionism and strategic threat.”378 And Newman remarks that “a recent 
study, which is broadly sympathetic to the enterprise [here it mostly about international 
administration after military intervention], nevertheless concluded that in practice it has sought 
to impose Western standards of economic and political liberalism, and the underlying 
assumptions have resembled nineteenth-century beliefs that such intervention is justified by a 
civilizing mission.”379 Others just call humanitarian intervention a “recolonization”. That is the 
view of Ali Mazrui who, after the Rwandese tragedy, thinks that “the successive collapse of the 
state in one African country after another during the 1990s suggests a once unthinkable solution: 
recolonization”, that is, an “external recolonization under the banner of humanitarianism,”380 as a 
solution to state disintegration. William Pfaff is of the same idea, except that for him, he openly 
advocates for another European colonialism under a French leadership in a complete disregard of 
the United Nations. Answering his own question on “who is competent to supply not only 
peacekeeping and peacemaking in Africa but serious support for building administrations, 
economies, and infrastructure,” he says: “Neither the United Nations nor the United States… As 
its former colonial ruler, the Italians know Somalia, just as the French know West and Central 
Africa, the British, East Africa, and the Portuguese, Angola and Mozambique.” He continues, 
“They still have among them not only former colonial administrators but specialists and scholars 
concerned with these regions. If anybody is competent to deal sympathetically with these 
countries, the Europeans are.”381 As he clearly demonstrates, Pfaff encourages Europe to retake 
its shares from Berlin Conference in another “project of a half-century, perhaps a century” in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
378 Roberts, “UN and Humanitarian Intervention”, 88. 
379 Newman, ibid., 143; see also 145.   
380 Ali Mazrui, “The Message of Rwanda: Recolonize Africa?” in New Perspectives Quarterly, Vol. 2, No 4, 1994, 
18. The Kenyan historian, however, advocates for local colonialism, arguing that “the ‘white man’s burden’ would, 
in the sense, become humanity’s shared burden.” Ibid.  
381 William Pfaff, “A New Colonialism? Europe Must go Back into Africa” in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No 1, 1995, 
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which “the European pledge to the Africans would be: We imposed this ordeal of modernization 
on you, which you are determined to complete. We are prepared to rejoin you and support you in 
that enterprise.”382 A very surprising way of cooperation through which the author of the evil 
becomes the savior! To start with, if modernization was imposed as ordeal, why is one 
determined to complete it? The logical way would be to reject the ordeal as an act of freedom. 
On the other hand, if one is determined to continue what was started, why is there need of 
recolonization, while the first try did not yield satisfying result? How certain are we that this new 
colonialism will not lead to the same consequences as the first one? 
 
These are some examples which show that even from the sympathetic side of 
humanitarian intervention, there is recognition of neocolonialism undergirding humanitarian 
intervention.383 Newman, however, evokes the other important side of humanitarian intervention 
as neocolonialism. Not only is humanitarian intervention analogous to the classical colonialism 
in its means, mechanism and vocabulary, it feeds from the postcolonial neocolonialism. The 
newly created states have to follow the international economic regulations which are elaborated 
without and yet imposed to them, from which they do not gain much since they are meant to 
protect Western interests. As these economic and political structures are domestically felt as 
imposed, they are sustained by heavy security institutions maintained by the elite bourgeois 
servant of the Western domination. Add to that the lack of local legitimacy, the artificial 
formation of colonial and postcolonial states, and the ingredients for social unrest are gathered, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
382 Ibid., 6. 
383 See also Gareth Evans who highlights problems connected with R2P concerning its possible misuse and its 
association with “neo-imperialism or neo-colonialism.” See his “The Responsibility to Protect, An Idea”, 288; he 
also raises the issue of double standard. See “From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect” in 
Wisconsin International Law Journal, Vol. 24, No 3, 2006, 711; See also Alex Bellamy who underlies different 
neocolonial challenges to R2P in his “Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 
2005 World Summit” in Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 20, No 2, 2006. 147-8;  
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which leads to the situation of civil wars in which crimes against humanity and violations of 
human rights are committed. Authors like Orford pay attention to the economic and social causes 
that led to situations of Kosovo and Rwanda, causes that were most of the time externally 
provoked. That is why, according to her, “the principle lesson we should have learned from 
Yugoslavia or Rwanda was…not primarily that we need a UN rapid deployment force, but rather 
that intellectuals and activists concerned about democratic and human rights issues should lobby 
their government’s representatives and directors to oppose support for this model of economic 
liberalization and marketization.”384 Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman, focusing particularly 
on Africa, raise the question whether “the adjective ‘humanitarian’ is appropriate on a continent 
that has been the target of a great many interventions directed to other ends… military action 
may be a poor substitute for preventive measures addressing the economic and social problems 
that lead to humanitarian intervention.”385 As for Mamdani, “the ICC heralds a regime of legal 
and political dependency, much as Bretton Woods Institutions pioneered an international regime 
of economic dependency in the 1980s and 1990s.”386 And as the proponents and official 
speeches attest, humanitarian intervention is to serve the value and interests of the West, which 
are both economic and ideological. This reinforces Schmitt’s observation that “in its ethical-
humanitarian form, [humanitarian intervention] is a specific vehicle of economic 
imperialism.”387 At this stage, there is no need to demonstrate parallelism with the classic 
colonialism since the first chapter showed how the latter also was carried out for economic 
reasons, among others. Hence, humanitarian intervention is neocolonialism both as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
384 Orford, 121.  
385 Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman, “Changing the Rules about Rules? Unilateral Intervention and the future 
of International Law” in Holzgrefe and Keohane, ibid., 191.  
386 Mamdani, “Responsibility to Protect”, 65.  
387 Schmitt, ibid. 
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reproduction of classical colonialism and the maintenance of postcolonial structures that 
perpetuate Western domination.  
 
Conclusion 
The goal of this chapter was to elaborate the second challenge to a theory of human 
rights, that of considering humanitarian intervention as neocolonialism. For indeed, how can we 
be taking human rights seriously, if we are not able to protect them? This chapter, however, 
discovered that the critics of humanitarian intervention have good reasons, as most of the time, 
whenever humanitarian intervention was invoked, it involved an unbalanced relationship 
between the entities involved and the prejudices in its justification. Furthermore, it became more 
popular in the age of colonial expansion whereby humanitarian discourse was used either to 
justify or to cover atrocities committed by Westerners against non-Western peoples. Hence, the 
first point went through the just war theory to discover that even there, whenever the protection 
of innocent was justified, it was non-Europeans protected by Europeans, justifying by the same 
token the European colonial ambitions outside the European continent. The second section 
looked at the legal foundation of the right of humanitarian intervention, from both natural law 
and positivist perspectives. The outcome was that there is no consensus on the legality of 
humanitarian intervention, as reasonable people disagree about different texts of international 
law and state practice. That is why only the moral justification and the politics behind 
humanitarian intervention remain as a source of contention. From the analysis of these two, the 
sceptics have good reasons to suspect humanitarian intervention; reasons rooted on moral 
ground, the practice of humanitarian intervention and the language used in its justification. All 
these three instances manifest a clear parallelism with classical colonialism but also participate in 
the maintenance of the postcolonial neocolonialism. That was the result of the third section.  
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Now, if theoretically, human rights are an imperialist ideology and if their practice is a 
reproduction of nineteenth-century structures of domination and a means for maintaining the 
neocolonial institutions inherited from decolonization, how can human rights be justified as tools 
of resistance against power and oppression? For they are being accused of being travestied as 
they are seen as an instrument of domination. What does philosophy offer as a response to these 
challenges, a response that justifies the validity of human rights and yet takes seriously the 
doubts and skepticism, and avoids falling into the same discourse of human rights that ends up 
portraying them as an imperialist ideology and another form of imperialism? The second part of 
this dissertation attends to these questions. 
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Chap. 3. Rawls and the Challenges to Human Rights 
 
If international stability requires the personal allegiance of 
non-liberal, but decent peoples, to the core values of liberal 
democracies whereas these values are external to their culture 
and tradition, these peoples are placed in a situation of deep 
inequality and we are faced with cultural imperialism. 
Catherine Audard 
3.0. Introduction 
 The previous chapters (1&2) have elaborated the theoretical and practical questions 
addressed to the human rights project. On the one hand, by showing that human rights are simply 
an ideological tool to propagate the Western liberal imperialism, this criticism targeted the heart 
of the philosophical justification of human rights. On the other hand, by demonstrating that the 
humanitarian intervention for the protection of human rights is not legally founded, and is a 
moral travesty since it covers neocolonialism, this point attacks the practical side of human 
rights. The second part of this dissertation looks at whether philosophy can respond to these 
challenges. To do so, I focus on two philosophers who have marked political and social 
philosophy in the last decades, namely, John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. Hence, this third 
chapter deals with Rawls’s understanding of human rights, while the fourth is consecrated to 
Habermas.  
Talking about John Rawls, he is one of the most influential philosophers in contemporary 
debates. His thought in political theory has renewed political philosophy showing, as Thomas 
Pogge puts it, “how philosophy can do more than play with its own self-invented question (Are 
moral assertions capable of being true or false? Is it possible to know that the external world 
exists?)–that it can work out thoroughly and creatively on important questions that every adult 
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citizen is or should be taking seriously.”1 While the major part of his work was devoted to the 
question of domestic justice,2 in 1993 Rawls presented a paper on “Law of Peoples” in his 
Oxford Amnesty International Lectures on human rights, where he developed a theory of justice 
for the international community.3 In his own words, “by the law of peoples I mean a political 
conception of right and justice that applies to the principles and norms of international law and 
practice,” and his paper aimed “to sketch […] how the law of peoples may be developed out of 
liberal ideas of justice similar to but more general to the idea [of] justice as fairness.”4 The paper 
would evolve into a book today known under the same title,5 where Rawls gives more space to 
the same subject.  
It is in this context of elaborating a theory of justice for “international norms and 
practice” that Rawls evokes human rights. Already in his 1993 paper, he noted that the “sketch of 
that law covers more ground and includes an account of the role of human rights.”6 Hence, 
Rawls’s treatment of human rights is much developed in this last major work. He, however, 
acknowledges that his theory streams from his political theory of justice as fairness as developed 
in TJ, and continued but also reworked in PL. Summarizing the role of his work, Rawls observes 
that “both A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism try to say how a liberal society might be 
possible. The Law of Peoples hopes to say how a world Society of liberal and decent Peoples 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Thomas Pogge, John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), viii.  
2 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971) 
henceforth, TJ, and Political Liberalism (NY: Columbia University Press, 1993), hereafter, PL. An abridged edition 
of his theory of justice as fairness was edited by Erin Kelly in John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. 
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 2003), henceforth, JF.  
3 John Rawls, Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), hereafter, 
CP.  
4 CP, 529. 
5 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, with “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited.” (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), hereafter, LP. 
6 CP, 529. 
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might be possible.”7 This being the case, before I set to studying his conception of human rights 
and what response he gives to the question of humanitarian intervention, it is important to go 
briefly –in the limit of a chapter—through his previous major works (TJ and PL), in order to 
show what and at what extent LP owes to them. This is even so when one recalls that Rawls’s 
Law of Peoples is an extension of his political liberalism to international law. For this reason, 
understanding LP requires grasping what is the specificity of his political theory, which is rooted 
in his original idea of justice as fairness. However, since the goal is to focus on his theory of 
human rights, the interest for his former works will be limited to the extent to which they help in 
that endeavor. For instance, it is not question of the soundness of his theory of justice and his 
political liberalism, unless it is related to his conception of human rights. That is why the first 
point will be much more expository rather than critical.   
To that end, this chapter is structured around three main points. In the first point, I trace 
the development of LP from TJ through PL, touching the main ideas of these two previous 
works. The second point focuses particularly on the Rawlsian conception of human rights in 
order to see if through it, one can respond to the theoretical critiques raised in the first chapter. 
The third and last point reconstructs Rawls’s justification of humanitarian intervention for 
protecting human rights in order to examine whether it satisfactorily answers the worries of its 
critics.  
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3.1. The Path to The Law of Peoples in Rawls’s Thought 
a). Justice as Fairness 
Rawls became a legend in political philosophy after the publication of his TJ, a work that 
Robert Paul Wolff said is reminiscent of Plato than of Locke or Bentham or Mill.”8 Indeed, 
according to many commentators,9 TJ reenergized political and social philosophy in the Anglo-
Saxon world that has been turning between different variants of utilitarianism and intuitionism. 
As Rawls puts it himself, those who have been criticizing those theories were not able “to 
construct a workable and systematic moral conception to oppose it. The outcome is that we often 
seem forced to choose between utilitarianism and intuitionism.”10 Rawls’s project is to get out of 
that dilemma and to offer an alternative that is both “workable and systematic,” and also 
superior. That is his theory of justice understood as justice as fairness.  
Rawls constructs his theory from the contractarian tradition of Locke, Rousseau and 
Kant, carrying “to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract.”11 The 
subject of this theory of justice is the basic structure because the latter determines the distribution 
of rights and duties, and as such, it deeply affects individuals. In his own words, “the basic 
structure is the primary subject of justice because its effects are so profound and present from the 
start.”12 Thus, now that I have noted the subject of his theory, the next question is to know how 
fair it is. The answer to this question corresponds to “the higher level of abstraction,” for the 
principles of justice have to be the result of an original contract, which will regulate subsequent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Robert Paul Wolff, Understanding Rawls: A Reconstruction and Critique of A Theory of Justice. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1977), 15.  
9 Sebatiano Maffettone, for instance, calls Rawls’s work, “a revolution.” See his Rawls: An Introduction. (Malden: 
Polity, 2010), 9. 
10TJ, viii. J Donald Moon, however, thinks that the work of Rawls is “a restatement of liberalism designed to answer 
the challenges to liberal modernity.” See his John Rawls: Liberalism and the Challenges of Late Modernity. (NY, 
London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 4.  
11 Ibid., 11. 
12 Ibid., 7. Later in JF, he says that “the basic structure is the way in which the main political and social institutions 
of society fit together into one system of social cooperation, and the way they assign basic rights and duties and 
regulate the division of advantages that arises from social cooperation over time.” JF, 10. 
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agreements. In order to make sure that the process of yielding to these principles is fair, Rawls 
resorts to an original situation, hypothetical in nature, in which free and rational individuals, 
concerned with the advancement of their interests, choose principles that are to regulate their 
basic institutions, and constitute their terms of cooperation. Justice as fairness is in “this way of 
regulating the principles of justice.”13 In other words, the fairness of his theory of justice resides 
in the possibility of framing principles in a situation of freedom and equality, and that is the role 
played by the idea of original position.  
In order to properly play its role of granting fairness, Rawls introduces another important 
element in the elaboration of his theory, the veil of ignorance. While the persons present in the 
original position are free, equal and rational, they do not have access to all kinds of information. 
The veil of ignorance is introduced to distill information so that the representatives in charge of 
choosing the principles of justice receive only the information needed to stay fair and are 
precluded from the kind of information that would bias them. Thus, in the original position, “no 
one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his 
fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.”14 
Rawls believes that by proceeding this way, he ensures that no one is being disadvantaged due to 
natural conditions or social circumstances. In that sense, the original situation allows the 
symmetrical relation between the persons, and the outcome of their agreement will be fair since 
it will be chosen under fair conditions. In Rawls’s terms, “the original position is, one might say, 
the appropriate initial status quo, and thus the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair.”15 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 TJ, 11. JF elaborates this point, noting that “the idea of original position is proposed … as the answer to the 
question of how to extend the idea of fair agreement to an agreement on principles of political justice for the basic 
structure.”, JF, 16.  
14 TJ, 12. 
15 Ibid.  
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Having designed the context in which the principles of justice are to be chosen, Rawls 
sets now to elaborate the content of his theory that is supposed to be presented to the 
representatives in the original position. That content is contained in the two principles of justice 
which are situated in a lexical order; that is, the first is to be satisfied before turning to the second 
one. In the final statement, the first principle is that “each person is to have an equal right to the 
most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberties 
for all.”16 Despite Brian Barry’s comment that the quality of Rawls’s liberalism is archaic,17 this 
first principle is well-known as setting the liberal tone of this theory of justice, as it strongly 
affirms the traditional liberal basic rights founded on the moral nature of a human person as free 
and equal. As Rex Martin notes, “Rawls’s first principle of justice establishes a particular ‘list’ 
of basic liberties; it identifies a specific set of liberties which are to acknowledged as being held 
equally by all.”18 The second principle reads, “social et economic inequalities are to be arranged 
so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just 
savings principles, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity.”19 Mostly known as the equality of opportunity and difference principle, 
the second principle of justice as fairness considers the question of distributive justice. The same 
way the relationship between the first and second principle is lexical, so also is the equality of 
opportunity prior to the difference principle. In Pogge’s words, “the second principle… imposes 
two requirements upon the social and economic inequalities an institutional scheme may 
generate: the opportunity principle and the difference principle. These are serially ordered so that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Ibid., 302.  
17 Brian Barry, The Liberal Theory of Justice: A Critical Examination of the Principal doctrines in A Theory of 
Justice by John Rawls. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 32. 
18 Rex Martin, Rawls and Rights. (Lawrence: University of Press of Kansas, 1985), 29. Maffettone talks of 
“liberalism of liberties.” Ibid., 53.  
19 TJ, 302.  
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the former ranks lexically above the latter, just as the first principle ranks lexically above the 
second principle as a whole.”20 This second principle regulates the distribution of what Rawls 
calls primary goods, which are “rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income and 
wealth,”—later he adds self-respect.21 According to Rawls, these are goods that individuals as 
rational persons need for realizing their moral powers of having and pursuing the conception of 
the good as well as the sense of justice. By its attention for providing a social minimum to the 
least advantaged so that she can enjoy the basic liberties, justice as fairness is egalitarian. As 
Samuel Freeman remarks, “what distinguishes justice as fairness is its egalitarianism: it defines 
the social minimum in terms of the difference principle.”22 In other words, Rawls’s liberalism is 
not only concerned with rights and liberties, but also the distributions of income and wealth. 
Rawls believes that, under the circumstances of justice of moderate scarcity and mutual 
disinterestedness, once situated in the original position regulated by the veil of ignorance, the 
representatives being moral persons, will choose to regulate the basic structure of their political, 
social and economic institutions by these two principles of justice, over the utilitarian or 
intuitionist versions, because he believes that his theory responds better to their moral nature as 
free and equal. One has to note, however, that for Rawls, these principles are to regulate a closed 
society that one enters by birth and exits by death. Such a society arranged on these principles is 
a fair system of reciprocal cooperation. Rawls calls such a society a well-ordered society.23 In 
this sense, Rawls follows Kant in providing a deontological theory that gives priority to the right, 
but he constructs his theory for institutions rather than for individuals as Kant did. Maffettone 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Thomas W. Pogge, Realizing Rawls. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 161-2. 
21 TJ, 92.  
22 Samuel Freeman, “Introduction” In Samuel Freeman, Ed. Cambridge Companion to Rawls. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 9.  
23 In JF, Rawls notes that the well-orderedness of a political society means that (a) it is regulated by a public 
conception of justice, (b)its basic structure is based on the principles of justice and (c) citizens have the sense of 
justice. JF, 8-9.  
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rightly observes that “Rawls aims to provide a deontological rather than teleological foundational 
ground for the principle of justice. In this sense, his inspiration is typically Kantian. Unlike Kant, 
Rawls centers his theory on institutions rather than individuals.”24 
Now, as a theory designated to regulate a society, one thing is to show that it is superior 
to other alternatives—in this case, utilitarianism and intuitionism—another thing is to attest that 
the institutions built on it are stable, which is the question of political philosophy par excellence. 
The institutional arrangements “must insure that just institutions are stable.”25 As David 
Rasmussen shows,26 it is this question of stability that Hobbes struggles with and tries to resolve 
instrumentally, while Rawls wants stability for rights reasons. That is why, in order to make sure 
that justice as fairness is stable, Rawls has to show that it can also be endorsed by individuals as 
they pursue their different and diverse rational plans of life. In other words, it has to be 
demonstrated that individuals do not accept the principles of justice for instrumental reasons or 
as a compromise, but rather on the moral ground, and that the theory of justice fits into their 
conceptions of the good. That is what Rawls calls stability for right reasons. As Rasmussen 
remarks, Rawls, “in contrast to Hobbes who favored an instrument framework, tried to achieve 
stability from a moral point of view.”27 
Rawls resolves this question of stability by reaffirming the priority of the right over the 
good—since his theory is, as Maffettone rightly notes, deontological and not teleological—and, 
at the same time, he recognizes that rational individuals have plans of life that they consider to be 
good. The stability then is attained when not only the rational plan of life of individuals does not 
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25 TJ, 32. 
26 David M. Rasmussen, Rawls, Religion and Clash of Civilizations. Unpublished Paper. 
27 Rasmussen, “The Emerging Domain of the Political” in Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol. 38, No 4-5, 2012, 
p. 460. 
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conflict with the principles of justice, but also that individuals as rational beings consider the 
principles of justice and a society their regulate—a well-ordered society—as also good. The 
question here is, “how is it possible [for] persons to fulfill adequately their own self-interests and 
at the same time comply with the demands of justice?”28 To that end, Rawls distinguishes two 
theories of good, a thin and a full theory of the good. The thin theory of the good focuses only on 
the primary goods—liberties and basic rights, opportunities, wealth, income and self-respect—
needed for rational representatives in the original position to frame the principles of justice. As to 
the full theory of the good, it is a comprehensive exploration of the good. Now, since the 
“purpose of the thin theory is to secure the premises about primary goods required to arrive at the 
principles of justice,”29 the stability question needs only this thin theory of the good. As Rawls 
states, “if within the thin theory it turns out that having a sense of justice is indeed a good, then a 
well-ordered society is as stable as one can hope for.”30 He continues, “not only does it generate 
its own supportive moral attitudes, but these attitudes are desirable from the standpoint of 
rational persons who have them when they assess their situation independently from the 
constraints of justice. This match between justice and goodness I refer to as the congruence.”31 In 
other words, the stability one is hoping for is this congruence of justice and goodness, accounted 
through the sense of justice fitting into the thin theory of the good.  
The idea of congruence brings together the two moral powers of the human person, as 
having the capacity to conceive, follow and revise, when necessary, a rational plan of life, and 
the sense of justice. In this sense, Freeman is on target when he observes that “in Theory Rawls 
sees the moral powers in Kantian terms; as the powers of practical reasoning in matters of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Rasmussen, Rawls, 11. 
29 TJ, 396.  
30 TJ, 398. 
31 Ibid., 398-9. 
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justice, they are the essential capacities for moral and rational agency.”32 The question remains, 
however, as to know what is the sense of justice and how it fits into this Kantian frame of human 
nature. To answer this question, Rawls resorts to the developmental psychology, showing that a 
human person develops as a child from the morality of authority in the family to the morality of 
principles lived in just institutions through the morality of association where she learns the 
importance of mutual cooperation through socialization. These are what he later calls the three 
psychological laws. He also reconstructs Aristotle, showing that people strive for the best, and 
they choose situations where they challenge themselves by exercising their best faculties. This is 
what he calls the Aristotelian principle.  
Concerning the sense of justice, Rawls defines it as “an effective desire to apply and to 
act from the principle of justice and so from the point of view of justice.”33 It is acquired during 
the third law of morality, that is, morality of principles, but the “inherent stability is a 
consequence of the reciprocal relation between the three psychological laws.”34 It is for this 
reason that “the most stable conception if justice…is presumably one that is perspicuous to our 
reason, congruent with our good, and rooted not in abnegation, but in affirmation of the self.”35 It 
is stable because it corresponds to the moral nature of the human person as free and equal, 
rational in her interest, but also ready to cooperate with others once she is assured that others will 
do their part. Put otherwise, it is stable because it demonstrates that “it is rational… for those in a 
well-ordered society to affirm their sense of justice as regulative of their plan of life.”36 
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Rawls is convinced that justice as fairness fulfills these requirements of a stable 
conception of justice, because it is construed on human nature of individuals who regulate their 
social cooperation on the principles of justice, and they do it on reciprocal terms and not for 
instrumental reasons. Thanks to the thin theory of goods, they see the sense of justice as a 
primary good they need, and they value the society built on the principles of justice as good since 
it is a well-ordered society. In this way, the isolation and the assurance problems are resolved on 
a moral basis, and not instrumentally, as Hobbes would have proposed. In Rasmussen’s words, 
“Rawls claims that the experience [of] the sense of justice and the evolution of moral experience 
does the same thing as Hobbes does but this time on a moral level, i.e., connect ‘the question of 
stability with that of political obligation.’ Significantly, at this point in his development Rawls 
believes that he has resolved the isolation and the assurance problems on moral grounds.”37 
Rasmussen is indeed right, because Rawls concludes his discussion on stability by asserting that 
“a well-ordered society satisfies the principles of justice which are collectively rational from the 
perspective of the original position; and from the standpoint of the individual, the desire to affirm 
the public conception of justice as regulative of one’s plan of life accords with the principles of 
justice of rational choice.”38 In other words, he has proven that from an individual point of view, 
regulating his rational plan of life on the principle of justice is rational, and this was the heart of 
the stability concern. Hence, Rawls can easily assert that “these conclusions support the values of 
community, and in reaching them my account of justice as fairness is complete.”39 Not only is 
the sense of justice rational for the individual, but also the well-ordered society is valued as a 
good. For this reason, justice as fairness is complete.  
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Now, if his justice as fairness was complete because it is stable, why did Rawls not 
content himself with the TJ? What is the cause of his further production that seemed even to 
correct his TJ? The next section attends to this question.  
b). Unstable Stability and the Need for Political Liberalism 
As already mentioned above, Rawls’s project was not only to offer a theory of justice that 
is systematically superior to utilitarianism and intuitionism, but also such a theory had to be the 
most stable. Although at the time of the TJ’s completion Rawls was convinced that justice as 
fairness fulfilled that requirement, he came to realize that his theory was not as stable as he 
thought. He discovered that the problem of a democratic society is that it is composed of citizens 
holding religious and metaphysical views that are irreconcilable, and none can be affirmed 
generally. Rawls terms this situation as the fact of pluralism, which is not accidental, but rather 
congenital to the free exercise of practical reason under free democratic institutions. In his own 
words, “the serious problem is this. A modern democratic society is characterized not simply by 
a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical and moral doctrines but by a pluralism of 
incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines.”40 In that sense, the fact of pluralism 
challenges the quest for stability of just institutions regulated by the two principles of justice as 
fairness. For this reason, the revision of the stability issue in TJ stems from “trying to resolve a 
serious problem internal to justice as fairness, namely from the fact that the account of stability 
of part III of Theory is not consistent with the view as a whole.”41 
One might ask the reason why the third part of TJ is not consistent with the whole and 
how it fails to address properly the stability question. Rawls observes that, while the substance 
and structure of justice as fairness is strongly affirmed in the TJ, his theory is presented as a 
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moral theory at par with the Kantian and Mill’s liberalisms. Consequently, justice as fairness is 
as comprehensive as any other comprehensive doctrines professed in a modern democratic 
society. In TJ, he does not distinguish moral from political domains. “Nothing is made of 
contrast between comprehensive philosophical and moral doctrines limited to the domain of the 
political.”42 Yet, it is a fact that the modern democratic society is characterized by pluralism. 
Therefore, its stability cannot be based on any of these comprehensive views. It has rather to be 
erected on a conception of justice that can be endorsed by these different comprehensive 
doctrines. Now, since the stability argument deployed in TJ does not take into account the fact of 
pluralism, Rawls judges it unrealistic as is the idea of a well-ordered society, because “it is 
inconsistent with realizing its own principles under the best of the foreseeable conditions.”43 
At this point, we have the answer to the question about the reason that pushed for the 
revision of a theory that was first judged complete and stable. It is the fact of pluralism that 
challenges the stability of modern democratic societies. The recasting of the account of stability, 
however, would require the revision of some fundamental ideas, especially the 
reconceptualization of justice as fairness as a political theory instead of being another 
comprehensive view. Furthermore, Rawls would have to revise his former premise that justice is 
an uncompromising value as is truth, giving up his epistemological foundation,44 and even 
introduce new ideas. As he puts it, “this change in turn forces many other changes and calls for a 
family of ideas not needed before.”45 The first task now will be to redefine political liberalism as 
a political conception of justice which, consequently, will shift the question of stability itself. 
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Instead of thinking that stability will be achieved once it is demonstrated that (i) justice as 
fairness fits into the rational plan of individuals, (ii) the sense of justice is part of the thin theory 
of the good, and (iii) the well-ordered society is appreciated as a good, the question of stability 
now is about finding a political conception that accommodates the diverse comprehensive moral, 
religious and philosophical doctrines that constitute the democratic culture. That is what Rawls 
calls political liberalism. In his own terms,  
the problem of political liberalism is: How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just 
society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines? Put another way: How is it possible that deeply opposed though 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines may live together and all affirm the political conception of a 
constitutional regime? What is the structure and content of a political conception that can gain the support 
of such an overlapping consensus? These are questions that political liberalism tries to answer.46 
Not only does this quotation contain the central question of political liberalism of 
stability and legitimacy,47 but it also introduces many important ideas. Before coming back to 
them, it is worth noting that Rawls’s turn from the theory of justice seen as a comprehensive 
doctrine to justice as fairness conceived as political happens from the eighties and forward, a 
period during which Rawls’s intellectual work set to remove “the ambiguity of Theory” and 
“justice as fairness is presented from the outset as a political conception of justice.”48 
Rasmussen49 argues that the presentation of justice as fairness as a non-comprehensive doctrine 
first appeared in Rawls’s essay of 1985, entitled: “Justice as Fairness: Political and not 
metaphysical.” Rightly, in this paper, Rawls mentions that he wants to move from his earlier 
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theory of justice, “because it may seem that this conception depends on philosophical claims I 
should like to avoid, for example, claims to universal truth, or claims about the essential nature 
and identity of persons.”50 In other words, he abandons the earlier epistemological foundation of 
his theory for an interpretive project as he turns back to the democratic culture,51 and alters his 
Kantian moral grounding of the conception of the human person for a political one. These are the 
steps for conceptualizing his political liberalism which avoids an allegiance to any 
comprehensive doctrine, be it religious, moral or philosophical. Rather, as designed for a 
constitutional democracy, it has to be free-standing. “The idea is that in a constitutional 
democracy the public conception of justice should be, so far as possible, independent of 
controversial philosophical doctrines.”52 Thus, while this political conception of justice keeps the 
basic structure as its subject, it however has to be free-standing and is constructed from the 
democratic culture.53 This brings us back to other main ideas that constitute the Rawlsian 
political liberalism.  
The first notion that undergoes transformation is the idea of the person. Instead of using 
the Kantian notion of human person as an autonomous rational being, Rawls reconstructs a 
political conception of the human person as a citizen; that is, someone who bears rights and 
duties in a democratic political community. As he says, “in the transformation from the 
comprehensive doctrine of justice as fairness to the political conception of justice, the idea of the 
person as having a moral personality with the full capacity of moral agency is transformed into 
that of the citizen.”54 And since this reconstruction takes place in the modern democratic culture, 
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the citizen is conceived and perceived as a free and equal person. Hence the question of a 
political conception of justice is about how free and equal citizens, marked by reasonable and yet 
irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines, can live together in just and stable institutions.  
As already noted, the fact of pluralism is at the source of the revision of his stability 
account. However, Rawls distinguishes the pluralism per se from the pluralism that is 
reasonable. As he notes, as a result of the exercise of practical reason under free institutions, 
there can be every kind of pluralism, even mad comprehensive doctrines. “In their case the 
problem is to contain them so that they do not undermine the unity and justice of society.”55 But, 
reasonable pluralism is at the heart of political liberalism,56 because it is one of the major 
characters of democratic institutions, and “not an unfortunate condition of human life.”57 It 
expresses the reality of the democratic cultures that free and equal citizens hold diverse 
comprehensive doctrines that are reasonable although irreconcilable, as the result of the exercise 
of their practical reason under free institutions. Because of that, none of these comprehensive 
doctrines can offer a source of legitimation for the coercive power. If it happens, it generates “the 
fact of oppression.”58 Instead, the legitimacy of the coercive power has to be based on a public 
conception of justice that is politically free-standing from all of them, and yet endorsed by all 
these reasonable comprehensive doctrines. This need of support for the political conception of 
justice “by at least the majority of its politically active citizens”59 is the core of the stability issue 
and it touches another central idea of Rawls’s political liberalism: the overlapping consensus. 
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59 Ibid., 38.  
201	  
	  
	  
Rawls had talked of the overlapping consensus in TJ, but he acknowledges that it has to 
undergo a transformation as he revisits the stability problem.60 This idea matures as Rawls 
develops his political liberalism. Rasmussen observes that Rawls wrote three papers on 
overlapping consensus with one that was included as a chapter of PL.61 In most of these editions 
the idea of overlapping consensus is closely linked to the question of stability and is presented as 
the second stage constitutive of the political liberalism, in addition to being a free-standing 
theory. While the first stage of political liberalism construes a conception that is independent of 
comprehensive doctrines, the second stage tries to establish its stability, by showing how these 
controversial metaphysical or religious views endorse the political conception from their own 
respective perspectives. In other words, it is a stability that takes into account the modern 
democratic condition.62 Such stability is based not on a modus vivendi, a pragmatic compromise 
through which a comprehensive doctrine awaits an opportunity to impose itself on others; neither 
is it a stability imposed by the power of a forceful coercion. Rather, the idea of overlapping 
consensus conveys the fact that the reasonable comprehensive doctrines appreciate the political 
conception of justice and endorse it as the stable condition conducive to their development. That 
is how a political conception of justice generates “its own support in a suitable way,”63 leading to 
a stability for right reasons, instead of an instrumental one. Rasmussen is correct to remark that 
the overlapping consensus constructed from the interpretive way of the democratic culture is not 
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“a compromise between comprehensive doctrines but as a process that must accommodate itself 
to the emerging domain of the political.”64 
Another important move from the theory of justice as a comprehensive doctrine to the 
political conception of justice as fairness is the shift from the epistemological realm to the 
interpretive model. This shift impacts the moral powers that are so central to the political 
liberalism, as they are no longer referring to the full moral personality, but rather to the faculties 
of a free citizen acting in free democratic institutions among equals. As Freeman notes, “in 
Political Liberalism, the moral powers are characterized in less ambitious terms; they are the 
capacities that anyone needs if he or she is to occupy the role of citizen and engage in, benefit 
from, and comply with the demands of social cooperation in a democratic society.”65 Thus, 
instead of the concept of truth underlying justice as fairness in TJ, Rawls relies heavily on the 
notion of reasonableness, which he distinguishes from the idea of rationality. That is why, not 
only does this idea of the reasonability qualify the fact of pluralism, it also distinguishes 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines from the unreasonable ones, and it plays a central role in the 
political justification offered by justice as fairness as a freestanding conception of justice.  
For Rawls, reasonableness is characterized by two main features. First, it conveys the 
idea of reciprocity in a system of fair cooperation; second, it comprises the fundamental 
disagreement66 that underlies the reasonable comprehensive doctrines in a democratic culture. 
That is what Rawls calls “the burden of judgment.”67 In Rawls’s words, “persons are reasonable 
in one basic aspect when, among equals say, they are ready to propose principles and standards 
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as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will 
likewise do so.”68 Once more, one notes that Rawls resolves the assurance and isolation problem 
on a moral ground, instead of resorting to an instrumental mechanism as Hobbes does. That it is 
the reason why he distinguishes it from rationality, which is the adjustment of means to an end 
by an isolated agent. Reasonability implies reciprocity since it is conceived in a system of mutual 
cooperation. Concerning the second basic aspect, it consists in “the willingness to recognize the 
burdens of judgement and to accept their consequences for the use of public reason in directing 
the legitimate exercise of political power in a constitutional regime.”69 A reasonable person 
recognizes the fact of reasonable pluralism as an enduring feature of the democratic culture and, 
therefore, no comprehensive doctrine can be invoked to legitimize the coercive power. Rather, 
when addressing each other on a subject of public concern, citizens offer fair terms of 
cooperation that can be accepted by the interlocutor. Hence the need of the idea of public reason 
as a consequence of the combination of the fact of reasonable pluralism and the idea of 
reasonable.  
The very idea of public reason implies that there are non-public reasons, and Rawls 
makes a clear distinction between the two. For Rawls, public reason is singular, while non-public 
reasons are plural, because they are those reasons at associational or domestic levels. Moreover, 
public reason is not opposed to private reason, since “there is no such thing as private reason.”70 
Hence, for Rawls, public reason is intrinsically linked to the democratic culture and that is why it 
is one of those fundamental ideas of political liberalism. In his own words, “public reason is 
characteristic of democratic culture: it is the reason of its citizens, of those sharing the status of 
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equal citizenship.”71 As such, the public reason is public in the sense that (i) it is the reason of 
citizens as they constitute the political body as a public, (ii) its subject is the good of the public 
and matters of fundamental justice, and (iii) its content and nature are public.72 Concerning the 
latter, its content is public because it is the political conception of justice as construed through 
the interpretive enterprise of the democratic culture. That is why its content is essentially liberal, 
and a political conception of justice is liberal if it (i) specifies basic rights, liberties and 
opportunities; (ii) affirms the priority of the right over the good and, (iii) assigns all-purpose 
means to all citizens so that they may benefit from their basic liberties and opportunities.73 Seen 
from this point of view, the idea of public reason ties together the idea of reasonableness and the 
political conception of justice designed to accommodate the fact of reasonable pluralism, 
characteristic of the modern democratic society.  
After exploring the political conception of justice, one would like to know what a well-
ordered society looks like, since the one developed in TJ was deemed unrealistic because it was 
founded on a comprehensive doctrine. Such a society is still a closed one that one enters through 
birth and exits through death, and it is conceived as a fair system of cooperation. However, it is 
conceived as a political society and not as a community or an association with intent of ordering 
the individual’s life according to a certain end. Rather, it affirms the priority of the right over the 
good. That is why the agents are citizens and not firstly as moral personalities. Therefore, under 
the political conception of justice as fairness, a well-ordered society means three main things: (i) 
it is a society characterized by reciprocity, since “everyone accepts, and knows that everyone 
else accepts, the very same principle of justice;” (ii) it is regulated by the principles of justice and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Ibid., 213.  
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73 Ibid., 223.  
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its basic structure is publicly known to satisfy them; (iii) its citizens have a sense of justice that 
allows them to comply with just-basic-institutions.74 
Those are some of the important ideas that were reworked or introduced in his PL. It was 
mentioned at the beginning that my interest in the Rawls’s previous work to LP was motivated 
by its influence on his understanding of human rights. Having touched some of the ideas of his 
political liberalism, I can now analyze how he moves from the political conception of justice for 
a domestic society to the elaboration of principles for the global society. 
c). A Liberal Theory for a Global Society 
In TJ, Rawls had already talked about international law, saying that the “problem, then, is 
to relate the just political principles regulating the conduct of states to the contract doctrine and 
to explain the moral basis of the law of nations from this point of view.”75 At this stage, Rawls 
wanted to extend the principles derived from his theory of justice as fairness to the conduct of 
nations. That is why he proposes an original position of peoples representing these nations in 
order to choose principles that would guide their mutual cooperation. He says, “at this point one 
may extend the interpretation of the original position and think of the parties as representatives 
of different nations who must choose together the fundamental principles to adjudicate 
conflicting claims among states.”76 Rawls claims that the resulting principles would be “political 
principles, for they govern public policies towards other nations.”77 From that international 
original position, Rawls believes that two main principles would be identified. First, there is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Ibid.,35.  
75 TJ, 377. 
76 Ibid., 378. The conditions for that original position are described in the same way as for the original position for 
the domestic justice. The representatives of nations do not have all kinds of information. For example, “they know 
nothing about the particular circumstances of human life, they know nothing about the particular circumstances of 
their own society, its power and strength in comparison with other nations, nor do they know their place in their own 
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77 Ibid. 
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equality principle with two consequences: (a) the principle of self-determination and (b) the 
principle of self-defense. Secondly, they would adopt the principle of observing the treaties, 
“provided they are consistent with the other principles governing the relations of states.”78 One 
astonishing remark about these principles is the absence of human rights among the principles 
regulating international cooperation. Thus, even at the outset, there is a big difference between 
the principles elaborated in TJ and those in LP, twenty years later. 
As already seen, after Rawls published his TJ, his political philosophy underwent a 
thorough revision of his fundamental concepts that led to the production of his PL. Some of 
those shifts were his affirmation that his theory of justice is political and not metaphysical,79 and 
the development of the ideas of overlapping consensus and the emergence of the political.80 But 
most importantly, the fact of reasonable pluralism as a permanent feature of modern society led 
him to restructure his political question and to develop his political liberalism as a response to 
this challenge. As he puts it, “political liberalism addresses two fundamental questions. The first 
is: what is the most appropriate conception for specifying the fair terms of social cooperation 
between citizens regarded as free and equal? The second question is: what are the grounds of 
toleration understood in a general way given the fact of reasonable pluralism as the inevitable 
result of powers of human reason at work within enduring free institutions?”81 This shift from a 
comprehensive (TJ) to a freestanding political liberalism (PL) transforms the idea of the person 
into that of the citizen, and relies on the overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines on political values as a way of stabilizing a democratic constitutional regime. It is in 
this context that the LP occurs, and it is logical to expect that, at this time, the Rawlsian notion of 
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80 Ibid., 473.  
81 PL, 47. Emphasis added. 
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international cooperation had been affected by the shift inside his political thought, and that is 
why he calls it “The Law of Peoples” instead of the classic “law of nations”. “By Law of 
Peoples,” he means “a particular conception of right and justice that applies to the principles and 
norms of international law and practice.”82 
As he endeavors to elaborate his Law of Peoples, Rawls recalls that “in §58 of A Theory 
of Justice I indicated how justice as fairness can be extended to international law (as I called it 
there) for the limited purpose of judging the aims and limits of just war.”83 In other words, his 
international theory in TJ was motivated by the question of just war. But “here [LP] discussion 
covers more ground.”84 This larger ground is constituted by five different kinds of societies. The 
first type is that of reasonable liberal peoples, the second is that of decent people, the third is of 
outlaw states, the fourth is of societies burdened by unfavorable conditions, and fifth, is 
benevolent absolutisms.85 
The first type, reasonable peoples, relies on what Rawls had already elaborated in PL 
about reasonability, with its two basic aspects, i.e., fair terms of cooperation and the burdens of 
judgment.86 This idea of reasonable leads to the question of legitimation through public reason, 
which is the corner-stone of Rawls’s political liberalism. These features also structure what 
Rawls understands by reasonable liberal peoples. As he states, “the idea of public reason for the 
Society of Peoples is analogous to the idea of public reason in the domestic case when a shared 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 LP, 3. This definition did not change from his Oxford Lecture of 1993 to the book of 1999, and he argues that it is 
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Rawls acknowledges that his use of “Law of Peoples” is the closest to the phrase ius gentium intra se, as what 
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83 LP, 4. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
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basis of justification exists and can be uncovered by due reflection.”87 As to the decent 
hierarchical peoples, Rawls introduces them to illustrate the toleration that has to characterize the 
Law of Peoples, so that it passes the test of universality and not only be considered ethnocentric 
to the Western world.88 For Rawls, toleration “means not only to refrain from exercising political 
sanctions –military, economic, or diplomatic –to make a people change its ways. To tolerate also 
means to recognize these non-liberal societies as equal participating members in good standing 
of the Society of Peoples.”89 And decent hierarchical peoples are “societies [that] are 
associationist in form: that is, the members of these societies are viewed in public life as 
members of different groups, and each group is represented in the legal system by a body in a 
decent consultation hierarchy.”90 In order to be tolerated by the reasonable liberal peoples, 
decent hierarchical peoples have to satisfy two principles: (1) Non-aggression; (2) a. protection 
of human rights; b. imposition of duties and obligations on all persons within peoples’ territory; 
c. judiciary system functioning for the interest of the common good.91 These two principles are 
related to the conduct of decent peoples both internally and externally. For Rawls, these two 
types of society constitute what he calls “well-ordered peoples”,92 and them only can participate 
in the elaboration of the Law of Peoples.  
For conceiving the principles for the Law of Peoples, Rawls resorts again to his “device 
for representation”, that is, the original position. He suggests three original positions, two for 
reasonable liberal peoples and one for decent hierarchical peoples. The first original position is 
for deciding reasonable principles guiding domestic justice in liberal societies. In his words, “the 
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89LP, 59. 
90 LP, 64.  
91 Ibid., 64-6.  
92 Ibid., 4.  
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first use of the original position, it models what we regard –you and I, here and now –as fair and 
reasonable conditions for the parties, who are rational representatives of free and equal, 
reasonable and rational citizens, to specify fair terms of cooperation for regulating the basic 
structure of this society.”93 He then sets five essential features for such a model of representation 
to work: (1) parties are representing citizens fairly (2). as rational; (3) they select the principles 
from available ones for the basic structures; (4) they do so for appropriate reason; (5) and for 
citizens considered as rational and reasonable.94 For the second original position, Rawls suggests 
an extension of the original position for domestic justice to justice among reasonable liberal 
peoples. “This time, the rational representatives of liberal peoples are to specify the Law of 
Peoples, guided by appropriate reasons.”95 Following the first model, there is fairness between 
“both the representatives and the people they represent” because they “are situated 
symmetrically.” Moreover, they are rational and subjected to the veil of ignorance. This second 
position satisfies the five essential features and therefore it is sound.96 From this second original 
position, Rawls derives the principles that are to constitute the Law of Peoples:  
1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by others. 
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings 
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them 
4. People are to observe the duty of non-intervention 
5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defense 
6. Peoples are to honor human rights 
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war 
8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a 
just or decent political and social regime.97 
Compared to the international theory developed in TJ, one notices many differences. In TJ, the 
theory comprised only two principles; but the Law of Peoples is shaped by eight principles—one 
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97 Ibid., 37. Emphasis added. 
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more compared to the list of principles of his 1993 Oxford Amnesty International lecture.98 More 
importantly, human rights are now part of the principles that are to guide the cooperation among 
peoples.  
The third original position comes as a second extension of the law of peoples to decent 
peoples to see if they can endorse the same principles as reasonable liberal peoples do. If the 
former adopts them, Rawls assumes that he will have proved that those principles are universal 
and not only constrained to the Western world. Now, among the principles that could cause some 
friction between liberal and non-liberal peoples is the principle regarding human rights. 
However, Rawls had taken great care to include honoring human rights into the criteria that 
define decent hierarchical peoples. Therefore, it becomes easy to presume that by submitting 
these principles to the representatives of decent peoples, they “would adopt the same eight 
principles as those […] adopted by representatives of liberal societies.”99 As in his theory of 
justice for a domestic society, Rawls does not want international relations to be based on self-
interest as the realist school would advocate, nor does he go in the line of hard 
cosmopolitanism.100 Rather, he believes that his Law of Peoples is the middle way between the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 CP, 529. In this paper, he omits the eighth principle enouncing the assistance duty of burdened societies; maybe, 
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99 LP, 69. 
100 The most cited in this category of hard cosmopolitanism from whom Rawls takes his distance are Thomas Pogge 
and Charles Beitz. For the former, see, for instance, his Realizing Rawls, ibid., “An Egalitarian Law of Peoples” in 
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two extremes101 and, therefore, it provides a moral foundation for international relations through 
international law, without being a comprehensive one. Thus, his political conception of 
international justice rests on principles regulating relations between peoples, making it not a 
modus vivendi, but rather a stable cooperation for appropriate reasons. 
Without further considering this matter for now, two questions arise: if the two types of 
peoples are to adopt the same principles, why did Rawls need two original positions? Second, 
why peoples and not states are actors in international cooperation, as it is a custom to use state 
rather than peoples? Although Rawls recognizes equality between liberal and decent peoples at 
the second level model –which elaborates the Law of Peoples102–he, however, does not answer 
the first question. And actually, there is no answer because the Law of Peoples is for liberal 
peoples and it is only extended to decent hierarchical peoples. That is why some scholars such as 
Mitchell Avila –who otherwise defends the Law of Peoples –argues that we must reject the 
possibility of the decent peoples to enter into an original position.103 Even the justification that 
Rawls gives104 is to show that decent peoples would agree on it.105 But why can’t decent people 
propose their own principles founded on their own conception of justice which is based on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 See Rex Martin and David Reidy, “Introduction: Reading Rawls’s The Law of Peoples” in Rex Martin and David 
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104 LP, 69. 
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common good? Following this principle of equality, why should they be tolerated instead of 
participating in the elaboration of the principles and not only to endorse principles that have been 
already derived from a liberal political culture? Why doesn’t Rawls imagine that, on the same 
principle of equality, decent people might want to meet among themselves, suggest a list of 
principles that would be extended on other peoples–liberal peoples included–in order to be 
tolerated? I come back to this point when dealing with his claim that, by showing that decent 
people agree on the liberal principles, the latter become universal.  
Concerning the second question, Rawls contends that there is a difference between 
peoples and states. The difference between the two lies in his distinction between reasonable and 
rational. For him, peoples are reasonable while states are rational. As he puts it, peoples have 
three main characteristics: institutional, cultural and moral,106 while states “are often seen as 
rational, anxiously concerned with their power –their capacity (military, economic, diplomatic) 
to influence other states –and always guided by their basic interests.”107 That is why “the Law of 
Peoples that regulates the Society of Peoples takes peoples as the actors, just as individuals are 
actors in domestic society.”108 According to Philip Pettit, “peoples are treated by Rawls as 
capable of agency and as possessed of something that parallels the psychology of an individual 
agent,” because they can make a commitment, “they can both give and receive respect from one 
another; they can insist on ‘receiving from other peoples a proper respect and recognition of their 
equality’.”109 Clearly, Rawls wants to overcome the modus vivendi that reigns in international 
relations by introducing the idea of reasonableness, and this is a laudable initiative. Nonetheless, 
with the evolution of international law, the conception of the modern state has eroded Rawls’s 
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109 Philip Pettit, “Rawls’s Peoples” in Rex Martin and David Reidy, eds., ibid., 42. 
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conception of state and brought it closer to his idea of peoples, so much that it is not easy to 
disentangle them. John Tasioulas, for example, observes that “since the middle of the previous 
century, the legal position has been that the sovereign state is no longer completely 
unencumbered externally, in its relations with other states and extra-territorial authorities, nor 
internally, in its relations with its own citizens and authorities within its territory.”110 And 
looking at the task ascribed to liberal peoples by Rawls, they are not that different from the role 
of states. For instance, Rawls asserts that “liberal people do […] have their fundamental interests 
as permitted by their conceptions of right and justice. They seek to protect their territory, to 
ensure the security and safety of their citizens, and to preserve their free political institutions and 
the liberties and free culture of their civil society.”111 They also cherish their “self-respect, 
amour-propre” à la Rousseau.112 Yet, as once again Tasioulas remarks, “these are precisely the 
hallmarks of the modern sovereign state as a mode of political organization.”113 In other words, 
the practice in international relations has already challenged and therefore changed the notion of 
state that Rawls wants to discard and come closer to his understanding of peoples.  
These questions on Rawls’s Law of Peoples in general will become sharper when talking 
about human rights in particular. Indeed, as it was noted above, one of the new elements added to 
the list of principles regulating international relations is that of human rights. They are also the 
stumbling stone of the relations between liberal and non-liberal, since honoring human rights 
guarantees toleration and acceptance into the society of Peoples, while non-honoring them opens 
the door to political sanctions including military intervention. Hence, the second point is about 
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Rawls’s understanding of human rights and how it faces the challenges elaborated in the first 
chapter. 
3.2. Rawls vis-à-vis Human Rights as Imperialist Ideology 
a). The Rawlsian Conception of Human Rights 
I have previously shown that human rights are part of the “basic charter of the Law of 
Peoples.” But what does Rawls understand by human rights? What are they and what is their 
role? Before Rawls introduces human rights in his theory, he had been talking about rights in his 
previous works. Rex Martin notes that “Rawls is one of the few contemporary philosophers who 
uses natural rights as his standard term.”114 He continues, “We will assume, though, that he 
means by natural rights roughly what others have meant by human rights.”115 Patrick Hayden is 
also of that opinion, that the basic rights elaborated in TJ should not be understood as “‘natural 
rights’ in some deep metaphysical sense.”116 Rather, “it would perhaps be more useful to regard 
them simply as human rights,” since “Rawls conceives of basic rights as natural rights insofar as 
they are universal and unconditional, yet in order to satisfy the actualization of social justice, 
these rights must be elaborated in the form of a sociopolitical institution, including the rule of 
law.”117 Part of Hayden’s study aims at situating Rawls in the contractarian tradition where 
human rights emerged from natural rights, and he shows that the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights can easily be understood from this tradition of thought 
Rawls used natural rights in his TJ, but by the time he writes LP, he had gone through the 
purification of his theory of any metaphysical basis in order to let it emerge as freestanding. 
Therefore, human rights evoked in LP are to be understood on a political conception basis and 
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not justified by comprehensive doctrines, religious, moral or philosophical. Moreover and for 
this reason, Rawlsian human rights are not to be considered only Western, but rather universal. 
Hence, for Rawls, “human rights are recognized as necessary conditions of any system of social 
cooperation. When they are regularly violated, we have command by force, a slave system, and 
no cooperation of any kind.”118 This is a political conception of human rights, because they “do 
not depend on any particular comprehensive religious doctrine or philosophical doctrine of 
human nature.”119 And since they are “conditions for any system of social cooperation”, Rawls 
accounts for them in two ways. “One is to view them as belonging to a reasonably just liberal 
political conception of justice and as a proper subset of the rights and liberties secured to all free 
and equal citizens in a constitutional liberal democratic regime. The other is to view them as 
belonging to an associationist social form.”120 In other words, human rights are accounted for as 
belonging to the “well-ordered peoples”, and they are to serve as an important criterion in their 
mutual cooperation as well as the cooperation with other types of peoples. Hence, in the line of 
the Law of Peoples itself, human rights are developed from the political liberalism and they play 
a great role in international cooperation since they are designed as a platform for liberal foreign 
policy. As Rawls asserts, “it is important to see that the Law of Peoples is developed within 
political liberalism and is an extension of a liberal conception of justice for a domestic regime to 
a Society of Peoples.”121 Here, Rawls is emphasizing the free-standing features of this Law of 
Peoples as is his political liberalism. The consequence of this background is that “in developing 
the Law of Peoples within a liberal conception of justice, we work out the ideals and principles 
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of the foreign policy of a reasonably just liberal people.”122 He adds, “this concern with the 
foreign policy of a liberal people is implicit throughout.”123 It is for this reason that human rights 
also are conceived in a non-comprehensive way and are meant to play a great role in the liberal 
foreign policy with regard to other peoples. Beitz would say that Rawlsian human rights play a 
public role and they constitute the principles for international affairs.124 
As a subset of liberal rights, Rawls gives a detailed list of rights that are to be recognized 
as human rights. He says, “among the human rights are the rights to life (to the means of 
subsistence and security); to liberty (to freedom from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation, 
and to a sufficient measure of liberty of conscience to ensure freedom of religion and thought); to 
property (personal property); and to formal equality as expressed by the rules of natural justice 
(that is, that similar cases be treated similarly).”125 For Rawls, these “human rights express a 
special class of urgent rights.”126 Compared to the usual list of rights enshrined in the Bill of 
Rights (UDHR, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR], and International 
Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights [ICSECR]), Rawls’s list is clearly very short, 
because he wants to overcome the parochialism so often attributed to them. Hence, he is 
confident that “human rights, thus understood, cannot be rejected as peculiarly liberal or special 
to the Western tradition. They are not politically parochial.”127 It has been, however, underlined 
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that decent hierarchical people are brought into the original position, not to craft their own 
principles, but rather to agree on liberal principles. Does it make human rights universal because 
they are understood in other cultural contexts? I will come back to this issue in due time. Right 
now, I proceed with the role that Rawls attributes to them.  
Rawls assigns two main roles to human rights in the society of reasonable peoples: “they 
restrict the justifying reason for war and its conduct, and they specify limits to a regime’s 
internal autonomy.”128 In this way and as Rawls himself notes it, human rights join the evolution 
of international law and international relations since World War II, which evolution has 
restricted the use of war as a political means and thus set a limit to the understanding of state 
sovereignty.129 It is important to notice here that, for Rawls, human rights play a political role in 
international politics. That is why he makes sure to distinguish them from constitutional and 
other rights guaranteed by institutions. In his own words, “human rights are distinct from 
constitutional rights, or from the rights of liberal democratic citizenship, or from other rights that 
belong to certain kinds of political institutions, both individualist and associationist. Human 
rights set a necessary, though not sufficient, standard for the decency of domestic political social 
institutions.”130 Rawls is more than clear that human rights are understood according to the role 
they play in the toleration of decent people. Thus, they are not for individual persons,131 nor are 
they for decent peoples as such. They are the conditions set by liberal peoples to be met by non-
liberal peoples in order to be tolerated. Therefore, only non-liberal peoples who honor human 
rights are considered decent. “Hence the special class of human rights has three roles: 1. Their 
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fulfillment is a necessary condition of the decency of a society’s political institutions and of its 
legal order; 2. Their fulfillment is sufficient to exclude justified and forceful intervention by 
other peoples, for example, by diplomatic and economic sanctions, or in grave cases by military 
intervention; 3. They set a limit to pluralism among peoples.”132 These three roles can be 
summarized as inclusion, exclusion and limitation. They play the inclusive role by defining 
decency; they perform the exclusive task by forbidding any intervention from the well-ordered 
peoples; and their limitative role is about the peoples that are to be admitted into the society of 
peoples. The last point is important because it stresses Rawls’s goal of extending the liberal 
conception of justice to the foreign policy of liberal peoples. Consequently, not all peoples are 
accepted in the society of peoples constructed on the Rawlsian model and that is how human 
rights play a limiting role.  
Having gone through the understanding and the role of human rights and their root in the 
LP, I now examine how the Rawlsian conception of human rights responds to challenges posed 
by considering them as an imperialist ideology.  
b). Human Rights Minimalism and Human Rights as Imperialist Ideology 
Rawls’s conception of human rights has provoked a very vivid debate in international law 
and international social justice, and has ushered in a new philosophical justification of human 
rights. Charles Beitz argues that the LP offers a “‘practical’ conception” of human rights which 
differs from what he calls “orthodox view”,133 that is what he would later call “naturalistic 
theories.”134 The LP is also the source of his (Beitz’s) double model theory of human rights, 
which he presents as “a fresh start” vis-à-vis other theories of human rights. As he says, “the 
alternative approach I shall suggest, is implicit in the view of human rights taken by John Rawls 
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in the Law of Peoples. Although I shall not endorse his view as Rawls presents it, I believe his 
way of understanding human rights is instructive in its departure from the more familiar 
positions.”135 Erin Kelly’s claim that “human rights are foreign policy imperatives” also finds its 
source of inspiration in Rawls’s view that human rights are necessary conditions for social 
cooperation in the society of peoples.136 David A. Reidy, on his part, almost apologetically, 
argues that “if we conjoin Rawls’s doctrine of basic human rights with the foregoing account of 
the politics of human rights, we see that Rawls has set out a powerful vision of how free peoples, 
following their own historical paths and faithful to the limits of a liberal conception of 
international rights, might arrive at a world within which[…]liberal democratic rights are 
universally recognized and enforced as human (though not basic human) rights.”137 These few 
examples show that the Rawlsian conception of human rights has initiated a new thinking and 
even generated some disciples. Does it, nonetheless, eschew the reefs of parochialism and 
imperialism that have always accompanied the human rights discourse? Before responding to 
this question, a quick reminder of what are the main critiques of human rights, as elaborated in 
my first chapter, is appropriate at this point.  
The strong critics of human rights as an imperialist ideology put forward four main 
arguments. Firstly, like the civilizing mission was used to cover the Western colonizing 
enterprise of the rest of the world, human rights is another way that the West has found to 
perpetuate its influence on the rest of the world. Secondly, the civilizing mission was 
undergirded by the racial prejudice of the West superiority over the rest of the world, and 
therefore had the duty to bring civilization to the inferior races, in order to bring them to the level 
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of civilization. In the same way, the human rights project carries out the same aim of the West to 
bring salvation to the savages who do not know and do not have human rights. That is the 
meaning of the savage-victim-savior metaphor. Thirdly, the civilizing mission was supported by 
the liberal belief in the progress of civilization based on the hierarchical anthropology. The 
critics contend that the human rights movement is also a liberal ambition to spread it on the non-
Western world. Fourthly, under the push of liberalism, this whole project of the civilizing 
mission was secured by international law as its legal scheme. On this level, critics show that 
human rights have been incorporated in international law that is mostly liberal, and therefore, 
human rights law is a continuation of the universalization of Eurocentrism. The seriousness of 
these arguments to prove that human rights are another imperialist ideology is that they touch the 
moral core of the human rights movement. For if human rights are an ideology in its negative 
sense, it means they are a lie and a liar, because they are not what they claim to be, and they 
serve an evil end. That is why responding to them is more than just showing that human rights 
are universal, since their universality concerns their scope and not necessarily their moral 
validity. The question then is to see whether the Rawlsian Law of Peoples and his conception of 
human rights address these worries satisfactorily. 
Concerning his law of peoples, one has, at the outset, to be fair to Rawls. His law of 
peoples is far from seeking the Westernization of the rest of world –at least in his intention. 
Being the extension of his political liberalism, it is inspired by the fact of reasonable pluralism 
and, therefore, posits a situation whereby there are other forms of political organizations –decent 
peoples as he calls them –that deserve respect and cooperation with liberal peoples without 
changing their way of life. That is why he refutes the cosmopolitanists and liberal crusaders who 
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criticize his theory as worse than realism,138 or too tolerant.139 As such, it is with no surprise that 
the fact of pluralism underlines his understanding of human rights.140 However, does Rawls’s 
conception of human rights successfully respond to the critics who view human rights as an 
imperialist ideology? It is not easy to tell, but there are reasons to suspect it does not. 
To repeat it again, the Law of Peoples is an extension of Rawls’s political liberalism. I 
have expressed that political liberalism as a political conception of justice is construed through 
an interpretive model that looked at the history of the constitutional democracy and constructed 
ideas developed in that culture. Rawls even points to the Reformation period as the date of birth 
of liberalism. In his own words, “the historical origin of political liberalism (and of liberalism 
more generally) is the Reformation and its aftermath, with the long controversies over religious 
toleration in the sixteenth century and seventeenth century.”141 Not only does Reformation 
constitute the historical origin of political liberalism, but it gives the latter its substantive matter, 
for “political liberalism starts by taking to heart the absolute depth of that irreconcilable latent 
conflict.”142 From this position, liberalism in general –political liberalism included –is culturally 
situated and originates from particular historical conditions. Moreover, one remembers that the 
Law of Peoples is first framed during the second original position, during an aparte for liberal 
peoples, and then extended to other societies without having participated in their elaboration. 
From this perspective, the critics might argue that the extension of the Law of Peoples is 
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synonymous with spreading a cultural imperialism as Audard observes, since norms and values 
are elaborated in one cultural context and placed on other peoples.143 
Furthermore, according to the critics, human rights as imperialist ideology carry with 
them the civilizing mission’s prejudice of racial and cultural superiority. For sure, Rawls does 
not advance any racial superiority. But the critics could point out that he seems to believe in the 
superiority of the liberal political institutions, for if the Law of Peoples is tolerant of decent 
peoples, it is in the hope that, at the end, they will evolve into liberal societies, for Rawls asserts 
that “if a liberal constitutional democracy is, in fact, superior to other forms of society, as I 
believe it to be, a liberal people should have confidence in their convictions and suppose that a 
decent society, when offered due respect by liberal peoples, may be more likely, over time, to 
recognize the advantages of liberal institutions and take steps toward becoming more liberal on 
its own.”144 Rawls expresses the same idea in another instance, saying that “if peoples are 
exposed to liberal civilization and culture’s basic principles and ideals in a positive way, they 
may become ready to accept and act on them.”145 Following these views, despite Rawls’s 
insistence that “liberal peoples must try to encourage decent peoples and not frustrate their 
vitality by coercively insisting that all societies be liberal,”146 the critics could also argue that he 
posits liberal civilization and its cultural principles as the goal to be reached by non-liberal 
peoples.  
Another reason that the critics put forward to assert that human rights are an imperialist 
ideology is the way the human rights movement proceeds through demonizing other cultures, 
setting the “us” liberals against the “other” non-liberals. Critics reading the Law of Peoples could 
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contend that there is a distinction between different peoples and in the process of elaborating the 
principles for the Society of Peoples, other peoples receive (or acquiesce to) what liberals have 
decided. Only liberals have agency and are active, while others peoples come later. Liberals meet 
in their original position and come up with norms that are to regulate the Society of Peoples by 
extension. In other words, international cooperation is regulated by liberal values,147 designed by 
liberals and extended to some other peoples if they are decent, and imposed on others if they 
cannot be ignored.  
Concerning the question of international law as a legal scheme with a purpose to spread 
liberal ideas through the civilizing mission, the critics can highlight that Rawls defines the Law 
of Peoples as “a particular political conception of right and justice that applies to the principles 
and norms of international law and practice.”148 Having shown that this Law of Peoples is a 
liberal theory for the liberal foreign policy, and having contended that its content is liberal, they 
could conclude that human rights as one of the principles of this Law of Peoples are another way 
of propagating liberal ideology. For although, according to Rawls, human rights are different 
from any institutionalized right, be it liberal or associationist,149 they still constitute the content 
of the Law of Peoples that was elaborated by the only liberal peoples.  
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Now, for Rawls, to show that human rights are not imperialistic goes in hand with the 
assertion of their universality, and he believes that his theory of human rights passes the test of 
universality. He writes, “human rights thus understood, cannot be rejected as peculiarly liberal or 
special to the Western tradition. They are not politically parochial.”150 And he explains that this 
universality of human rights is to be understood “in the following sense: they are intrinsic to the 
Law of Peoples and have a political (moral) effect whether or not they are supported locally. 
That is, their political (moral) force extends to all societies, and they are binding on all peoples 
and societies, including outlaw states.”151 Critics could once more challenge this justification of 
human rights universality, showing that, as already underscored, human rights occur as one of 
the principles that are to guide the cooperation between liberal peoples understood as reasonable. 
It is during the second original position that they are extended to the decent hierarchical peoples, 
not as their principles, but as the conditions to fulfill in order to be tolerated. Only at the third 
original position are these principles extended to every other society. Now, if decent hierarchical 
peoples would accept human rights because they have been included in the second original 
position, the question arises as to why and on what basis human rights are to be imposed on 
outlaw states. Why should outlaw states be asked to comply with a law that they did not 
participate in its formulation? Alistair Macleod also finds a problem here and notes that if decent 
people could endorse these liberal principles, “it is difficult to see why the representatives of so-
called ‘outlaw’ societies should be thought to be under an obligation to respect human rights 
about which liberal and decent societies happen to be in agreement.”152 It is also Beitz’s 
question: “Why would the liberal and decent peoples be justified in establishing adherence to 
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human rights as a threshold of membership in international society?”153 In other words, the 
critics’ challenge has a reasonable basis. 
It is helpful to recall that Rawls defines outlaw states as those refusing to comply with the 
reasonable Law of Peoples and violating human rights.154 This definition, however, raises 
questions because it is a functionalist definition. Outlaw states are defined by what they do not 
do, that is, not to comply with honoring human rights. The question now is: Is it a refusal to 
honor human rights that they had made? For example, is it a liberal people or decent people who 
partook in the original position, and later refused to comply with the principles of the Law of 
Peoples? If that is the case, then there can be moral reasons and reasonable motives to impose 
human rights on such a state which becomes outlaw by the very fact of not complying with the 
Law of Peoples. Nevertheless, if it is the other way around, it becomes problematic. If indeed the 
outlaw states were not represented in the original position, it becomes difficult to justify why 
human rights should apply to them. Therefore, unless representatives of all peoples have 
participated in the original position that frames the Law of Peoples, it becomes difficult to see 
how such a law can claim universality and validity over all peoples, without being received as an 
imposition. Critics could then use this imposition of human rights on outlaw states as another 
sign that Rawls’s conception of human rights does not address their challenge to human rights as 
an imperialist ideology. 
All these observations related to the universality of human rights bring to the fore the 
critics’ claim of its imperialist use by the Western world over the rest. But before I address that 
problem, I now examine if all peoples would limit their rights to the list that Rawls suggests. 
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Sanja Ivic celebrates Rawls’s conception of human rights as a post-modern definition that 
is more open than the UDHR,155 while many of those who have oriented their attention to 
Rawls’s LP are struck by his narrow list of human rights. Costa calls it “a short list,”156 while 
Wilfried Hinsch and Markus Stepanians note that “Rawls’s account of human rights contrasts, 
indeed, starkly with what Beitz calls the ‘conventional view’ which found expression, for 
example, in the Universal Declaration.”157 Therefore, “in view of the rather sparse and 
minimalist account of human rights in LoP, one may also wonder why so many rights 
acknowledged as human rights in international declaration and covenants are not included in 
Rawls’s short-list.”158 Others, however, have recognized the benefits of this short list of “proper 
rights,” especially in a multicultural context. For instance, Joshua Cohen argues that 
“minimalism may be more than we should ever reasonably expect,”159 although he distinguishes 
between “justificatory” and “substantive” minimalism.160 Still others have argued that this 
limited list of human rights allows “for an unforced agreement on the Law of Peoples that is not 
parochial or subject to the charge of imperialism.”161 However, before pursuing it further, it is 
worth analyzing the relationship between Rawls’s list of human rights and the actual 
international human rights culture, since some scholars contend that Rawls draws his Law of 
Peoples from the ideas already implicit in the international culture.162 
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The minimal list of what Rawls calls “human rights proper” corresponds to articles 3-18 
of the UDHR, which constitute roughly the first generation of liberal human rights. In Rawls’s 
own words, “Consider the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 [….] Articles 3 to 18 
may all be put under this heading of human rights proper, pending certain questions of 
interpretation.”163 Rawls adds that human rights are related to extreme cases of genocide and 
apartheid. These are the human rights that Rawls considers to be included for defining the 
decency of non-liberal peoples. Other rights are the expression of liberal inspiration –as in art. 1 
of UDHR –or require specific political institutions for implementation. Therefore, they should 
not be extended to non-liberal peoples.164 One has to recognize here Rawls’s effort to avoid 
liberal imperialism, proceeding “from the international political world as we see it,”165 a world 
marked by different comprehensive doctrines and cultural pluralism. Nonetheless, many critics 
have shown that Rawls leaves out many rights that are fundamental for the realization of what he 
calls “human rights proper.” This critical trend refers to the UDHR’s articles 19-21, which 
emphasize the right to freedom of expression and opinion, the right to association and the right to 
democratic participation. For instance, Buchanan argues that it appears “that, other things being 
equal, the Rawlsian human rights will tend to be more secure in a democratic society than in a 
society that includes only a consultation hierarchy,”166 whereas Hayden holds that “both 
democracy and human rights are at risk unless each includes the other.”167 
Rawls has a point in insisting that liberal peoples should not aim at imposing a liberal 
political organization, since the latter is hermeneutically interpreted from the Western culture. 
Moreover, as the goal of his understanding of human rights is for foreign policy, he clearly sets 
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himself aside from any liberal imperialist endeavor, at least against decent peoples. However, 
even with his “human rights proper,” a question arises as to the implementation of some of them. 
For instance, the right to liberty includes a “right to a sufficient measure of liberty of conscience 
to ensure freedom of religion and of thought.”168 Now, for one to exercise his/her religion or 
his/her freedom of thought would need the right of expression and the right of association. 
Furthermore, religion normally implies a community of faith and a thought is such because it is 
expressed. Hence, the right to liberty will not be granted if he excludes these and other articles of 
UDHR are ignored. The same questioning reaches the right to life which, for Rawls, appeals to 
the right “to the means of subsistence and security.”169 It is certain that “the means to subsistence 
and security” are to be interpreted in the context of what is contained in UDHR’s art. 25 as right 
to food, to clothing, to housing, medical care, etc. In other words, Rawls’s list of “human rights 
proper” involves more than the articles 3 to 18 of UDHR, yet the international human culture 
today admits the interconnectedness of all the generations of human rights170 in order to be 
effective. 
Concerning the right to democracy, Rawls is correct to warn the liberal champions that it 
would be unreasonable to impose on other peoples their liberal understanding of democracy. And 
once again, conceived for foreign policy, human rights should not be used for this purpose. 
Nonetheless, if the right to democracy is to be understood as an inherent right of a people and is 
to be understood according to different cultures,171 there are no good reasons for an inclusive 
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original position not to secure it as a basic right of participating in one’s government. It is worth 
noting that the right to participation in one’s government –which I take to incarnate the basic 
fundamental feature of the right to democracy—meets Rawls’s aspects of reasonableness. 
Indeed, (1) having assumed that all participants are capable of reasonableness, they would agree 
on that principle as a feature of a reasonable law of peoples; (2) originating from different 
cultures, they would recognize that its implementation can be different from one culture to 
another. Actually, from a colonial perspective, these very rights discarded by Rawls were 
instrumental for claiming independence from colonial powers without necessarily becoming 
liberal.  
Hence, once the proposition of one inclusive original position is adopted, many of, if not 
in all the articles of UDHR, would be found acceptable to the representatives of peoples. The 
actual situation of human rights practice on a global level showing the majority of states ratifying 
most of the human rights instruments is a palpable sign and even a positive point that can be 
considered as a sign of emerging shared international norms.172 But this would be so because the 
role assigned to human rights would have changed. Before taking up this issue, I now go back to 
the question of imperialism.  
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Most of the critics of human rights as instruments of the Western World argue that human 
rights are just Western instruments for propagating Western imperialism. In the words of one the 
most acerbic critics, “[the legitimation] of cultural imperialism[…]is particularly the case if the 
human rights corpus is seen purely as a liberal project whose overriding goal, though not 
explicitly stated, is the imposition of Western-style liberal democracy, complete with its 
condiments.”173 Sure enough, Rawls is not pushing for such a vision of human rights, as he even 
excludes the right to democracy from the list of proper rights. However, from the previous 
discussion on the universality of human rights which has shown that they are elaborated during 
the original position of liberal peoples and human rights being part of a liberal theory for foreign 
policy, critics could interpret them as having an imperialistic goal, since human rights are 
extended to non-liberals. 
Moreover, Rawls’s functionalist view of human rights makes them vulnerable to an 
ideological use, deviating from their goal of empowering individuals facing oppression. Indeed, 
human rights for Rawls are conditions for social cooperation for the well-ordered peoples. In 
other words, they are what Erin Kelly calls foreign policy imperatives and that is why they are 
narrowly conceived. According to her, “given the foreign policy stakes involved and room for 
significant and not unreasonable disagreement about the requirement of domestic justice, only a 
narrow conception of human rights could be collectively endorsed.”174 This foreign policy 
oriented conception of human rights is different from the goal of the international human rights 
movement, and conflicts with the current international practice. Not only did the evolution of 
international relations alter the internal sovereignty of states and limit their rights to war, but 
most importantly human rights were not drafted for foreign policy, but rather for protecting 
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individuals’ rights. This was and is the big change in the international arena, that “the individual 
is treated as a subject of international rights.”175 Benhabib goes even further to show that even 
for Kant and other scholars like Beitz and Pogge, “it is individuals who are the units of moral 
and legal rights in a world society and not peoples.”176 And for justifying the R2P, Antonio 
Guterres insists that state sovereignty cannot be an excuse when individuals’ rights are violated. 
Rather, “the sovereignty of the individual must be paramount.”177 In this perspective, human 
rights after WWII were not conceived first and for most to limit state sovereignty and the right to 
war. Rather, the latter are limited because the importance of the individual’s rights have become 
a concern for international concern.  
One would want to understand Rawls for not taking individuals as a subject of 
international rights, because, as Tasioulas observes, “the interests of individuals are assumed to 
be directly catered for at the domestic level, by the conceptions of political justice that define 
liberal and decent regimes.”178 It is also the consequence of his political conception of justice as 
fairness, which adopts a political conception of the human person as a citizen, and this is not 
necessarily the same in other political forms of society. Furthermore, Rawls’s society is closed 
and self-sufficient. However, if well-ordered peoples are self-sufficient and yet want to get 
involved in outlaw states’ business, it would be difficult to do it in the name of human rights 
without being suspected of imperialism.  
In addition, although scholars like Kelly think that Rawls has concern for persons’ rights, 
he says that “some primitive societies” with no interest with liberal and decent peoples are not a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 H.J. Stein, et al., International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals. 3rd Ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 144. 
176 Benhabib, The Rights of Others, ibid., 97. 
177 Antonio Guterres, “Millions Uprooted: Saving Refugees and the Displaced” in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 5, 
2008, 93. 
178 Tasioulas, ibid., 373. 
232	  
	  
	  
big issue. Only “those that are more developed, seeking trade or other cooperative arrangements 
with liberal or decent societies, are a different story,” meaning, well-ordered peoples have to 
check how they honor human rights in order to enter into cooperation with them.179 In other 
words, persons’ rights in societies that are not part of well-ordered peoples are not an issue, as 
long as the former do not seek any sort of cooperation with the latter. This sounds like a realist 
view, whereby well-ordered peoples get concerned with human rights only when they are 
engaged in trade or other mutual arrangements. In this scheme, the individual is doubly hurt. 
First, he/she is living under an oppressive regime; second, the international community–in our 
case, well-ordered peoples—does not care about him/her as long as his/her society has nothing to 
offer. However, the ambition of the international human rights movement aims at reaching out to 
any human being’s rights to have his/her urgent needs satisfied.  
In summary, while Rawls wants to avoid the ethnocentric and imperialist challenges to 
human rights, the latter being part of his Law of Peoples, he does not satisfactorily address the 
concerns of the critics of human rights as an imperialistic ideology, used to spread liberal 
imperialistic culture. Although he takes into account the fact of pluralism in the global order, the 
Law of Peoples is still the work of liberal peoples, which is then extended to non-liberal peoples. 
In this sense, other peoples do not contribute to the framing of this Law that is going to be 
applied to them. Furthermore, the Law of Peoples is designed for a liberal foreign policy and 
human rights are the criterion for being tolerated and accepted into the society of well-ordered 
peoples. Hence, since human rights assume the role for toleration of non-liberal peoples in the 
liberal foreign policy, human rights cannot be easily defended as not spreading the liberal 
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culture. Even the principle of reciprocity that Audard180 thought would save Rawls from being 
accused of defending imperialism, does not help that much. Reciprocity is linked to the 
reasonableness and, from the Rawls’s, the fact of global pluralism is not reasonable. In this 
sense, despite Rawls’s principle of toleration of liberal peoples for other peoples, the critics’ 
challenges are not satisfactorily addressed. Hence, another conception of human rights is needed 
that can address these challenges. But before that, there is the question of humanitarian 
intervention. How does Rawls respond to it? 
3.3. Rawls and Humanitarian Intervention as Neocolonialism 
a) Rawls’s Justification of Humanitarian Intervention 
My second chapter argued that humanitarian intervention draws its moral background in 
the just war doctrine, especially in its reasons for waging a war –jus ad bellum. In this context, 
human rights are invoked as a legitimate/just cause to wage war against those regimes accused of 
violating them. For those advocating for such an intervention, human rights give a moral ground 
for a humanitarian intervention. But for many critics, such a justification is an apology for 
another form of colonialism, both as a repetition of the Western domination in the name of 
human rights and as an economic exploitation of the non-Western world through the 
international institutions. The question at stake now is: does Rawls condone humanitarian 
intervention in the name of human rights? If he does, does he address the concerns of those 
suspecting neocolonialism behind such an intervention? 
To start with, Rawls dealt with the question of just war theory since his TJ. After 
elaborating, in his original position, the principles that should guide international law, such as the 
principle of equality, whose consequences are self-determination, self-defense and reciprocal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 Audard, “Peace or Justice? Some Remarks on Rawls’s Law of Peoples”, in Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 
Vol. 60, No. 237 (3), 2006, p. 325.  
234	  
	  
	  
respect of treaties, he concludes that “these principles define when a nation has a just cause in 
war or, in the traditional phrase, its jus ad bellum.”181 From this perspective, only the self-
defense constitutes the moral motive for waging war. In this sense, Rawls subscribes to the 
traditional principle of non-intervention, as he strongly affirms the right to self-determination 
and the right to self-defense, both originating from the fundamental principle of international 
law: the equality of states. He does not include human rights among the principles that would be 
adopted in his original position as a guiding principle for international relations. Therefore, they 
cannot be the cause for humanitarian intervention.  
This position had changed when he considered the question of humanitarian intervention 
in the Law of Peoples. His Law of Peoples is composed of three parts, two constituting the ideal 
theory during which he frames the principles of the law of peoples –first among liberal peoples, 
and then extended to decent peoples –while the third part considers how the ideal theory can be 
put into practice. As he asserts it, “non-ideal theory asks how this long-term goal might be 
achieved, or worked toward, usually in gradual steps. It looks for policies and courses that are 
morally permissible and politically possible as well as likely to be effective.” 182 It seems to me 
that this is where Rawls’s Law of Peoples aims to be a realistic utopia. It is not enough to 
elaborate a theory; it is also important to see how it can be effective. It is in this context that 
Rawls evokes the question of right to war. One, however, has to recognize that the transition 
from ideal to non-ideal theory is not clear. For instance, we find the question of right to war in 
the ideal theory part,183 and as he just affirmed, the non-ideal part of his theory looks for morally 
acceptable means to apply the ideal principles; meaning that even this part comprises a 
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normative background. It is the same as the question of humanitarian intervention that is in both 
the ideal and non-ideal parts.184 In Buchanen’s words, “although Rawls does distinguish between 
ideal and nonideal theory in the Law of Peoples, nothing he says suggests that his nonideal 
theory relaxes his Westphalian assumption of deep unity within states,”185 that is, there is a 
normative assumption in the non-ideal part. 
Notwithstanding this, Rawls reconfirms that the only reasonable cause for waging war is 
self-defense. He excludes the rational motives as conferring a right to war to well-ordered 
peoples. If they wage war for their own interests, the well-ordered peoples become outlaw states. 
As he also notes it, “no state has a right to war in the pursuit of its rational, as opposed to its 
reasonable, interests. The Law of Peoples does, however, assign to all well-ordered 
peoples…and indeed to any society that follows and honors a reasonable just Law of Peoples, the 
right to war in self-defense.”186 Further, he adds, “a liberal society cannot justly require its 
citizens to fight in order to gain economic wealth or to acquire natural resources, much less to 
win power and empire. (When a society pursues these interests, it no longer honors the Law of 
Peoples, and it becomes an outlaw state.)”187 As Rawls clearly and strongly affirms, only self-
defense confers the right to war for the well-ordered peoples. Moreover and more importantly, 
imperialism and state interests are excluded from the morally acceptable reasons for war.  
So far, the self-defense principle is classic in international law, justified already by the 
natural law tradition. That is why the self-defense is not in contradiction with the principle of 
non-intervention that was affirmed in TJ. However, even in the ideal theory, Rawls warns that “a 
principle such as the fourth—that of non-intervention—will obviously have to be qualified in the 
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general case of outlaw states and grave violations of human rights.”188 Moreover, when defining 
the role of human rights, Rawls states that they set the limit to the conduct of war and the state 
sovereignty. He says, “human rights are a class of rights that play a special role in a reasonable 
Law of Peoples: they restrict the justifying reasons for war and its conduct, and they specify 
limits to a regime’s internal autonomy.”189 It is in this dynamic that Rawls adds the grave 
violation of human rights as a second reason that can justify war, a condition of what is normally 
known as humanitarian intervention. As he puts it, “war is no longer an admissible means of 
government policy and is justified only in self-defense, or in grave cases of intervention to 
protect human rights.”190 For Rawls, therefore, it is clear that, after WWII, the principle of non-
intervention in internal affairs of a given state is no longer absolute. To use Ronald Dworkin’s 
expression, human rights trump state sovereignty.191 In the same sense, for Rawls, human rights 
limit the state sovereignty and they justify interference and even a humanitarian intervention 
when they are not respected.  
This is a change from the theory of international law developed in TJ; for there, the 
principle of non-intervention was strongly affirmed based on the principle of equality of states 
that guaranteed them the right to self-determination. But with the Law of Peoples, “a people’s 
right to independence and self-determination is no shield from that condemnation, nor even from 
coercive intervention by other peoples in grave cases.”192 In other words, Rawls supports 
humanitarian intervention in order to protect human rights. It does not need aggressiveness or 
imperialist motives. In a particular footnote, Rawls asserts that even when outlaw states are 
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rather weak and not aggressive and expansionist, an egregious violation of human rights is “a 
prima facie for intervention of some kind in such cases.”193 Human rights violation becomes a 
just cause for interfering in other’s state business and this is part of their functional role in the 
liberal foreign policy.194 
This intervention, however, is selective, for only those peoples in a relation with well-
ordered peoples are threatened by human rights vindication. This selectivity in monitoring the 
respect for human rights is based on the subdivision and ordering of cultures, assuming some as 
primitive, while others are a developed civilization, although not at the level of a liberal one. 
That is why, in Rawls’s view, even when there is such a prima facie case for intervention, “yet 
one must proceed differently with advanced civilizations than with primitive societies. Primitive, 
isolated societies, with no contact with liberal or decent societies, we really have no way to 
influence.”195 He continues, “but those that are more developed, seeking trade or other 
cooperative arrangements with liberal or decent societies, are a different story.”196 It has been 
already highlighted that Rawls esteems liberal institutions to be better than other forms of 
society. From this point of view, critics would underscore that he is using the same vocabulary 
that was developed during the civilization mission, vocabulary of primitiveness and civilization, 
and the degree of civilization. Furthermore, it seems that the intervention is not really envisioned 
for the sake of the human rights, but rather in order to expand liberal influence. In addition to 
that, liberal or decent peoples are presented as not in need of any influence from outside; that is 
why they are accorded the right to protect their cultures and their institutions, while the same 
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194 Buchanan challenges this direct connection between human rights and intervention saying that “to assume that 
human rights have this direct connection with intervention is nothing less than a stipulative redefinition of ‘human 
rights,’ and Rawls gives us no good reason to accept it.” See his “Taking the Human out of Human Rights” in R. 
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right is not granted to all peoples. Liberal and decent peoples are presented as having everything 
they need, since only the other peoples seek to trade or cooperate with them, as if it is not a 
reciprocal need. Yet, the history proves the contrary: the West, as far as it represents the liberal 
tradition in Rawlsian theory, invaded the non-liberal West in order to solve its internal socio-
economic conflicts. There is no reciprocity here. When the West wants trade or other cooperative 
arrangements, it can do them without any criterion imposed on it by the non-Western world. 
However, when the latter wants to cooperate with the liberal or decent peoples, their 
performance in human rights becomes a moral requirement that might even lead to a coercive 
intervention. That is why critics would disagree with Alistair Macleod who claims that “Rawls’s 
doctrine of human rights in LoP offers hope for more effective protection of human rights in all 
parts of the world;”197 for clearly, only those parts of the world that are advanced in civilization 
and are a subject for liberal and decent interests will raise concern about their human rights 
record.  
One of the crucial questions when dealing with humanitarian intervention is about the 
participants involved in it. The question then is: who intervenes and where in the name of human 
rights? From a Rawlsian perspective, the answer is straightforward: it is the responsibility of the 
well-ordered peoples (liberal and decent peoples) to intervene for protecting human rights. Now, 
Rawls calls states that violate human rights outlaw states. “An outlaw state that violates these 
rights is to be condemned and in grave cases be subjected to forceful sanctions and even to 
intervention.”198 Hence for Rawls, well-ordered peoples have the rights to intervene in outlaw 
states in order to protect human rights, and this intolerance of outlaw states springs from 
liberalism and decency as such. In Rawls’s words, decent and liberal peoples “simply do not 
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tolerate outlaw states. This refusal to tolerate those states is a consequence of liberalism and 
decency.”199 He continues, “if the political conception of political liberalism is sound, and if the 
steps we have taken in developing the Law of Peoples are also sound, then liberal and decent 
peoples have the right, under the Law of Peoples, not to tolerate outlaw states. Liberal and decent 
peoples have extremely good reasons for their attitude.”200 One has to recall that it is not clear 
whether the outlaw states were part of the framing of this Law of the Peoples that is being 
applied to them, since the different typology of societies is given on the outset of the Law of 
Peoples.201 Whatever the situation, critics would argue that as some societies are not recognized 
as peoples and therefore are not represented in the original positions that generate the principles 
of the Law of Peoples, human rights universality is not morally grounded. Consequently, their 
universal application –the protection of human rights –is not morally justified. Yet, Rawls 
confers the right of enforcement of the Law of Peoples to well-ordered peoples, and so even to 
non-members of the Society of Peoples, that is, outlaw states.   
The case of outlaw states is challenging to both the universality of human rights and their 
defense through humanitarian intervention. When he explains “democratic peace and stability,” 
Rawls writes that “the Society of Peoples needs to develop new institutions and practices under 
the Law of Peoples to constrain outlaw states when they appear.”202 Clearly, Rawls’s language 
on outlaw states is not of toleration. While human rights play an exclusive role towards decent 
peoples from intervention, here they constitute a justificatory role for intervention. Well-ordered 
peoples are called to be intolerant towards the outlaw states, not only when the latter are 
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aggressive, but even when they violate human rights.203 Two comments on this position deserve 
to be mentioned. First, by assigning the role of justifying intervention, Rawls sets human rights 
under the risk of imperialistic use, as recent history has shown it. Second, while it is true that 
outlaw states might be dangerous and aggressive, they can also come together for their own self-
defense, and even, unfortunately, for fostering their aggressive goals. The Second World War 
can serve as an example, where Italy and Japan joined Germany in its expansionist project.204 
Now, the fact that, according to Rawls, well-ordered peoples never go to war against each other, 
does not guarantee that they are more powerful militarily than the outlaw states. Then, should the 
well-ordered peoples intervene whenever human rights are violated without examining the 
prospect of victory? Surely, Rawls would agree that they should not. But if he agrees, then he 
will open the door to the critique of human rights as an imperialistic means through the 
humanitarian intervention. That is why it is necessary to now see whether Rawls’s justification 
of humanitarian intervention quenches the fears of those who think of humanitarian intervention 
as neocolonialism. 
b). Rawls and Humanitarian Intervention as Neocolonialism 
As a reminder, neocolonialism is generally understood as the maintenance of colonial 
power under the creation of local bourgeoisie. However, when the critics of humanitarian 
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204 Joshua Cohen argues that “democracies win their wars more frequently than non-democratic,” (Cohen, “Is There 
a Human Rights to Democracy, ibid., 227, note 1), while Rawls states that “none of the more famous wars in history 
was between settled liberal democratic peoples” (LP, 52). These views seem to suggest that if the world were under 
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intervention identify it with the neocolonialism, they allude to the repetition of the colonial 
methods and imperialistic strategies and language in order to spread liberal culture and gain 
economic and political influence. They substantiate their critiques from both a moral point of 
view and from the practice itself of humanitarian intervention.  
From the moral perspective, humanitarian intervention is justified by the helplessness of 
the victim, which deviates from the revolutionary power of human rights. It also focuses on the 
political rights, discriminating against other rights. The consequence is that the crimes that call 
for humanitarian intervention are generally non-Western crimes. Another normative argument 
against humanitarian intervention is the fact that it deconstructs the traditional understanding of 
state sovereignty, a deconstruction that threatens the existence of many non-Western states, 
especially the postcolonial ones that were created on the assumption of respect for state 
sovereignty. The outcome is that it gives a lee-way to strong states –generally Western ones—to 
intervene in the weaker ones, creating an international order based on domination. Finally, there 
is the conception of the international community understood as the liberal states of the West, 
viewed as stable and well-ordered with the mission to stabilize the non-liberal troubled world. 
This dichotomy is reminiscent of the civilizing mission, which was founded on the opposition 
civilized-uncivilized; or the Mill’s argument that a civilized nation cannot stand a barbarous one 
in the same neighborhood.  
As to the practice of human rights, it poses problems because humanitarian intervention 
is never only a moral issue; it also—and decisively—involves political and strategic motives, 
which give reason to the critics of suspecting that human rights are being used ideologically to 
hide self-interests. The other important question in the practice of humanitarian intervention is 
the agent who determines that a situation is an egregious violation of human rights. The practice 
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shows that, in most of the cases, it is the Western strong states that decide, through their 
international institutions, where to intervene and it has been always in the non-Western ones. 
Moreover, this practice is selective, setting a double standard when it comes to protect human 
rights through humanitarian intervention. As long as it is a strong state or one of its friends, it can 
openly violate human rights without fearing a humanitarian involvement. Another element that 
stains the practice of humanitarian intervention is the labelling process, through which the 
liberal-Western states identify the victim without his/her consent, and demonize the non-Western 
states as tyranny or rogue/failing states, whereas they find better terms for their own 
misconducts.  
These are the reasons why the critics of humanitarian intervention, while recognizing that 
there are situations of human rights violations that shock the conscience of humanity and, 
therefore, require international involvement. They also show that there are serious reasons to 
suspect that the practice of humanitarian intervention is another form of neocolonialism. Does 
Rawls’s justification of humanitarian intervention escape from this suspicion and does it respond 
satisfactorily to the critics’ worries? 
Concerning the first moral reason of justifying human rights on the helplessness of the 
victim, Rawls does not use that kind of argument, for his human rights play a role in the liberal 
foreign policy instead of focusing on the individual. However, for the question of discriminating 
some rights and giving priority only to political rights, it has already been shown that his narrow 
list of human rights is limited to the first generation of human rights, commonly known as 
negative liberal rights—although not all are included—as his human rights proper are a subgroup 
of the liberal constitutional rights. In this sense, Rawls’s justification of humanitarian 
intervention does not meet the expectation of defending all rights equally. In the case of 
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humanitarian intervention only being concerned with non-Western crimes, Rawls maintains that 
liberalism emerged as a cultural practice of constitutional democracy in the West since the 
Reformation. Then, he asserts that human rights are already respected in liberal and decent 
peoples. From these premises, it follows that the crimes against human rights are outside the 
Western world, and therefore the critics will still have their case confirmed.  
The deconstruction of state sovereignty does not need more elaboration, since for Rawls, 
after WWII, independence and self-determination do not shield a state from external 
interference, especially when there are grave cases of a violation of human rights. The fear of 
strong states invading the weaker ones in the name of humanitarian intervention becomes evident 
under Rawls’s justification of humanitarian intervention. Rawls justifies interference by well-
ordered peoples into the outlaw states’ internal affairs even when the latter are weak, and not 
aggressive or dangerous. As to the claim that humanitarian intervention is carried out by liberal 
Western powers under the cover of the international community, the Rawlsian justification of 
humanitarian intervention also falls in this accusation, as he gives rights to the well-ordered 
peoples to ensure that the international order is secured, and Rawls affirms that they have good 
reasons to do so. Moreover, he uses the concepts of “civilization” and “civilized peoples” which 
suppose the antithesis of uncivilized ones, the so-called barbarous or primitive societies. Through 
this model, civilization means following the ideals of the Law of Peoples, a law that is first 
conceived by liberal peoples, and only after is extended to those defined as decent. “These 
become ideals and principles of liberal and decent civilizations, and principles of the Law of all 
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civilized Peoples.”205All of these points show that Rawls’s justification of humanitarian 
intervention does not address its critique as a neocolonialism. 
The dissatisfaction of Rawls’s justification of humanitarian intervention on a moral level 
is also observed when confronting the problems posed by the practice of humanitarian 
intervention. Rawls says that the non-ideal part of his theory looks at what are the morally 
permissible means to apply the Law of Peoples, and also politically possible as well as 
realistically doable. The critics convincingly show that there is no humanitarian intervention that 
has ever taken place for human rights sake only. Most of the time, there are political and 
geostrategic interests that are involved, and human rights come in as a moral cover. This appears 
this way because the liberal-Western states that have interests at stake are the ones that determine 
where and when humanitarian intervention should take place. For example, discussing the Darfur 
case and the inculpation of President El Bashir, Mahmood Mamdani observes that “more than 
the innocence or guilt of the president of Sudan, it is the relationship between law and 
politics[…]that poses a wider issue, one of the greatest concerns to African governments and 
peoples.”206 The point here is about who makes the decision of implementing this intervention 
and for what. While ideally, Rawls has ruled out the rational interests in his Law of Peoples by 
substituting peoples for states, the non-ideal context confronts Rawls with real politics. Do the 
well-ordered peoples intervene to protect human rights or do they pursue their own interests? In 
as much as the goal is to extend the liberal foreign policy to all societies, it would be difficult to 
persuade the critics of humanitarian intervention of the contrary. Furthermore, it has been 
underlined that not all violations of human rights provoke indignation of the well-ordered 
peoples. Only do those happening in the “advanced civilizations” seeking trade and cooperative 
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arrangements alert the liberal and decent peoples about egregious violations of human rights. 
This actually is the consequence of Rawls’s functionalist conception of human rights, whereby 
the latter play a role in the foreign policy of liberal peoples. From this perspective, the risk of 
human rights manipulation for political interests is high. This claim is reinforced by the fact that 
the non-ideal theory takes the international order as it is, contrary to the ideal part that was trying 
to imagine it as it should be. The actual international order is not made of peoples as Rawls’s 
Law of Peoples suggests, but rather by states, and Rawls himself acknowledges that they are 
more rational rather than reasonable. They most often act for self-interest and power rather than 
for moral reasons. Since humanitarian intervention falls in this non-ideal theory, the fears of 
human rights manipulation for intervening for political, economic and geostrategic interests are 
not excluded from the application of the Law of Peoples. 
For the same reason, it is not clear whether the Rawlsian justification of humanitarian 
intervention would respond to the question of selectivity and a double standard that are observed 
in the actual practice of humanitarian intervention. These concerns are also linked to the 
possibility of manipulating human rights in order to intervene for self-interest and the interests of 
allies. Furthermore, as it has already been underscored, with Rawls, the right to humanitarian 
intervention is granted only to the well-ordered peoples, and other peoples seem to not have the 
same right. Yet, in the practice of humanitarian intervention, it is less the morally upright that is 
invoked than the mighty that is convoked to carry it out. As already stated, to be declared an 
outlaw state, does not mean a military weak state, and the forceful intervention has to weigh the 
chances of success. In other words, to reserve that right to humanitarian intervention to a certain 
category of states that might not be able to intervene, while those excluded might have been, can 
be detrimental to the cause of human rights as such.  
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The critics also underline the labelling process through which non-liberal and hence non-
Western states are demonized, while the liberal ones find euphemisms for their own violations of 
human rights. They can invade other countries and get away with it, under the principle of state 
sovereignty that they refuse to those they declare outlaw states. Rawls confronts this case and 
says that any liberal state that acts for self-interest is an outlaw state.207 But as we are in the non-
ideal theory that is supposed to provide what is politically realizable, it seems to me that he does 
not answer the question raised here of double standards applied in the humanitarian intervention, 
whose consequence is the labelling process. Moreover, Rawls himself resorts to the same 
practice because he calls states that do not comply with his Law of Peoples as outlaw states or 
burdened societies, or benevolent absolutisms; all these being excluded from the international 
order constituted of well-ordered peoples. Even in the latter, the real members are the liberal 
peoples; decent ones are just tolerated. Once thus classified, the outlaw states are already 
targeted by their being called so. And as we saw that these outlaw states are likely to be non-
Western states, it is clear that the law of peoples does not properly address the fear of a 
resurgence of neocolonialism through humanitarian intervention.  
However, the most critical concern is the fact that humanitarian intervention destroys the 
emancipatory power inherent to the conception of human rights. Critics like Mamdani do not 
believe that the rights protected under the humanitarian intervention are proper rights. They are 
“residual rights.” For him, “to the extent that the global humanitarian order claims to stand for 
rights, these are residual rights of the human and not the full range of rights of the 
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citizens.”208This view challenges Rawls’s understanding of human rights and challenges the role 
he wants human rights to assume on the international scene. Rawls conceives human rights as 
playing a role in the foreign policy of liberal peoples, and also as a justification for humanitarian 
intervention. But none of these roles seems to reach the essence of human rights as tools in the 
hands of the oppressed to resist oppression. Through their functionalist role, human rights are 
robbed of their revolutionary and emancipatory power, and that is why they are exposed to 
political manipulation.  
Sure enough, Rawls suggests the creation of institutions to monitor the implementation of 
human rights209 or to speak in the name of the whole world like the UN.210 However, these 
institutions are created by the well-ordered peoples and, therefore, they are likely to be rejected 
by those excluded from the process of putting them into place. That is why, if there is to be a 
justified intervention in the name of human rights which would not be considered imperialistic, 
there will have to be an inclusive process for designing those structures, so that they can be 
deemed neutral in their judgment about intervening for protecting human rights and in 
establishing the modalities to carry out such a mission. But, if humanitarian intervention follows 
Rawls’s Law of Peoples, there will be good reasons to suspect and fear that human rights will be 
used for imperialist and neocolonialist motives.  
That is why retrieving that emancipatory power of human rights will have to diverge from 
the use of human rights in liberal foreign policy in international politics. From the Rawlsian 
model, humanitarian intervention aims at institutional change, since the concern is to help these 
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societies to join the society of well-ordered peoples. For example, Kelly who follows Rawls’s 
conception of human rights and views human rights as imperatives for foreign policy suggests 
that well-ordered peoples use trade, aid and intervention in order to protect human rights.211 But 
nowhere does she examine or refer to the consequences of such sanctions on individuals. Yet, as 
Sen so often remarks, officials never starve. Most often, such sanctions hurt the most vulnerable 
individuals and allow more abuse of human rights, while they strengthen the oppressors’ 
domination. Even removing a tyrant through military intervention does not guarantee that the 
successors will be much better. In other words, when human rights are conceived as playing a 
role in foreign policy they do not pay much attention to the protection of individuals’ rights and 
the empowerment of the individual in order to resist oppression. In this sense, the role Rawls 
attributes to humanitarian intervention does not meet the challenge expressed by the critics of 
humanitarian intervention who characterize it as neocolonialism. Hence, even on this area of 
humanitarian intervention, it is clear that we need another justification that would attend to these 
concerns. 
Conclusion 
One of the principal concerns for Rawls as he constructs his Law of Peoples was to make 
it political; that is, not justified by comprehensive doctrines. This concern for a political 
conception comes out strongly when he talks about human rights. He notes “these rights do not 
depend on any particular comprehensive religious doctrine or philosophical doctrine of human 
nature.”212 He wants his theory of human rights to be freestanding from all comprehensive 
doctrines, due to the fact of pluralism in today’s world society. In doing so, Rawls achieves a 
political justification of human rights, as he had also done for the principles of justice as fairness 
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in PL. In attempting to take into account the fact of global cultural pluralism, Rawls has set a 
new path for approaching human rights, because then “there is no need for a single, commonly 
agreed justification of human rights.”213 Unfortunately, as much of this chapter illustrates, 
Rawls’s method does not yield a convincing justification of human rights’ universality, nor does 
he eschew the critics of imperialism under a human rights banner. As such, it is difficult to 
respond to the different challenges to human rights as imperialist ideology and their protection 
through humanitarian intervention as neocolonialism. Most importantly, the role he attributes to 
human rights is counterproductive vis-à-vis the goal of the international human rights of 
protecting individuals’ rights. That is why, while his political conception of human rights is a 
contribution to the philosophical debate about human rights, his conclusions are not practical 
today.  
For instance, not only have many events happened since The Law of Peoples,214 but also 
his model does not give space to the individual and local-international NGOs involved in 
promoting and protecting human rights. As Beitz rightly observes, Rawls “notices but does not 
take into account the broad array of non-coercive political and economic measures that might be 
used by states and international organizations to influence the internal affairs of societies where 
human rights are threatened…And he does not represent human rights as justification for 
individuals and nongovernmental organizations to engage in reform-oriented political action.”215 
Beitz concludes, “in all these respects, Rawls’s conception of the political human rights is 
narrower than what we observe in present practice.”216 Talking about present practice, it relies 
much on the activities on a local level where the human rights are used by local activists to 
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empower local individuals and NGOs to claim their own rights and set a priority on what rights 
come first according to present circumstances. Moreover, in the actual practice of international 
human rights, they assume more functions than what Rawls attributes to them.217 
Therefore, instead of working out a liberal view for well-ordered peoples only that is to 
be extended to other societies, Rawls’s methodology can be of great help by hermeneutically 
taking into account the present practice of human rights in order to find the emerging norms of 
international law. Indeed, as many countries are now signatory to human rights Declarations, 
Covenants and Conventions, it is a good sign that a common culture is being built in which 
values/norms are shared and therefore can constitute a basis to construct a political justification 
of human rights, without setting the world into groups of well-ordered and “ill-ordered” peoples, 
which might end up in antagonistic relationships.  
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Chap. 4. Habermas and the Challenges to Human Rights 
 
Habermas’s cosmopolitanism ethics favours too strongly the Western 
liberal order. Liberalism is an ideology that informs both emancipatory 
and imperial aspirations…peace building missions have taken a neo-
colonial character as international civilian administrators have taken 
control over these war-torn societies.  
Carlos Yordán,  
 
4.0. Introduction 
This chapter follows the scheme of the previous one. It is about looking at another 
perspective, presently the Habermasian understanding of human rights, in order to examine 
whether it is possible to respond to the challenges raised against human rights. The reason of 
choosing Jürgen Habermas is that he is among the leading intellectuals who are engaged today in 
the debate about international and global justice, and he represents another school of thought—
critical theory—that pays particular attention to social questions. As David Ingram portraits him, 
he “is indisputably an international star in the pantheon of living thinkers, but he is also a public 
intellectual who has engaged political and religious leaders…a spokesperson on behalf of public 
policies that advance equal rights and the common good, at home and abroad.”1 Being such a 
great figure on the font of global issues, it is with no surprise that one encounters human rights in 
many of his works. His interest in human rights is not only rooted in his global engagement, but 
also in his constant interest in politics and morality that permeates his whole career. As 
Habermas acknowledges it himself, “the public sphere as space of reasoned communicative 
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exchanges is the issue that has concerned me all my life. The conceptual triad of ‘public space,’ 
‘discourse,’ and ‘reason,’ in fact has dominated my work as a scholar and my political life.”2 
This assertion cannot be more than true when one recalls that Habermas’s first book was 
on the emergence and the transformation of the bourgeois public sphere.3 In that work, not only 
is the conceptual triad already present although at its nascent stage, but also more other themes 
such as human rights are addressed. For example, having talked about the liberal negative rights, 
he notes that “today basic social rights to welfare are found…in the United Nations Declaration 
of Human Rights of December 10, 1948.”4 From this point of view, Ingram is on target when he 
observes that “Habermas’s interest in law and morality is the single constant thread running 
throughout his career and predates his interest in knowledge and morality.”5 This preoccupation 
for law and morality with emphasis on human rights would reoccur in subsequent works. For 
instance, chapter two of his Theory and Practice which deals with “natural law and revolution,” 
shows the process through which natural law was put into a positive form through the French and 
American human rights declarations, as the fundamental human rights had lost their religious and 
metaphysical foundations.6 By the time he writes his Legitimation Crisis,7 most of the themes 
that were to constitute the architectonic of his theory are elaborated. He formulated the basic 
insight that a modern secularized society can no longer rely on the traditional authority for its 
integration, because it is highly rationalized. Rather, its stability has to be founded on the 
discursive justification. As he puts it, in such a kind of society, “at every level, administrative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Jürgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays. Trans. Ciaran Cronin (Malden: Polity 
Press. 2010), 12-3.  
3 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society 
Trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991).  
4 Ibid., 225.  
5 Ingram, Habermas, 153. 
6 Habermas, Theory and Practice. Trans. John Viertel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), especially 112-20. 
7 Habermas, Legitimation Crisis. Trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 2005). 
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planning produces unintended unsettling and publicizing effects. These effects weaken the 
justification potential of traditions that have been flushed out of their nature-like course of 
development. Once their unquestionable character has been destroyed, the stabilization of 
validity claims can succeed only through discourse.”8 Although the book mentions human rights 
only in few instances, the way is set and it reaches its fulfilment in his work on law and 
democracy.9 
This short overview shows that the human rights theme is recurrent in Habermas’s 
voluminous work. However, he does not have a book solely dedicated to the human rights 
subject. Moreover, while expressions such as subject rights, individual rights, human rights, 
political rights, civil rights, a system of rights and so forth permeate his writings, it is not clear 
whether they mean the international human rights corpus. Hence in this chapter, my main task is 
to better understand Habermas’s theory of human rights before examining whether through it one 
can respond to the challenges identified in the first two chapters.  
In his “Remarks on Legitimation through Human Rights,” Habermas mentions that he 
made a “proposal…for reconstructing the internal relation between democracy and human 
rights,”10 and a note appended to this proposal shows his Between Facts and Norms.11 Indeed, 
the author devotes a whole chapter on human rights, with a strong accent to its relationship with 
democracy. It is in this seminal text that one has to go back and see how Habermas gets to the 
system of rights. Once there, one discovers that the system of rights is reconstructed from “a 
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discourse-theoretic standpoint.”12 A question, therefore, arises as to what a discourse-theory 
means. Thus, this chapter is structured around three main points. In the first point, I attempt to 
grasp the meaning of the Habermasian discourse theory –in the limit of a chapter—as it is the 
grounding source of his reconstruction of his system of rights. The second point, then, focuses on 
his understanding of human rights and confronts it with the theoretical challenges to human 
rights. Finally, my third and last point analyzes Habermas’s view on the doctrine and practice of 
humanitarian intervention in order to examine whether, here too, one can satisfy the practical 
challenges to human rights implementation.  
4.1. Discourse Theory as a Basis for a System of Rights 
a). From Instrumental to Communicative Rationality 
Habermas’s thought originates from the modern critical theory school of Frankfurt, 
commonly associated with Max Horkeimer and Theodor Adorno. While it is true that his 
conceptual triad of “public sphere,” “discourse,” and “reason” have been present throughout his 
academic career, his methodology of maintaining them together evolved. David Rasmussen, for 
instance, notes that Habermas’s earlier work in the critical theory was epistemological in nature. 
“Critical theory was for Habermas, at least originally, the problem of ‘valid knowledge,’ i.e., an 
epistemological problem.”13 This epistemological tone of his project is affirmed in the preface of 
his Knowledge and Human Interest14. That epistemological project, however, is not motivated by 
interest in the status of knowledge as such. It is rather undertaken as an archeological search for 
an important forgotten moment in philosophy, i.e., self-reflection. As he puts it, he undertook “a 
historically oriented attempt to reconstruct the prehistory of modern positivism with the 
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14 Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest. Tans. Jeremy J. Shapiro. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971).  
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systematic intention of analyzing the connection between knowledge and human interests.”15 He 
continues, “in following the process of the dissolution of epistemology, which has left 
philosophy of science in its place, one makes one’s way over abandoned stages of reflection.”16 
He adds, “retreading this path from a perspective that looks back toward the point of departure 
may help to recover the forgotten experience of reflection.”17 Commenting on this passage, 
Thomas McCarthy observes that the book is “an effort to open—or rather reopen—certain 
avenues of reflection that were blocked by ascendancy of positivism during the last hundred 
years.”18 For McCarthy, this “forgotten experience of reflection” refers to the abandonment of 
the German tradition by the positivism “from Kant to Marx,” and indeed, Habermas goes back 
and engages them. However, the forgetfulness was not particular to the positivism. The earlier 
critical theory also focused only on Marx, leaving aside other main figures of German thought. 
According to Rasmussen, Habermas’s critical theory “began to take shape as an alternative 
argument to the one which Horkeimer and Adorno put forth. In this context, Habermas would 
avail himself of certain resources within the tradition of contemporary German philosophy which 
his mentors had overlooked.”19 In that sense, Habermas’s critique is not aimed at the positivism 
only, but it is also a critique of the critical theory itself. It challenges the premises of its 
understanding of rationality. From the beginning, Habermas wants to redeem the project on the 
Enlightenment, believing in the emancipatory power of reason.20 That is why he follows it until a 
certain point.  
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The Frankfurt school had shown that, instead of being liberating, the modern reason has 
become a source of oppression as it only operates instrumentally, abolishing all possibility of 
freedom. Under the guidance of modern reason, social relationships follow the domination model 
of the relationship between subject and object. The Dialectic of Enlightenment21 is an exposé of 
the failure of the modern reason to deliver its emancipatory promise, instituting rather 
domination and estrangement. Indeed, by its very definition, “Enlightenment, understood in the 
widest sense as the advance of thought, has always aimed at liberating human beings from fear 
and installing them as masters.”22 However, as things stand now, “Enlightenment is 
totalitarian.”23 It “stands in the same relationship to things as the dictator to human beings. He 
knows them to the extent that he can manipulate them. The man of science knows things to the 
extent that he can make them.”24 Horkeimer and Adorno capture that paradox in this excerpt: 
In the enlightened world, mythology has permeated the sphere of the profane. Existence, thoroughly 
cleansed of demons and their conceptual descendants, takes on, in the gleaming naturalness, the numinous 
character which former ages attributed to demons. Justified in the guise of brutal facts as something 
eternally immune to intervention, the social injustice from which those facts arise is as sacrosanct today as 
the medicine man once was under the protection of his gods. Not only is domination paid for with the 
estrangement of human beings from the dominated objects, but the relationships of human beings, 
including the relationships of individuals to themselves, have themselves been bewitched by the 
objectification of mind. Individual shrinks to the nodal point of conventional reactions and the modes of 
operation objectively expected of them. Animism had endowed things with souls; industrialism makes 
souls into things.25 
The message here is that modern reason has subjected everything to the objectification process, 
which makes it blind to the critical power that it was supposed to have; a critical power to 
uncover the source of social injustices. In that process of objectification, human beings lose their 
contact with objects and among themselves because all their social interactions follow the 
instrumental model. There is no more space for spontaneity and freedom; the instrumental reason 
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imposes certain reactions to things and souls. In that sense, reason operating in industrialism is 
not different from animism; they are just playing at different levels, but both are an expression of 
bondage, as they both suppress the space where human beings can be free. Herbert Marcuse 
raised the same concern about technologized society. “By virtue of the way it has organized its 
technological base, contemporary industrial society tends to be totalitarian. For ‘totalitarian’ is 
not only a terroristic political coordination of society, but also a non-terroristic economic-
technical coordination which operates through the manipulation of needs by vested interests.”26 
The founder-fathers of the Frankfurt school were criticizing the modern society under the 
power of modern reason as expressed in modern science and technology, which led to 
industrialization and modern capitalism. Habermas is aware of this social situation and in a way, 
shares their diagnosis.27 He concurs with Weber’s sociological analysis that modern society has 
gone through the process of rationalization, resulting into the differentiation of the spheres of 
value. The consequence is that the unity of reason has been shattered, engendering the loss of 
meaning and freedom.28 However, he refuses to throw the reason away and that is where the 
critique of the critical theory yields its fruits. For Habermas, the remedy to the negative 
consequences of the instrumental reason is not outside the realm of reason. Rather, he still 
believes that the alienating role of reason is due to a certain understanding of rationality that has 
dominated the philosophical discourse since modernity. Therefore, the solution is not to reject 
the reason altogether, but to look for other forms of rationality that would redeem that project of 
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27 See for instance Habermas, La technique et la science comme idéologie. Introd. and trad. Jean-René Ladmiral. 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1973), especially the first chapter which is a lecture offered at the seventieth birthday of Herbert 
Marcuse. 
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modernity, that is, the commitment to freedom through reason and at the same time, to eschew 
the damages of its possible instrumentalization.  
By engaging “the forgotten experience of reflection” and other main figures of German 
thoughts, Habermas discovers that the modern philosophical discourse has been constructed 
around the subject. One is to recall that philosophical modernity points to that experience 
whereby philosophy is weaned off its religious or traditional foundation. It had to rely on reason 
and reason alone. In Rasmussen’s words, “the discourse on modernity begins from the striking 
realization that precisely the ‘modern’ problematic is that reason has no recourse other than 
itself, has no tradition to fall back upon, no myth to rely upon, on religion for which it may exist 
as a rational counterpart. Philosophy suddenly finds itself alone, perhaps even at an end.”29 The 
consequence of this “loneliness” of philosophy is that the philosophical activity becomes a 
lonely exercise, where the subject retracts in his consciousness to construct the reality through 
his rational capacity. In the philosophy of the subject, everything has now to obey the order of 
the concept constructed by the knowing subject who considers the rest of reality as his/her object 
under an obligation to obey him/her. Self-consciousness becomes the master of everything else 
through objectification. As Habermas puts it, in the philosophy focused on consciousness, 
“subjective reason regulates exactly two fundamental relations that a subject can take up to 
possible objects. Under ‘object’ the philosophy of the subject understands everything that can be 
represented as existing; under ‘subject’ it understands first of all the capacities to relate to 
oneself to such entities in the world in an objectivating attitude and to gain control over objects, 
be it theoretically or practically.”30 In that context, as Rasmussen remarks, “self-consciousness 
will eventually link up with absolute knowledge [as Hegel’s philosophy exemplifies] which leads 
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simply to an endorsement of that which is.”31 Consequently, “the attempt to embody the 
emancipatory principle of enlightenment in the philosophy of subject ends by the legitimating all 
forms of institutional repression. This is the paradox of the dialectic of enlightenment.”32 
For Habermas, critical theory succumbed to this philosophy of subject; that is why it 
could not find a way through reason to go beyond the instrumental rationality, because it was 
denouncing it through a negative dialectics. Habermas maintains that “the program of early 
critical theory foundered not on this or that contingent circumstance, but from the exhaustion of 
the paradigm of the philosophy of consciousness.”33 It is Habermas’s conviction that critical 
theory could not solve the problem raised by its critique of instrumental reason, because it is still 
in the boundaries of the philosophy of the subject. In his own words, “the critique of instrumental 
reason, which remains bound to the conditions of the philosophy of the subject, denounces as a 
defect something that it cannot explain in its defectiveness because it lacks a conceptual 
framework sufficiently flexible to capture the integrity of what is destroyed through instrumental 
reason.”34 A critical theory bound to the philosophy of the subject cannot correct the defect 
because it is expressed in the same relation of subject-object. And as Rasmussen observes, “all 
subject-object formulations are instrumental.”35 Therefore, “a critique of instrumental reason 
developed within the confines of the philosophy of consciousness will be unable to free itself 
from the very instrumentalism implicit in the subject-object formulation.”36 That is why, 
according to Habermas, in the forties, Horkeimer and Adorno had abandoned the previous 
project of the critical theory of developing a critique of society through an “interdisciplinary 
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materialism,” which required a theoretical knowledge. It developed into a philosophy that 
withdrew “behind the lines of discursive thought to the ‘mindfulness of nature’,” which betrayed 
then the very goal that was assigned to a critical theory.37 
b). Communicative Reason and Discourse Theory as Basis for A System of Rights 
Having identified the problem and committed to redeeming the emancipatory project of 
modernity through reason carried through a critical theory, Habermas endeavors to look for 
another understanding of rationality that fits the task. He finds it in the shift of paradigm from the 
philosophy of consciousness to the communicative rationality. He contends that “a change of 
paradigm to the theory of communication makes it possible to return to the undertaking that was 
interrupted with the critique of instrumental reason; and this will permit us to take up once again 
the since-neglected tasks of a critical theory of society.”38 From there on, Habermas embarks on 
the second methodological route that some have called “the linguistic turn.”39 As Ingram 
observes, “taking up the ‘linguistic turn’—the expression used by philosophers to designate the 
twentieth-century turn away from psychological experience to language and logic as the proper 
place for investigating knowledge—Habermas set aside his earlier work on knowledge-
constitutive interests and developed an entirely new philosophical approach which he dubbed the 
theory of communicative action.”40 This theory was systemically developed in his two volumes 
of Theory of Communication action,41 aiming at showing intersubjective rationality inscribed in 
the daily communication through language, contrary to the solipsist rationality of the philosophy 
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of the subject. Habermas’s thesis is that, from a performative perspective, the fundamental goal 
of the use of language is to reach an understanding between those engaged in communication.  
Although the idea received a thorough systematization in the latter work, it was already 
present in his earlier works, as Habermas started looking at the philosophy of language and logic 
to demonstrate that the communicative action is inherently different from and cannot be reduced 
to the instrumental one. For example, in Knowledge and Human Interest, Habermas criticizes 
Peirce for not having seen that investigators are engaged in dialogue that cannot be reduced to 
the instrumental action. In that sense, for Habermas, Peirce’s pragmatism already contained the 
way out from the subject-object relationship of the philosophy of consciousness. He writes, “in 
continuing his analysis, Peirce would have to come upon the fact that the ground of 
intersubjectivity in which investigators are always already situated when they attempt to bring 
about consensus about methodological problems is not ground of purposive-rational action, 
which is in principle solitary.”42 In other words, at this stage already, Habermas distinguishes 
two different grounds for purposive activity and the dialogue that leads to consensus. The former 
is solitary whereas the latter is intersubjective. Furthermore, the latter requires the recognition of 
the individuals taking part in it. Only can the intersubjective use of language be called 
communication, for “the communication of investigators requires the use of language that is not 
confined to the limits of technical control over objectified natural process.”43 Rather, “it arises 
from symbolic interaction between societal subjects who reciprocally know and recognize each 
other as unmistakable individuals. This communicative action is a system of reference that 
cannot be reduced to the framework of instrumental reason.”44 Once more, it is clear that already 
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at this time, Habermas had identified a kind of rationality that can go beyond the instrumental 
reason that was the target of the critical theory since the beginning. In his other major earlier 
works, he goes further to emphasize that “reaching an understanding is a normative concept; 
everyone who speaks a natural language has the intuitive knowledge of it and therefore is 
confident of being able, in principle, to distinguish a true consensus from a false one.”45 By the 
time he writes Legitimation Crisis, Habermas is confident enough in his new theory that he can 
set the program of this theory of communication. He says, “social systems can maintain 
themselves vis-à-vis outer nature through instrumental actions (according to technical rules), and 
vis-à-vis inner nature through communicative actions (according to valid norms), because at the 
socio-cultural stage of development animal behavior is reorganized under imperatives of validity 
claims. This reorganization is effected in structures of linguistically produced 
intersubjectivity.”46 Consequently, “practical reason can no longer be founded in the 
transcendental subject. Communicative ethics appeals now only to fundamental norms of rational 
speech, an ultimate ‘fact of reason’.”47 This excursus on some works before the publication of 
the Theory of Communicative Action is meant to show that Habermas got the idea of going 
beyond the philosophy of consciousness very early in his career, but it received its systematic 
treatment is the latter. 
To work out his theory of communication, Habermas analyzes the philosophy of 
languages, especially the speech acts, in order to formulate what he called a formal/universal 
pragmatics, in opposition to the empirical pragmatic. The latter is concerned with the analysis of 
a particular use of language, while the former is concerned with the use of language in active 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Habermas, Theory, 17.  
46 Habermas, Legitimation, 10. 
47 Ibid., 120. 
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communication among individuals who want to reach understanding about something in the 
world. As he puts it, “the task of universal pragmatics is to identify and reconstruct universal 
conditions of possible mutual understanding.”48 Maeve Cooke underlines that, while Habermas 
used universal pragmatics in his earlier work, he later preferred the term of formal pragmatics 
because it relates to the formal semantic analysis of language.49 Nonetheless, he goes beyond the 
latter by analyzing the use of language in everyday communication. That is why, as he says, 
“formal-pragmatic analysis starts with idealized cases of the communicative action that is typical 
of everyday life of modern societies.”50 
Following Austin’s distinction between locutionary (expressing states of affairs), 
illocutionary (performing an action by saying something) and perlocutionary (producing 
something upon the hearer) speech acts, Habermas identifies the illocutionary speech acts as 
those fitting into the communicative action oriented toward reaching understanding.51 Indeed, in 
illocutionary acts such as commands, promises, greetings, etc., “the speaker lets a hearer know 
that he wants what he says to be understood as greetings, warning, explanation, and so forth.”52 
On the other end, the hearer has to take a position about what the speaker says, and it is only in 
this way that the speaker succeeds to bring about his illocutionary intention. Contrary to the 
perlocutionary acts that aim at producing effects on the hearer by hidden motives, the 
illocutionary operates in the open and relies on this transparency in the intention from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Communication. Ed. Maeve Cooke (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), 21. 
49 See the introduction to On the Pragmatics, 2. 
50 Habermas, “A Reply to my Critics” in John B. Thompson and David Held, Eds. Habermas: Critical Debates 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982), 236.  
51 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 288ff.  
52 Ibid., 290. 
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speaker, so that the hearer is not cheated. That is why for Habemas, “what we mean by reaching 
understanding has to be clarified solely with the connection to the illocutionary acts.”53 
Analyzing then these illocutionary speech acts, Habermas shows that the hearer takes a 
“yes” or “no” position to the utterance of the speaker.54 Such a position is possible because the 
hearer assumes some arguments/reasons justifying the speaker’s utterance, and the speaker is 
ready to justify his utterance, should it be rejected. This leads Habermas to assert that every 
speech act raises what he calls validity claims which can be redeemed through argumentation. 
According to him, every speech act raises a claim to truth, to normative rightness and to 
truthfulness at once, although only one can be raised directly, while the two others are raised 
indirectly. In Cooke’s words, “every speech act can be shown to raise precisely one claim in the 
first instance (or ‘directly’), and this claim determines its illocutionary mode and its speech-act 
category. In addition to this ‘direct’ claim, each speech act raises two other claims ‘indirectly.’ 
Habermas expresses this intuition as the thesis that the speaker, with every speech act, raises 
three validity claims simultaneously.”55 The importance of these validity claims is that they offer 
a possibility to the hearer to challenge any speech act and rejects it if the conditions of its 
acceptance do not obtain. Taking the example of asking for a glass of water, Habermas shows 
that a speech act such as “please bring me a glass of water,” can be rejected from the three 
validity claims perspective,56 and concludes that  
what we have shown in connection with this example holds true for all speech acts oriented to reaching 
understanding. In contexts of communicative action, speech acts can always be rejected under each of the 
three aspects: the aspect of the rightness that the speaker claims for his action in relation to a normative 
context (or, indirectly, for these norms themselves); the truthfulness that the speaker claims for the 
expression of subjective experiences to which he has privileged access; finally, the truth that the speaker, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Ibid., 293. 
54 Klaus Günther argues that the communicative freedom is rather linked to the possibility of negation. See his 
“Communicative Freedom, Communicative Power, and Jurisgenesis” in Cardozo L. Rev., Vol. 17, 1996, 1038. 
55 Maeve Cooke, Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas’s Pragmatics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994), 59.  
56 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 306.  
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with his utterance, claims for a statement (or for the existential presuppositions of a nominalized 
proposition).57 
These three validity claims raised in every speech act define the latter’s structural components—
“the propositional, the illocutionary and the expressive,”58—and “they represent three 
fundamental modes and form the basis for distinguishing three corresponding categories of 
speech act: the constative, the regulative, and the expressive.”59 Thus, as reaching understanding 
“means, at the minimum, that at least two speaking and acting subjects understand a linguistic 
expression in the same way,”60 the validity claims offer the conditions under which a hearer can 
accept what the speaker says, in which case the speaker can redeem them by offering the reasons 
that underlie them. As he puts it, “validity claims aim at being acknowledged intersubjectively 
by speaker and hearer; they can only be redeemed with reasons, that is discursively, and the 
hearer reacts to them with rationally motivated ‘yes’ or ‘no’ positions.”61 That is why they also 
become the conditions for communication oriented toward understanding.62 
The discovery of this validity idealization inherent to the pragmatic use of language 
opens a door to a new understanding of another form of rationality that can salvage the project of 
modernity and carry forward the critical theory ambition. The analysis of everyday 
communication reveals reason at work, no longer in a solipsist way, but rather intersubjectively 
between at least two competent subjects engaged in actual communication. On the other hand, 
when they enter into communication, they are motivated by the need for consensually 
coordinating their action as social subjects. Habermas calls “interactions communicative when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Ibid., 307. See also Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative action. Trans. Christian Lenhardt & 
Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), 58; and his On Pragmatics, 317.  
58 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, 62. 
59 Cooke, Language, 59.  
60 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 307. 
61 Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays. Trans. William Mark Hohengarten (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1996), 74. Also his Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics. Trans. Ciaran Cronin 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 29.  
62 Leslie Howe, On Habermas (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2000), 20. 
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the participants coordinate their plans of action consensually, with the agreement reached at any 
point being evaluated in terms of the intersubjective recognition of validity claims.” 63That is 
why for him, the communicative action becomes the embodiment of a new form of rationality 
that goes beyond the instrumental reason and solves the problem caused by its critique, because 
it relies on the reciprocal recognition between those engaged in communication. At the same 
time, the latter becomes a way of social integration and the means for the coordination of the 
social action through the medium of language. Moreover, as it relies on the criticizability of 
validity claims raised by every speech act in an actual communication, the communication action 
retains the theoretical moment that the founders of the critical theory school were tempted to 
reject. Indeed, “in communicative action one actor seeks rationally to motivate another by 
relying on the illocutionary binding/bonding effect…of the offer contained in his speech act.”64 
Thus, by communicative action, Habermas means “the type of interaction in which all 
participants harmonize their individual plans of action with one another and thus pursue their 
illocutionary aims without reservation.”65 
In tying the communicative action to this coordination of action through the illocutionary 
aims, Habermas distinguishes it from the strategic action.66 The latter can also serve for action 
coordination, but the speaker uses influence on or manipulation of the hearer so that he/she can 
get to his/her personal interest. In terms of Austin’s categories of speech acts, the strategic action 
would correspond to the perlocutionary acts because the speaker seeks to produce an effect on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Habermas, Moral Consciousness, 58. Also, Between Facts and Norms, 18. 
64 Ibid.  
65 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, 294.  
66 Many have criticized this Habermas’s theory of communicative action. Among others, Ernest Tugendhat, 
“Habermas on Communicative Action” and the whole third section in David Rasmussen & James Swindal, eds. 
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Action: Essays on Jürgen Habermas’s The Theory of Communicative Action. Tans. Jeremy Gaines and Doris L. 
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the hearer by hiding his intention. He/she calculates all the ways to use languages as a means to 
get advantage of the hearer. There is no cooperation between the speaker and the hearer, as the 
latter ignores the motives behind the speaker. Habermas qualifies such a usage of language as a 
parasite to the original goal of reaching understanding, and there can only be consensus when 
there is no reservation on the part of the participants. As Habermas says, “I count as 
communicative action those linguistically mediated interactions in which all participants pursue 
illocutionary aims, and only illocutionary aims, with their mediating acts of communication. On 
the other hand, I regard as linguistically mediated strategic action those interactions in which at 
least one of the participants wants his speech acts to produce perlocutionary effects on his 
opposite number.”67 In other words, while the communication action coordinates social 
interactions through a linguistically mediated consensus, strategic action aims at success through 
a linguistically mediated influence or manipulation.  
The communicative rationality operating through the communicative action is the 
paradigm needed to go beyond the aporia raised by the critique of instrumental reason, for the 
strategic action almost follows the model of instrumental reason. The same way the instrumental 
reason posits a subject-object relationship of domination, strategic actors use the other party in 
order to reach their personal interest. They count on their wittiness and manipulative power to 
achieve the success of their project. That is what is impossible with the communicative action, 
because the illocutionary aims require the cooperation and the outcome is never assured from the 
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start since it depends on the consensus resulting from the intersubjective interaction. In 
Habermas’s words, “illocutionary aims can…only be achieved cooperatively and are never, as it 
were, at the disposal of an individual party to interaction. Strategic action also occurs under 
condition of the double contingency of actors equipped with a freedom of choice. Yet these 
purposive actors, who condition one another with a view to their own perspective success, can be 
reached by one another only as entities within the world.”68 He adds, “they have to attribute 
successes and failures solely to themselves, namely as their causal intervention in the supposedly 
regular nexus of innerworldly processes.”69 
Communicative action avoids the shortcomings of the strategic action because it relies on 
the validity claims raised in every speech act. These validity claims transcend the context in 
which they are invoked, and yet they are to be redeemed in the actual coordination of action 
through the acts of communication. In this sense, they are both context-transcendent and yet 
context-bound. As Habermas argues, “the validity claims factually raised and recognized within 
an action-coordinating role, an element of unconditionality enters into everyday communicative 
practice,” because “at least from the viewpoint of the participants, they transcend all merely local 
agreements and base themselves on a subversive, continually flexible potential of disputable 
reasons. Yet they must be raised here and now within a specific context and with coverage 
provided by an unquestioned cultural background and accepted (or rejected) with a view to non-
reversible action sequences.”70 
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70 Ibid., 243. In another instance, he says that “the theory of communicative action detranscendentalizes the 
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From this context, the underlying idea of the communicative action is the argumentative 
reason through which participants in communicative action exchange rational arguments. This 
leads to what Habermas calls argumentation. By argumentation Habermas understands “a 
procedure for exchange and assessment of information, reasons, and terminologies.”71 In the 
context of communicative action, argumentation occurs when the hearer rejects with rational 
reasons the offer of the speaker. The latter has to justify his illocutionary aims, likewise through 
rational reasons. In other words, argumentation occurs when there is a disruption of 
communication oriented toward reaching understanding. In that reciprocal “exchange and 
assessment” of given reasons, the validity claims are intersubjectively redeemed.72 
It is on this argumentation basis that Habermas constructs his discourse theory, elevating 
the communicative rationality discovered in the daily communicative action to the abstract level, 
in order to theorize the reflexive exercise of argumentation. In the daily communicative action, 
reasons are assumed by both the speaker and the hearer. But, at the discourse level, Habermas 
examines the conditions that could allow the possibility of such an intersubjective redemption of 
validity claims. “In communicative action, we proceed naïvely, as it were, whereas in discourse 
we exchange reasons to assess validity claims that have become problematic.”73 That is why it is 
an idealization that goes beyond the actual practice of communicative action, and yet becomes a 
regulative idea of the exercise of communication as it is the conditions of its possibility. As he 
puts it, “discourses are islands in the sea of practice, that is, improbable forms of communication; 
the everyday appeal to validity-claims points, however, to their possibility. Only to this extent 
are idealizations also built into everyday practice.”74 He continues, “but I do wish to hold fast to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Habermas, Justification, 58.  
72 Habermas, Postmetaphysical, 74.  
73 Habermas, Between Naturalism, 16.  
74 Habermans, “A Reply to my Critics,” 235.  
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the strict distinction between communicative action in the naïve attitude and reflexively achieved 
understanding in regard to hypothetical validity-claims.”75 
Thus there is correlation between discourse and communication in everyday practice, as 
the former is made possible by the latter, and the latter brings the “element of unconditionality” 
into the former. However, there still is a fundamental difference because in discourse, validity 
claims raised in a speech act are explicitly yet hypothetically discussed, while in the everyday 
communication, validity-claims are naively assumed. As McCarthy observes, “whereas the 
validity claims that unavoidably (even if only implicitly) raised with every speech act are more 
or less naively accepted in ordinary interaction, their validity is regarded as hypothetical and 
explicitly thematized in discourse.”76 He concludes, “thus discourse represents a certain break 
with the normal context of interaction.”77 That is why discourse is an idealization as it assumes a 
situation such that the consensus is reached only through rational argumentation. That is the 
reason why, for Habermas, discourses are “reflexive forms of communication.”78 
Habermas experiences this discursive reflexivity in the written word. As he argues, 
“rational discourse borrows this reflexivity from the written word, that is to say, from the 
published article or the scholarly treatise, because discourse is designed to include everyone 
concerned and to create a third platform on which all pertinent contributions are heard. It is 
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78 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, 74. Here he writes, “because communicative action demands 
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supposed to ensure that the unforced force of the better argument prevails.”79 This statement 
raises two important points. First, it indicates the goal of the discourse –creating a platform 
where all pertinent contributions are heard and to ensure that the better argument prevails—
second, it hints to one of the conditions for the possibility of the discourse, that is, the inclusion.  
Normally, Habermas singles out four “most important features of the process of argumentation.” 
In addition to the inclusion stated as “(i) that nobody who could make a relevant contribution 
may be excluded,” other features are “(ii) that all participants are granted an equal opportunity to 
make contributions; (iii) the participants mean what they say; and (iv) that communication must 
be freed from external and coercion so that the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ stances that participants adopt on 
criticizable validity claims are motived solely by the rational force of the better reason.”80 
At this level of general presuppositions for formal argumentation, “discourse” is an 
umbrella of many forms of discourses. Not only are there theoretical, practical, or hermeneutical 
discourses, but also there are moral, legal, ethical, or pragmatic discourses.81 All these forms of 
discourse, however, do not require the same rigor in argumentation. For Habermas, only the 
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Critical Introduction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 42.  
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theoretical and the practical (moral) discourses satisfy the context-transcending condition of 
discursive argumentation. Cooke notes that “Habermas singles out claims to propositional truth 
and normative rightness as validity claims that are conceptually linked to the idea of universal 
agreement on the universal validity of what is agreed.”82 As far as we are concerned, it is the 
normative justification that interests us, because it is through it that Habermas reconstructs the 
system of rights—which is the central theme of this chapter. As Peter Bal asserts, from the 
Habermasian perspective, human rights presuppose the practical discourse.83 Habermas 
classically conceived this form of discourse as discourse ethics (D), mainly understood as “a 
defense of the rationality of moral argumentation.”84 However, as he reformulates it in Between 
Facts and Norms, he wants it to be so abstract that it can cover different levels of normative 
justification of action norms. As he asserts; “despite its normative content, it lies at the level of 
abstraction that it is still neutral with respect to morality and law, for it refers to action norms in 
general.”85 As such, it has to be universal, formal and deontological, as well as cognitive,86 as it 
is supposed to provide the procedural structure for all forms of normative justification. In other 
words, the discourse principle has to remain open87 and not be only limited to a certain domain. 
In his own terms, “to conceive (D) with sufficient abstraction, it is important that we not limit a 
fortiori the kind of issues and contributions and the sorts of reasons that ‘count’ in each case.”88 
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Hence, Habermas formulates it as “D: Just those action norms are valid to which all 
possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourse.”89 At this level, (D) is 
differentiated from morality expressed now under the universalization principle, enunciated as 
“(U) All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be 
anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interest (and these consequences are 
preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation).”90 And when (U) is applied 
to concrete cases, it takes the form of the principle of appropriateness.91 At the same time, (D) 
can accommodate other forms of discourse, such as the democratic principle, which is crucial in 
the reconstruction of the system of rights. As William Rehg remarks, “earlier, Habermas had 
presented this [(D)] as the leading principle of his moral theory; now he repositions D so that it 
overarches both law and morality in a manner prejudicial to neither.” He continues, “in the 
context of moral judgment formation, D takes the more specific shape of the universalization 
principle…in the context of the institutionalized action systems of law, it assumes the shapes of a 
‘democratic principle’ that unfolds as a system of basic rights.”92 
In other words, (D) generates the system of rights through the democratic principle, and 
this is what we were looking for; that is, the meaning of discourse theory and how from it, we get 
to the system of rights. The question now at hand is to know the identity of that system of rights 
reconstructed through (D). 
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91 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 109. See also his “Law and Morality” in M. McMurrin, ed., The Tanner 
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4.2. Habermas’s System of Rights and Human Rights as Ideology 
a). Constructing and Defining Rights 
Habermas’s consideration of rights does not start by defining them; rather, he focuses on 
their horizontal dimension. He states, “I take my starting point the rights citizens must accord 
one another if they want to legitimately regulate their common life by means of positive law.”93 
This starting point springs from the reciprocal recognition of citizens living together. That is why 
“this formulation already indicates that the system of rights as a whole is shot through with that 
internal tension between facticity and validity manifest in the ambivalent mode of legal 
validity.”94 While this excerpt does not define what right is for Habermas, it however sets the 
tone of Habermas’s understanding of rights, which are in constant connection with morality and 
law. But most importantly, Habermas insists on the essential relationship between human rights 
and democracy in what he calls private and popular autonomy. For him, “democracy and human 
rights form the universalist core of the constitutional state that emerged from the American and 
French Revolutions in different variants.”95 As Ingeborg Maus rightly captures it, “Habermas’s 
entire line of argument therefore is aimed at explaining the internal link between human rights 
and popular sovereignty in a system of rights which is based on the equal value and mutual 
enabling of private and public autonomy.”96 
Hence, in his reconstruction, Habermas views human rights as those designating 
individual (or subjective, or liberty) rights and they are meant to protect private autonomy.97 
They correspond to the first generation of the current human rights corpus, and Habermas 
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originates them in the liberal tradition starting with John Locke. They represent “the classical 
human rights” that “guarantee the life and private liberty –that is, scope for the pursuit of 
personal-life-plans—of citizens.”98 Most of the time when he talks about human rights, 
Habermas means these rights although he disagrees with their liberal interpretation, mainly on 
two main points. On the one hand, this tradition relies on natural law, entitling rights to a person 
by the fact of being a human being. Yet, according to Habermas, the postmetaphysical thinking 
can no longer follow such a path of thought; it does not accept an external authority to reason. 
“Consequently, the understanding of human rights must jettison the metaphysical assumption of 
an individual who exists prior to all socialization and, as it were, comes into the world already 
equipped with innate rights.”99 On the other hand, the liberal view isolates individuals and 
opposes them against the state, since “such rights were supposed to provide inherently legitimate 
barriers that prevented the sovereign will of the people from encroaching on inviolable spheres 
of individual freedom.”100 Habermas repudiates this view, arguing that, “at a conceptual level, 
rights do not immediately refer to atomistic and estranged individuals who are possessively set 
against one another.”101 Furthermore, “individual freedom is not exhausted by the right to a 
utilitarian ‘pursuit of happiness’ and hence cannot be reduced to the authorization to the private 
pursuit of temporal and spiritual goods.”102 These objections allow Habermas to state three 
characteristics of human rights: they are (i) socially constructed; hence (ii) they are 
intersubjective and (iii) they are justified through the discourse principle which leads to the 
democratic principle.  
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Having dismissed any kind of “metaphysical” foundation for a doctrine of rights, 
Habermas stresses that “rights are a social construction that one must not hypostatize into 
facts;”103 they “are not pregiven moral truths to be discovered, but rather constructions.”104 
Habermas is here emphasizing that human rights are not prepolitical rights grounded on “a 
fictive state of nature,”105 as the liberal view suggests. They rather “presuppose collaboration 
among subjects who recognize one another, in their reciprocally related rights and duties, as free 
and equal citizens.”106 That is why, for Habermas, they are intersubjective and this is a 
fundamental point as it connects to the underlying basis of communicative action.  
According to him, “the theory of rights is not necessarily connected with an 
individualistic contraction of the conception of rights. If one starts with an intersubjective 
concept of rights, the real source of error is easily identified,” because “public discussions must 
first clarify the aspects under which differences between experiences and living situations of 
(specific groups of) women and men become relevant for an equal opportunity to take advantage 
of individual liberties.”107 From this perspective, Habermas shows that the individualistic 
interpretation of human rights is not constitutive of a theory of rights. Citing Raiser, he argues 
that “a right, after all, is neither a gun nor a one-man show. It is a relationship and a social 
practice, and in both those essential aspects it is seemingly an expression of connectedness,”108 
and the liberal “individualistic reading” makes “unrecognizable” this “intersubjective character 
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of rights.”109 It is because of this connectedness and intersubjective character –and not the 
metaphysical foundation of human rights—that the discourse principle is of paramount 
importance.  
I have already shown that Habermas states the discourse principle (D) as: “just those 
action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in 
rational discourses.”110 The discourse principle meets the intersubjective dimension of rights, 
because they are reconstructed through a public discussion, where everybody can participate and 
make a contribution. Habermas attaches a great importance to the participation of “the affected 
parties” in the deliberation about any social construction, so that “they articulate the standards of 
comparison and justify the relevant aspects.”111 For him, “individual private rights cannot even 
be adequately formulated, let alone politically implemented, if those affected have not first 
engaged in public discussions to clarify which features are relevant in treating typical cases as 
alike or different, and then mobilized communicative power for the consideration of their newly 
interpreted needs.”112 Now, since (D) finds its content in the theory of argumentation,113 whose 
presuppositions are that it (i) has to be open and inclusive, (ii) everyone has to have an equal 
right to make a contribution; (iii) every participant is bound by truthfulness; and (iv) there must 
not be external coercion to agree to the best argument,114 (D) reinforces the Habermasian idea 
that rights are constructed through the mutual recognition between citizens. At the same time, 
this understanding presupposes the complementarity between private and public autonomy.  
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Contrary to the classical liberal reading of rights from Locke that gives priority to private 
autonomy, Hebermas prefers the Kantian autonomy that implies, in the footsteps of Rousseau, 
both private and public autonomy. “Kant sees,” Habermas says, “that the ‘single human right’ 
must differentiate itself into a system of rights through which both ‘the freedom of every member 
of society as a human being’ as well as ‘the equality of each member with every other as a 
subject’ assume a positive shape.”115 This Kantian “single human rights, i.e., right to equal 
liberties” designates the core of what Habermas understands by human rights, since “the classical 
liberal rights –to personal dignity; to life, liberty, and bodily integrity; to freedom of movement, 
freedom in the choice of one’s vocation, property, the inviolability of one’s home, and so on—
are interpretation of, and ways of working out, what we might call a ‘general right to individual 
liberties’.”116 The interpretation and the working out of this “general right” are done in the social 
context where citizens recognize one another as co-associates. “In this way, the morally 
grounded primordial human right to equal liberties is intertwined in the social contract with the 
principle of popular sovereignty.”117 That is how and why the private and popular autonomy, 
individual and political rights are co-original, because individual rights that secure the private 
autonomy can only have their full meaning in the exercise of political autonomy, “through the 
communicative form of discursive processes of opinion and will-formation.”118 
The co-originality of human rights and democracy, private and popular sovereignty is the 
core of Habermas’s conception of human rights as elaborated in the system of rights.119 But 
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before considering it, a question remains pending concerning these reconstructed rights: what is 
their normative content? In other words, what is the nature of these rights? To this question, 
Habermas responds without hesitation that human rights are essentially juridical. According to 
him, “the concept of human rights does not have its origin in morality, but rather bears the 
imprint of the modern concept of individual liberties, hence of a specifically juridical concept. 
Human rights are juridical in their nature.”120 Elsewhere, he asserts that “human rights, too, 
which are inscribed in citizens’ practice of democratic self-determination, must then be 
conceived from the start as rights in the juridical sense, their moral content notwithstanding.”121 
Thus, being juridical in their very nature and as individual or subjective rights, human 
rights are constitutive of modern law and therefore they have to be enacted into positive law 
through a legislative process. Although, as constitutional norms, they have the privilege of 
constituting the legitimating framework of the legal order and can even be justified merely from 
a moral point of view, human rights do not lose their “juridical character” because “legal 
norms…preserve their legal form, regardless of the kinds of reasons on the basis of which their 
claim to legitimacy can be justified.”122 Therefore, they “belong structurally to a positive and 
coercive legal order which founds actionable individual legal claims,”123 and they share “the fate 
of all positive law; they, too, can be changed or be suspended, for example, following a change 
of regimes.”124 If human rights are considered to be moral rights, it is because they “have that far 
managed to achieve an unambiguous positive form only within the national legal orders of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Sovereignty” in Obrad Savić, Ed. The Politics of Human Rights (London: Verso, 1999); or Jürgen Habermas 
“Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles” in Political Theory, Vol. 29, No. 6, 
2001, p. 767. 
120 Habermas, The Inclusion, p. 190. 
121 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 105. 
122 Habermas, The Inclusion., 191 
123 Ibid., 192. 
124 Ibid., 190. 
280	  
	  
	  
democratic states,” and “they remain only a weak force in international law and still await 
institutionalization within the framework of a cosmopolitan order”125 
In conclusion, Habermas reconstructs human rights from the classical liberal 
understanding of right through a re-reading of Kantian “single human right” and the Rousseauian 
principle of popular sovereignty, based on his discourse principle. The result is that human rights 
are inherently juridical and socially constructed, with intersubjective character. This 
reconstruction constitutes the basis for his system of rights.  
b). The System of Rights 
Habermas’s re-reading of Kant leads him to “the Kantian principle of law, which holds 
that each person has a right to individual liberties...[and] the liberty of each person is supposed to 
be compatible with equal liberty for all in an accordance with a universal law.”126 For Habermas, 
however, this Kantian understanding still leans on morality, in the sense that “the form of general 
law legitimates the distribution of liberties, because it implies that a given law has passed the 
universalization test and been found worthy in the court of reason.”127 Habermas argues that law 
should not be subordinated to morality as Kant does in this context, in order to preserve the co-
originality of the private and popular sovereignty. As Habermas contends, “the idea of self-
legislation by citizens, that is, requires that those subject to law as its addressees can at the same 
time understand themselves as authors of law, …[and] we cannot meet this requirement simply 
by conceiving the right to equal liberties as a morally grounded right that the political legislator 
merely has to enact.”128 In other words, as already mentioned, rights enacted into law are not 
simple moral facts pregiven politically. They are rather social constructions, and that is why they 
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cannot be imposed on the legislator. For this reason, “the idea of self-legislation by 
citizens…should not be reduced to the moral self-regulation of individual persons. Autonomy 
must be conceived more abstractly, and in a strictly neutral way.”129 As Rasmussen observes, 
Habermas avoids deducing the popular sovereignty from the private autonomy.130 
To achieve this abstract level of autonomy, Habermas resorts to the discourse principle, 
because as we saw, it is neutral vis-à-vis both morality and law. He applies (D) to the general 
right to liberties, that is, private autonomy, and in order “to confer legitimating force to the 
legislative process,” the discourse principle “assumes the shape of a principle of democracy.”131 
Thus, (D) mediates the relationship between private and public autonomy without subordination 
between them. For Habermas, the democratic principle results from the “interpenetration” of the 
legal form and the discourse principle, and he understands “this interpenetration as a logical 
genesis of rights.”132 This move is a key element for comprehending the system of rights that 
Habermas elaborates, as it conceives the principle of democracy “as the heart of a system of 
rights.”133 Indeed, if the system of rights is supposed to “contain precisely the rights the citizens 
must confer on one another if they want to legitimately regulate their interactions and life 
contexts by means of positive law,”134 then the democratic principle is definitely central because 
it embodies the structure through which the addressees of the law see themselves as author of the 
law they obey. They do not follow the law for only its coercive force, but also because they have 
good reasons to justify it. Without this political autonomy through which the addressees of the 
law assume its authorship, a legitimate law would be impossible. That is why the discourse 
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principle and the legal form are the ingredients needed to construct the system of rights, because 
the discourse principle allows the assessment of the validity of the norms, whereas the legal form 
“stabilizes behavioral expectations.”135 
Five categories of “basic rights” constitute the content of this system of rights, and they 
can be subdivided into three classes  
(i). This class includes three categories that “guarantee…the private autonomy of legal 
subjects”136 and they are: (1) “basic rights that result from the politically autonomous elaboration 
of the right to the greatest possible measure of equal individual liberties;” (2) “basic rights that 
result from the politically autonomous elaboration of the status of a member in a voluntary 
association of consociates under law,” and (3) “basic rights that result immediately from the 
actionability of rights and from the politically autonomous elaboration of individual legal 
protection.”137 Ingram summarizes these three categories as “1. subjective rights (permissions) to 
act freely, without constraint; 2. citizenship rights to political membership; 3. rights to have 
one’s rights adjudicated according to due process.”138 
Some observations about this first class are necessary. To start with, although they all 
form a same class, these three categories seem to enjoy an unequal status, because Habermas 
says that (2) and (3) are necessary corollaries of (1). In other words, even if one recognizes the 
importance of political membership and legal protection as basic per se, (2) and (3) seem to be a 
means for (1), such that they obtain their raison d’être as long as (1) is secured. This 
subordination also occurs strongly about the fifth category of basic rights. Moreover, in spite of 
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guaranteeing “private autonomy”, Habermas makes clear that these basic rights are not “the 
liberal rights against the state.” Rather, they “result simply from the application of the discourse 
principle to the medium of law as such, that is, to the conditions for the legal form of a horizontal 
association of free and equal persons.”139 Put otherwise, they are the outcome of reciprocal 
recognition of consociates, “in their role of addressees of laws.”140 
(ii). Hence, the fourth category of basic rights—constituting the second class—which 
grants to the bearers of the first class of rights the authorship of their legal order, is stipulated as 
“basic rights to equal opportunities to participate in processes of opinion- and will-formation in 
which citizens exercise their political autonomy and through which they generate legitimate 
law.”141 Ingram calls it “political rights to participate in legislating rights.”142 This category 
grants the political autonomy to the legal subjects whose private autonomy is protected by the 
first category. It “is reflexively applied to the constitutional interpretation and the further 
political development or elaboration of the basic rights abstractly identified in (1) through (4). 
For political rights ground the status of free and equal active citizens.”143 In terms of the 
discourse principle, this fourth category assumes the discourse principle in the form the principle 
of democracy, whereas the first three categories are the translation of “the discourse principle 
into the medium of law as such.”144 For Habermas, these four categories of rights are “absolutely 
justified,” because they affirm the co-originality of private and public autonomy, human rights 
and popular sovereignty, and they are reconstructed through the medium of the discourse 
principle. 
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(iii). Habermas’s system of rights is completed by a fifth and last category of rights—
third class—less important than the others, for it is implied by the first four categories, so that the 
citizens may “interpret and develop their private and civic autonomy simultaneously.”145 In other 
words, the last category is defined relative to the rights guaranteeing private and political 
autonomy, and it “can be justified only in relative terms.” These rights are stated as “basic rights 
to provision of living conditions that are socially, technologically, and ecologically safeguarded, 
insofar as the current circumstances make this necessary if citizens are to have equal 
opportunities to utilize the civil rights listed in (1) through (4).”146 Ingram terms them as “social 
rights to the background conditions requisite for effectively exercising rights 1-4.”147 This 
category is not only subordinated to the other four, but it is also formulated in a way that it seems 
to enjoy a lower status. One might even ask in which sense the rights of the last category are 
basic, since they totally depend on those supposed to be “absolutely justifiable.” As John 
Tweedy and Alan Hunt underscore, “within his discourse-based account, civil and political rights 
are seen to secure the public sphere and allow for collective will formation. Social rights, in 
contrast, are revealed to be deeply paradoxical.”148 
These are the categories of basics rights of the Habermasian system of rights, 
reconstructed from a discourse-theory point of view. As already mentioned, they constitute the 
core of the democratic constitutional state; that is why they represent the abstract form of legal 
rights as found in modern democratic constitutions. The question now is to see the relationship 
between this system of rights and the international human rights, since the challenges at the heart 
of this dissertation are addressed to the contemporary human rights movement. Only after 
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examining Habermas’s account of the universal human rights and its relationship to his system of 
rights will one be able to assess whether one can respond to these challenges to human rights 
from the Habermasian conception of human rights. 
c). Habermas and the International Human Rights 
While Habermas’s system of rights constitutes the core of the constitution of the 
democratic state, he refers to international human rights when he talks about international law 
and/or globalization. In such contexts, he calls upon the United Nations Charter or UDHR and 
presents them as part of the evolution of international law. Reflecting on the Kantian project and 
the possibility of the “constitutionalization of international law,” he remarks that UN Charter 
made an innovative move by bringing together the securing of peace and protecting human 
rights. He says, “the charter of the League itself does not draw a connection between world peace 
and a global constitution based on human rights. The development of international law remains 
the means to the end of averting war.” He adds, “all this changes with the UN Charter, which, in 
the second clause of the preamble, reaffirms ‘faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity 
and worth of the human person’.”149 He then mentions the Article 1 of the same Charter, which 
“links the political goal of global peace and international security with the promotion of ‘respect 
for human rights and for fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language or religion’ throughout the world.” And he concludes, “The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights of December 10, 1948, which explicitly refers back to the statements from the 
preamble to the Charter, underscores this correlation.”150 He even goes through the evolution of 
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the Bill of Rights through different Covenants and other relevant international instruments 
related to UDHR.151 
Habermas also evokes international human rights in the same line of international law as 
a source of legitimacy in the post-national constellations and globalization context. He observes 
that “in the transition from the nation-states to a cosmopolitan order, it is hard to say which poses 
the greater danger: the disappearing world of sovereign subjects of international law [nation-
states], who lost their innocence long ago, or the ambiguous mish-mash of supranational 
institutions and conferences, which can grant a dubious legitimation but which depend as always 
on the good will of powerful states and alliances.” Human rights “in this volatile situation” are 
the “sole recognized basis of legitimation for the politics of the international community.” He 
uses “human rights” to refer to “the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.”152 Hence, 
when he talks about international human rights, Habermas views them as an outcome of the 
evolution and innovation of international law after WWII and the globalization phenomenon. He 
confers to them the role of providing a basis for building a cosmopolitan community.  
Nevertheless, sometimes, he seems to doubt the ability of the international human rights 
to play that founding role of the international community by offering the “sole recognized basis 
of legitimation for the politics of the international community.”153 For instance, he notes that 
“‘human rights’, i.e. legal norms with an exclusively moral content, make up the entire 
normative framework for a cosmopolitan community.”154 However, he hastens to add, “this fact 
doesn’t’ predict whether the UN Declaration on Human Rights, whose wording was agreed on 
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by the comparatively small number of founding members of the United Nations in 1946, could 
approach a unanimous interpretation and application in today’s multicultural world.”155 In other 
words, Habermas perceives the challenge of multiculturalism to the universal validity of 
international human rights. Furthermore, he thinks that the cosmopolitan community cannot 
achieve the “civic solidarity” usual to a nation-state level, although he “sees no structural 
obstacles to expanding national civic solidarity and welfare-state policies to the scale of a 
postnational federation.”156 The impossibility of this worldwide “civic solidarity” is due to the 
fact that “civic solidarity is rooted in particular collective identities,” whereas “cosmopolitan 
solidarity has to support itself on the moral universalism of human rights alone.”157 In other 
words, in a multicultural world, it is not obvious to reach a consensus on “the validity, content, 
and ranking of human rights.”158 Another reason for him to doubt about the efficacy of the 
international human rights regime is the lack of “an executive power” to implement them. In his 
words, “the weak link in the global protection of human rights remains the absence of an 
executive power that could enforce the General Declaration of Human Rights, if necessarily by 
curtailing the sovereign power of nation-states.”159 That is why Habermas pleads for the 
juridification of international law so that it can be evenly applied.  
Despite these doubts, however, Habermas still believes that human rights constitute a 
solid “basis for legitimation” to the cosmopolitan community. It is in this regard that he suggests 
some reforms so that human rights might be implemented on a global scope. According to him, 
there should be a multilevel global system—basically constituted of three levels: supranational, 
transnational and national—through which “the classical function of the state as the guarantor of 
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security, law, and freedom would be transferred to a supranational world organization 
specialized in securing peace and implementing human rights worldwide.”160 It is at this 
supranational level that human rights would intervene as they are linked to peace and security. 
For Habermas, the UN looks to be a good starting point, but it would need a reform that confers 
on it an executive power. Indeed, “for actionable rights to issue from the United Nations 
Declaration of Human Rights, it is not enough to simply have international courts; such courts 
will first be able to function adequately only when the age of individual sovereign states has 
come to an end through a United Nations that can not only pass but act on and enforce its 
resolutions.”161 From this quotation, it is clear that Habermas is advocating for the UN to 
embody the so-much-desired executive power over individual states for protecting human rights.  
As one follows Habermas through his reasoning about international human rights, he/she 
might think that the author gives the same consideration to all the rights anchored in the 
international instruments. But there is a hierarchy in the different categories of rights, and 
international concern for human rights is not expanded to all generations of human rights. In 
Habermas’s understanding, even the proposed “supranational world organization” would not 
have to implement “all” human rights; “it would not shoulder the immense burden of a global 
domestic policy designed to overcome the extreme disparities in wealth within the stratified 
world society, reverse ecological imbalances, avert collective threats, on the one hand, while 
endeavoring to promote an intercultural discourse on, and recognition of, the equal rights of the 
major world civilizations, on the other…These problems differ in kind from violations of 
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international peace and human rights.”162 Obviously, here “human rights” designates less than 
the large spectrum of rights encapsulated in the different international instruments. The question 
now is to identify the category of rights that are to constitute the basis and concern for the 
cosmopolitan society.  
According to some historians, international human rights are made of different 
generations. Douglas Elwood, after many others, notes that the recent history of human rights is 
at least made of three generations.163 The first generation encompasses the freedom-oriented 
rights which are embodied in the articles 2-21 of the UDHR. Their keyword is liberty and they 
were promoted by the English, American and French Revolutions. They are called negative 
rights because they are rights from. The second generation concerns the rights contained in the 
articles 22-27. They are need-based rights and that is why they are also named positive rights 
because they are rights to. The key-word here is equality and they are the fruit of the social 
revolution. The third generation is the result of the decline of the nation-state and are rights to 
self-determination and self-development as contained in the articles 28-29, mostly developed 
from the Third World. Today, however, “with the globalization of the economy and 
communications and the emergence of developing post-colonial states, new rights have been 
added to the human rights corpus. These include rights to healthy environment, to sustainable 
development, to culture, to immigration and to political asylum.”164 We have here a fourth 
generation and it is not impossible that we may have a fifth, since all this long history shows that 
human rights are an ongoing process. 
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In this long history, while Habermas recognizes the importance of UDHR and other 
human rights instruments and their role in a globalized world, he seems to favor the first 
generation of human rights–although with nuances165—as absolutely justifiable and with a 
justificatory duty for other generations. For instance, he maintains that the right to social justice 
is founded on the interconnectedness of the universal right to equal freedom and the universal 
right to equality, as part of the evolution of individual rights. In his words, “the interpenetration 
of the principle of legal freedom with the universal right to equality grounded the expectation 
that social justice could be concomitantly established by defining spheres of individual 
liberty.”166 For him, social justice plays a diaconal role towards individual rights. That is why 
“from a normative point of view, both materialization and the new category of social 
entitlements are justified in a relative sense, namely, in relation to an absolutely justified equal 
distribution of individual liberties.”167 Put into other words, social entitlements cannot be 
justified by and for themselves, because “the distributive aspect of equal legal status and equal 
treatment…is simply what results from the universalistic character of a law intended to 
guarantee the freedom and integrity of each.”168 Thus, from a normative perspective, social 
entitlements are justified through the individual and political rights, which are liberal in 
essence.169 Even in a multicultural world where human rights are subject to different 
interpretations, Habermas persists to assert the priority of individual rights, arguing that “from a 
normative standpoint, according ‘priority’ to social and cultural basic rights does not make sense 
for the simple reason that such rights only serve to secure the ‘fair value’ (Rawls) of liberal and 
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political basic rights, i.e., the factual presuppositions for the equal opportunity to exercise 
individual rights.”170 
Thus, according to Habermas, social, economic and cultural rights are given an 
instrumental role of securing liberal and political basic rights. Nonetheless, although here 
Habermas puts social and cultural rights at the same level, he later justifies cultural rights from 
the individual and political perspective, in order to show that they are as basic as individual and 
civic rights. He says, “one misses the point of cultural rights by incorporating them into an 
extended model of the welfare state. Unlike social rights, cultural rights must be justified in 
terms of their role in facilitating the equal inclusion of all citizens.”171 Once justified from this 
political background, cultural rights acquire the same priority over social rights, and “it makes 
sense to derive [them] from the principle of inviolability of human dignity”, because “the equal 
protection of the integrity of the person, to which all citizens have a claim, includes the guarantee 
of equal access to the patterns of communication, social relations, traditions, and relations of 
recognition that are required or desired for developing, reproducing, and renewing their personal 
identities.”172 This understanding of cultural rights stands on the private and political autonomy 
that constitute the core of Habermas’s system of rights, because for him, “the normative key is 
autonomy and not well-being.”173 
From this reading, it is clear that Habermas favors the first generation of human rights, as 
absolutely justifiable and offering the basis for justification to social rights. That is why for the 
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cultural rights to enjoy a certain higher standard compared to social and economic rights, they 
have to be justified by their role in individuation and political participation of citizens. Thus, one 
can only conclude with Ingram that “first-generation (liberal, civil, and political) rights are 
privileged over second and third-generation (social and cultural) rights in such a way that only 
the former appear to be core human rights that come under legal protection.”174 
This hierarchization of human rights and the prioritization of individual rights—those 
securing both private and political autonomy—over other categories of rights, raise some 
questions. To subordinate some rights under others is to undermine their inherent normative 
justification and their inner value. As Alessandro Ferrara rightly observes, “the rights listed in 
the Declaration are not ranked in a hierarchy of importance,”175 that is, the first generation is not 
more important than other generations, and they are not to be subordinated to one another. 
Instead, they are to be taken together in order to enhance and protect human dignity. In this 
consideration, Ingram is right to respond to Habermas that “many rights –albeit, not necessarily 
all those specified by the UN Declaration of human Rights (which includes, for instance, the 
right to “leisure” and “rest”)—have an intrinsic value, and one—contrary to Habermas—that 
exists quite apart from our metaphysical condition as potentially rational speakers.”176 This is the 
opposite of Habermas’s position which asserts that only individual rights have intrinsic value. In 
his own terms, “the human rights that guarantee everyone a comprehensive legal protection and 
an equal opportunity to pursue her private life-plans clearly have an intrinsic value. They are not 
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reducible to their instrumental value for democratic will-formation.”177 Contrary to this view, 
subjective rights –which are only a part of UDHR—should not enjoy any priority; rather, “the 
priority is that of basic rights over less basic rights within each category of rights.”178 
As noted earlier, for Habermas, “the key point is autonomy and not well-being.” Suppose 
this were true, a question arises as to what extent a person living in a precarious situation is 
autonomous, both subjectively and politically. We saw that the political autonomy is built on the 
discourse principle in its form of democratic principle, which calls for participation of free and 
equal citizens in public deliberation. Such participation requires a certain level of education and 
the capacity to gather information that is beyond the simple communicative competence 
imbedded in the use of language. Moreover, Habermas insists on the fact that “rights can be 
‘enjoyed’ only insofar as one exercises them.”179 However, to exercise them one needs first a 
certain level of well-being. In other words, there is a need of a certain “well-being” for a person 
to even understand the meaning of autonomy in order to exercise it. As Henry Shue notes, “any 
person who is already deprived of subsistence and is helpless to provide it for himself or herself 
will from that time never enjoy any human right, unless some persons fulfill the duty to aid the 
helpless one…If the person has been deprived of adequate subsistence since birth, death will 
come almost certainly early and very certainly before any human right is ever known.”180 
Concerning Habermas’s justification of cultural rights, one reads the assumption of the 
Western society confronted with immigrant communities that, sometimes –if not always—
challenge the Western ethos. Therefore, cultural rights are understood in an individualistic 
framework. This conception, however, does not account for the cultural rights as rights of a 
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given culture to exist as such. Yet, it is this right to cultural existence that challenges the human 
rights movement in a multicultural world, because it claims the right for a group of people to 
exist as they wish, even when the individual rights are threatened. Hence, this understanding 
hardly touches the structural dimension of human rights. It is not first about the protection of the 
culture for the sake of the individual identity, but rather the right to a cultural identity itself. In 
this sense, it becomes difficult –if not impossible—to justify cultural rights from Habermas’s 
system of rights.  
Another area of concern is his insistence that human rights are essentially juridical. 
According to Habermas, although with a moral content, human rights (i.e. individual rights) are 
essentially juridical and socially constructed, since they are the result of reciprocal recognition 
between citizens who accord one another these rights, so that they can live together. It is also 
under the same justification that they acquire a legal status because they have to be enforced as 
positive law if they are to yield any efficiency. Consequently, only legal persons enjoy these 
rights and human rights become limited to the persons living in a political community. In his 
own terms, “spatiotemporally localized legal community protects the integrity of its members 
only insofar as they acquire the status of bearers of individual rights.”181 In other words, these 
rights serve to differentiate members and non-members of a legal community, the former being 
protected by rights whereas the latter are left to themselves. Habermas himself asserts that “the 
establishment of a legal code calls for rights that regulate membership in a determinate 
association of citizens, thus allowing one to differentiate members and nonmembers, citizens and 
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295	  
	  
	  
aliens. In communities organized as national states, such rights assume the form of rights that 
define membership in a state.”182 
This understanding seems to contradict the very goal of the international human rights 
movement which proclaims the rights for every person independently of one’s political 
belonging. In its very first Article, the UDHR asserts that “all human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights.”And in its Article 2, it states:  
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any 
kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, 
jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs,183 whether it be 
independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.  
 
These two articles show that human rights are to be enjoyed by every person, without 
consideration of one’s origin or one’s political status as a citizen of “a determined legal 
community.” Such a claim is less juridical than moral.  
Habermas opposes the conception of human rights as moral rights because “rights can be 
‘enjoyed’ only by being exercised,”184 and he presumes that they can be exercised only as legal 
norms in a politically delimited community. For him, “moral rights are derived from reciprocal 
duties,” and “the moral universe, which is unlimited in social space and historical time, includes 
all natural persons with all the complexities of their life histories.”185 To realize such moral 
rights, “one can imagine the global expansion of human rights in such a way that all existing 
states are transformed –and not just in name only—into constitutional democracies, while each 
individual receives the right to nationality of his or her choice.” Unfortunately, “we are 
obviously a long way from achieving this goal. An alternative route would emerge if each 
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individual attained the effective enjoyment of human rights immediately, as a world citizen…But 
even the goal of an actually institutionalized cosmopolitan legal order lies in the distant 
future.”186 I think that it is this pessimistic realism that constrains Habermas to limit rights to 
individual rights because, at least, these ones can be implemented by some constitutional 
democracies. But then, the tension between his understanding of human rights and the goal of 
international human rights increases. Indeed, for the General Assembly that proclaimed the 
UDHR, human rights were set “as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all 
nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society…shall strive by teaching and 
education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national 
and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance.”187 In this 
sense, as a common standard, international human rights are not primarily a juridical code, but 
rather a moral call to all and everyone, individualities as well as institutions to strive for its 
implementation. Following Ingram’s observation, “human rights designate goals or standards 
against which we judge shortfalls in basic goods that any fully civilized society ought to provide 
its citizens. This exclusively moral understanding of human rights thus designates an 
aspiration.”188 Their constitutionalization is but one and not the only way of implementing them.  
One of Habermas’s arguments for the juridical nature of human rights is that they share 
“the fate of all positive law; they too, can be changed or be suspended, for example, following a 
change of regimes.”189 While it is true that they can be suspended and even changed for political 
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reasons by a given regime, the very regime will be condemned by the international community in 
the name of human rights, and the local actors will advocate for their own rights through human 
rights discourse. To be sure, some rights are much more efficient when they are incorporated into 
a legal code as constitutional norms, but their constitutionalization does not exhaust their 
inherent value. Thus, in lieu of saying that human rights are essentially juridical, I would argue 
that human rights are essentially moral rights which gain very much in efficiency by being 
constitutionalized, but whose constitutionalization does not exhaust their far-reaching 
meaning.190 And as Ingram observes, “by focusing almost exclusively on the juridical notion of 
human rights as legal claims…[Habermas] cannot fully capture what is most distinctive about a 
DT [discourse theory] of human rights, namely the progressive genesis of human rights in a 
collective process of enlightenment.”191 
In some sense, Habermas himself agrees with this view, making his position, maybe not 
problematic, but rather evolving. In one of his recent publications on human rights,192 he appeals 
to human dignity to ground them. He endeavors to “present some legal reasons in support of the 
claim that ‘human dignity’ is not only a classificatory expression, as it were, which lumps a 
multiplicity of different phenomena together, but the moral ‘source’ from which all of the basic 
rights derive their sustenance.”193 Human dignity constitutes the source of consensus in the 
international arena and “changing historical conditions have merely made us aware of something 
that was inscribed in human rights implicitly from the outset—the normative substance of the 
equal dignity of every human being which human rights only spell out.”194 A question arises 
here: if human rights only spell out the normative substance of the equal dignity of every human 
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being, how can they still be “socially constructed” and only protect those living in a given 
political community? This question is even radicalized by the fact that “human dignity, which is 
one and the same everywhere and for everyone, grounds the indivisibility of all categories of 
human rights.”195 In the original paper presented at Stony Brook, he had added: “only in 
collaboration with one another basic rights can fulfill the moral promise to respect the human 
dignity of every person equally.”196 Two important points are underlined here. First, Habermas 
affirms the universality of human dignity, beyond any constraints of political borders. Second, he 
abolishes the hierarchization of the different categories of human rights, for only as undivided 
can they protect and enhance human dignity. In other words, once human rights are related and 
grounded on human dignity, they are no longer in competition. With this indivisibility of 
different categories of human rights through human dignity, the hierarchy between basic rights 
vanishes because it is only when taken together that they can “fulfill the moral promise to respect 
human dignity of every person equally.”  
From this perspective, it becomes difficult to understand how rights that spring from 
human dignity can be social constructions that citizens accord one another, because they live 
together, ignoring anyone else outside the determined political community. For if human dignity 
is one and the same everywhere and for everyone, and the human rights stemming from it are 
shared by all human beings, how can they still be limited to a certain given legal community? 
This clearly concurs with the conclusion that human rights are moral claims. However, 
Habermas insists that human rights cannot be assimilated to moral rights. Rather, they have a 
moral content with a legal form. As he puts it, “notwithstanding their exclusively moral content, 
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they have the form of positive, enforceable subjective rights which guarantee specific liberties 
and claims.” He continues, “they are designated to be spelled out in concrete terms through 
democratic legislation, to be specified from case to case in adjudication and to be enforced with 
public sanction.” And he concludes that “thus human rights circumscribe precisely that and only 
that part of morality which can be translated into the medium of coercive law and become 
political reality in the robust shape of effective civil rights.”197 Although he still understands 
human rights legalistically and acknowledges that they can be justified morally, I would still, 
however, argue that human rights go beyond that part morality that can be translated into 
coercive law in the line of Sen, because all rights do not need legal mechanism to be 
implemented or even claimed.  
Habermas refutes that this position of conceiving human rights on basis of human dignity 
revises his “original introduction of the system of rights” in Between Facts and Norms and in 
Time of Transition,198 arguing that they complete each other. While it might be true that this is a 
complement, it does not emphasize as did his system of rights that human rights are essentially 
juridical, to the point that they share the same fate with the positive law. Their moral content is 
context-transcendent as is the source from which they stem: human dignity. For the same reason, 
I do not see how human rights would be restricted to citizens of a given legal community in 
exclusion of the non-members, for all human beings have human rights in virtue of the human 
dignity which is “one and the same everywhere.”199 
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In conclusion for this subsection, I suggest that Habermas’s conception of human rights is 
quite complex. He seems to have a dual understanding of them. On the one hand, there is the 
system of rights made of basic rights that secure private and popular autonomy, as well as the 
basic rights to social, economic and cultural rights that are justified relative to the former. This 
system of rights, specifically those protecting private and popular autonomy are the core of the 
constitutional democratic state. On the other hand, he refers to the international human rights in 
the context of the evolution and the constitutionalization of international law. While at first 
glance, he seems to privilege the first generation of liberal rights, some recent works affirm the 
indivisibility of the different categories of human rights, because it is only when they are taken 
together that they can secure the respect for human dignity from which they evolve. The problem 
is that the relationship between the two conceptions is not clear—if it is there. This is further 
complicated by the fact that the system of rights is reconstructed from his discourse theory, while 
international human rights are founded on the moral concept of human dignity.200 With these two 
parallel conceptions of human rights, can we address the challenges raised at the normative level 
of viewing human rights as another imperialist ideology? That is the topic of the following 
subsection.  
d). Habermas and Human Rights as Imperialist Ideology 
The first chapter established the argument put forward to justify that human rights are 
playing the imperialist ideology role in the contemporary world. Critics advance four main 
reasons. First, they compare the contemporary human rights movement to the civilizing mission 
that was used to cover the Western colonizing enterprise of the rest of the world. The critics 
argue that, like the Western colonization that was carried under the positive idea of the civilizing 
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mission, human rights is another way that the West has found to perpetuate its influence on the 
rest of the world. In the second place, they claim that the so-called civilizing mission was 
founded on racial prejudices of the West superiority over the rest of the world. That superiority 
prejudice legitimated the duty to bring civilization to the inferior races, in order to bring them to 
the level of civilization. In the same way, the human rights project carries out the same aim of 
the West to bring salvation to the savages who do not know and do not have human rights. That 
is the meaning of the savage-victim-savior metaphor. Thirdly, the civilizing mission was 
supported by the liberal belief in the progress of civilization based on the hierarchical 
anthropology. The critics contend that the human rights movement is also a liberal ambition to 
spread Western values in the non-Western world. Fourthly, under the push of liberalism, this 
whole project of the civilizing mission was secured by international law as its legal scheme, 
which embodied the racial prejudices and the hierarchical anthropology, and therefore conferred 
the legality to it. On this level, critics show that human rights have been incorporated in 
international law that is mostly liberal, and therefore, human rights law is a continuation of the 
universalization of Eurocentrism. These arguments to prove that human rights are another 
imperialist ideology touch the moral core of the human rights movement, in that as ideology, 
human rights are accused of travesty as they pretend to be what they are really not. Therefore, 
they constitute a challenge to the justification of human rights, and the question is whether they 
can be addressed from Habermas’s understanding of human rights.  
I have already underscored that Habermas construes his system of rights from his 
discourse theory and posits it as the core of the constitutional democratic state. On the other 
hand, he recognizes the international human rights as an innovation of international law and a 
legitimating basis for a globalized world community. In that sense, Habermas’s response to these 
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challenges is not easy to construct. From the reconstructed system of rights perspective, the latter 
is designated for domestic constitutional democracy, because it contains “the rights citizens must 
accord one another if they want to legitimately regulate their common life by means of positive 
law.”201 The constitution puts them into effect.202 In his own words, “the project of realizing the 
system of rights [is]—a project specifically designed for the conditions of our society, and hence 
for a particular, historically emergent society.”203 It is also the opinion of Jeffrey Flynn who 
observes that “Between Facts and Norms… deals explicitly with the system of rights within the 
democratic constitutional state.”204 Now, since Habermas is concerned with a legal theory for a 
political community, the system of rights cannot offer away forward to address the challenges 
raised above.  
Moreover, his system of rights is reconstructed from a discourse theory which fits the 
postmetaphysical thinking—to use his own words—of Western modern society. Setting the 
context for his theory in Between Facts and Norms, he says: “I start from the modern situation of 
a predominantly secular society in which normative orders must be maintained without 
metasocial guarantees.”205 And when he comes to the co-originality of private and public 
autonomy, he notes that “from a normative point of view [it] can be explained with the help of a 
parsimonious discourse principle that merely expresses the meaning of postconventional 
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requirements of justification.”206 In other words, the discourse principle is designated for modern 
societies which can no longer rely on the traditional or religious/metaphysical sources for 
justification for action norms. In that sense, it cannot be generalized because the world is still 
composed of societies whose political institutions are based on either traditional or religious 
authority. This being the case, we are left with Habermas’s consideration of international human 
rights.  
Concerning the international human rights, it has already been underlined that Habermas 
sees them in the line of the evolution and the transformation of international law, following the 
horrendous crimes of WWII. In that regard, human rights participated in the transformation of 
the state of nature between states that had characterized international law until the beginning of 
its moralization through the League of Nations, fruits of the WWI and the Kellog-Briand Pact. 
At this time, though, Habermas observes that international law is still bound to war; “the 
development of international law remains a means to the end of averting war.”207 It is only, he 
claims, with the creation of the United Nations that a new step is taken in the development of 
international law, as now peace and security are linked to the protection of human rights. In other 
words, the subordination of international law to the threat of war is superseded. As he asserts, all 
this international law geared by the fact of war “changes with the UN Charter, which, in the 
second clause of the preamble, reaffirms ‘faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person,’ and in Article 1, Paras. 1 and 3, links the political goals of global 
peace and international security with the promotion of ‘respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction of race, sex, language or religion’ throughout 
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the world.”208 UDHR and different Covenants and Conventions on human rights came to 
concretize that same correlation of peace-security with the respect for human rights. For 
Habermas, this fact signed the move toward a cosmopolitan society since from now on, both 
states and individuals are subjects of international law. In other words, the innovation brought by 
the international human rights is that they transform the “international law as a law of states into 
a cosmopolitan law as a law of individuals”209 by granting “individual citizens recognition as 
immediate subjects of international law.”210 
This is, for Habermas, the first innovation in the development of international law. The 
second that I now mention briefly—since I will come back to it broadly below—is the limitation 
of the non-intervention principle to the case of self-defense only. And the third innovation is the 
inclusivity of membership in the UN General Assembly. Every state is recognized as a member 
regardless of its political regime. “In contrast with the structure of a League of Nations 
composed of a vanguard of states that already possess liberal constitutions, the United Nations 
was designated to be inclusive from the beginning.” He continues, “Granted, all member states 
must accept the obligations imposed by the principles of the Charter and the human rights 
declarations; but from the first day states such as Soviet Union and China were among members 
of the Security Council accorded veto power.” He concludes, “today, the world organization, 
which has expanded to 193 members, comprises, in addition to liberal regimes, authoritarian and 
sometimes even despotic and criminal regime.”211 Of course, Habermas recognizes that there can 
be contradictions, especially when one of those criminal regimes chairs the human rights 
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committee. Nevertheless, that is the price to be paid for obtaining such a large membership 
inclusivity.  
Moreover, while Habermas believes in the universality of human rights because they 
exclusively have a moral content, he also acknowledges that they have to be differently 
interpreted according to their context of application. As he puts it, “each national constitution 
represents a historically different way of construing the same—theoretically reconstructible—
basic rights, and each positive legal order implement the same basic rights in a different form of 
life.”212 Habermas is also very much opposed to the possible ideological use of human rights, 
which leads to liberal hegemony through the spreading of the liberal ideas and free market. 
Commenting on the Iraq invasion by the American-English coalition, Habermas writes that 
“England and America were content with the normative goal of promulgating their own liberal 
order internationally, if necessary with force.”213 Criticizing the neoconservative politics, he 
thinks that “from the perspective of a liberal post-histoire à la Fukuyuma,” the relevant question 
is: “what could possibly be better for people than the worldwide spread of liberal states and the 
globalization of free markets?”214 According to Habermas, this kind of imposition of the so-
called universal values is simply a universalization of ethnocentrism, and is at the service of 
imperialism. Taking the American example, he states that “even an ultra-modern power like the 
US relapses into the pseudo-universalism of the ancient empires when it substitutes morality and 
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ethics for positive law in issues of international justice. From Bush’s perspective, ‘our’ values 
are universally valid values that all other nations should accept in their best interests. This 
pseudo-universalism is a kind of universalized ethnocentrism.”215 Not only does international 
law become imperial,216 but also justifying it through the spread of democracy and human rights 
becomes an ideology. Once again taking the Bush’s Iraq invasion, Habermas asserts that “the 
normative viewpoints offered as pretexts for a justification, such as exporting democracy and 
human rights, have in the meantime degenerated into sheer ideology.”217 
All these examples show that Habermas is against any imperialist use of human rights to 
impose one liberal vision of the world. In the words of Neil Walker, Habermas rejects “a kind of 
hegemonic liberalism based upon unipolar American-dominated world order.”218 In that sense, 
Habermas’s position is different from those who identify the human rights movement with the 
United States.219 Habermas does not even believe in the myth of the democratic peace. It is true 
that he acknowledges that the idea that democratic states do not resort to war in their foreign 
policy is not completely false, and he attributes the merit to the citizenry that is alert and asks for 
justification for any war to be conducted. In such a case, “the deployment of military force is no 
longer exclusively determined by an essentially particularistic raison d’état but also by the desire 
to foster the international spread of nonauthoritarian states and governments.”220 This does not, 
however, mean that democratic states are more peaceful than others. In his rereading of the 
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Kantian presuppositions for perpetual peace—democratic republics, global trade and public 
sphere—Habermas observes that they “have proved with hindsight to rest on questionable 
assumptions.”221 One of them is that, “although it is true that republics have generally behaved 
peacefully toward other republics, in other contexts they have been as energetic in their military 
pursuits as authoritarian states.”222 This point of view espouses the Jennifer Mitzen argument that 
“it is not clear that the democratic peace is necessary to solve the problem of war. For example, it 
is not the case that liberal states maintain a zone of peace while nonliberal states inhabit a realist 
world. Stable interstate peace has evolved among states of various regimes types.”223 Again, at 
this level also, Habermas does not necessarily equate the global order with the neoliberal one.  
From these points, it is clear that Habermas’s position on international human rights is 
not pushing for an imperialistic use of human rights. But the question now is, can we address the 
challenge of human rights as ideology from this Habermasian view of human rights? The critique 
is not directed toward a particular country using ideologically human rights for its own goal or 
interest. In other words, does his conception of human rights as a step forward in the 
development of international law get out of the liberal spectrum of getting imposed on the non-
liberal world? The answer seems not to be readily positive. Firstly and to start with, Habermas’s 
critique of the hegemonic liberalism is based on a particular use of international law, while the 
critics of human rights as imperial ideology point out the similarity between the role played by 
the civilizing mission and the one being played by human rights. In response to that, Habermas 
would need either to show that the human rights movement is not liberal in its origin, or if it is 
liberal in its origin, then show that in its practice it goes beyond its liberal birth place. That is 
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what seems not to be present in his work. Secondly, in some of his comments on the system of 
rights, he seems to universalize something that was conceived for a domestic democratic state. 
The system of rights is reconstructed from a discourse principle that is conceived for secularized 
societies, yet the world is also composed of nonsecularized societies in which the practice of 
international human rights should also apply. Thirdly, sometimes he gives a sociological 
explanation of human rights as a response to the modern challenges as if all societies confronted 
with modernity have to respond the same way that Europe did to its own. The following lines 
will substantiate these three arguments. 
(i). Concerning the liberal origin of international human rights and its incorporation in the 
international law, itself of liberal origin, Habermas recognizes it. Recall that international human 
rights intervene as a stage in the development of international law which was accustomed to be 
geared by the fact of war. In this history of international law, Habermas acknowledges that it 
began with nationalist liberals in the colonial context, with only Western liberal (colonial) 
powers recognized as the only subjects of international law. He observes that “the 
internationalists were not insensitive to the brutal aspects of colonialism but they also took the 
view that the European had been burdened with the role of bringing civilization to all corners of 
the earth. From the perspective of the superiority of the white West, it appeared perfectly natural 
that the colonial powers should regulate with their own colonies, by legal means.”224 And he 
adds, “the existing differences in levels of cultures, and the resulting mission civilisatrice, 
supposedly explained why the universalism of international legal principles was compatible with 
the exclusionary logic inherent in the colonial project.”225 There are two important points from 
this statement. First, it confirms what the critics claim that international law is liberal in its 
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conception; secondly, Habermas joins the critics of international law of its colonial origin, and 
therefore its discriminatory character. It is true that Habermas notes that one of the innovations 
of post-WWII international law is the inclusiveness of the UN Charter. In this sense, it goes 
beyond both the Eurocentric origin of international law and its liberal development of the League 
of Nations. However, even with the UN Charter and the human rights instruments that emanated 
from it, one cannot deny the liberal influence. Indeed, membership is conditioned by accepting 
the non-aggressiveness principle and the respect of human rights, and Habermas notes that 
liberal rights are the core of all human rights declarations. As he declares, “from a historical 
perspective, these ‘liberal’ (in narrow sense) basic rights in fact make up the core of human 
rights declarations.”226 If the core of human rights is liberal, it would be hard to convince the 
critics of human rights movements that bringing them into the nonliberal world is not a hidden 
project of propagating liberal culture itself.  
Habermas does not question this liberal origin of international law and even his project of 
its constitutionalization builds on it, making it more West-centric. Habermas rightly observes 
that human rights come as the response to the crimes and massacres that struck the Western 
world during WWII—a fact that the critics take as an example showing that human rights are not 
primarily concerned with all human beings, for other crimes and atrocities were committed to 
non-Western people through colonialism and slavery, yet they did not prompt the same response! 
Now, for him, the constitutionalization of international law which incorporates human rights is 
simply the liberal project that is to be extended beyond the state. In other words, the 
constitutionalization of international law has to follow the liberal pattern—raising only the 
problem of legitimation, since the opinion- and will-formation through which the legislative 
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process acquires its legitimacy is absent at the supranational level. Except that, “supranational 
constitutions rest at any rate on basic rights, legal principles, and criminal codes which are the 
product of prior learning processes and have been tried and tested within democratic nation-
states.”227 He concludes, “thus, their normative substance evolved from constitutions of the 
republican type. This holds not only for the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, but even for the treaties underlying GATT and the WTO.”228 In other words, the 
constitutionalization of international law adopts the liberal form. As he puts it, “the liberal type 
of constitution that limits the power of the state without constituting it… provides a conceptual 
model for a constitutionalization of international law in the form of a politically constituted 
world society without a world government.”229 
Habermas simply confirms what the critics put forward that international law in general 
and international human rights in particular are essentially liberal. For that reason, they are not 
culturally neutral, and to claim their universality in order to impose them on other cultures 
sounds like a cultural imperialism. Furthermore, although he praises the formal equality of UN 
members, Habermas contends that there is a normative gradation on the top of which is liberal, 
followed by semi-authoritarian and despotic states, acknowledging Rawls for having pointed it 
out. Add to that the fact that Habermas is convinced that only a democratic constitutional state 
exhausts the substance of human rights, then there is no illusion that one can address 
satisfactorily the challenges raised by the critics of human rights, because they target the basis on 
which Habermas’s enterprise of constitutionalizing international law is founded: the liberal 
model, and Habermas does not respond to it. It is true that he perceives “the need for 
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intercultural communication and interpretation, between civilizations shaped by one or more of 
the major world religions” about the innovation occurring in the international law.230 However, 
apart from the fact that even this perception of the need is discriminatory—why only 
civilizations of the major world religions? Does it mean that other civilizations have nothing 
pertinent to contribute to the conversation?—he does not elaborate to show how such 
communication and interpretation would alter the quest of the critics. Therefore, I maintain that 
from this perspective, it would be hard to address the challenge that the human rights movement 
is being used as an imperialist ideology.  
(ii). From another angle, Habermas extends his system of rights that was first conceived 
for the domestic constitution democracy, to the global arena. Considering the tension between 
the universality of human rights—classical liberal rights—and their form of positive law, he 
notes that “the discrepancy between, on the one hand, the human-rights content of classical 
liberties and, on the other, their form of positive law, which initially limits them to a nation-state, 
is just what makes one aware that the discursively grounded ‘system of rights’ points beyond the 
constitutional state in the singular toward the globalization of rights.”231 This awareness is linked 
to Habermas’s plea to reform the UN system so that it may have some executive power. 
According to him, “for actionable rights to issue from the United Nation Declaration of Human 
Rights, it is not enough simply to have international courts; such courts will first be able to 
function adequately only when the age of individual sovereign states has come to end through a 
United Nations that can not only pass but also act on and enforce its resolutions.”232 In other 
words, the globalization of rights that Habermas is advocating would follow his system of rights 
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model, which is embodied in the constitutional democracy, and so even in a multicultural world. 
He seems to think that the system of rights is so universal that it should not be challenged by the 
global fact of pluralism. He says, “the claim of the system of rights to represent universal human 
rights becomes especially relevant whenever the growing interdependencies of today’s world 
make an issue of the controversial selective readings of these rights by different cultures.”233 He 
adds, “this contest of interpretations makes sense only on the premise that it is necessary to find a 
single correct reading that claims to exhaust the universalistic content of these rights in the 
present context.”234 The first question that comes to mind is to know why the system of rights 
would have such a claim to represent the universal human rights, while it is designated for a 
particular kind of society. Indeed, as it has been underlined, this model developed in the West is 
based on a mode of justification that assumes the modern pluralist and secularized society. Why 
then would it represent the universal human rights? After all, as Rawls rightly observes, 
discourse principle is another comprehensive doctrine235 and the world is populated with many 
of those. Therefore to claim universality of rights constructed from only one side, would not 
satisfy the critics of human rights movement who accuse it of being just another means to 
propagate liberal culture.  
This leads to the second question linked to the belief that different interpretations are only 
possible on the premise that there can be a correct reading that exhaust the universalistic content 
of these rights. This assumption seems to be that the system of rights might be that reading. But 
if one takes seriously the critique, he/she cannot posit the universal content of human rights 
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before submitting them to a multicultural test, which might even start by calling into question 
their source, that is, the discourse principle itself. True, from the discourse principle, right has 
priority over the ethical good. However, is the discourse principle the best among all the 
comprehensive doctrines to edict which rights are universal? The question is important especially 
when one recalls that Habermas takes international human rights as a stage in the development of 
international law, and does not apply the discourse principle to them to see whether they would 
be vindicated—unless one assumes the fact that was highlighted; that is, for Habermas, the 
content of the supranational constitutions developed from the Western democratic constitutional 
states. If this is the case, it would still lend support to the critics’ argument that international 
human rights are just exporting liberal culture. Even Amy Bartholomew who believes that the 
discourse principle offers a better basis for a multicultural discussion on international human 
rights does not convince, since she uses it to disqualify other perspectives but does not apply it to 
the international human rights to see how many would pass the test.236 Again, this shows that the 
Habermasian understanding of human rights does not offer the best way to address the challenge 
raised by considering human rights as an imperialist ideology. 
(iii). Finally, there is the sociological argument that human rights are a response that the 
West invented to deal with the crisis of legitimation caused by modernity. Habermas claims that 
“the Western mode of legitimation [is] an answer to general challenges that are no longer just for 
Western civilization.” 237 For sure, he acknowledges that the Western answer “is not the only one 
or even the best one.” He even concedes that “the current debate [about prioritizing some rights 
over others] provides us with an opportunity to become aware of our own blind spots.”238 This 
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approach, however, assumes human rights to be essentially European, and Habermas 
acknowledges it. He says, “the conception of human rights was the answer to a problem that 
once confronted Europeans –when they had to overcome the political consequences of 
confessional fragmentation.”239 Habermas is convinced that “the normative substance of those 
rights which emerged in the West will withstand the usual accusation that it is merely a reflection 
of Western traditions.”240 And the reason is that “they express a more or less compelling 
response to the very same problems that Europe has faced since the eighteenth century, and 
which other regions or cultures cannot escape facing today.”241 Other cultures are thus obliged to 
embrace human rights because the same problem that confronted Europe “now confronts [them] 
in a similar fashion.”242 They are “exposed to the challenges of social modernity, just as Europe 
was in its day, when it in some sense ‘discovered’ or ‘invented’ human rights and constitutional 
democracy.”243 
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Habermas provides the critics of international human rights with an unwanted help. 
Indeed, if human rights were just a historical/sociological response to a contextual European 
problem, why would they have to be imposed on other cultures, pretexting that the latter are 
facing the same problem? At the most, this generosity should keep a modest profile until those in 
need make an open demand, and they would choose what works better for them. Furthermore, 
while there is a globalization of problems, responses need not be necessarily similar, and there is 
no assurance that the way the West responded to the challenges of social modernity would fit 
into other cultures, especially that there are multiple modernities as Habermas himself recognizes 
it.244 It even contradicts what he believes in when he criticizes the neoliberal propaganda. 
According to him, “the many cultural faces of the pluralist global society, or multiple 
modernities, do not fit well with a completely deregulated and politically neutralized world 
market society. For this would rob the non-Western cultures that are shaped by other world 
religions of their freedom to assimilate the achievements of modernity with their own 
resources.”245 If this is true for the neoliberal economy, why cannot it also work for human rights 
understood as a Western response to the challenges of modernity? That is, why do other cultures 
have to take the ready-made answers to the challenges of social modernity without resorting to 
their cultural resources? Is it not also to rob the non-Western cultures their freedom to adopt and 
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adapt human rights according to their understanding of modernity and their cultural 
backgrounds?  
If the reading I have done of it is plausible, it is another element showing that 
Habermas’s understanding of human rights does not offer a sure path to respond to the 
theoretical challenge to the human rights movement as a cultural imperialist adventure. It 
remains to examine whether we can use his theory of humanitarian intervention to respond to its 
assimilation to neocolonialism. 
4.3. Habermas and Humanitarian Intervention as Neocolonialism 
a). Habermas’s Justification of Humanitarian Intervention 
Habermas talks about humanitarian intervention in many places of his works, but his own 
position on it varries from supporting it and at the same time criticizing it. For instance, on the 
one hand, he hails that the intervention carried out by the UN since 1989 ushered in a new era of 
cosmopolitan law, saying that “the decisions and strategies of the world organization, and 
especially the interventions of force carrying out the UN mandates since 1989, indicate the 
direction along which the international law…is gradually being transformed into a cosmopolitan 
law.”246 On the other hand, however, Habermas is worried that “interventions in support of 
internal democratization are…irreconcilable with a conception of democratic self-determination 
that grounds of national independence for the sake of collective self-realization of a cultural form 
of life.”247 This shows that Habermas perceives the ambiguity incrusted in the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention even at its normative justification. Perhaps that is why Habermas has 
adopted different positions toward the different interventions, sometimes supporting them, other 
times opposing them. As Ingram remarks,  
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By the 1990s Habermas was advocating that the UN change its original mandate from that of peacekeeper 
to defender of human rights. This idea found expression in a number of controversial positions he adopted 
with respect to the use of military force in stanching human rights violations. On the one hand, grievous 
human rights violations led him to support the 1991 UN-sanctioned Persian Gulf War, which was provoked 
by the Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, as well as the 1999 NATO-led intervention against Yugoslavia over its 
violent military escapade in Kosovo. On the other hand, he objected—again on human rights grounds—to 
the conduct of these interventions, which caused heavy civilians casualties. In 2003 he criticized the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq by bypassing UN approval and violating international conventions governing warfare.248 
In this context, although it is not easy to see exactly what Habermas’s position on humanitarian 
intervention is, it seems that he justifies from two grounds: normatively from the Kantian project, 
and legally from the evolution of international law, but he becomes wary about the way those 
interventions are carried out. Therefore, I organize Habermas’s position around these three 
points. 
(i). In his evaluation of his position on the Kosovo war, Habermas writes that “three 
weeks into the controversial NATO military action, I took a stance on the conflict…Aspects of 
the operation that had been problematic from the beginning –the paper-thin legitimacy according 
to international law, the disproportionate use of military force and the unclear political objectives 
–were thrown into even sharper relief by the subsequent course of events and the facts which 
have since come to light.”249 And he concludes, “nevertheless, I still defend the Kantian 
perspective of a transition from international to cosmopolitan law from which I sought to justify 
the intervention principle at the time.”250 The Kantian perspective that Habermas invokes here is 
the fact that international law is no longer limited to states only; rather, individuals are also 
subject of international law. Indeed, according to the classical international law, only nation-
states are the subjects of international law, and they consider each other equal in their reciprocal 
recognition, independently of their economic, political, geographical or demographic factors. 
They are sovereign both internally –as they exercise control over their territories—and externally 
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–as they sign and execute treaties. In that sense, they do not accept any authority above them. For 
this reason, they have the absolute right to go to war. As Kant remarks, “nations can press for 
their rights only by waging war and never in a trial before an independent tribunal.”251 
This fact of states exercising their right through war because there is no independent 
tribunal, highlights the discrepancy between international law and state law. In the latter, 
political power is regulated through the mechanism of law; but in international law, there is only 
political power, because “war and its favorable consequence, victory, cannot determine the 
right.”252 That is why for Habermas, the “interdependence of ‘political power’ and ‘law’ is 
absent at the international level, where an asymmetrical relation between power and law persists 
because international legal regulations reflects the underlying power constellations between 
states without normatively transforming them.”253 In other words, what lacks in the classical 
international law is the normative transformation of its political power, for “the concept of the 
right of nations as a right to go to war is meaningless.”254 For that reason, Kant posits an 
international community not built on the so-called belligerency rights of states, but rather on the 
hospitality inscribed in the cosmopolitan right as foundation of a perpetual peace among peoples, 
and that is what Habermas sees as transition from classical international to cosmopolitan law. 
For “because a (narrow or wider) community widely prevails among the Earth’s peoples, a 
transgression of rights in one place in the world is felt everywhere; consequently, the idea of 
cosmopolitan right is not fantastic and exaggerated, but rather an amendment to the unwritten 
code of national and international rights, necessary to the public rights of men in general.”255 
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Kant infers that “only such amendment allows us to flatter ourselves with the thought that we are 
making continual progress towards perpetual peace.”256 Put into other words, the condition of 
peace is based on the establishment of rights both nationally and internationally, and for Kant, it 
is the extension of the republican model to the international level that creates a law-governed 
relationship between states. It institutes a “civil constitution” between states because it is based 
on rights.  
Habermas notes that “the reference to a ‘civil constitution’ here is crucial: international 
law, which regulates interactions among states, must be superseded by the constitution of a 
community of states.”257 Once this step is accomplished, the international community as a 
cosmopolitan condition is no longer constituted by states only, but also by citizens whose rights 
are protected even beyond their national borders. By institutionalizing civil rights at the 
international level, classical international law “as law of states” is transformed “into the 
cosmopolitan law as a law of individuals. The latter are no longer legal subjects merely as 
citizens of their respective states, but also as members of a ‘cosmopolitan commonwealth under 
a single head.’ The civil rights of individual persons are now supposed to penetrate international 
relations too.” 258 
From this perspective, Habermas can then justify humanitarian intervention as a military 
intervention to protect the victims of human rights violations, for international human rights are 
also the matter of international concern, and they challenge the classical principle of state 
sovereignty, “since human rights would have to be implemented in many cases despite the 
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opposition of national governments.”259 Under the cosmopolitan law, states are no longer the 
final authority when human rights are violated, and their sovereignty is legitimated by the respect 
of these rights.  
(ii). Habermas sees the implementation of this Kantian project in the development of 
modern international law, especially with the creation of the UN through a Charter that linked 
peace and security to the protection and respect of human rights. As I have already indicated, 
until then international law was still bound to the fact of war, trying to avert it. But with the UN 
Charter and the UDHR with all the subsequent human rights instruments, “all this changes… the 
international community commits itself to the global implementation of constitutional principles 
that had previously been realized only with nation-states.”260 In other words, this was the 
realization of Kant’s dream of elevating the civil condition internal to republics to the 
international level so that there can be interdependence between political power and law in the 
states’ relations. Consequently, not only are states legitimated by their respect of human rights, 
but also, thanks to the cosmopolitan law, the international community has the responsibility to 
protect the human rights of every individual, since under the cosmopolitan right, “a transgression 
of rights in one place in the world is felt everywhere.” For that reason, “the international 
community violates its legal obligation to protect human rights worldwide if it simply sits back 
and watches mass murders and mass rapes, ethnic cleansing and expulsion, or a policy of 
deliberately exposing people to starvation and disease without intervening.”261 
The consequence of this evolution of international law from a law of states to a law of 
individuals is that it undermines the sacrosanct principle of non-intervention that was the 
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cornerstone of state sovereignty. By the very fact of being recognized as a member of the 
international community, the classical international law granted the state the control monopoly 
over its territory. There was no external state or any other body to question its dealings with its 
citizens. With the constitutionalization of international law through the UN Charter and the 
different human rights instruments, the use of violence is limited to the case of self-defense and 
“the principle of non-intervention does not hold for members who violate the general prohibition 
on the use of violence.”262 War is no longer a legitimate instrument for foreign policy. Any 
expansionist project is prohibited. This is the limitation in the external dimension of state 
sovereignty. With regard to the internal sovereignty, states are no longer free to decimate their 
citizens or commit other crimes against humanity with impunity, as Nuremberg and Tokyo trials 
show, and as the recent International Tribunals –International Criminal Court (ICC), 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (IPTY), International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (IPTP) – or the arrest of Pinochet testify. “Internal state sovereignty is no longer 
restricted to simply maintaining law and order but also includes the effective protection of the 
civil rights of citizens.”263 All these elements show that “the erosion of the principle of 
nonintervention in recent decades has been due primarily to the politics of human rights.”264 
With this normative foundation for his justification of humanitarian intervention, 
Habermas can now address the critiques raised by the realist school, which advocates for the 
classical international law based on political power. Taking Carl Schmitt as the representative of 
this school, Habermas notes that “his rejection of intervention grounded in appeal to human 
rights can already be accounted for by his belligerent conception of international relations, 
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indeed of politics in general.”265 In this school of thought, states should be left alone in their 
assertion of power as they pursue their own interests without involving morality. For Schmitt 
invoking humanity is a way of demonizing the enemy, while a state as incarnation of a collective 
will has to engage into war for its survival. War, for a state, is its condition of existence. As 
Habermas remarks, “according to this doctrine, independent nation-states in the international 
state of nature should act freely in accordance with their own interests because the security and 
survival of the collectivity are non-negotiable values for its members and because, from the point 
of view of an observer, conflicts between actors are still best regulated by the imperatives of 
instrumental rationality.”266 
Habermas reminds the realists that the world has grown so interconnected that states are 
no longer that sovereign to be able to manage all the crises alone. As he says, “nation-states have 
in fact lost a considerable amount of their controlling and steering capabilities in the functional 
domains in which they could make more or less independent decisions until the most major 
phase of globalization.”267 He adds, “this holds for all of the classical functions of the state, from 
safeguarding peace and physical security to guaranteeing freedom, the rule of law, and 
democratic legitimation.”268 This is to say that, even without talking about humanitarian 
intervention, states are no longer absolutely sovereign to ensure by their own their survival. But 
more importantly, for the case of humanitarian intervention, Habermas remarks that it is carried 
out because the states in question have failed to ensure their proper function. In Habermas’s 
words, “it is simply not the case that the postnational constellation can be characterized as one in 
which nation-states bristling with power are tied to the apron strings of the world community. On 
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the contrary, it is the erosion of state authority, either in the form of civil wars or ethnic conflicts 
within collapsing states or states held together by authoritarian means, which brings intervention 
onto the scene.”269 One would say that, according to Habermas, humanitarian intervention is 
called upon by the collapse of the internal sovereignty that the realists defend.  
Furthermore, Habermas does not give weight to the ideological accusation, because “the 
momentous, risky, and costly intervention”270 cannot simply be explained by self-interests of the 
intervening countries. Another argument against “realism” is that states have lost innocence after 
the horrors endured during the last century. “The trails of blood left behind by the subjects of 
international law during the catastrophic history of the twentieth century have rendered the 
presumption of innocence in reference to classical international law absurd.”271 Hence, “the 
founding of the UN as well as its declaration of rights, the threat to punish wars of aggression 
and crimes against humanity –implying at least a partial abrogation of the principle of non-
intervention –all were necessary and correct answers to the morally significant experiences of 
this century, to totalitarian political ragings and the Holocaust.”272 From this point of view, the 
transition from classical international law to a cosmopolitan one was a proper response to the 
loss of innocence of the states as they are responsible for most of the grave crimes committed 
against humanity and violations of human rights. To the question of judging humanitarian 
intervention morally, Habermas advocates for a UN reform so that human rights be strongly 
institutionalized in order to distinguish morality from law. In that case, “the institutionalization 
of legal procedures…will protect the juridically-tamed manner of dealing with violations of 
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human rights from both the dedifferentiation of the law and an unmediated moral discrimination 
against ‘enemies’.”273 
(iii). This quest for the institutionalization of human rights so that their violations might 
be legally adjudicated raises the question of executive power at the supranational level, which 
leads Habermas to changing stances when it comes to the practice of humanitarian intervention 
itself. In his analysis of the second innovations brought about by the cosmopolitan law, he 
remarks that, although the UN Charter prohibits the use of violence and abolishes the right to 
non-intervention for members who breach the nonviolence principle except for self-defense, it 
does not creates a police above the states so that it can execute its orders. He acknowledges that 
“the Charter makes provisions for sanctions in case of violations and, if necessary, the use of 
military force in the conduct of police operations.”274 He even notes that “Article 42 of the 
Charter marks the second and decisive step in the direction of a constitutionalization of 
international law…Article 43 even authorizes it to take command of the forces and logistical 
support that member state are obliged to make available to it.”275 However, “this provision is 
inoperative, so there has never been a UN supreme command.”276 The consequence is that “today 
the United Nations is not yet in a position to compel a non-compliant member state to guarantee 
democracy and the rule of law to its own citizens. And the highly selective enforcement of the 
UN’s human rights policy is subject to the constraints of political realities.”277 It has to 
accommodate the major powers’ interests which usually shoulder the intervention. As he puts it, 
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“the Charter pays for the willingness of the major powers to cooperate by granting them veto 
rights that pose a major obstacle to the effectiveness of the Security Council.”278 
As the UN humanitarian interventions are carried out under such conditions, not only 
does Habermas notice the veto-right problem for the functioning of the Security Council, he also 
perceives the selectivity in choosing where to intervene. “One needs only recall the highly 
selective and shortsighted decisions of a non-representative and far from impartial Security 
Council, or the half-hearted and incompetent implementation of interventions which have been 
authorized –and their catastrophic failure.”279 He even mentions the cases of simply ignoring the 
international law for the self-interests of the major power, which threatens to portray the moral 
credibility of international human rights as an imperialist ideology. For “when human rights 
policy becomes a mere fig leaf and vehicle for imposing major power interests, when the 
superpower flouts the UN Charter and arrogates to itself a right of intervention, and when it 
conducts an invasion in violation of humanitarian international law and justifies this in the name 
of universal values, this reinforces the suspicion that the programme of human rights consists in 
its imperialist misuse.”280 
The examination of the actual practice of humanitarian intervention on the backdrop of 
its normative justification led Habermas to support the NATO intervention in Kosovo for moral 
reasons,281 not without critique though. For “even 19 undoubtedly democratic states, as long as 
they authorize their own intervention, remain partisan. They are exercising a power of 
interpretation and decision-making which, if things were properly conducted, could only be 
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exercised by independent institutions. To that extent, they are acting paternalistically.”282 They 
might have good moral reasons, but “moral norms which appeal to our better judgment may not 
be enforced like established legal norms.”283 That is why “NATO’s self-authorization should not 
be allowed to become the general rule.”284 As to the invasion of Iraq, Habermas is completely 
against it as it not only breaches the principles of international law, but also lacks the moral 
ground. It was just a hegemonic neoliberal project that did not have any normative foundation, 
but rather could only be understood as imperialist strategy.285 
In summary, Habermas sees in the transition from classical international law to the 
cosmopolitan law as it has been developing after the WWII, the normative ground to justify 
humanitarian intervention. As Carlos Yordán observes, Habermas suggests two standards for 
humanitarian intervention. “First, these interventions must follow established international 
decision-making procedures to make sure that a country’s interests do not dominate the 
international response….Second, cosmopolitan interests, and not national interests, should 
inform these operations.”286 However, when he examines the actual practices, there is a gap 
between the normative justification and the way humanitarian intervention is carried out. That is 
why Habermas calls for reforms that institutionalize human rights so that they can be legally 
enforced and with a real executive power of the UN to enforce its own resolutions when it comes 
to intervening against states. The question, at this point, is whether this Habermasian justification 
responds to the challenge raised by those who view humanitarian intervention as a 
neocolonialism.  
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b). Habermas and Humanitarian Intervention as Neocolonialism 
One recalls that, from the second chapter, neocolonialism generally refers to the 
maintenance of colonial power through a local bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, the critics of 
humanitarian intervention identify it with the neocolonialism to mean the colonial methods and 
imperialistic strategies and language used to spread liberal culture and gain economic and 
political influence. Their critiques are grounded on both normative reasons and the practice itself 
of humanitarian intervention.  
From the moral point of view, humanitarian intervention emphasizes the helplessness of 
the victim, shadowing the emancipatory power of human rights. Furthermore, it is only 
concerned with political rights, neglecting the other categories of rights. The result is that 
humanitarian intervention targets crimes that are generally non-Western crimes. Another 
normative argument is that humanitarian intervention deconstructs the traditional understanding 
of state sovereignty, which threatens the existence of many non-Western states, especially those 
created after the colonial era, since their survival was based on the assumption of equality of 
states and respect for their sovereignty. The consequence is that strong states –generally Western 
ones—get a lee-way to intervene in the weaker ones; which then creates an international order 
based on domination. Finally, by the international community, humanitarian intervention 
discourse designates the liberal states of the West, considered as stable and well-ordered, with 
the mission to stabilize the non-liberal troubled world. This opposition reminds the civilizing 
mission which was founded on the asymmetrical relation between civilized-uncivilized; or the 
Mill’s argument that a civilized nation cannot stand a barbarous one in the same neighborhood. 
Those are the reasons given by the critics to justify why humanitarian intervention is another 
form of neocolonialism. 
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Concerning the practice, humanitarian intervention constitutes a problem because it is 
never only a moral issue; it also—and decisively—involves political and strategic motives. This 
gives reason to the critics for suspecting human rights as being used ideologically to hide self-
interests when they are invoked to justify a humanitarian intervention. Another important 
element that besmirches humanitarian intervention is about the agent who determines that a 
situation is an egregious violation of human rights. From the experience of humanitarian 
intervention cases, it is the Western strong states that decide, through their international 
institutions, where to intervene and it has been always in the non-Western ones. In addition, they 
proceed selectively, using a double standard mechanism. When it is a major power or one of its 
allies, they can openly violate human rights without fearing any humanitarian involvement. 
Another stain on the humanitarian intervention practice is the labelling process, through which 
the liberal-Western states name the victims without their consent, and stigmatize the non-
Western states as tyranny or rogue/failing states, while they find better terms for their own 
misconducts. Can Habermasian justification of humanitarian intervention offer a venue to 
respond to these normative and empirical arguments? 
To start with the concerns raised from the practice of humanitarian intervention, 
Habermas shares the worries with the critics about the possible ideological use of human rights, 
especially when a superpower takes the universal values to cover its own interests.287 He also 
recognizes the selectivity and the double standard applied in the intervention. As it has already 
been shown, he links this problem to the fact that the UN does not have a real executive power, 
and therefore has to adapt its actions to political realities. For instance, “Russia need not fear an 
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armed intervention in Chechnya because it is equipped with veto power,”288 the same case 
applies to the other permanent members of the Security Council. That is why for Habermas, the 
solution is the respect for international law, specifically now that it is taking the turn to becoming 
cosmopolitan law. As he asserts, “all the more important, therefore, is the core mission of 
peacekeeping for which the UN was originally founded, that is, enforcing the prohibition against 
wars of aggression which, in the aftermath of World War II, led to the elimination of the ius ad 
bellum and set new restrictions on the sovereignty of individual states.”289 He concludes, “with 
this, classical international law took at least a first decisive step along the road of a cosmopolitan 
rule of law.”290 In other words, the solution to this selectivity in implementing the protection of 
human rights lies in the enforcement of cosmopolitan law. I now consider whether this solution 
satisfies the normative questions raised by the critics of humanitarian intervention.  
At the present level of practice, it is not clear whether the critics would agree with 
Habermas’s support to NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. Indeed, Habermas acknowledges that in 
the Kosovo case, NATO was imposing a liberal order. He notes that “after the failed negotiations 
at Rambouillet, they are conducting the threatened punishment strikes against Yugoslavia with 
the declared goal of implementing a liberal solution for the autonomy of Kosovo with Serbia.”291 
If that was the situation, was not his support a push for a liberal imperialism as a liberal order 
being imposed on another country? That is at least the opinion of Yordán who contends that 
Habermas believed that not only was the NATO’s intervention a turning point in the progress 
toward cosmopolitan law, but also an expansion of “the frontiers of the Western liberal-
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democratic order.”292 He argues that “this is supported by the fact that NATO’s members are 
democracies and that the organization’s action can only be taken if all members unanimously 
endorse them.”293 Yordán’s point is corroborated by the fact that Habermas supports that, in case 
of the absence of a UN leadership for humanitarian intervention, the neighboring democratic 
states should take the responsibility to intervene. As he says, “when there is no other way, 
democratic neighboring states must be permitted to intervene in emergency in accordance with 
customary international law.”294 Although Habermas does not make it a rule, but rather cautions 
that “in such cases the incompleteness of the cosmopolitan conditions demands exceptional 
sensitivity,”295 why are only the democratic states granted this right to intervene? By this, he 
posits democracy as the criterion for participating in the intervention, and not the simple fact of 
neighborhood. It would mean that, if there is an emergency in a certain part of the world where 
the neighboring countries are not democratic, they would have to fetch beyond the neighboring 
countries in order to find the democratic ones so that they can intervene. From this perspective, 
the critics might side with Yordán that “Habermas’s cosmopolitan ethics favours too strongly the 
Western liberal order.”296 
As to the labelling process, here also Habermas’s position might not deal properly with 
the critics of humanitarian intervention. Indeed, he endorses the gradation in legitimacy among 
states. According to him, “there exists a gradation in legitimacy between liberal, semi-
authoritarian and despotic member states, in spite of the formal equality enjoyed by all 
members.”297 He gives credit to Rawls for having raised this problem and seems to confirm the 
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legitimacy superiority “enjoyed by democratic countries.” That is the reason why, although this 
fact “hardly lends itself to formalization… customs and practices could develop that take account 
of it.” It is in this sense also that he calls for “the need to reform the veto rights of the permanent 
members of the Security Council.”298 The observation from this position is that this gradation is 
done from the liberal perspective, and no country judges itself authoritarian or despotic. 
Moreover, he assumes the superiority of democratic legitimacy and is pushing for its 
formalization to the point of even reforming the veto right. These points lead to the next question 
whether his normative justification of humanitarian intervention quenches the worries of its 
critics.  
As I have stated, Habermas shows that internal sovereignty has already been challenged 
by globalization that has undermined the states’ capacity to perform all their classical roles that 
justified their internal sovereignty. Moreover, he showed that the post-WW II international law 
based on UN Charter, conditions the principle of non-intervention by the prohibitions against 
aggressive war and the respect of human rights. From this normative point of view, Habermas’s 
justification seems to offer a way to respond to the critics of humanitarian intervention as a 
violation of the non-intervention principle, because it is already eroding through the growing 
interdependencies between states. Nonetheless, Habermas founds his normative justification of 
humanitarian intervention on the emergence of cosmopolitan law which is conceptualized from 
the experience of the constitutional state as it developed in the West. Even his three levels of 
reformulation of the Kantian project start from the liberal model of legitimation, and he limits the 
question of human rights to the supranational level where “the international community assumes 
institutional form in a world organization that has the ability to act in carefully circumscribed 
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policy field without itself.”299 From this point of view, it is not sure whether the cosmopolitan 
justification would not fall into the same accusation of promoting neocolonialism since it is 
promoting only the liberal order. Yordán, for instance, notes that “liberalism is an ideology that 
informs both emancipatory and imperial aspirations.” However, “peace-building missions have 
taken a role of neo-colonial character as international civilian administrators have assumed 
control over these war-torn societies.”300 
Even if we were to adopt Habermas’s model, it is not clear whether the monopolization 
of the humanitarian intervention by major powers would change, for the world organization 
would still depend on states to protect human rights. For, according to Habermas, “the world 
organization must be buttressed by power centers organized at the state level if it is to constitute 
the main pillar of a legal pacifism backed up by power.”301 States still play a role in “the 
cosmopolitan human rights regime that is capable of protecting individual citizens, if necessary 
even against their own government.”302 Now, it is an empirical fact that states are not equal. That 
is why the nation-states born of decolonization counted on the formal equality and the principle 
of non-intervention to survive. How then does the cosmopolitan law ensure them existence once 
these two pillars are undermined? How does it resolve the political realities that hamper the 
actual Security Council, which founds the fears of the critics of humanitarian intervention? At 
this point, one remembers Habermas’s observation that humanitarian intervention occurs because 
the state itself is scrambling due to civil war or other human rights violations. True, and the 
critics also acknowledge that there are instances of human violations that shock the conscience of 
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humanity. But the question of avoiding neocolonialism would be to have a neutral body that is 
not controlled by some states only, and it is not clear whether the cosmopolitan law addresses 
this worry satisfactorily. Habermas would respond that nation-states have to go through a 
learning process that consists in “internalizing the norms of world organization and acquiring the 
ability to pursue one’s interests by prudently merging into transnational networks.”303 This might 
be helpful, but transnational networks would also be marked by the weaknesses or strength of the 
composing states, and therefore they would not be shielded from neocolonialism.  
Furthermore, as the cosmopolitan law is thought from the liberal point of view, it would 
also be difficult to address the claim that humanitarian intervention is carried by the West taken 
as the international community. Indeed, it has already been underscored that humanitarian 
intervention would be justified from the liberal mode of legitimation that developed in the West, 
and therefore, the endorsement would be taxed to be Western. As he states, “the liberal type of 
constitution that limits the power of the state without constituting it… provides a conceptual 
model for a constitutionalization of international law in the form of a politically constituted 
world society without a world government.”304 It is from this liberal type that humanitarian 
intervention would be justified, and this is supported by the fact that Habermas’s discussion on 
the question of humanitarian intervention is very much focused on Europe and the United States. 
Moreover, the world organization that embodies the institutionalization of the international 
community does not specify the criteria for membership. Is it another one or does the actual UN 
fulfill that function? If it is another one fitting the liberal model, either Habermas would assume 
that states have already followed the democratic constitutional model, or he needs to justify why 
non-liberal states would accept the cosmopolitan law to justify humanitarian intervention.  
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Finally, it is not easy to respond to the claim that humanitarian intervention is only 
concerned with civil-political rights, without paying attention to the economic factors that may 
be the source of the need of intervention. Habermas leaves these questions to the transnational 
level,305 which is not concerned with human rights, and the cosmopolitan law is only concerned 
with civil rights. Therefore, it is clear that Habermas’s justification of humanitarian intervention 
would not offer a path to address this concern. 
In conclusion, while there are some points from Habermas’s justification of humanitarian 
intervention that might offer a way to respond to the challenge raised by its critics as a 
neocolonialism—such as the fact that globalization has affected the internal sovereignty— many 
other arguments go unanswered, because his normative ground is what the critics put into 
question, that is, the liberal cosmopolitan law that founds Habermas’s normative justification of 
humanitarian justification.  
Conclusion 
Habermas deploys a complex argument for human rights that he reconstructs from his 
discourse theory. While his system of rights is to constitute the core of the constitutional 
democracy, he also pays attention to the international human rights for a global society, 
especially when he is preoccupied by carrying forward the Kantian project of building a 
cosmopolitan law in which both states and individual citizens are subjects of international law. 
My interest in his theory of human rights was to look for responses to the challenges raised 
against human rights from both theoretical and practical grounds. Theoretically, they accuse of 
human rights to be another imperialist ideology, while human rights practice through 
humanitarian intervention is viewed as neocolonialism. If my reading of Habermas is plausible, 
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it turns out that it would not be easy to respond to those two challenges from his perspective, 
according the reasons that I have developed.  
Having considered the two major sources of contemporary political and social theory 
with only limited success, in the next chapter, I draw from them and other theories and try to 
suggest a response to these challenges. The result cannot be presumed until the task is complete.   
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Chap. 5. Conceiving Human Rights from Local Practices 
 
It is men and women working ‘out there’ who spread and 
protect human rights 
Mathews Davies  
 
5.0. Introduction 
It might be relevant to recapitulate our journey so far. My project is to respond to the 
theoretical and practical challenges posed to the contemporary human rights movement by 
claiming that it is an imperialist ideology propagating a liberal culture, while its implementation 
through humanitarian intervention is seen as a new colonialism. It is in that regard that the first 
and second chapters focused on the elaboration of these points, raising the arguments put 
forward in a rather neutral way, since I exposed them without taking a position, except 
underlying that they are so strong that they undermine the legitimacy of human rights discourse 
and practice and, therefore, have to be taken seriously by any philosophical inquiry on human 
rights. In searching for a philosophical response to them, I resorted to Rawls’s and Habermas’s 
conceptions of human rights1 in chapter three and four, and confronted them to these challenges. 
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(Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), especially, chap. 17; and his 
Development as Freedom (N.Y: Anchor Books;1999); Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human 
Development: The Capability Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), especially pp. 
96-101. I chose the two authors because it is my conviction that they are the most influential thinkers in 
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satisfy the challenges presented here, and on this point I concur to their critique by Charles Beitz in his 
The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), especially chaps. 3-4, 
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The result is less than satisfactory and that is why the object of the present chapter is to look for 
another philosophical response. 
Methodologically, the chapter builds on the practices of human rights in local instances, 
where different actors are involved as they invoke human rights in their daily struggles against 
injustices and oppression. That is why it draws from social anthropology, international relations 
and international law literature concerned with the translation and domestication of international 
norms into local contexts, with my case focusing on human rights. In this sense, I am not 
primarily concerned with the universality of human rights; rather, I assume their origin to be 
Western. For, although many scholars such as Lauren contend2 that human rights find origin in 
different cultures, it can hardly be argued that the contemporary human rights movement does 
not find its origin in the Western political and social philosophy influenced by the technological 
and cultural, and social changes.3 As the UNESCO commission already observed at the moment 
of drafting the UDHR, despite this apparent long history of human rights that can be traced in all 
traditions, “the history of declarations of human rights…is short and its beginnings are to be 
found in the West in the British Bill of Rights and the American and French Declarations of 
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Interpretation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949), p. 260, and Jozeph Runzo et ali., ed. Human Rights 
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The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010).  
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Rights formulated in the seventeenth and eighteenth century.”4 And this is the history that led to 
the actual human rights regime. In other words, while it is true that one can find ethical 
justifications of human rights in different traditions, it is right to say that “our modern conception 
of rights, wherever in the world it may be voiced, is predominantly European in origin.”5 
Another argument for claiming human rights as non-Western is based on the actors who 
framed it, be they states or the commissioners who drafted the UDHR.6 For instance, Susan 
Waltz argues that “a wide range of participants outside the Western bloc made significant 
contributions to the construction of the most elemental international standard of human rights.”7 
To respond to this claim, apart from the fact that by the time of drafting the UDHR many of the 
contemporary states were still under colonial rule, even the non-Western individuals present on 
different committees were intellectually and academically formed in the Western culture, and the 
South American countries were very much influenced by the liberal culture.8 Even the so-called 
second and third generations of human rights were inspired by philosophies developed in the 
West and were responding to Western political and social conditions. Hence, as Abdullahi 
Ahmed An-Na’im states, “the ‘representatives’ of non-Western countries may have been more 
representative of Western cultural perspectives than their own.”9 For these reasons, the 
conception of human rights I build on local practices does not presuppose that human rights are 
universal. Rather, it assumes that the origin of the human rights movement is Western. The 
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6 For a thorough analysis, see Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Glendon, ibid. 
7 Susan Waltz, “Universalizing Human Rights: the Role of Small States in the Construction of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights” in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 1, 2001, 50. 
8 See Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 119.  
9 An-Na’im, “Problems of Universal…” p. 346. This is a commonplace view, especially from the Third World 
scholars. As one examples among many, see Boaventura de Sousa Santos, “Toward a Multicultural Conception of 
Human Rights” in Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol (Ed.), Moral Imperialism: A Critical Anthology 
(N.Y/London: N. Y. University Press, 2002), 45-5.  
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conception I am looking for will have to answer the question how such a particular view of 
human rights can be applied in other cultural settings without endorsing an imperialist ideology 
or lending support to the imperialistic use of human rights. That is the goal of this chapter, which 
will then be able to respond to the theoretical and practical challenges posed to the human rights 
discourse.  
Thus, this chapter will have four main parts. Since the approach I will be developing goes 
in the same line of what Charles Beitz has called a “practical conception” of human rights—
because I am also looking for a conception that draws from the practice of human rights at local 
level—in the first point, I expose and discuss Beitz’s conception of human rights. The second 
points elaborates the conception of human rights from the local practices, whereas in the third 
section, I confront this new conception to the theoretical challenge in order to show how 
satisfactory it stands the ground. Finally, in the fourth and last section, I check weather from this 
new conception, there is a possibility of justifying humanitarian intervention and if yes, under 
which conditions.  
5.1. Human Rights as an Emerging Global Practice 
a). Common Skepticisms about Human Rights 
Charles Beitz is among the thinkers who interpret human rights from a political 
perspective following the role they play in the global public discourse. As he acknowledges it, 
his book The Idea of Human Rights “is a contribution to the political theory of human rights,” 
which represent “the articulation in the public morality of world politics of the idea that each 
person is a subject of global concern.”10 Beitz seems to believe that human rights have become 
the moral language of the global society, although it does not follow that the idea of human 
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rights is “any more clear what kind of objects human rights are supposed to be, why we should 
believe that people have them, or what follows from this belief for political practice.”11 That is 
why his enterprise to consider anew human rights is based on several forms of skepticism vis-à-
vis human rights. The first skepticism is about the enforcement of human rights as they stand 
today. As Beitz notes, “some philosophers believe it is part of the idea of a right that there should 
be some mechanism in place for its effective enforcement.”12 Yet, some of the rights stated in the 
major treaties do not have effective enforcement. Hence, the second form of skepticism is 
deduced from the former as it seems clear that some rights cannot be satisfied in the existing 
conditions or in a near future. Further forms of skepticism arise from the question of human 
rights universality. Are they applicable to everyone and can everybody claim them? This form of 
skepticism raises the question of human rights validity across different cultural and moral 
spectra. Finally, there is the fifth form of skepticism stemming from the historical fact that 
human rights treaties are mostly a fruit of Western great powers.  
Beitz believes that it is not enough to refute and dismiss these forms of skepticism 
facilely. Hence before he builds his own theory of human as a global practice, he discusses these 
different forms of skepticism arising from the different theories of human rights, showing their 
merits and their shortcomings, and his approach of human rights as practice is supposed to be “a 
constructive explanation of the subject matter that causes the force of skepticism doubts to 
weaken.”13 As a consequence, his practical approach aims at two particular families of theory—
what he calls the naturalistic and agreements theories—calling “into question the familiar 
conceptions –the idea of human rights as entitlements that belong to people ‘by nature’ or 
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‘simply in virtue of their humanity’ and the distinct idea of human rights as objects of 
agreements among diverse moral and political cultures.”14 
b). Critiques of the Common Theories of Human Rights 
Beitz’s own theory as well as those he criticizes try to address multiple problems linked 
to the interpretation and justification of human rights such as their nature, their normative scope, 
their universality, their capacity to guide action or their validity when they encounter the ethical 
pluralism that is characteristic of international human rights. After devoting two chapters (3-4) to 
these naturalistic and agreement theories, Beitz concludes that they “distorts our perception of 
the human rights of international doctrine.” According to him “we do better to approach human 
rights practically, not as the application of an independent philosophical idea to the international 
realm, but as a political doctrine constructed to play a certain role in global political life.”15 Now, 
how do these two theories distort our philosophical understanding of human rights? 
From a naturalistic perspective, “human rights ‘are rights possessed by all humans (at all 
times and all places), simply in virtue of their humanity’.”16 Beitz analyses these natural rights 
under four banners. Sometimes, they are viewed as independent of social moral conventions and 
positive law; while other times they are conceived as pre-institutional. Or, they are supposed to 
be “possessed by all persons ‘at all times and in all places’;” or they “belong to persons ‘as 
such’.”17 Beitz is convinced that the naturalistic views “are more restrictive as to the content and 
basis of human rights than they might at first appear.”18 Concerning the first feature, he concedes 
that human rights can be considered as natural rights when they are considered as standards for 
positive law, but they differ from natural rights because the former cannot have only one 
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justificatory source as the latter do. In other words, human rights share with the natural rights 
their critical capability, in the sense of being context-independent. However, they diverge on the 
fact that natural rights seem to have one foundational moral source of justification, while human 
rights accepts a pluralistic justification. Concerning the second feature of natural rights as pre-
institutional, the naturalistic conception reduces the core of international human rights which is 
based on the fact that the individual is already in society. For that reason international human 
rights cannot be assimilated to natural rights. This provides a way to the third element of natural 
rights which asserts the validity of human rights “at all times and in all places.” Beitz argues that 
international human rights cannot be valid the same way “in all places and at all times” because, 
not only human rights are historically situated, but also they adapt to the changes affecting 
societies, and these changes affect also the content of human rights.  
As to the fourth feature of considering the person “as such”, Beitz distinguishes two 
sides: the demand side and the supply side. The demand side is related to the notions of 
personhood and capabilities theory. Both perspectives are “grounded on one or a few values we 
might call ‘basic human interest’,” and share “the belief that the nature and content of human 
rights at the most fundamental level can be apprehended without any reference to the role of 
human rights in global political life.”19 Nevertheless, Beitz thinks that these views offer a shaky 
basis for accounting for the nature of international human rights. The first limitation he identifies 
is that these views neglect the actual human rights practice in the international arena. Secondly, 
in not taking into account the present international practice, Beitz argues that they fail to address 
some of the important concerns of human rights protection, one of them being the contribution of 
external action in protecting human rights when the domestic agent does not fulfill its duty. 
Thirdly, because they derive the list of human rights from their philosophical theory, there is a 
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risk that the normative content of their list is shorter that the international human rights. 
Fourthly, the naturalistic theories assumes a certain normative superiority vis-à-vis the 
international human rights, for “when there are discrepancies between international doctrine and 
the most persuasive naturalistic theory, then the theorist must hold that there is at least prima 
facie reason to reform international doctrine.”20 These objections allow the author to assert the 
basic distinction between naturalistic theory and international human rights: the former have one 
source of justification, while the latter have various justifications. Hence this question affirming 
his new direction as different from naturalistic one: “Why should we insist that international 
human rights conform to a received philosophical conception rather than interpret them, as they 
present themselves, as a distinct normative system constructed to play a certain special role in 
global political life?”21 
Turning to the supply side, which is about the “agent(s) for whom human rights are 
supposed to provides reasons for action,”22 Beitz discusses Hart’s distinction of “general” and 
specific rights. This conception of “human rights as general rights” based on freedom, does not 
convince Beitz for the same reason of assuming one source of human rights. In Beitz’s words, 
“the underlying view about the grounds of general rights might seem to rule out without 
argument the possibility that we can have general rights based on other considerations than the 
value of freedom.”23 Moreover, this conception takes for granted that “any right that can properly 
be said to belong to human beings ‘as such’ must be natural…The reasons to contribute to its 
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satisfaction derive from considerations of humanity independently of people’s social relations. 
But it is not at all obvious that we are compelled to make such an assumption.”24 
In conclusion, Beitz reaffirms the point that international human rights are an emerging 
practice with plurality of justifications and this was intended as such by the framers. Specifically, 
they avoided to conflate them with natural rights so that they do not become self-justificatory. As 
he puts it, “it was intended from the outset to afford common grounds for political action to 
persons situated in cultures with differing moral traditions and political values. It was explicitly 
agreed by the framers, as a general matter, that international doctrine should not embrace its own 
justification, and in particular that it should not presuppose that human rights are ‘natural’.”25 
Concerning the agreement theories, Beitz argues that they are the fruit of reflection of the 
legal and social diversity that surround human rights. Taking into account that diversity, “these 
theories conceptualize human rights as standards that are or might be objects of agreement 
among members of cultures whose moral and political values are in various respect dissimilar.”26 
Beitz responds to such views by showing that international human rights were not conceived as 
“a culturally or politically ecumenical or syncretistic position.”27 He indicates that the 
proponents of agreement theories struggle to establish values that can be cross-culturally 
accepted as human rights, and those that are to be discarded. Beitz identifies two approaches in 
the agreement theories. First, there are those who advance a common core and an overlapping 
consensus. By common core of human rights, Beitz refers to Michael Walzer’s notion of “the 
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moral minimum,” constituting “a set of standards to which all societies can be held.”28 For Beitz, 
this version of the agreement theory suffers the characteristic limitation of this philosophical 
category of theories, because it would end up excluding some important human rights norms 
enshrined in the international instruments. As to the notion of overlapping consensus29 which 
may seem much broader than the common core, it relies, on the one hand, on human rights as 
norms for a globalized world distinct from other moral, religious, philosophical and cultural 
values. On the other hand, based on the purpose of these global norms, the overlapping 
consensus version assumes that it would be reasonable for different comprehensive doctrines—to 
use Ralws’s vocabulary—to endorse them from their respective perspectives. But, according to 
Beitz, this view is also restrictive and, therefore, it is not obvious whether it “would be more 
successful than a common-core view in accommodating such evidently controversial rights as 
those to freedom of religious practice, democratic political institutions, or the legal equality of 
women.”30 Beitz is also afraid that reducing human rights to what cultures can agree on would 
deprive human rights of their critical force. As for those who base their critique of the 
effectiveness of human rights on the cultural agreement, Beitz opposes them with an empirical 
observation that the actual ineffectiveness of human rights is not due to the lack of agreement 
about the present international doctrine of human rights. It is, rather, caused by the absence of 
political will, which should find “a different explanation.”31 
The second version of agreement theories is what Beitz calls progressive convergence, 
designating the conceptions held by authors like Charles Taylor’s unforced consensus, An-
Na’im’s evolutionary interpretation and Joshua Cohen’s justificatory minimalism. This approach 
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envisions “an intercultural agreement as arising, not from the actual content of existing moral 
cultures, but instead from the contents of these cultures as they msight develop or evolve under 
pressures for adaptive reinterpretation.”32 For Beitz, the progressive convergence aims at 
showing that certain elements of international human rights play a justificatory role for different 
comprehensive doctrines; that is, human rights can be reached from the different worldviews 
even when, presently, human rights are not yet found in them. After a thorough discussion of 
pros and cons of this approach, Beitz is not convinced by it. He argues that it is a based on “a 
hypothesis of moral progress” that is difficult to verify whether it becomes true. In such a 
situation, the only way remaining for the progressive convergence is the hope for the success of 
the international human rights regime as worldviews would evolve as a response to social 
changes. “But such a basis for hope would not satisfy the aspiration that…human rights should 
be recognizable as common concern among all the world’s cultures.” Therefore, “the 
straightforward interpretation of that thought is one we might better simply give up.”33 
Unsatisfied with the existing philosophical theories on the nature and meaning of human 
rights, Beitz prefers a fresh start. 
c). The Two Level-Model 
Beitz understands human rights mostly as those norms contained in the Bill of Rights and 
the core documents of international human rights, although he also mentions the treatises 
regarding human rights at the regional level.34 He describes human rights as a normative practice 
of global scope, concerned with the protection of individuals “against the consequences of 
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certain actions and omissions of their governance.”35 This description already highlights three 
important elements. First, the nature and scope of human rights, again not from a theoretical 
point of view, but rather from their function. They are a normative practice on a global scale. 
Second, the description identifies the object of human rights: they are meant to protect 
individuals. In asserting the individuals as the center of international human rights, Beitz follows 
the liberal heritage and contends that group rights are conceivable only as much as the group 
benefits the individuals. In the contrary case, groups as such cannot be the subject of human 
rights. In his own words, “if there is such a thing as ‘group interest’ which is non-individualistic, 
in the sense that its importance cannot be seen as deriving from the interests of individual 
members of the group, then, if we were to accept the two-level model, we could not say that such 
an interest could be protected by a human right.”36 Put otherwise, groups rights are conceived as 
serving an individualistic interest. Finally, Beitz’s description of human rights as a normative 
global practice designates the government, through its action or omission, as the source of the 
dangers that human rights conjure. I later return to these elements; for now, I focus on the main 
argument of his conception of human rights as a global normative practice.  
Beitz notes that this practice plays a discursive and political role, because it regulates 
normatively the behavior of states, and at the same time, it offers ways to criticize the violations 
of these norms. That is why Beitz’s endeavor is to derive the concept of human rights from the 
role they play in this practice. Hence, his approach is practical, because it constructs the idea of 
human rights by taking them as they are in their international instruments, instead of conceiving 
a theory that claims authority over the existent international human rights treaties. This practice 
is characterized by two main features. First, the fact that the norms are widely recognized does 
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not mean that there is an agreement on their content. Put otherwise, the practice is not a result of 
the agreement about the content or the practical implication of these norms. Rather, the practice 
is constituted “by acceptance of a distinctive class of norms as sources of reasons.”37 This feature 
underlines the discursive role of human rights in the global practice. Secondly and as a 
consequence of the first feature, Beitz characterizes the practice as emergent, to mean that, 
contrary to mature social practices which gather consensus about the action to take within the 
community when there is failure, there is no agreement about the components of human rights. 
As emergent, human rights practice is still evolving in terms of defining and fixing its nature, 
content and scope. Hence, its salient features are the “normative breadth, the heterogeneity of the 
institutional requirements of its constitutive norms, the dynamic character of the practice’s 
normative content, and the variety of paradigms of political action that might be understood as 
justified in response to infringements.”38 
Nevertheless, although emergent, Beitz argues that his practical approach is more than 
just a notice of the existence of the practice. It also bears “a certain authority in guiding our 
thinking about the nature of human rights.”39 More importantly, the emergent practice relies on 
the idea that states are the primary agent responsible for respecting, protecting and fulfilling 
human rights for their people, and if or when they fail, an external action, either to remedy or to 
prevent, might be justified. This is a key element for Beitz’s practical approach because his two-
level model dubbed “a fresh start” is built on this central role played by states in the practice of 
human rights.  
Beitz’s fresh start takes inspiration from Rawls’s conception of human rights presented in 
The Law of People. According to Beitz, human rights for Rawls are part of the public reason for 
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the well-ordered Peoples, that is, the liberal-democratic and decent peoples, with states as a 
political model. For that reason, human rights have four characteristics. First, they are “a special 
class of urgent rights” whose violation calls for condemnation from the well-ordered Peoples. 
Second, they constitute a list of what Rawls calls “human rights proper” that is shorter than the 
rights anchored in the international doctrine. Third, the world society includes other states 
labelled “outlaw states” in addition to the liberal and decent ones. Fourth, human rights show 
their political importance by playing a “‘special role’ in the public reason of the Society of 
Peoples.”40 These four elements underscore the discursive and political role of human rights in 
the global practice. In that sense, Beitz’s practical conception of human rights follows Rawls. 
However, despite the advantage of this view, Beitz finds that Rawls’s “understanding of the 
functions of human rights is narrower than what is found in present international practice.”41 
That is why Beitz sets for a new conception and new model of human rights as a global practice, 
that is, a practical conception which is different from both the naturalistic and agreements 
theories.  
As already stated, the practical approach construes the conception of human rights by 
looking at the doctrine and the practice of human rights as they are contained in the international 
politics. It does not have to go outside the international practice to define the nature and the 
content of human rights, but rather considers what is called human rights in the international 
instruments as its sole source. It does not rely on a transcendental source of rights from which 
human rights would be deduced or evaluated, nor does it assume human rights to be common to 
all moral universes or reachable from all worldviews. On the contrary, the practical approach 
considers “the functional role of human rights in international discourse as basic: it constrains 
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our conception of a human right from the start.”42 This is definitely a departure from the 
naturalistic and agreement theories, at least methodologically. Human rights practice is 
conceived as sui generis for understanding its nature and content. Instead of looking outside its 
practice, one looks at the practice in its discursive role, and constructs a conception.  
This methodological difference, added to the other differentiations developed so far, 
allows Beitz to build his practical conception that he calls a “two-level model,” which is founded 
on the “division of labor between states as the bearers of the primary responsibilities to respect 
and protect human rights and the international community and those acting as its agents as the 
guarantors of these responsibilities.”43 In other words, for Beitz, an international practice of 
human rights involves primarily states, and then the international community. That is why his 
model is a two-level one, because it assigns responsibilities to these two actors in the 
international human rights practice. Thus, founded on the definition of human rights as 
“requirements whose object is to protect urgent individual interests against predictable dangers 
(‘standard threats’) to which they are vulnerable under typical circumstances of life in a modern 
world order of states,”44 the first-level of the model asserts that “human rights apply in the first 
instance to the political institutions of states, including their constitutions, laws, and public 
policies,” while the second-level restates that “human rights are matters of international 
concern,”45 that is, the international community has a role to play when states fail their 
responsibilities with regard to human rights. For Beitz, the first-level model implies three 
requirements: first, it means that states have to respect human rights in their official business; 
second, states have the obligation to protect human rights against threats from non-states agents 
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that are under their jurisdiction; third, they have the duty to aid the victims who are deprived 
unwillingly of human rights. As to the second level, the international community plays a 
vicarious role; it is called to act only when the primary responsible agents, that is, states, fail 
their duties to respect and protect human rights for the individuals living under their jurisdiction. 
For that reason, (a) the international community is required to supervise states’ performance in 
the protection of human rights; (b) when a state falls short from fulfilling its responsibility 
because of lack of means, other states and non-states actors “with means to act effectively have 
pro tanto reasons” to help such a state; and (c) if a state refuses to act according to human rights 
standards, external actors—states and non-states—who are willing and able, “have pro tanto 
reasons to interfere” in such a state in order to protect human rights.46 In other words, Beitz 
follows Rawls in affirming that non-respecting human rights is a good reason for intervention in 
order to protect human rights. For Beitz, however, this external interference is not limited to 
humanitarian intervention as defined in chapter two as a military intervention. He rather 
understands it in a broader sense—as does Rawls also—including diplomatic and economic 
means, and the armed intervention would be required in some cases.  
Beitz anticipates some possible objections to his conception, one of them being that such 
a conception does not convincingly show in which sense human rights are rights, since it only 
assigns a pro tanto reason to unspecified external actors; and yet, if human rights are universal, 
they have to be linked to a clear universal obligation. To this objection, Beitz responds that his 
two-level model interprets the discursive practice of human rights as it stands in contemporary 
doctrine, and that there are no clear criteria of when and how external action is to be carried out 
in case of the failure of states’ institutions to protect human rights. From that perspective, human 
rights are rather “aspirational” in their application, but that does not deter their discursive role. 
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Like the manifesto rights, they still guide our action-thinking in the absence of clear duties 
assigned to designated persons. Another objection is related to the place that he gives to states 
acting individually or collaboratively to protect human rights. Beitz acknowledges that it is not 
always clear that states are the best candidates for protecting human rights, nor is it obvious 
whether they perform better when they do. However, it is a fact that all human rights treaties rely 
on states as the primary responsible agent for implementing them. In that sense, he follows the 
step of international law informing human rights law. The last objection he considers is the role 
he attributes to human rights for justifying the interference. Beitz answers that this “interfering-
justifying role of human rights” conveys the international concern for human rights. And indeed, 
if human rights do not supply justifying reasons for interfering into an individual state that fails 
its responsibility to respect, protect and fulfill human rights, then the second-level of his model 
would not have its place, and the understanding of human rights as a global practice would not 
hold. Hence, for Beitz, human rights as “matter of international concern” is interpreted through 
“the interference-justifying role” they play in this global discursive practice.47 
d). Beitz and the Challenges to Human Rights 
I observed in the introduction to this chapter that the idea of human rights I am tracing 
follows Beitz’s footsteps since the goal is to look at the practice and construct a conception of 
human rights. Now that I have exposed his practical conception of human rights, it befits to 
examine whether we can respond satisfactorily the challenges I am philosophically addressing. 
However, before engaging in that examination, there are some remarks about his practical 
conception, which has a lot of merit, but also raises several questions. One of its advantages is 
the insistence that human rights practice accepts different sources of justification. This opens up 
a real possibility of understanding human rights practice in different cultural settings. The second 
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merit is the highlighting of the fact that the mechanism of implementing human rights is not 
merely juridical. The latter is just one among other ways which can even be outside a state’s 
controlled channels. On this point too, Beitz disentangles human rights from the legalistic 
conception, which emphasizes the juridical side of human rights to the detriment of other means 
of implementation. The third advantage is methodological. Looking at the practice itself in order 
to grasp the nature and content of human rights is an innovative way to approach human rights, 
opening the venue for talking about the human rights doctrine as a whole, instead of imposing a 
preconceived philosophical theory which, at the end, cannot account for all human rights as they 
presently exist internationally, and therefore has to declare some rights to be “more rights” or 
“proper rights” than others.  
However, despise these positive points of the practical conception of human rights, it also 
raises some questions. To begin with, Beitz plays down the fact of human rights historicity. He 
seems to assume that because it is a global practice, human rights do not carry the Western 
imprint especially that, for him, the framers did not wish them to be self-justifying. According to 
him, “the drafters represented not only different countries, but also different religious and 
philosophical traditions and political positions.”48 I have already demonstrated that, not only did 
not the different commissioners represent all traditions (what was quite impossible), but also 
most of them were educated in the Western culture. In other words, although coming from 
different areas and views, they represented the same tradition, i.e, Western. Moreover, to 
represent different background does not exclude having the same underlying source of 
inspiration. Johannes Morsink shows, for instance, that, although the UN representatives dropped 
any transcendent source, “nonetheless the debate on Article 1 does show that they looked upon 
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most of the rights in the Declaration as grounded in human nature.”49 According to the same 
author, the conflictual debate about the weight of new rights was due to the doubts that they be 
deduced directly “from human nature.”50 
In sum, I agree with Beitz that human rights can (and should) have a variety of sources of 
justifications,51 but this does not erase the Western fingerprint on them, and their liberal flavor. 
Beitz expresses this liberal dimension in his individualistic conception of human rights which 
creates conflict with the group rights. As he admits it himself, group rights are justified only 
relative to the protection and fulfillment of individual’s human rights. Otherwise, there could not 
be such a thing as group interest protected by a human right. However, today, thanks to the 
international human rights movement, we have a UN Declaration on the Rights for Indigenous 
Peoples considered as group, although the Declaration also adds the individual: “Indigenous 
peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights 
and fundamental freedoms as recognized in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and international human rights law.”52 Beitz might respond to this 
critique arguing that his approach focuses on the doctrine enshrined in the Bill of Rights and the 
Core conventions; a fair point that might even be an answer to the worry of human rights 
inflation.53 While a good answer, it would rather underline another limit to Beitz’s description of 
the practice itself. Indeed, although a Declaration such as this on Indigenous Peoples’ rights is 
not legally binding, it constitutes a moral source of inspiration and action-guiding for those who 
are involved in advancing the cause of Indigenous peoples. Put otherwise, limiting human rights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Johannes Morsink, “The Philosophy of the Universal Declaration” in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.6, 
No. 3, 1984, 333. 
50 Ibid., 334.  
51 Allen Buchanan also develops a pluralistic justification methodology. See The Heart of Human Rights, pp. 43, 67. 
52 UN, 2007, article 1. Emphasis added.  
53 See Brian Orend, Human Rights: Concept and Context (New York: Broadview Press, 2002). 
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practice to the legally binding instruments only is to cut off many other human rights means that 
are equally effective.  
This observation leads to the way Beitz describes the whole human rights phenomenon as 
a normative global practice. Looking at human rights practice as it stands today, Beitz leaves 
aside many important actors and instruments that are on the forefront of the human rights battle. 
With the slowness of the international mechanism for protecting human rights, regional bodies 
for human rights have become the main mechanism for fulfilling human rights promise. The best 
example is the European Union which has championed the enforcement of human rights, making 
it a condition for each member beyond national borders.54 Beitz mentions them once in a while55 
but he does not assign them a place in his model. Perhaps they are included in the second level of 
his model, but he does mention it. And here also arises another question, related to this second 
level. He speaks of international community or “appropriately placed outside agents”56 who 
might have pro tanto reason to intervene when a particular state fails its mission to respect and 
protect human rights. However, he does not suggest a mechanism of designating those 
appropriately nor does he refer explicitly to the UN bodies or other international mechanisms 
such as the different committees related to the different instruments. Perhaps the regional bodies 
could fit into these “appropriately placed outside agents” but it would have been clearer to name 
them.  
More importantly though, Beitz’s two-level model does not accommodate the key players 
in the practices of human rights, that is, the non-states actors, both individuals and NGOs. Yet, 
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they are present at each level of the making of human rights treaties.57 They are at the origin of 
the whole human rights movement, from its inception, through its drafting, signing and 
ratification to the monitoring of implementation. Beitz himself recognizes it when he shows that 
the transnational human movement was borne out of the actions of different international 
organizations such as La fédération internationale des droits de l’homme or l’académie 
diplomatique internationale.58 Nevertheless, Beitz’s model does not assign them a visible role.  
One might want to salvage Beitz by reminding that his second-level model includes non-
states actors into those who may have pro tanto reason to intervene in a case of a state’s failure 
vis-à-vis human rights. This is true until one recalls that Beitz insists that state is the primary 
agent of satisfying human rights requirements. That is why at the first-level, he does not include 
non-states actors, both individuals and organizations, although he acknowledges that domestic 
processes of contestation and agitations “are of substantial and probably increasing significance 
as mechanisms for implementing human rights.” He however excludes them because “they do 
not fit within the conventional categories of compulsion and inducement,” therefore “they are not 
accurately understood as external efforts to intervene or impose in a recalcitrant local culture.”59 
In other words, the only non-states that are accepted are external and even here, with a 
conception so much centered on the state, one wonders whether by non-states actors Beitz is 
thinking of activists or INGOs; these also do not fit into the “conventional categories of 
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compulsion and inducement.” He might rather be thinking of inter-states organizations or 
coalitions. Actually this is the case because he asserts that “states are the principal guarantors of 
the human rights performance of other states, both through their collaborative activities in 
international organizations and by unilateral action.”60 In other words, his model does not 
incorporate activists and NGOs, because it is state-centered. This point gives a way to the last 
question I now evoke.  
That Beitz’s practical conception relies so heavily on states as primary responsible for 
respecting human rights with such a confidence only because human rights treaties make them 
so, is a little bit puzzling. Indeed, scholars such as Micheline Ishay underline the paradox that 
human rights treaties make states responsible for protecting human rights while states are the 
main violators of rights, and therefore the same treaties are actually supposed to protect 
individuals from states.61 Other scholars like Amartya Sen consider states as an impediment to, 
rather than a proponent of, the advancement of the human rights cause.62 As for Kerri Woods,63 
he notes how the state-centered conception is problematic especially when confronted with failed 
states. To whom do these failed states’ peoples turn for the protection of their rights? To other 
states, one would guess. But then how will other states be able to intervene in such a context 
without being accused of neocolonialism?  
Beitz seems not to take into consideration these facts about states in their relationship to 
human rights. Again the reason is that human rights treaties make states the first responsible for 
human rights. But this is only for the Covenants and Conventions as they are supposed to be 
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61 Ishay, ibid., 8.  
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legally binding. Therefore, states are made the primary responsible for human rights because 
they make treaties, and not because of their capability or willingness to bear the beacon of 
human rights. Hence I have already observed that the human rights movement includes more 
than just the legal binding instruments, such as different declarations. Considering declarations, 
since all the subsequent human rights instrument are rooted in the UDHR, states lose their 
prominent role as the modern nation-state is completely ignored. The UDHR resorts to general 
terms such as: “all”, “everyone”, “all peoples”, “no one” and so on, as responsible for the 
fulfillment of these rights. This fact leads Morsink to remark that the drafters were more 
cosmopolitanists rather than internationalists, the UDHR being “resoundingly silent on the role 
of the modern nation-states, a fact that speaks against the prevailing internationalist 
interpretation of the documents.”64 That the UDHR became a source of legal documents and has 
itself gained a legal status without being based on states’ agreement illustrates that states are only 
one among many actors that are called upon to advance the cause of human rights.  
Another reason for which Beitz founds his model on states is the international fact that 
the global world is politically organized into states. While this is true, it does not follow that in a 
world politically organized differently rather than through states, human rights would disappear. 
Beitz might respond that such a political reconfiguration would require a reconceptualization of 
human rights. That might be a good answer but then it weakens his practical conception, which 
would call for another one that can sustain the justification of human rights through the global 
political transformations. In fact, his assumption that states are the primary agent responsible for 
human rights becomes problematic when one looks at the entire practice of human rights 
including states and states organizations and coalitions, as well as non-states actors such as 
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activists and NGOs, both international and local. Indeed, one discovers that states are the least 
interested in the human rights project per se. Without the actions of these non-states actors, 
few—if any—treaties would be drafted, signed and ratified, let alone implemented. They are the 
ones who draft the instruments, who lobby states to sponsor the texts, and they will be the one 
who will pressure states to ratify them after they have ceremoniously signed them,65 and they 
will spend their whole life making sure those texts are implemented by states.66 Even the 
international concern expressed through the interference-justifying role of human rights would 
not function without the tremendous works of NGOs, both locally and internationally.67 
All these remarks concur to the conclusion that states are not the only subject of 
international morality, at least with regards to the global human rights practice, and they should 
motivate us for another practical conception of human rights that takes into account all these 
parameters. However, I am not concerned with a conception of human rights per se, but rather, a 
conception that could respond satisfactorily to the challenges elaborated in the first two chapters. 
Despite these questions arising from Beitz’s practical approach, it remains to be seen whether it 
can address them, a task if well performed would alleviate our burden of looking for another 
conception of human rights.  
Beitz discusses the political and cultural critiques of human rights and its practice as 
pathologies to the human rights doctrine, making a parallelism between these critiques and the 
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critique of nineteenth century international law.68 The same way the latter was used to advance 
the civilizing mission, the same is said about human rights, which were supposed to correct these 
pathologies, and yet its practice becomes pathological. He argues that the critiques have an 
empirical and normative claim. The empirical one is related to the objection that human rights 
are Western in origin and that determines their natures and their content. Beitz supports the usual 
reply that not all human rights are Western, because human rights related to physical security, 
material goods or essential freedoms are not particular to the West. If one takes these claims 
abstractly and at their empiric value, one would agree with Beitz. However, when political and 
cultural critics insist on the Western origin of human rights as having impact on the nature and 
content, they convey the fact that these abstract claims carry a Western interpretation. In that 
sense, what was a simple empirical claim raises to the status of a normative one; for if we claim 
that they are not just Western, it means they are found in other cultural universes. Yet, there is 
conflict, for instance between the human rights to physical security and the way it is culturally 
understood. The physical security is to be protected by the articles 6 of the ICCPR, which affirms 
the right to life. It is aspirational as to the death penalty, but at its fifth part, this article states that 
death penalty cannot be imposed to a pregnant woman or a child; that is, a person of less than 18 
years. Childhood and adulthood are defined differently across cultures. The generalization of 
adulthood at 18 years old is definitely a Western notion. Another article related to the physical 
security is the article 7 of ICCPR, related to physical integrity, protecting the individual against 
torture or cruel treatment. In its first article, CAT states,  
for the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him 
or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed 
or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason 
based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or 
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with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does 
not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. 
 
One might think that this is so obvious, but several scholars contend that, even in the 
West, the notion of cruelty is linked to the change of attitude toward pain,69 the attitude toward 
one’s body, the change of the political role played by cruel punishment and other social changes 
that impacted moral behavior. As Hunt observes, “legally sanctioned torture did not end just 
because the judges gave up on it or because Enlightenment writers eventually opposed it.”70 That 
was not the case. “Torture ended because the traditional framework of pain and personhood fell 
apart, to be replaced, bit by bit, by a new framework, in which individuals owned their bodies, 
had rights to their separateness and to bodily inviolability, and recognized in other people the 
same passions, sentiments, and sympathies as in themselves.”71 This is to say that, even the 
human rights that are not particularly Western considered abstractly, their epistemological and 
moral backgrounds are Western and bear on how they are understood and applied. That is why 
and when they enter into conflict with other cultures which, obviously, have their own 
understanding and moral content of physical security different from this one. For example, John 
Gitlitz72 reports a case of Peruvian peasants who had to confront their practices for punishing 
criminals in their community with the introduction of human rights. While they did not consider 
as cruel the treatment of the suspected persons, although it was physically harmful, the 
community had to learn a new language of human rights that brings a new way of looking at 
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physical treatment. All were not happy about the new language, but others appreciated this new 
way of dealing with crimes. As to the human rights to material goods, it is hardly contestable that 
the underlying philosophy beneath the economic and social rights are the right to private 
property and the right to privacy, and the rights designed to correct the pathologies of a modern 
society based on capitalism and technology.73 This underlines the individualistic tone of the 
international human rights instruments. This being the case, these are definitely Western; one 
cannot easily discard these claims.  
The point of this development is to show that what Beitz considers to be a simple 
“inflated” empirical claim, the claim that the Western origin of human rights has impact on their 
nature and content, carries a certain normative weight. This bridges the normative dimension of 
these critiques recognized by Beitz, that is, the “moral imperialism” that can characterize the 
application of human rights, if not as a whole, at least part of it. As he draws a parallelism 
between nineteenth century international law and today’s human rights, Beitz acknowledges that 
such a critique should be taken seriously. However, he does not think that it affects the human 
rights doctrine as a whole, and even for the affected part, it is only in terms of over-reaching 
instead of imparting their nature and content. Like the nineteenth century international law which 
did not fail because of a bad philosophical foundation but rather because it did not fit into the 
cultural institutions of the colonies, some human rights might suffer the same problem. But, 
Beitz argues, that is a practical rather than philosophical problem.  
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I disagree on this reading of the role of international law in the furthering of colonialism, 
and therefore disagree also on the conclusions drawn from its parallelism with human rights. As I 
showed in the first chapter, the international law came to give a legal scheme to the colonial 
project that was morally justified as a civilizing mission in order to mask its moral evil side. The 
civilizing mission was used ideologically to oppress abroad, and to give moral coverage at home, 
and international law helped to integrate the enterprise in the legal scheme. In this sense, serving 
colonial project was the philosophical basis that besmirched the international law. It is in that 
sense that the political and cultural critiques of human rights go beyond the simple over-reaching 
problem, that is, applying human rights to unfit cultural institutions. The claim is that, before 
being applied, human rights are conceived as an ideology to justify the imperialistic goal of the 
West to dominate culturally the rest of the world. In that sense, their moral authority is 
undermined by this conception and it reverberats to their practice. That, I believe, is a 
philosophical problem because it attacks the nature and the content of human rights, and Beitz 
seems not to respond to it satisfactorily.  
It remains the question of humanitarian intervention, which Beitz touches also slightly as 
part of the pathologies. He mentions the imperialistic use of human rights to advance the great 
powers’ interest, and the selectivity in the place where to intervene. Concerning the first one, it is 
not clear where he stands on it, but he seems to endorse the possibility of unilateral intervention, 
if only it could be corrected so that it does not serve its own interest. As he puts it, “it is not hard 
to imagine an international regime combining a mechanism for approval of unilateral protective 
efforts with a capacity to apply incentives to encourage fidelity to the efforts’ purpose.”74 As to 
the selectivity problem, he also recognizes that it can discredit the moral authority of human 
rights as a public practice as well as the existing enforcement mechanisms. But for Beitz, this is 
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just an “empirical conjecture” and even if it turns out to be true, “inconsistency is not inherent in 
the idea and practice of human rights; it is an artifact of the global distribution of political power 
and the weakness of global institutions capable of regulating its effects.”75 
Such a treatment of humanitarian intervention and its selective enforcement would not 
convince those who view it as a neocolonialism. As the second chapter of this dissertation 
elaborated, the practice of humanitarian intervention through unilateral intervention is one of the 
breaches of the feeble international law, which gives leeway to greater powers to impose their 
will under the whip. Beitz seems to think that it is not hard to imagine a mechanism that curbs 
states’ thirst of self-interest, but he does not suggest how it would look like. Moreover, he knows 
that, as Rawls notes,76 states care more about their interests than the protection of human rights. 
It is then surprising that Beitz is not worried by this fact. Concerning the argument that 
inconsistency in enforcement does not affect the idea and practice of human rights, it is because 
Beitz does not take into account the ideological use of human rights and the experience of 
neocolonialism. For the claim of those who accuse humanitarian intervention as neocolonialism, 
they do not consider as a conjecture the fact that selectivity undermines the authority of human 
rights and its practice. They affirm that it does so since it justifies a neocolonial practice and it 
affects the idea of human rights because they are robbed of their emancipatory power. In 
Mamndani’s words, “the language of humanitarian intervention has cut its ties with the language 
of citizen’s rights. To the extent that the global humanitarian order claims to stand for rights, 
these are the residual rights of the human and not full range of rights of the citizen.”77 This is a 
strong claim that Beitz’s response does not address and therefore we are forced to look for 
another conception of human rights that might address these challenges in a satisfactory manner.  
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365	  
	  
	  
 
5.2. A Normative Account of Human Rights from Local Practices 
a). Departure from Beitz 
The reserves about Beitz’s practical conception and the fact that it cannot address 
properly the theoretical and practical challenges raised by the political and cultural critiques of 
human rights compel us to look for another conception. However, this other conception remains 
practical and as such, follows Beitz’s methodology. It assumes the same definition of a practical 
approach to human rights, looking at the practice as it is, and trying to understand its nature and 
content. In other words, the practical conception from local practices also takes “the international 
human rights as a normative practice to be grasped sui generis and consider how the idea of 
human rights functions within it,”78 and from that, deduce its meaning. For as Goodale says, “to 
study what human rights do is to study what human rights are.”79 Moreover, I agree with Beitz 
that, looking at human rights practices at its different levels reveals a normative and a political 
dimensions. Human rights offer “a moral touchstone or a common reference point in deliberation 
about political action and social criticism.”80 These are the discursive and political aspects that 
Beitz highlights and that I share. I also hold that the human rights practice is an emerging 
practice, accepting several sources of justification.  
However, the commonalities between Beitz’s practical conception and the conception 
based on local practices end here. Indeed, while he emphasizes the fact that human rights 
practice is a global one, the conception I am looking for assumes that human rights practice as 
such involves many levels, whose ultimate effects are to be felt at the local level where human 
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rights are claimed. For as much as it is true that “the effectiveness of human rights regime is a 
matter of its success in improving respect for human rights,”81 there is no better place to measure 
such effectiveness than the local level where human rights apply. Beitz insists on the fact that 
international human rights have decentralized the concern for the individual from the state to the 
international arena. This is definitely true, but it has to be nuanced. Although we seem to have 
some international mechanisms for checking states’ performance with regard to human rights, 
such as the different committees related to different human rights instruments and even the 
possibility of complaining against states by the individual,82 there are no international police to 
punish the bad performers. There is not even a mechanism to force a state to submit to the 
process itself. This is the paradox we above mentioned of entrusting the lamb to the wolf. States 
are the worst violators of human rights, and yet the international human rights treaties would rely 
on them for their protection. Since the humanitarian intervention—as armed intervention—is 
only allowed in extreme circumstances—with all the ambiguities related to it as presented in the 
second chapter of this work—states remain with only diplomatic and economic pressures. But 
“linking human rights practices to money, trade, or prestige is not a sufficient condition for 
effectiveness.”83 To make the case worse, even diplomatic and economic pressure is rarely 
undertaken by a country without the tireless work of local activism in collaboration with 
transnational activists and NGOs, which then exert pressure on their particular governments to 
intervene in case of human rights violations.84 Otherwise, governments are not ready to enforce 
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measures that protect human rights, especially against their allies. As Beth Simmons writes, 
“despite the fact that governments toward the end of the twentieth century have accepted a 
higher degree of peer accountability than ever before, they are still largely reluctant to enforce 
international human rights agreements in all but the most egregious cases, and only when it 
serves their broader political purposes.”85 Once more, this is a reason why the local site is the 
place to focus on when looking for a conception of human rights founded on their practice.  
Another element of my disagreement with Beitz is the content of the doctrine itself. It has 
been shown that for him, the doctrine is constituted by the Bill of Rights and the Core 
Conventions. Basically, he limits it to the legally binding human rights instruments. In contrast 
with him, the conception from local practices takes the human movements as a whole, that is, the 
legal and the moral documents: treaties and declarations regarding human rights. The reason is 
that, while declarations are not legally binding for states as they are not parties to them, they are 
not less a source of inspiration for those who believe in the cause of such declarations, and 
therefore are as action-guiding as treaties are. Moreover, even discursively, they can be held to 
states inasmuch as they have a certain moral concern. Eventually, such declarations become or 
generate a legal binding instrument.  
More importantly, the practical conception from local practices decentralizes human 
rights practice and distributes the burdens to the different actors involved at different levels of 
responsibility. From global politics, states are the primary ones responsible for the protection of 
human rights; but from the effectiveness point of view, which is the cornerstone of the human 
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rights project, one has to look at the local level. In between these layers, there is a constellation 
of actors that intervene to hold states and the international community accountable, or simply to 
protect human rights without state’s intervention. Furthermore, I question whether the centrality 
of the state in Beitz’s model is due to his definition of human rights, or if it is the way around; 
for his definition identifies the government as the source of the threats against which human 
rights have to protect; it can be by action or omission of the government. However, when one 
looks at the local practices, human rights are invoked in different settings which do not 
necessarily involve states. For instance, human rights are called upon to challenge cultural 
practices that are judged harmful to human dignity.86 These are not state’s actions or omissions, 
and sometimes, depending on the legal traditions, states do not have a choice. Simmons, for 
example, observes that treaties meet great resistance in “common law than in civil law system.”87 
Another reason to decentralize the state in the human rights practice is the fact that even the 
world politics is passing into a “postnational constellation” era, as Habermas would say. This has 
two main consequences. First, the threats to human rights might come from outside the state’s 
jurisdiction that a state alone will be unable to deal with it. In this case, there is a need of non-
states intervention to help alleviate the situation. Second, the Westphalian model of the modern 
nation-state is waning away as a big player in international politics, clearing the way to big 
regional blocs.88 Today, regional blocs can constrain states about what they can or cannot do, to 
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the point that human rights effectiveness is benefiting from this, especially in a region which 
values human rights norms, such as the European Union.89 That is why a conception of human 
rights from local practices takes them into account. Now, since the goal of the practical approach 
is to extract a conception of human rights by looking at the role played by human rights both 
discursively and politically, taking into account these actors and shifting the focus to the local 
locus as the ultimate place for the effectiveness of the human rights project—of course in 
conjunction with other levels—it is my conviction that the nature and content of human rights 
will change accordingly. But before embarking to grasping that conception, some other points 
need to be enlightened, among them, the contours of local and local practices. 
Most of the time, local is opposed to the global in an unhealthy dichotomy,90 and it might 
have a geographical connotation. From a world politics perspective, local would mean an 
individual state, while the global would refer to the international institutions. There can even be 
an ideological use of it, whereby global refers generally to the West, while local evokes the 
primitive; the real; the uncontaminated by modernity. As Merry notes, “local tends to stand for 
lack of mobility, wealth, education, and cosmopolitanism as well as recalcitrant particularity, 
whereas global encompasses the ability to move across borders, to adopt universal moral 
frameworks, and to share in the affluence, education, and cosmopolitan awareness of elites from 
other parts of the world.”91 Without entering into these disputes, local in this study does not 
assume such a tension, although I maintain that it implies a certain notion of space, with 
geographical connotation, but also with metaphorical signification. Thus, local means the 
interval under the state’s official activities related to human rights, in which non-states actors 
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operate to make their impact effective. Geographically speaking, it can be a region or many 
regions of a country; it can also be a sub-region unit in which human rights are being 
implemented. In any case, by local I mean the amorphous interlude beneath the state’s official 
space, in which human rights are translated, contested and incorporated in the value system of 
the locus, and become discursive and action-guiding, as they also get new meanings. By the 
same token, local practices mean all the activities, discursive and political, undertaken at the 
local level thus understood, in the human rights practice. As we shall now see, the local becomes 
a crossroad of ideas, actions and actors from different levels yet with the same goal: to make 
effective the emancipatory power of human rights where it is the most needed. To use Goodale’s 
words, it becomes “a node of articulation”92 of all of them. This development leads to the 
analysis of the different levels involved in the human rights practice.  
b). The Actors 
It has already been said that the practice based on local practices involves several actors 
representing several levels of intervention. On the bottom level, there are the beneficiaries. These 
can be an individual or group of individuals claiming a certain human right. This is not only the 
bottom in logical terms, but also the justifying reason of the whole practice. Without the need at 
the bottom, a human rights practice would not have a purpose. That is why the beneficiaries are 
the measure of the success of the human rights regime, inasmuch as the latter is confirmed by the 
success in protecting human rights. An important note though; the beneficiaries are not passive 
receivers. Rather, they own their own story, raise their concern for human rights, claim them in a 
discursive and political resistance against whatever source of threat it may be. In An-Na’im’s 
terms, “the beneficiaries of human rights standards themselves assume the primary responsibility 
for protecting their own rights, whether against the state, or by inducing it to support them 
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against some external actors or conditions causing the human rights violations.”93 Human rights 
function as a means of resistance against any threat, and they empower their users both 
discursively and politically by being a source of normative reasons and action-guiding in 
choosing a determining action to undertake and strategies to follow.  
The second level is constituted by the local non-states actors. These are different in 
nature, from different backgrounds, usually focusing on a particular area of human rights. Some 
might be concerned with women rights, while others labor for child rights; some might be 
concerned with political liberties, while others busy themselves with socio-economic and cultural 
rights, and even ecological ones, depending on their interests or their expertise. However, despite 
their diversity, they share the position of the middle between the beneficiaries and the state’s 
officials. They translate the human rights idea to the local beneficiaries who might not know 
them, and serve as intermediaries between the beneficiaries and other members of the web. As 
Merry remarks, “those occupying the middle are no longer the village headmen of colonial 
indirect rule but activists providing service and advocacy to local communities.”94 They can be 
individual activists or be members of local NGOs. Through them, human rights get translated 
both literally and metaphorically, to make them available to the beneficiaries and relevant to the 
local situations. At the same time, though, they are more than just being in the middle between 
states and the beneficiaries, because they also are in contact with other members of the web, and 
that also defines their identity. In addition, while they are usually educated and travel a lot to 
attend trans- and international meetings, they are mostly committed to the cause of human rights 
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in their local contexts which exposes them to life-threatening danger.95 Furthermore, some of 
these NGOs are granted a role—although not an active one—in the structure of international law 
as observers. Although it may sound anodyne, it gives them the opportunity to lobby about the 
human rights agenda, and they can also file information to the different commissions and 
committees, which will be taken seriously by some of the members. I have already mentioned 
how important is their work, even after the signature of a treaty, for states to ratify and comply 
with it.96 
This is the decisive category in the human rights practice, because they are the ones who 
usually claim a share of the public sphere to the state’s officials who would like to monopolize 
the discourse about the political health of the country, and contest the official version of the 
human rights situation. They are capable of mounting pressure from both within by educating 
local communities about human rights, creating human rights consciousness, and without, by 
collecting and disseminating information about human rights to the external actors who can then 
pressure the actual country. Hence, “because domestic human rights NGOs are a crucial link in 
the network, where these groups are absent…, international human rights work is severely 
hampered.”97 It is not only the international human rights efforts; even the national one is 
incapacitated, especially in situation of human rights violations. That is why the primordial 
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enemy of states violators of human rights is not the international community, but rather local 
non-state actors, be they individual activists or NGOs.  
The third category is constituted by the states and some mixed institutions, such as the 
Independent National Commissions of Human Rights (INCHR). The place of the state in the 
human rights regime is quite clear and highly appreciated. It owns this primacy to the global 
world politics organized into states and the role they play in putting into place human rights 
instruments. In that sense, from the international law perspective, states are the only moral 
subjects recognized. However, this is only a formal view which cannot satisfy a human rights 
practice aiming especially at effectiveness in the protection of human rights. That is why for a 
conception of human based on the local practices, the state is integrated into a web of actors who 
exert pressure on it in order to yield the expected fruit. This, nonetheless, does not mean that the 
state is not important in the human rights enterprise. Its role is still preponderant inasmuch it is 
still the only political institution habilitated to sign treaties. And since the human rights practice 
involves legal mechanisms to the point that for Buchanan international human rights law is at the 
heart of the human rights regime,98 the states has an irreplaceable role to play. However, I 
maintain that human rights effectiveness would not happen by only the state’s will without the 
other actors. That is why, because treaties make states have the primary responsibility for human 
rights protection and yet, on the ground, they are ineffective, instead of making it central, human 
rights practice has to reframe the state’s role in the human rights enterprise, without relegating it 
to the periphery.  
Another reason is the fact that states are the worst violators of human rights. In that sense, 
some rights are addressed to the states as a way of conjuring states from violating them. 
Furthermore, there are claims that can only be discharged by states. For instance, as the 
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monopoly of violence, the state is in charge of granting security to its citizenry, who are to hold 
states responsible for that. In addition, although most of the time through transitional pressure, 
states have more means than other actors to interfere with an individual state that fails to respect 
human rights, through diplomatic and economic channels; and because they possess the military 
power, they are the ones who can intervene militarily to protect human rights. In other words, the 
state is an important actor in the human right practice, although effective only in combination 
with the rest of actors, because states can also play a hampering role for advancing the human 
rights cause.  
This third category also comprises mixed institutions supposed to play a role between the 
states and the local non-states actors. The so-called Independent National Human Rights 
Commissions are mixed because they have to gain the favor of both the government and the civil 
society, a task that is not always easy to fulfill, especially that they are usually dependent 
financially on the governments, and yet are supposed to convey the grievances of the civil 
society. The result of their works is not easy to evaluate, but in some instances they contribute to 
the cause of human rights.99 That is why I include them in this third category.  
In today’s human rights practice, Regional Organizations play a major role in inducing 
the effectiveness of human rights in their country members. The example mentioned most of the 
time is the European Union, but the influence of such institutions on their members with regards 
to human rights has become common in the other parts of the world.100 Furthermore, these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 For an account of these INHRC on Africa, see Human Rights Watch, Protectors or Pretenders? Government 
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Mertus, Human Rights Matters: Local Politics and National Human Rights Institutions (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2009); see also Catherine Shanahan Renshaw, “National Human Rights Institutions and Civil 
Society Organizations: New Dynamics of Engagement at Domestic, Regional and Institutional Levels” in Global 
Governance, Vol. 18, 2012. 
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For a focus on Asia, see Sidney Jones, “Regional Institutions for Protecting Human Rights in Asia” in Proceedings 
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Regional Bodies are more and more getting involved militarily to protect human rights in their 
Region.101 The question, however, related to these kinds of institutions is that they are not 
uniformly constituted and they vary in size, goals, and influence. Moreover, to be efficient agents 
in protecting human rights, they need to adhere to human rights norms, otherwise they can be 
opposed to them in the same manner that they are internally.102 Despite these limitations, 
regional institutions cannot be ignored in today’s human rights practice. Hence, by them, I mean 
all these organizations created by and made of states beyond the individual state and below the 
international institutions. As such, they are not specifically designed for human rights protection, 
but they end up including the respect for human rights in their principles, and even creating 
regional instruments and institutions for implementing that goal. 
There is a fifth category of actors involved in the human rights practice which assumes a 
seminal role in the implementation of international human rights norms: it consists of the 
international non-states actors. There are the different international activists and INGOs 
dedicated to the human rights cause. Similarly to the local non-states actors, these international 
non-states activists come from different vantages, they work in different fields and are motivated 
by different ideals. Sometimes, those from the Western sphere are reproached of working to 
advance the same imperialist cause as the country of origin. For instance, with regard to East 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Spread: Whose Norms Matters? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asia Regionalism” in International 
Organisation, Vol. 58, No. 2, 2004. For an African case see, Mwiza Jo Nkhata, “The Role of Regional Economic 
Communities in Protecting and Promoting Human Rights in Africa: Reflection on the Human Rights Mandate of the 
Tribunal of the Southern African Development Community” in African Journal of International and Comparative 
Law, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2012; Isaac Terwase Sampson, “The Responsibility to Protect and ECOWAS Mechanisms on 
Peace and Security: Assessing their Convergence and Divergence on Intervention” in Journal of Conflict and 
Security Law, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2011.  
101 The Kosovo case comes to mind, but other cases such Haiti, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Burkina-Faso, etc. also 
fall into the same category, although they are disputed as intervention for protecting human rights. See my chapter 
two.  
102 One thinks of the famous debate on the Asian values. As examples, among others, of such debate see Xiaorong 
Li, “Asian Values and the Universality of Human Rights” in Martha Meijer,Ed., Dealing with Human Rights: Asian 
and Western Views on the Value of Human Rights (Utrecht: Greber Publisher, 2001); Joane Bauer and Daniel Bell 
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African NGOs, Mutua remarks that INGOs are more focused on political and liberal rights, such 
as democracy and good governance, which might not be the priority of the local situation but 
rather the same agenda of propagating the liberalism. And since local NGOs took inspiration 
from their Western model, they both serve the same master. In his own words, “the parent 
international nongovernmental human rights organizations (INGOs), such as AI, HRW, and ICJ, 
the models that inspired domestic NGOs elsewhere in the world, are firmly rooted in liberal 
thought and philosophy.”103 In other words, while this view is a little bit reductive, since the 
domestic civil society is engaged in various works beyond the political rights arena,104 it alerts us 
to the obstacles to overcome as we search for a practical conception of human rights based on 
local practices, because one cannot ignore international non-states actors in today’s human rights 
practice. They constitute what Keck and Sikkink, among others, call the transitional activism.105 
The last not least actor in this web of actors involved in the human rights practice is the 
international community. Although controversial because it is usually taken to be mostly 
Western by the neocolonial critics, for the sake of the argument, the international community 
here means international institutions created by and formed of states beyond the regional 
organizations. These are important partner in the practices of human rights, and I suspect Beitz 
was thinking of them as he formulated the second level of his model, although it can also include 
the regional organizations. The importance of their role come from the fact they are, actually, the 
authors of the international human rights law and, in that sense, should assume their 
responsibility in its implementation. However, being composed of states, these institutions end 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Mutua, “Human Rights NGOs in East Africa: Defining the Challenges” in Makua Mutua (Ed.), Human Rights 
NGOs in East Africa: Political and Normative Tension (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 20-1. 
104 For activism in economic and social rights in Africa, see Lucie White and Jeremy Perelman (Ed.), Stones of 
Hope: How African Activists Reclaim Human Rights to Challenge Global Poverty (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2011). For a broader perspective, see Katharine Young, Constituting Economic and Social Rights (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012).  
105 Keck and Sikkink, ibid. 
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up suffering from the same shortcomings that affect their members, constituting a battlefield for 
political interests. Nonetheless, the institutions specifically designed for human rights—such as 
the diverse committees or commissions related to different human rights instruments, the UN 
Council on Human Rights—in spite of being under political pressure from states, have become 
unavoidable in the present human rights practice.  
These are the main categories I identify in the practice of human rights today. Taking 
them into account and analyzing how they work, challenge the way we understand human rights 
through their function in the whole process. Hence, the next section focuses on how these actors 
work to generate the protection of human rights, before looking at the conception such a practice 
gives rise to.  
c). Domestication through Translation 
The different actors identified above work to the effectiveness of human rights in diverse 
capacities. However, while the states put into legal form human rights ideals by signing treaties, 
and that the latter makes states the first responsible for respecting human rights, as the second 
model of Beitz shows, it is a credit to individuals or NGOs that those instruments yield its 
expected result. Hence, not only do activists and NGOs, both local and international, contribute 
to the drafting and the ratification of these instruments, but they also play the core role in their 
implementation. Without their work, it is my conviction that human rights would not be 
protected since states are often suspected for violating them and act under pressure. Therefore, 
the local advocacy cannot be avoided. This is especially true in places in dire need of human 
rights. As An-Na’im observes, “human rights are protected in developing countries by local 
NGOs, with the active support of their local constituencies, and through activities to their own 
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governments and public opinion.”106 But this is not particular to the developing countries. For 
instance, studies show how minority migrants used human rights discourse to challenge Japanese 
culture and resist the discrimination they were subjected to. Focusing on Koreans living in Japan, 
Kiyoteru Tsutsui and Hwa Ji Shin observe that human rights gave them a common ground as 
they claimed their rights against the Japanese government. In their words, “resident Koreans 
used international political forums to pressure the Japanese government and leveraged the 
provisions of the human rights in domestic debates, thus successfully changing the government’s 
approach from treating Koreans as noncitizens undeserving of rights to providing them with 
universal human rights that anybody living in Japan deserves.”107 This is what leads Amy 
Gurowitz to remark that international norms such as human rights norms create an impact only 
when they are made significant in a local context. As she states, “international norm can matters 
only when they are used domestically and when they work their way into the political 
process.”108 These examples corroborate the primordial role played by local non-states actors for 
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making human rights instruments, not only available to the local communities or individuals, but 
also to make sure that they are effectively implemented. The question remains however as to 
how they work.  
As a general view, the first stage of non-states actors is to produce international norms, 
by generating ideas, helping in the drafting and lobbying for their adoption so that they acquire 
international recognition, moral or/and legal. That is why, some scholars remark that “many 
international norms, such as those pertaining to human rights, have their origins in national 
discourse,”109 because they grow from local experiences and the desire to propagate them by 
believing that they might help in similar circumstances elsewhere.110 Once these texts are 
adopted, these non-states actors move to the second stage which is their implementation. They 
bring them home, translate them both literally and metaphorically to make them understandable 
relative to the local situations. They translate them literally because most of these texts are 
produced in foreign languages to so many diverse contexts in which they have to be applied. 
Hence, these people of the middle—as Merry calls them—111 looks for images and other cultural 
vehicles of meanings to translate the ideas of these international norms. They “are intermediaries 
who translate global ideas into local situations and retranslate local ideas into global 
frameworks.”112 This first moment of the process is usually called “vernacularization”; that is, 
the movement of making available in the local language these international norms, without 
which, the latter would remain foreign to the local situations. At the same time, this translation is 
metaphorical because it is about translating these ideas in meaningful terms presented to these 
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local cultures. That is why, the vernacularization process is also a transformative experience for 
these international norms. As Daniel Goldstein observes, “vernacularization…describes a 
process of reception and transformation, a dialectic in which transnational conceptions are made 
meaningful within—rejected on the basis of local realities.”113 That is why, as I show below, 
human rights acquire new meanings through this translation and assumes a role that the focus on 
states would miss.  
On the other hand, these intermediaries translate local concerns into an international 
framework, especially when they have to ask for support from international actors—both states 
and non-states. As their concern is the effectiveness of human rights in these particular 
situations, the local non-states actors translate domestic cases into the language of human rights, 
and adopt strategies to remedy these cases. Thus, one item of their work is to hold accountable 
the origin of human rights violations, be it national or international. They are familiar with the 
venues and the vocabulary to address the issues of human rights. That is why, while the most 
common interlocutor is the state, they normally go after the violator of human rights as such, and 
that is the reason why, also, they use different means depending on the nature of cases.114 When 
they fail to curb the violation by their own force, these non-states actors contact other actors both 
national and international. When the case is of a state’s violation of human rights, they can work 
with regional bodies, the international community and transnational activists to lobby in order to 
put pressure on the individual state. However, even at this level, without the work of the 
international non-states actors, foreign states would not act, especially against their allies. 
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Furthermore, it is only because there are respondents at the local level that even the international 
pressure yields fruit. In other words, when the violator is the state, it is through the combination 
of pressure from within and without, with priority for pressure from within, that states finally 
adhere to human rights norms; it is through pressure from within that they engage in effective 
protection of human rights.115 It is in that sense that local practices are the keystone of today’s 
human rights practice and therefore a practical conception of human rights has to attribute to it a 
prominent place.  
Schematically, I present this diagram in which the initials stand for:  
IC: International Community; RB: Regional Bodies; SMI: States and Mixed Institutions; Benfs: 
Beneficiaries; INSA: International Non-States Actors and LNSA: Local Non-states Actors. 
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The plain arrows show a direct relationship between actors. The long broken arrows 
mean that the impact is not direct or obvious, while the dot-dash arrows show a slight influence. 
In the middle of the practice process are the local non-states actors who are in contact with all 
other actors. The relationship is constant between the beneficiaries and the LNSA, through 
translation and advocacy in order to put pressure on governmental institutions. When this action 
does not effect a result, they call upon regional bodies, INSA and the international community 
itself, which can then intervene in a particular case. That is what I call domestication –of human 
rights in the present case. It is more than the vernacularization, because it implies both the 
production and the implementation of international human rights norms, and several actors are 
involved. In that process of producing and implementing human rights norms, the central actor is 
not the state, although the latter plays a legal role of formally creating the human rights legal 
norms. The main actors are beneficiaries and the non-states. They are the ones who make human 
rights effective in their particular contexts, sometimes in collaboration with actors. More 
specifically, domestication takes seriously the translating work and the advocacy involved in the 
local practices in order to make human rights effective in/to these particular contexts. Because 
this process is transformative, it affects the meaning of human rights, their role and their 
recipient, which in turn, affects their nature and their content. That is the focus of the next 
section. 
d). Toward a Multilayer Conception of Human Rights 
Having described the practice and identified the actors involved, it becomes possible to 
identify the function of human rights norms and from that, to conceptualize them. Looked at 
from the local practices, human rights represent a means of resistance against oppression or any 
other threat to basic interests of an individual or group of individuals. As Goodale states, “human 
rights discourse nurtures a new kind of diversity, and this, in turn, establishes the conditions for 
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new forms of social resistance to very old forms of inequalities and oppression.”116 One can 
generalize this resistance power contained in human rights discourse and unleash its unlimited 
outreach. In that sense, human rights become a resistance to any form of oppression and 
inequalities, past, present and future. But then the question arises at to what is particular to 
contemporary human rights, since every culture has always had channels to address such social 
evils. The response to this question is that, if contemporary human rights are adopted by different 
cultures despite their own normative systems, it is because they offer a better language to 
translate their grievances and transform them into a human rights claim that their local context 
could not afford them previously.117 That is where the translation work of human rights is 
fundamental. Through the collective work of beneficiaries and LNSA, a new normative 
vocabulary is introduced and a human rights consciousness is developed. Human rights are no 
longer alien to them, but rather appropriated through their local means, and these actors claim 
them as their proper author. As Gregg asserts, members of the community are regarded “as 
potential co-constructors” of human rights.118 This does not mean that human rights espouse the 
cultural views of the local community. Rather, “human rights ideas are appealing because they 
provide a radically different frame for thinking about the relations about power and inequality in 
society.”119 
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From that perspective, human rights provide a normative foundation for a discursive 
critique of the situation in which injustices and inequalities arise, and a basis for a political action 
to redress them. As Gregg states it rightly, “granting oneself human rights will surely challenge 
the political and cultural environment to some extend in all cases.”120 These discursive and 
political roles are not necessarily processed smoothly—as shown by the tension between the 
state and the LNSA. Indeed, as the human rights struggle targets injustices and inequalities 
embedded in cultural practices, political institutions and economic interests, a human rights 
function will oppose those who promote them and those who hold onto their power. By offering 
a new discourse which challenges these establishments, human rights empower those who 
assimilate and appropriate them in their local situation; and those who hold on these privileges 
are forced to reinvent their justification, since old ones are challenged. What Simmons says 
about treaties can be generalized to the entire human rights practice. She argues that “like other 
formal institutions, treaties are causally meaningful to the extent that they empower individuals, 
groups, or parts of the state with different rights preferences that were not empowered to the 
same extent in the absence of treaties.”121 Simmons’s point is supported by the conviction that 
external pressure on a state is unreliable, and therefore, “the politics of change is likely to occur 
at the domestic level.”122 In the same way, human rights discourse empowers all the parts of the 
local situations in which it intervenes, because it brings new elements that were not present 
before.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Gregg, “Individuals as Authors of Human Rights: Not only Addressees” in Theory and Society, Vol. 39, No. 6, 
2010, p. 638. See also Goodale, “Toward a Critical Anthropology of Human Rights” in Current Anthropology, Vol. 
47, No. 3, 2006, 495; Norani Othman, “Grounding Human Rights in Non-Western Culture: Shari’a and the 
Citizenship Rights of Women in a Modern Islamic State” in Bauer and Bell, ibid., 174.  
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for him the empowerment is for individuals; a reason why I prefer Simmons’s description of empowerment that goes 
beyond the individual to include all those that were not empowered before, be they individual, groups or parts of 
states.  
122 Simmons, ibid., 126. Baxi would say that “the local…remains the crucial site of struggle for the enunciation, 
implementation, and enjoyment and exercise of human rights.” Ibid., 158.  
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Again, we retrieve here the transformative function of human rights, through which a 
human rights culture is created at the grassroots level, because as Zehra Arat observes, “the 
expansion, full recognition, and the protection of rights demands the transformation of cultural 
norms and their material foundations.”123 I would say that not all cultural norms have to change, 
but some have to negotiate with this new normative source. At the same time, through translation 
which is always an exercise of interpretation, human rights norms are also scrutinized and 
recognized—or rejected, not necessarily as universally invalid, but rather as not significant to 
this particular situation. They acquire new meanings as they are interpreted and integrated in 
these new contexts following the function they assume. In their case about a Ghanaian man 
liberated because of human rights activism, Perelman and Young note that, three years later, a 
participant remembered that event, less as a legal victory than a creation on meaning. They write, 
“for her, the case was a moment of meaning-creation that was grounded in community 
norms.”124 This moment of “meaning-creation” takes place because human rights have been 
made meaningful to these particular situations through their translation and incorporation and 
enjoyment. That is how they bring their emancipatory power where it is needed. By offering a 
new venue to express grievance, the victims are no longer silenced by the institutional structures, 
but rather the latter are challenged in their legitimacy. The victims are empowered to raise their 
voice to defend what they deem vital interests, and the other side has to justify its opposing view. 
Human rights avail these tools to local actors who are no longer “voiceless victims to be rescued 
by altruist external political actors,” and make them “agents with some power selectively to 
choose tools that will help them achieve their rights goals.”125 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Zehra Arat, “Women’s Rights in Islam: Revisiting Quranic Rights” in Pollis and Schwab (Ed.), Human Rights: 
New Perspectives, New Realities, 71.  
124 Perelman and Young, ibid., 139.  
125 Simmons, ibid., 126. 
386	  
	  
	  
The conception of human rights from local practices has to capture all these elements 
involved, the actors and their different levels of actions, and capture this emancipatory nature of 
human rights. Hence, in a multilayer conception, human rights are standards empowering 
individuals or groups of individuals, the latter conceived as social beings and organized in 
political entities, in order to resist, through different levels of influence, any source of threat 
endangering their basic interests.126 Some consequences follow from this conception. First and 
foremost, the purpose of human rights is not to serve the foreign policy; rather, human rights’ 
purpose is the emancipation of those who are suffering from an unjust infringement to their basic 
interests. Their use in international relations is a consequence of this purpose, and is considered 
as one means—not necessarily the most effective—to influence states’ behavior with regard to 
the implementation of human rights. Hence, human rights empower those whose basic interests 
are threatened to raise a claim against the violator. That is why, secondly, the main subject of 
human rights are not states, but rather the individuals or groups of individuals susceptible to 
these threats, and they are the ones who are in charge of protecting their basic interests by 
reminding all of those involved, their respective responsibility for the promotion and protection 
of these human rights.127 This, of course, raises the question of those incapacitated from claiming 
their rights—either because of age, such as infants, or because of natural disabilities or diseases. 
To answer this question, it is important to recall that international human rights developed 
because of different actors moved by different ideals, coming from different backgrounds but 
sharing the same goal: to make human rights effective in particular situations. Furthermore, it 
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Side of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), chap. 1. 
127 This seems to join Griffin’s definition of human rights as protecting normative agency, ibid., 2. They differ, 
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works through collaboration of many actors playing at different stages. These two elements show 
that not only does this conception not reduce human rights to individuals, but it also implies a 
proxy responsibility, as it is built on advocacy. The LNSA are already doing this in their task of 
translating human rights and making connections with international actors. Thus, in the same 
way, those at the local level who care about the basic of the incapacitated individual are 
empowered by human rights discourse to resist any threat to his or her basic interests. This leads 
to a third consequence: the multilayer concept is all but individualistic; and that is why 
individuals as well as individuals as group can be empowered by these standards. 
Fourthly, basic interests protected by human rights will vary according to situations to 
which they apply, depending on their urgency. As Beitz observes, “to recognize an interest as 
urgent, we must be able to understand why it would be reasonable to regard its satisfaction as 
important within some range of normal lives but we need not believe that all persons value the 
interests or care about its satisfaction in their own case.”128 In other words, in one context there 
might be a need of political resistance, while in another there is an economic one, without 
annihilating each other’s validity. That one context focuses on a certain set of human rights at a 
particular time, pertaining to a particular historical context and social circumstances, does not 
mean that they do not or should not value others. It actually is the contrary. The multilayer 
conception satisfies the promotion and protection of human rights only if all the actors involved 
believe in the normativity of the entire human rights corpus, although its application depends on 
the urgency of the threat against basic interests of individuals or groups.  
Fifthly, the source of threats to basic interests against which human rights empower the 
victims are not caused by states only, nor are they necessarily under a state’s control.129 It can be 
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cultural practices, political institutions as well as non-state agents. They can also be from within 
as they could also be from without. Finally, this multilevel model adopts three levels of 
influence, each one with a complex combination of actors and strategies that lead to the 
effectiveness of human rights at the particular situations that appeal to them. The first level is the 
national one. It comprises the beneficiaries, the LNSA and the governmental and mixed 
institutions. These are the main actors involved in the promotion and protection of human rights. 
They can work together when the threat is not from one of them; or two against the one 
constituting the threat. If this level fails to yield the expected result, then those engaged in human 
rights resistance raise the case to the regional level, seeking more human rights power to help 
diffuse or stop the threat. This level is composed of Regional bodies, LNSA belonging to the 
country members and INSA who operate at that regional level. If the regional level does not 
provide the necessary influence, then the case moves to the international level, which is 
constituted of International organizations, INSA and LNSA belonging to some state members 
who might have a major role to play. Their action can be directed immediately to the cause of the 
threat, or through the intermediary of regional bodies. At every level, however, the beneficiaries 
have to be taken into consideration, not as helpless victims, but rather in order to form a stronger 
resistance with them against the identified threat. The aim should not be to protect human rights 
for, but rather with, them, and they should take the first initiative. Borrowing from Rawls’s 
vocabulary, these levels work following a lexical order; that is, the resistance through human 
rights should start from the national level, before passing to regional and then international 
levels.  
In any case, the analysis of today’s human rights practice shows that a genuine human 
rights struggle never succeeds and has a lasting impact without an effective involvement of those 
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primarily affected by it. The multilayer conception has only drawn from this fact a new practical 
conception of human rights. This does not, far from it, represent a last word on the nature and 
content of human rights. Nor does it resolve all disagreements about the subject, and it was not 
its ambition—moreover, I agreed at the outset with Beitz that human rights practice is an 
emerging one and therefore still evolving. Rather, the reason to look for another conception was 
to find a philosophical account of human rights that could respond satisfactorily to the theoretical 
and practical challenges posed by considering human rights as an imperialist ideology and its 
practice through humanitarian intervention as a neocolonialism. At the same time, it has to 
ensure that human rights are not used imperialistically. Now that we have this multilayer 
conception of human rights, it is time to see whether it fares better than other philosophical 
accounts as encountered in chapters three and four.  
5.3. The Multilayer Conception and Human Rights as an Imperialist Ideology 
The first chapter of this dissertation elaborated on this theoretical challenge launched by 
those criticizing human rights as an imperialist ideology. The argument showed that, in the past, 
the civilizing mission justified the expansion of the Western World over the rest of the world 
under the disguise of bringing progress to uncivilized cultures. Yet it concealed the fact that, 
through domination and exploitation, the West used colonialism to attend to its internal 
problems—political, economic and demographic. The same is being done, the critics argue, with 
human rights used to perpetuate liberal culture over the rest of world. That critique was 
epitomized by Mutua’s SVS metaphor, which leads to undermining human rights normativity, 
since, if it is an imperialist ideology serving an imperialist domination, it is a lie and liar, and its 
purpose is evil. Can the multilayer conception address this fundamental critique than those so far 
examined?  
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a). Advantages of the New Conception 
Before one endeavors to discuss these arguments, methodologically, there are some 
important points that the multilayer conception brings onto the scene. Firstly, because it focuses 
on the local actors, this new practical conception of human rights shifts the discussion about the 
justification of human rights. Indeed, the critique of human rights as imperialist ideology is 
directed toward the Western powers, arguing that they are using them to foster their influence 
over the rest of the world. For instance, Mutua observes that “increasingly, the human rights 
movement has come to openly be identified with the United States, whose chief executive now 
invokes human rights virtually every time he addresses a non-European nation.”130 The practical 
conception of human rights based on local practices shows that this is not the real purpose of 
human rights enterprise; because they are meant for local victims who find in them an 
empowering normative source to resist any source of oppression. Hence, the discursivity is 
shifted from contention between West and non-West, to those in the local context who reject 
human rights, usually the elite benefiting from political system or cultural legitimacy, and the 
LNSA and beneficiaries who found in the human rights discourse a new source for resisting 
inequalities and injustices. Indeed, since “local leaders in many parts of the world resist the 
human rights claim of subordinated groups by asserting that this claim is an alien, Western 
import not suited to local normative systems,”131 they will have to justify these local normative 
claims that are being challenged by those local actors who appropriated human rights discourse 
to unearth the inequalities and injustices sustained by these local normative systems. In other 
words, the challenge to human rights becomes irrelevant because the discussion will turn to the 
legitimacy of these systems that caused the calling for human rights norms in the first place. If 
the alleged injustices are not present, then the invocation of human rights will be nullified; but if 
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human rights discourse offers a language that better translates an existent situation, those 
challenging it will have to engage in a reason-giving process with those who claim the contrary. 
Sure enough, the multilayer conception does not ensure the outcome of the justification, but the 
shift of the debate itself is already a positive indication that this new conception suggests another 
way of approaching this theoretical challenge.  
Secondly and relative to the first one, the critique of human rights as an imperialist 
ideology claims that like the civilizing mission, human rights also repose on the civilized-
uncivilized binary, whereby the civilized are the Western nations, while the rest represent the 
uncivilized. This is sustained by the belief in racial superiority with the “ontological duty” to 
bring help to inferior races.132 The multilayer conception deconstructs this basis because, in its 
presuppositions, the practice does not suppose external messengers coming to rescue endangered 
species lost in an uncivilized world. Once more, if the local situation does not include cases of 
oppression and injustices to be resisted, then human rights discourse will not be invoked. But if 
these situations exist, the debate and the political action will not oppose external civilizers 
against backward uncivilized, but rather those involved in the same situation, using the same 
vocabulary and symbols to describe and judge the same situation, although they might disagree 
in their respective description and judgment. That is why I emphasize that the three levels need 
all the time to take into account the local actors, especially the beneficiaries and LNSA. Once 
more, this seems to be a breakthrough on the path to addressing this theoretical challenge.  
Thirdly and as a consequence of what precedes, this new conception releases the tension 
between the Western and the non-Western, because the practice of human rights based on local 
practices is not adopted only for the non-Western world. It concerns all situations of injustices of 
oppression, injustice and inequalities against which human rights empower local actors with a 
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new means, which were not available before, to resist these evils wherever they might be, be it in 
the Western or non-Western world. The accent is put on the empowerment of local actors for 
their self-emancipation. As Jack Mahoney would says, “all human cultures without exception are 
subject to constant scrutiny, evaluation and challenge by a doctrine of human rights, and none is 
ethically sacrosanct or immune from such critique.”133 It is this critical power of human rights 
that delivers them from being constrained into one or another culture. 
Fourthly, the main actors in the practice of human rights as imperialist ideology are 
Western powers, international institutions and the INGOs.134 These are the “saviors” to use 
Mutua’s words. The multilayer conception integrates these actors in a larger web of interactions, 
and their actions are not to count more than that of local actors. It suffices to recall that the 
different levels involved in the practice work in a lexical order, in the Rawlsian sense. Hence, 
because the main part has to be played by the beneficiaries in protecting human rights, the 
priority shifts and therefore Western powers, INGOs and international institutions, can no longer 
be considered as the sole actors. If they intervene, it is in response to a local call for increasing 
the resistance, together with, and not in replacement of, local actors.  
This new conception also presents a fifth advantage that it does not require a specific 
form of political institutions, nor does it rely on one source of justification. Local actors are the 
ones determining the kind of institutions that they deem befitting them for a political order that 
respects and protects their basic interests. Moreover, because it accommodates plural sources of 
justification, and human rights are appropriated through translation, human rights are not adopted 
because they are or are not liberal. Rather, they are adopted because of their function in the 
present context, while their justification is left open.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Jack Mahoney, The Challenge of Human Rights: Origin, Development and Significance (Malden: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2007), 110-1.  
134 Mutua, Human Rights, 35-36.  
393	  
	  
	  
A sixth methodological advantage is the fact that the practical view of human rights 
based on local practices does not conceive human rights from the polemical vantage of 
universality-relativism—although I shall touch on this question of universality later. It assumes, 
from the beginning, the historical facticity of human rights: they are Western in many ways; but 
that is not an impediment for them to be applied to other cultural contexts, as the local practices 
attest, as long as they are not imposed, but rather freely chosen. Like many concepts or items that 
have origin in one place but are appreciated in settings different from their origin because of their 
function, human rights also are adopted in different contexts because of their empowering and 
emancipatory role. For instance, as Arvind Sharma remarks, “international numerals… are really 
an adaption of Arabic numerals by the West, and the Arabs took them over from India…. To the 
extent that these numerals might be considered universal, their Indian origin is an interesting fact 
but has little to do with their present function.”135 The same can be said for human rights; their 
function takes a full attention, notwithstanding their Western origin. Once this historicity is 
accepted and one focuses on its function, the question of the origin of human rights loses its 
importance for their nature and content. Finally, the political and cultural critique of human 
rights as an imperialist ideology focuses only on the role played by states and the institutions 
created by states as well as INGOs, at the expense of the local actors, who are the touchstone of 
the multilayer conception. As such, it misses an important element in the understanding of the 
function, and therefore the meaning of human rights, which might challenge the claim itself that 
the whole human rights movement is simply another imperialist ideology.  
Some objections can already be raised based on this very fundamental element of the 
multilayer conception of human rights, the local actors, especially the LNSA. One of them is that 
the LNSA depends on financial support that can jeopardize their independence in the promotion 
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and protection of human rights. In a specific context such as the East African region, Mutua 
claims that most of the local NGOs followed the agenda of the Western NGOs which support 
them both morally and financially. The consequence, he believes, is that they end up being local 
channels of these INGOs, instead of focusing on problems that are relevant to the local 
situation.136 In his own words, “most of human rights groups in East Africa have rather blindly 
copied the model of AI and HRW with respect to the question of their mandates, although the 
majority of East Africans live a meager existence defined by the most blatant, brutal, and 
unimaginable denials of the most basic economic social, and cultural rights.”137 The point here is 
that NGOs in East Africa focus on political and civil rights, instead of focusing on economic, 
social and cultural rights. Merry also raises the same worry about the status of these 
intermediaries and the danger threating them of succumbing to the power they get from their 
translating work. “Their ultimate loyalties are ambiguous and they may be double agents.”138 
Moreover, their role of translation “is influenced by who is funding them; their ethnic, gender, or 
other social commitments; and institutional framework that create opportunities for wealth and 
power. They may have greater interest in the source than the target of the transaction and vice 
versa.”139 The tension may even be heightened when they depend on the same source of financial 
support as their respective states, as it is the case in the Third World. In that situation, they can 
be accused of threatening national interests—and therefore be presented as the “enemy of the 
Nation”, especially when they use those resources to denounce the state’s human rights 
violations; or they can be considered betrayal of the tradition and the “local ilk”140 of Western 
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imperialists. All these points seem to undermine their moral integrity, and therefore the integrity 
of the human rights conception drawn from local practices. 
While the demonizing of LNSA is part of their daily life, and therefore does not really 
affect their moral integrity as it is part of political strategies of the governmental officials to 
discredit them, the possible danger of succumbing to power and abusing the trust invested in 
LNSA is an empirical claim which cannot validate the whole practice. Only if it were shown that 
all LNSA systematically fall into the trap, the moral integrity of the practice would be 
undermined. As to the financial dependency that limits the ability of some LNSA to focus on the 
most urgent needs commended by the situation, it has already been underscored with Beitz that a 
practical conception does not resolve all disagreements, but rather offers a new framework to 
clarify them. In that sense, the problem of the disagreement is about which rights should have 
priority, and that is left to the free choice of a particular LNSA. Moreover, in the multilayer 
conception, LNSA designates a whole web of actors engaged at different fronts, because of 
different reasons, animated by different ideals, and certainly constrained by financial 
circumstances, and yet all using human rights to resist every source of inequalities, injustices and 
oppression, with the purpose of making human rights effective. From what precedes, it follows 
that these cases do not undermine the normative stance of the practical conception of human 
rights in a multilayer form. Hence we can proceed with a confrontion with the theoretical 
critique. 
b). Reconsidering the Narrative 
According to Mutua, “human right is a grand narrative of an epochal contest that pits 
savages against victims and saviors.”141 The crux of his characterization of human rights as an 
imperialist ideology is his Savage-Victim-Savior metaphor, in which, as expressed in this 
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quotation, savages are contrasted with victims and saviors. Before looking at the metaphor itself, 
it is worthwhile reconsidering this grand narrative as he describes it and attributes to it a 
normative value. According to him, the human rights corpus is Eurocentric and it continues the 
colonial project, assuming superior and inferior positions. This is the first component of this 
grand narrative. From the multilayer conception, while it admits the Western origin of human 
rights, it does not follow necessarily that they are a continuation of the colonial project. A recall 
that this practical conception takes the human rights corpus as it developed after WWII and 
onward. Analyzing it, it is all but being based on a superiority-inferiority relationship. Moreover, 
it is inclusive contrary to the colonial discourse that was clearly dividing humanity into 
categories, assigning one group the tutorial duty to advance the civilization of the others. On the 
contrary, all the documents of the human rights corpus insist on the inclusion, banning exclusion 
based on sex, religion, race, political opinion, or any other motives.142 Not only is the human 
project inclusive, but it also is egalitarian. It does not confer privilege to any particular group or 
civilization.143 Moreover, the corpus aims at ensuring these rights for everyone, and entrusts the 
duty to everybody to advance such a cause.144 It would be, therefore, an overstatement to 
conclude that the human rights corpus as it presents itself is written in the same script as the 
colonial project which was justified by the civilizing mission, and supported overtly by racial 
prejudices. The human rights project is not born from the Western jingoism of incarnating the 
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best virtues that have to be exported. It is rather an attempt to deal with the Western’s own 
failure to live up its own values. Once more, it does not share the same civilizing missionary zeal 
of the colonial project. Hence, taking into account the historicity of the human rights project 
from the start, instead of quarrelling about their universality, reorients the debate about human 
rights as an imperialist ideology.  
Perhaps Mutua and other critics who contend that human rights perpetuate the colonial 
project think of the human rights developed during the modern period. On this subject, Baxi’s 
distinction between modern and contemporary paradigms of human rights is helpful. According 
to him, the modern, that is, the Enlightenment paradigm was mainly liberal and based on 
exclusion, because only white adult male, possessing reason and will, was the subject of rights. 
But the contemporary doctrine of human rights, that is, the one ushered in after WWII, is 
inclusive and emancipatory. In his own words, “in the ‘modern’ paradigm of rights the logics of 
exclusion are pre-eminent whereas in the ‘contemporary’ paradigm the logics of inclusion are 
paramount.”145 And indeed, because of these logics of exclusion, “the foremost historical role 
performed by these was to accomplish the justification of the unjustifiable: namely, colonialism 
and imperialism.”146 Furthermore, according to the same author, the modern paradigm kept a 
whole range of humanity invisible, both socially and politically, while the contemporary doctrine 
emphasizes the self-determination of all peoples. He also underlines the fact that the modern 
right doctrine was statist and Eurocentric, while “the processes of formulation of contemporary 
human rights are increasingly inclusive and often marked by intense negotiation between the 
practitioners of human rights activism and of human repression.”147 All of these elements lend 
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credibility to the thesis that the critique of human rights as continuation of the colonial project 
fits the “modern” paradigm of rights rather than the contemporary human rights doctrine.  
The second component that undergirds the human rights narrative, according to Mutua, is 
that it does not allow a cross-cultural examination because it promotes Eurocentric ideals under 
the neutral cloak of a universal language. In his own words, “the subtext of human rights is a 
grand narrative hidden in the seemingly neutral and universal language of the corpus.”148 The 
practical conception of human rights based on local practices is not based on the universality of 
human rights and does not posit on the first hand their neutrality. Indeed, human rights discourse 
is not neutral, in that it is historically situated, and stands for some values and opposes some 
practices. As standards empowering victims to resist any threat to their basic interests, human 
rights discourse takes a position. In that sense, the human rights corpus does not resist cross-
cultural examination, because it enters cultures through translation, using local symbols and 
stories. At the same time, though, culture does not occupy the judge stance, because it is also 
challenged by the new norms incorporated in its normative system as a new medium for 
conveying grievances. In that sense, the question of cross-cultural examination does not apply, 
since the practical conception does not presuppose the universality of human rights for affirming 
their normativity. Rather, it looks at their function in different local practices and induces their 
meaning. Thus, this practical conception relates differently to the human rights narrative.  
The claim of the impossibility of cross-cultural examination led to the third underlying 
limitation of the human rights project; that is, its problem of cultural legitimacy. The cultural 
legitimacy theme has been developed by An-Na’im, which he defines as “the quality or state of 
being in conformity with recognized principles or accepted rules and standards of a given 
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culture.”149 His idea is that human rights would command internal compliance if/when they 
receive an internal legitimation from the existing normative system of a given culture. That is 
supposed to occur through a cross-cultural as well as an internal cultural dialogue. The problem 
of this position is that human rights might lose their critical edge, which is actually why human 
rights language is adopted. For instance, as Merry observes, “in the area of violence against 
women, human rights ideas are powerful precisely because they offer a radical break from the 
view that violence is natural and inevitable in intimate relations between men and women.”150 In 
other words, when one looks at local practices, human rights are not adopted because they 
represent a culturally accepted norms. Rather, they get accepted through the contestation of the 
existing normative system, a contestation that confronts those defending the cultural system and 
those who, using human rights language, judge it oppressive. In that sense, from a practical 
conception based on human rights practices at the local level, the problem of cultural 
legitimation does not apply because human rights are culturally legitimated by being adopted 
because of their functional importance to those who use them. The same explanation fits into the 
fourth flaw that, according to Mutua, infects human rights corpus because it is founded on the 
assumption that raising one cultural normative system as universal over the rest becomes a power 
issue. Otherwise, why should these norms that are Western be declared universal? Since the 
multilayer conception does not posit universality of human rights as a sine qua none condition 
for their normativity, it debunks the objection. Once more, from the practical conception, human 
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rights are not invoked because they are liberal and from Europe. They are convoked because they 
translate better what those calling upon them are living. They could have come from another 
origin, and still be adopted. Their origin is, in this sense, purely contingent on the reason why 
they are used in these local contexts. It is only the efficacy of their language that gives them 
credence. 
Finally, there is the racial underpinning that permeates the human rights practice. As 
Mutua puts it, “in the human rights narrative, savages and victims are generally nonwhite and 
non-Western, while saviors are white.” Its ideological role allows the transformation of the racial 
relationship into an imperialist narrative and a psychological soteriology “in which whites who 
are privileged globally as a people—who have historically visited untold suffering and savage 
atrocities against nonwhites—redeem themselves by ‘defending’ and ‘civilizing’ ‘lower,’ 
‘unfortunate,’ and ‘inferior’ peoples.”151 From the multilayer conception, those engaged in the 
human rights contestation are from the same cultural background and therefore there cannot be 
racial prejudice because the contestation takes place at the local level. If a local situation opposes 
whites against non-whites, it is only particular to that one context, and not generalizable as a 
pattern of the whole human rights practice, since in other instances, it opposes whites and non-
whites among themselves. To repeat Mahoney’s observation, human rights discourse challenges 
all cultures. Once again, if one conceives human rights from local practices, it becomes difficult 
to read a racial subtext that might be surreptitiously undergirding the whole human rights 
practice.  
However, while this narrative seems to not hold when confronted by the multilayer 
conception of human rights, its empirical basis might be a fact; namely, the continuation of the 
imperial project under the United States of America’s banner, which has replaced the former 
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European empires, France and the United Kingdom. “The domination of the globe exercised by 
European powers for the last several centuries has been assumed by the United States.”152 In that 
domination enterprise, human rights displays its ideological role of legitimation and concealing. 
It legitimates the American discourse and at the same time hides its proper motivations. That is 
why, “increasingly, the human rights movement has come to openly be identified with the United 
States, whose chief executive now invokes human rights virtually every time he addresses a non-
European nation.”153 This is the heart of the issue.  
To respond to it, one is to observe that, first, normatively and empirically speaking, from 
the practical conception of human rights, the United States is not the leading actor in human 
practice. US is only one among many actors. Therefore, their attitude toward human rights 
should not impart the normativity of the human practice as a whole, as it is not a pattern of all 
actors involved in the practice as such. Secondly, however, pragmatically, being the primary 
military and economic power in today’s world politics, its use of human rights gets more 
attention, but this does neither affect the normativity of human rights conception, nor its content 
and its purpose. Moreover, for being standards that empower those whose basic interests are 
threatened, human rights discourse also offers a tool to resist the United States’ ideological 
manipulation of human rights. That is why, as Rajagopal notes, although human rights language 
can be hegemonicly used, it also has the counter-hegemonic side that allows it to resist 
hegemony. “Social movements of indigenous peoples and other relied on human rights discourse 
to challenge repression, displacement, and violation of their rights.”154 For instance, the 
hegemonic use of human rights discourse did not help the US to win the case against 
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Nicaragua.155 This is an indication that the abuse of human rights discourse by one of the actors 
does not empty its emancipatory power; and therefore cannot discredit its nature and its purpose. 
Thirdly, the key element of the multilayer conception of human rights is the LNSA and it is 
essentially a non-statist model. It follows, therefore, that human rights practice in the US should 
not be limited to the actions carried out by a US government official, but also and especially the 
role of LNSA inside the US. If it were demonstrated—what is unlikely!—that all, or at least the 
majority of US LNSA support the imperialistic use of human rights, then the claim would be 
well founded. Nonetheless—and this is the fifth point—even if it were to be proven that US 
foreign policy promotes human rights, this would not affect the normativity of a conception of 
human rights based on local practices. Indeed, although it does not conceive human rights as 
imperatives for foreign policy—to use Kelly’s words—it does not/should not determine the 
content of the foreign policy of states. Therefore, these, or some of these states, can adopt human 
rights as one of their interests, and therefore put human rights among the requirements of their 
international cooperation,156 while others might be pushing for economic development, military 
might or diplomatic influence. However, the multilayer conception of human rights does not 
conceive human rights doctrine as first for foreign policy, but foreign policy can be useful for its 
purpose. In the case of a hegemonic use, human rights discourse turns its resisting power against 
this new threat.  
Thus, even from this perspective, the practical conception from local practices seems to 
suggest another narrative of the human rights project; and if this holds, then it provides a basis 
for looking at the metaphor itself. 
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c). Deconstructing the Metaphor 
As I have already alluded to it, Mutua’s critique uses the savages-victims-saviors 
metaphor, whose terms are metaphors on their own. Hence, the first metaphor is the savages. 
Now, from a statist model, the state is the key player in the human rights enterprise as it is in 
charge of respecting, protecting and fulfilling human rights. At the same time, as it has been 
repeatedly shown, a state can be the dreadful violator of these rights which are under its 
responsibility. Hence for Mutua, the savage in the human rights corpus is a state that threatens 
human rights. In his own terms, “underlying the development of human rights is the belief that 
the state is a predator that must be contained. Otherwise it will devour and imperil human 
freedom. From this conventional international human rights law perspective, the state is the 
classic savage.”157 In other words, the savage metaphor aims at the state in the enterprise of 
human rights. However, Mutua seems to think that, actually, the ferity element expressed against 
a state is just a pretext to attack the culture that sustains the state. “The state should be unmasked 
as being a mere proxy for the real savage. That leaves the historically accumulated wisdom, the 
culture of a society as the only other plausible place to locate the savage.”158 In other words, 
through the state, the human rights discourse targets the culture as the real savage.  
The deconstruction of this metaphor is threefold, as I move to a response from the 
multilayer conception. First, there seems to be inconsistency in Mutua’s argument. On the one 
hand, he rightly shows that human rights are Western because they were codified before most of 
the non-Western states existed. That being the case, then the state as the classical savage targeted 
by the human rights corpus is not a non-Western state, but rather a Western, and this is correct, 
because human rights originated from the horror of WWII which took place in the Western 
world. On the other hand, though, he seems to claim that human rights discourse targets non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Mutua, Human Rights, 22.  
158 Ibid. 
404	  
	  
	  
Western states, which were not yet existent at the moment of the codification of these 
instruments. In other words, if there is a state targeted by the human rights instruments it is the 
Western state and not the non-Western. Secondly, he claims that state as such is construction 
which expresses a culture, and therefore targeting it is to aim at the culture as the real savage. 
The argument goes in the same way as the precedent: by the time the human rights project is 
launched, the background culture behind the state that is targeted is the Western culture. 
Therefore, the critique of culture linked to human rights would be the Western culture and not 
the non-Western one. Thirdly, even the states that resulted from the decolonization followed the 
Western model, to the point that most of the postcolonial states are not an embodiment of their 
cultures. Mutua himself recognizes that non-Western states should not be given credibility since 
“many, if not the majority, do not even speak for their peoples or cultures.”159 Once again, if 
human rights is targeting a state and the culture behind the contemporary state, it is the Western 
state and culture.  
This should suffice to show that the metaphor does not convey the claim that the human 
rights doctrine is a continuation of imperialist ideology, because the latter located the savage 
outside the Western world, while if what precedes is valid, the savagery is inside the Western 
culture. But to add to this a perspective from the practical conception of human rights based on 
local practices, it has been noted several times that the human rights purpose does not target a 
particular source of threat, but rather they empower victims to resist any source of threat to their 
basic interests. It is not against Western or non-Western culture, but against any threat wherever 
it might come from. The threat can be a states or non-states agent, and human rights empower 
those threatened in order to resist.  
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Although these arguments seem convincing at the theoretical level, Mutua presents 
examples that might be more compelling. The first one is the campaign against some cultural 
practices using CEDAW by some INGOs, such as female circumcision (usually labelled as 
Female Genital Mutilation—FGM—in human rights activism) and dowry as focusing on non-
Western cultures to stigmatize them. He writes, “images of practices such as ‘female genital 
mutilation,’ dowry burnings, and honor killings have come to frame the discourse, and in that 
vein stigmatize non-Western cultures.”160 The second example is the insistence on liberal 
democracy as the model of political institutions to be emulated by all non-Western cultures, even 
conditioning the financial aid. “When it rejects non-Western political culture as undemocratic, 
the human rights corpus raises the specter of political savagery.”161 When the Western states and 
INGOs push for these issues using human rights, Mutua believes that it is a clear sign that the 
human rights project has “picked up where European colonial missionaries left off. Savagery in 
this circumstance acquires a race—the black, the dark, or non-Western race.”162 
These examples present a strong case and are able to resurrect the racial side of human 
rights that had appeared to be satisfactorily dealt with.  However, as strong cases as they might 
look like at the first glance, the practical conception of human rights based on local practices 
takes another direction on these issues. Concerning the case of CEDAW, the credibility of the 
CEDAW cannot be questioned on the basis that it is was a Western enterprise only. Without 
going through its drafting process, it was adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly whose 
majority, by that period, was composed of non-Western states. As Antonio Cassese observes, the 
periods “around the middle 1970s, sees the prevalence of the Third World and their launching of 
a new doctrine of human rights that eventually gains the upper hand and aims at supplanting the 
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views previously upheld by the General Assembly.” 163 That is why the Third World preferred 
the General Assembly rather than forum the Security Council that was/is still dominated by the 
Western powers.164 Once the normativity of this convention is removed, then it is clear that the 
issue is about its use by a certain category of actors.  
Now, from the multilayer conception of human rights, the use of such an international 
convention belongs to LNSA who engage in a reason-giving exchange with their supporters 
about those practices. From this perspective, the racial stain of the practice loses its justification. 
On the other part, however, the practical conception sides with Mutua if it becomes clear that the 
INGOs are bringing in issues that have not been translated into the local context in order to 
create the consciousness of the dark side of the practice. If a particular community has a cultural 
practice that the beneficiaries and the LNSA do not judge to be a threat to their basic interest, it 
should not be a concern of international human rights activism. Rather, it can be a starting point 
of conversation between international activism and the local actors in order to create 
consciousness about the evil side of the practice. Until then, it has to be left to these local actors. 
The whole point of the multilayer conception is that the human rights struggle has to be carried 
out firstly by the beneficiaries, if one is not instituting an unhealthy paternalism. Moreover, 
without the collaboration of these local actors, there is no possible effectiveness to be 
expected.165 
As to the Western critique of non-Western governments as undemocratic and making it a 
condition for foreign aid, there are two ways to respond to this use of human rights. On the one 
hand, these examples are empirical and do not exhaust the normativity of human rights practice, 
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especially that they do not document the way human rights are used in other parts of the world. 
For instance, the European Union imposes the respect for human rights to all its new members, 
and these are not “black, the dark, or non-Western race.” On the other hand, as I have already 
mentioned, the human rights’ main goal is not to play the foreign policy in international 
relations, but international relations can serve the human rights’ purpose. In that sense, a country 
can decide to put into its foreign policy human rights and democratic governance as part of its 
interests, as another can busy itself with expanding its economic power or military cooperation. 
These states’ interests do not affect the purpose of human rights and therefore, human rights 
normativity remains intact. If local beneficiaries do not think that such a model of governance is 
part of their basic interests, human rights play their role of empowering them to resist it. Since 
states care more about their interests than advancing certain moral goals, one should not expect 
to get a financial aid after refusing its conditionality. Once more, this is an empirical example; 
otherwise in an ideal theory that presupposes equality of states and their economic sufficiency, 
this case would not occur.  
All in all, the first term of the metaphor, which is itself a metaphor, does not support that 
human rights are an imperialist ideology, if one understands the human rights from local 
practices. The second term of the SVS metaphor, is the victim. This is also another metaphor. 
Mutua rightly observes that the victim is central to human rights project. He states, “without the 
victim there is no savage or savior, and the entire human rights enterprise collapses.”166 The 
problem is not only that there is the centrality; there is also/especially the way the victim is 
presented as helpless, poor, powerless and without any capability remaining. The victim is 
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presented “as a helpless innocent who has been abused directly by the state, its agents, or 
pursuant to an offensive cultural or political practice.”167 
The human rights project understood from local practices does not need the savage to 
exist. However, Mutua is on target to notice that the human rights doctrine emerges from the 
WWII which made victims, and the human rights project has a goal to prevent those atrocities to 
happen again. In a way, that makes the difference between the “modern” and “contemporary” 
paradigm of rights. According to Baxi, the modern paradigm did not link human rights to the 
suffering. Rather, hiding suffering was part of the whole modern human rights enterprise, while 
the contemporary paradigm takes into account these experience of suffering and cruelty 
seriously, and therefore makes a goal to resist them. In his words, “making human suffering 
invisible was the hallmark of ‘modern’ human rights formation. Suffering was made invisible 
because large masses of colonized peoples were not regarded as sufficiently human or even as 
potentially human.”168 This is an important observation, because the human is recovered from 
recognizing his/her suffering. The colonial project did not take it into account suffering, for it 
was not designed for the victims, since these ones were not even allowed the visibility. In 
contrast to that, “the post-Holocaust and post-Hiroshima/Nagasaki angst registers a normative 
horror at human violation. The ‘contemporary’ human rights discursivity is rooted in the 
illegitimacy of all forms of the politics of cruelty.”169 The contemporary human rights doctrine 
was born from the attempt to refuse the banality of human suffering.  
In that sense, Mutua is right to observe that a human rights project takes seriously the 
victim, and the practical conception based on local practices subscribes to this understanding. 
However, it does not present a victim as helpless and human rights are not a saving power 
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brought by an external savior. From the nature and purpose of human rights understood from the 
multilayer conception’s point of view, human rights empower the victims to emancipate 
themselves from the sources of harm. It might be a state, as it might be a non-state agent as well. 
Moreover, the state is integrated in a network of actors concerned with making this resistance 
effective. Thus, by making local actors the keystone of human rights practice, the multilayer 
conception eschews the presentation of victims in “a degree of neediness and passivity that fails 
to capture the dimensions of agency available to victims.”170 Rather, it makes victims a subject 
of human rights, and by that, “a subject of his or her fate, a political actor in his or her own 
rights, capable of harnessing unusual energies and determination to the pursuit of survival.”171 
From this perspective, even the second metaphor does not offer a support that human rights is an 
imperialist ideology.  
If the response developed until now from the multilayer conception to the two first SVS 
metaphors stands, then its third term, itself another metaphor, should not require a long 
argument. Indeed, as Mutua acknowledges it, without the victim there is no savior. However, I 
have conceded that the contemporary paradigm of human rights also takes into account the 
victim. Hence, although the practical conception from the local practices does not present the 
victim in a helpless situation, it is still important to look at this third metaphor.  
For Mutua, the savior metaphor encompasses the characteristics of missionary zeal and 
Eurocentricism, through which the Eurocentric values and norms are propagated by zealous 
saviors in the non-Western world. These missionaries are the United Nations, the Western states 
and Western Institutions, as well as INGOs. The savior metaphor constitutes the summit of the 
ideological side of the human rights project, for these saviors pretend to save the victims using 
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human rights while they are spreading Western norms under the guise of universality. And 
“inherent to any universalizing creed is an unyielding faith in the superiority of at least the belief 
of the proselytizer over those potential converts, if not over the person of the convert.”172 In other 
words, the savior metaphor resides in the universalization of Western norms by the zealous 
United Nations, Western Powers and International Institutions which are pro-Western.  
It is true that the United Nations reaffirmed its faith in the fundamental human rights173 
and enshrined in its purpose equal rights and self-determination of all peoples.174 It might also be 
true that Western countries and international institutions insist on human rights in their foreign 
policy,175 and INGOs might be advocating a certain category of rights than others. However, 
from the multilayer conception of human rights, they are not the initiators or the cornerstones of 
the human rights practice. The victims as beneficiaries of human rights effectiveness are the ones 
who use human rights instruments to resist. That is the first point to be mentioned. Secondly, 
these norms are not posited as universal, and are not adopted because of that. Rather, it is 
because of their function in the resistance against any threat to basic interests that they are 
incorporated into different cultural normative systems. Thirdly, these three agents are integrated 
into a web of actors and they contribute according to the call received from local actors who are 
not seen as helpless, but rather resisters. Fourthly, the practice conceptualized through the 
multilayer model operates on the lexical order, that is, the international community intervenes 
only when the subaltern levels call upon them. In that sense, they cannot be saviors because the 
victims are not in need of their saving power—that they actually do not have! At the best, they 
are cooperative to a larger practice involving many actors, some more effective than others 
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depending on cases and contexts. They cannot universalize any cultural norms, because they are 
not the primary actors in the practice, and the local actors who resort to human rights to express 
their grievance do not do so because they want to universalize them. Some did not even know or 
care about until their situation required it. Hence, they are less preoccupied by human rights 
universality than their capacity to resist what threatens their basic interests. If this argumentation 
is convincing, it follows that human rights do not function as an imperialist ideology because 
they do not act to legitimate a hidden interest of an absent agent. Rather, they offer a new means 
to those resisting against injustices, oppression and inequalities.  
Once the metaphor itself is deconstructed, it remains to be seen what its content becomes. 
Indeed, for Mutua, the content of the metaphor is that human rights project has the goal of 
propagating liberal culture by universalizing its norms, because the human rights doctrine is 
rooted in a liberal culture. As he writes, “the postwar elaboration and codification of human right 
norms has been the process of the universalization of liberalism and its outgrowth, Western 
political democracy,”176 which led to “a holy trinity: liberalism, democracy and human rights.”177 
This is to say that human rights are mainly civic and political.  
Before answering this claim from the multilayer conception, this is certainly reductive 
because the doctrine of human rights contains more than just civic and political rights. The 
UDHR itself contains many generations of rights, but in addition to it, there are economic, social 
and political rights, child’s rights, women’s rights, to mention but a few, and these are not 
particularly civic and political. Furthermore, while human rights historicity as Western is 
granted, it does not follow that the West is ideologically unified. The proof is the ideological 
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tensions that characterized the debates about the different human rights instruments.178 
Therefore, one cannot qualify the whole human rights corpus as liberal. As to those rights of 
liberal origin such as civil and political rights, when they are adopted outside a liberal culture, 
the multilayer conception contends that liberal justification is one among many reasons those 
who adopt human rights may have. In essence, it admits a pluralist justification. Therefore, if a 
particular situation adopts liberal civil and political rights, its justification will come from the 
contestation between those for and those against such rights. Mutua’s take on this point is only 
understandable on the backdrop of his savior metaphor, because then, these rights are being 
imposed imperialistically. But once one shifts the attention to the local actors who adopt them, it 
becomes obvious that to challenge their choice will require a reason-giving process, through 
which the partakers engage in a respectful argumentation. Put otherwise, once the metaphor is 
deconstructed, its content also becomes debatable.  
d). Reopening the Debate and A Response to the Imperialist Crusaders 
If the multilayer conception of human rights allows another subtext of human rights 
narrative and if, from human rights practice from local practices, the metaphor itself does not 
convey the practice as such, it is a legitimate question to ask whether one can continue to 
maintain that the human rights corpus is a vehicle of an imperialist ideology. At the same time, 
the goal of this dissertation is not only to attempt a response to the critique of human rights as an 
imperialist ideology, but also to ensure that human rights are not justified from their possible 
imperialistic use. Hence, this section deals with these aspects of the question.  
The first argument—to call human rights practice an imperialist ideology—is the fact that 
it operates like the civilizing mission which covered morally the exploitive and dominative 
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ambitions of the Western powers over the rest of the world. Following the above discussion 
however, the two concepts had different origins and different purposes. While both originate in 
the Western world, the civilizing mission that animated the imperialism and colonialism at the 
end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries was motivated by political, 
economic and demographic problems. As Arendt observes, “imperialism and its idea of 
unlimited expansion seemed to offer a permanent remedy to a permanent evil.”179 On the other 
hand, the contemporary human rights doctrine comes from the aftermath of WWII as an attempt 
to remedy these evils. In this sense, both the purpose and the addressee of the civilizing mission 
and human rights are different. For the civilizing mission, the purpose was to elevate inferior 
races and backward civilizations to an upper class of civilization by the superior race, while 
human rights purpose is to ban these evils first where they happened: the Western world. Human 
rights are not first conceived for “them” the uncivilized by “us” the civilized. They are an 
attempt to uproot the thorn of uncivilization within every culture, starting with the one that was 
claimed to bear the beacon of civilization by the civilizing mission.  
An objection can be raised here since the contemporary paradigm of human rights is 
based on inclusion, proclaiming those rights to be for all peoples and every person,180 and yet it 
is being argued that they are a response to particular circumstances. Why do they need to be 
exported to other cultures which did not suffer the same evil? One might respond to this 
objection by resorting to Kant’s observation that “because a (narrower or wider) community 
widely prevails among the Earth’s people, a transgression of rights in one place in the world is 
felt everywhere.”181 However, from the multilayer conception, it would be enough to show that, 
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although the human rights corpus extends beyond its origin’s audience, their effectiveness 
depends on their acceptance and adoption by the local actors. In a way, since it does not rely on a 
presupposed universality of human rights, the conception of human rights from local practices 
prevents the exportation of human rights by insisting on the role played by local actors in the 
human rights practice, independently of its historical and/or ideological origin, because it focuses 
on the human rights function in different cultural settings. From this perspective, the debate is 
reopened at local levels where human rights are disputed and challenged, and not between those 
who are accused of imposing human rights, but rather those who use human rights to resist and 
those who resist them for their own political agenda.182 
Human rights practice was also called an imperialist ideology because it promotes the 
racial assumptions of the White having an ontological duty to civilize the non-White races. This 
was especially exemplified by the SVS metaphor. Following the discussion of the metaphor and 
how the multilayer conception emphasizes the local actors, the claim that the human rights 
corpus is playing an imperialistic role because of its racial biases becomes hard to justify, and 
when it is invoked, it is confronted to those who adopt human rights as a resistance discourse, 
which does not have space for racial prejudices, unless the local situation is itself racially 
structured. But here it cannot be imputed to human rights as such, as human rights can be used to 
resist racial injustices in these same particular circumstances.  
Another difference between human rights and the civilizing mission as an imperialist 
ideology was the belief in the civilization progress. The civilizing mission was built on the firm 
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conviction of improving the natives’ conditions. For that reason, colonialism—despite its evil 
side—was justified as a necessary sacrifice to be paid in order to access civilization. And of 
course, such a conviction was rooted on the hierarchical anthropology, with clear natural duties 
and attributes distributed naturally to each category. Human rights doctrine does not have those 
categories; it rather presents itself as a common enterprise to achieve a common goal. In the text, 
one cannot decipher a justification of a category of humanity as superior to others. Empirically, 
however, with international institutions and the big Western powers dominating them, critics 
would be justified to raise their concern when human rights are used by these actors to cover up 
their own interest and aggrandize their political influence on the rest. Even at this level, however, 
the multilayer conception reopens the debate by showing that those actors are only one layer of 
actors involved in human rights practice, and therefore their misuse of human rights cannot 
invalidate the whole practice as imperialistic. Moreover, human rights practice offers resources 
to resist those kinds of states’ behavior that tarnish human rights practice as such.  
The last area of contestation open by the confrontation of human rights as imperialist 
ideology with the multilayer conception of human rights is the role of international law. During 
the colonial era, international law offered a legal scheme in order to legally legitimate the 
imperialist project. It was rooted in the civilizing mission and it sustained its legal existence. In 
the same way, human rights have been incorporated into an international human rights law which 
serves Western powers to disseminate their liberal ideology, especially through the international 
institutions. As Mutua asserts, “even the international law of human rights, arguably the most 
benign of all the areas of international law, seeks the universalization of Eurocentrism.”183 The 
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multilayer conception opens up the debate about this claim from different perspectives. First, 
while positive international law used imperialistically was state-centered and only limited to the 
Western conception of state, the multilayer conception of international human rights law is 
decentered from the state and it is open to different forms of political institutions. Secondly, the 
imperialistic international law did not take into account the consent of non-Western 
governments, while the international human rights law relies on all states for signing and 
ratifying these texts, independently of their origin. Thirdly, all states have equal freedom to 
introduce declarations or reservations, and even withdraw from these human rights treaties; 
which was not the case with the imperialistic international law. Indeed, the colonialized 
territories where not recognized by international law, and therefore could not have a say about it. 
Fourthly and most importantly, non-states actors and beneficiaries participate in the production 
and practice of international human rights law from their local situations,184 which was not the 
case with the imperialist international law. Moreover, it has already been demonstrated that 
human rights doctrine contains more than just liberal rights. In that sense, it is not obvious 
whether the fact of adopting a legal form through the international human rights law, human 
rights corpus is actually continuing the imperialist ideology, although one can be tempted to 
assert so after looking at the way some international institutions use human rights to advance 
liberal goals—both economic and political.185 The multilayer conception acknowledges such a 
claim but points out that international actors are but one, and not even the first one of those 
engaged in human rights practice with the goal of making them effective. In addition, human 
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rights still offer a better means to resist their own abuse, by providing a language to local actors 
that express these grievances.  
From what has been said so far, even in the case of the multilayer conception might not 
satisfactorily answer all the questions posed by the critique of human rights as an imperialistic 
ideology, it reopens the debate about the claim, by shifting a critique of human rights from the 
binary White-non-White, Western-non-Western, to the local contexts in which they are 
translated and adopted by those who want to challenge the sources of a threat to their basic 
interests. With the same token, such a practical conception of human rights from local practices 
unclogs human rights debate from cultural battle in order to make it a challenges to all cultures—
to use Mahoney’s words. As such, it also opens a window to address those who champion the 
imperialistic use of human rights.  
According to this view, human rights are of a Western origin and are essentially liberal; 
therefore it is a moral duty for liberal states to make sure they are enforced worldwide. For 
Donnelly, they set new standards of civilization, as did once the civilizing mission, and share the 
same model of legitimation. He asserts, “despite the fatal tainting of the language of 
‘civilization’ by abuses carried out under (and by the exponents of) the classic standard of 
civilization, internationally recognized human rights share a similar legitimating logic.”186 That 
legitimating logic gives then the yesteryear missionaries of the civilizing mission the same duty 
to stand for civilization. That is why the “European human rights initiatives have been 
missionary in the best sense of the term, seeking to spread the benefits of (universal) values 
enjoyed at home.”187 The salvation vocation of the liberal culture is expressed in its clearest 
terms and its apostles are identified. Europe gains back its natural duty to enlighten the dark 
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corners of the earth. Those who invented “universal values” and are enjoying them at home 
cannot sit idly while knowing of parts of the world that do not have the same chance. Hence, 
“fear and historic guilt, arising from the moral blindness and abuses of missionaries operating 
under earlier standards of civilization, should not immobilize us in the face of abuses of power 
by murderous dictators hiding behind the legal norm of sovereignty or a claim to radical cultural 
difference.”188 Human rights have to be adopted by will or imposed by whip, as was the 
civilizing mission. With such a tone, human rights imperialism is promoted in the open!  
This is a view of human rights that comforts the Third World critics of human rights as 
an imperialist ideology, because human rights practice follows the same logic of legitimation as 
the civilizing mission, and the yesterday’s missionaries are reminded of their natural duty of 
proclaiming this new gospel, regardless of international law and in total disrespect of other 
cultural understandings. The conception of human rights based on local practices rejects this 
missionary zeal in the human rights practice, because the latter is founded on local actors who 
take human rights discourse as their own to resist any threat to their basic interests. Moreover, 
this conception affirms the equal value of all human rights, although all are not practiced at the 
same time in every context. In this sense, human rights are not just liberal; rather, human rights 
doctrine includes rights of different ideological origins. In addition and more fundamentally, 
contemporary human rights do not share the same logic of legitimation as did the civilizing 
mission. The purpose of human rights is not to oppress and exploit the non-Western world; the 
human rights project does not exclude non-White people because they are of inferior status; 
human rights corpus does not entrust Europe as its guardian. If anything, human rights remind 
the Westerners their responsibility for what befell to the world in the twentieth century, and if 
they are sensitive to the respect of human rights, it should be less for exporting the fruit of 
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enjoying them at home rather than the fear of witnessing their history in other parts of the world. 
The multilayer conception of human rights relies on the local actors to be the champions of the 
protection of their rights, and that is why there is no place for their imperialistic use. If the 
Western countries insist on the respect for human in their foreign policy, it is considered as 
representing just one way of promoting human rights; it is not the only one. Furthermore, those 
who accept and adopt human rights discourse do it for various reasons, more than just because 
they are liberal. In Rawls’s vocabulary, liberalism is as comprehensive as other sources of 
justification, be they religious, metaphysical or philosophical. If one adopts the practical 
conception of human rights based on local practices, there is no possibility of imposing human 
rights, for such an imposition will be resisted with the human rights discourse itself, as human 
rights are an empowerment for individuals or groups of individuals politically situated so that 
they can resist any source of threat to their basic interests.  
Once more, even if this practical conception might not respond satisfactorily to all the 
worries posed by the critique of human rights as imperialist ideology, and the imperialistic use of 
human rights, I believe it opens up another way of approaching these issues that is more 
promising for the effectiveness of human rights which, as Beitz rightly observes, “is a matter of 
its success in improving respect for human rights.”189 The remaining question is whether the 
same openness is available to the critique of humanitarian intervention as neocolonialism; that is 
the subject of the following section. 
5.4. Multilayer Conception and Humanitarian Intervention as Neocolonialism 
Again as my second chapter established, the bone of contention in the humanitarian 
intervention is limited to the use of force by a singular or a group of states in order to protect 
human rights without the consent of the targeted state. Thus, humanitarian intervention is 
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narrower than the external intervention which can take different forms, such as diplomatic or 
economic. Furthermore, because it is mostly concerned with military intervention, the main 
actors involved are states as they have the monopoly of violence. That is why violence 
challenges the multilayer conception which essentially includes many actors with a main focus 
on the local actors in the practice of human rights. In other words, humanitarian intervention is 
state-centered while the conception of human rights from local practices is decentered from the 
state. Can it suggest another way of approaching humanitarian intervention?  
a). Moral Ground 
To start with, it is worth recalling that even those who criticize humanitarian intervention 
agree that there might be situations which call for a moral duty to intervene. For example, 
Ayoob, although a strong opponent of humanitarian intervention, acknowledges that in face of 
tragedies and genocide “a moral case can certainly be made regarding the need for humanitarian 
intervention and the violation of sovereignty that such intervention may necessarily entail.”190 
The question, therefore, is not the absence of a moral case for intervention; it is rather that the 
practice of that intervention in the name of human rights undermines the very moral case that 
was supposed to legitimate it, especially when one follows the justifications that it is given. Now, 
the first delegitimating factor of humanitarian intervention is that it relies on powerless victims in 
need of an external savior, whereby the victim is not a subject of rights but rather an object of 
pity. Such portrayal of a victim takes away the emancipatory power of human rights. According 
to Mamdani, such a discourse “seeks to turn victims into so many proxies.” 191 
From the multilayer perspective, the critique is already taken care of as discussed in the 
second metaphor of victim (5.3). Fundamentally conceived as empowering victims to resist any 
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threat to their basic interests, human rights can no longer be accused of presenting victims as 
helpless. Victims are rather standing for their rights and that is the purpose of the human rights 
project. Such a conception is the antipode of views that victims “have no rights to fight for.”192 
Not only do they have rights but they are the first responsible to fight for them; others can only 
come to strengthen their fight, and not fight in place or on behalf of them. The question, 
however, remains concerning how a humanitarian intervention can be justified from this 
perspective, without endorsing a neocolonialism.  
Before responding to it, there are other factors that undermine the legitimacy of 
humanitarian intervention, such as its impartial application. Only states labelled “rogue” or 
“failed” suffer a humanitarian intervention, which ends up focusing on the newly formed states 
which are still unstable, and most of the time from the non-Western world. Again Mamdani 
remarks that “looked at closely and critically, what we are witnessing is not a global but a partial 
transition. The transition from the old system of sovereignty to a new humanitarian order is 
confined to entities defined as ‘failed’ or ‘rogue’ states.”193 This is one of the clearer indications 
that humanitarian intervention is another colonialism, because the world is again divided 
between those stable states with the mission to stabilize the rest that are morally corrupt and 
politically unstable.  
Still another element that undermines the moral soundness of the humanitarian 
intervention is the emphasis of political and civil rights as worthy of international protection 
while others receive little attention, if not completely neglected. For instance, Tesón argues that 
“qualitatively, only the violation of basic civil and political rights warrant humanitarian 
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intervention.”194 Not only does such an attitude put human rights at different scales, but it also 
shields economic crimes from international concern. For the critics of humanitarian intervention, 
it is a source of focusing only on the crimes of non-Western states, and passing under total 
silence those crimes committed against them.195 
Since these critiques are drawn from the actual practice of human rights, they are hard to 
dispute. Rather, to respond to these concerns, I suggest another justification of humanitarian 
intervention from the multilayer conception, and from that, see whether these fears would 
dissipate. To start with, the practical conception from local practices admits cases where a 
humanitarian intervention can be morally justified. This is not particular to it, since even those 
who oppose it agree on this point. The question, to restate it, is how such an intervention can be 
conducted without being seen as a neocolonialism. Hence, from the multilayer conception, the 
first condition is that any external intervention has to be called upon by local actors, the victims 
themselves. Consequently, humanitarian intervention comes as a contribution to a resistance 
carried out by local actors. Second, its aim is not to protect them, but rather to strengthen them in 
their resistance to protect their rights. In Mégret’s words, it is about “help ‘to help 
themselves’.”196 Although resistance here can take several meanings, I remain in the paradigm of 
the state disposing the monopoly of violence. Therefore, the resistance of local actors here is 
rather non-violent, even if UDHR understands that one might have recourse to rebellion as a last 
resort to protect one’s rights.197 Once these two pre-requirements are fulfilled, the intervention 
itself should be taken by groups of states and follow the principle of subsidiarity. As Hebert 
Petzold defines it, “the principle of subsidiarity is generally understood to mean that in a 
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community of societal ‘pluralism’ the larger social unit should assume responsibility for 
functions only insofar as the smaller unit is unable to do so.”198 In our model, three actors are 
legally entitled to use military force: states, regional bodies and international institutions such as 
the UN through the Security Council. Hence, applied to the multilayer conception, the principle 
of subsidiarity means that, since humanitarian intervention is invoked because the targeted state 
is either involved in the atrocities, or unable or unwilling to stop them, the next responsible body 
to undertake such an intervention should be the regional bodies, starting with the smallest in 
which the state in question is a member. If this first level of intervention fails, then the next level 
steps in, and so on until the situation is abated.  
The subsidiarity principle does not, however, preclude the contribution of other actors to 
the success of such humanitarian intervention. Rather, since in addition to the political 
willingness, humanitarian intervention is also about capability, other actors more able might 
support this regional intervention so that it brings the intended result. From the international law 
perspective, chapter VIII of the UN Charter concerning the role of regional organizations should 
be more and more taken as the key text in terms of protecting human rights, instead of Chapter 
VII which puts so much trust in the Security Council.  
The advantage of this practice of humanitarian intervention is that it is realistic in the 
sense that it takes into account states’ interests that are usually accused to be behind 
humanitarian intervention. Indeed, usually the regional organizations are mostly economic or 
security organizations, and the protection of human rights becomes somewhat instrumental, 
rather than a moral goal. However, most of the time, these organizations include human rights 
among their principles and therefore becomes the moral reason for intervening. For instance, 
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ECOWAS (Economic Community of Western African States) that was first developed as an 
economic organization of Western African countries has evolved into a regional organization 
that protects human rights and is proactive to defend democracy and good governance as they 
contribute to its initial goal.199 Furthermore, as these organizations are, most of the time, formed 
according to cultural affinity, economic interests, historical common background and geographic 
proximity, their meddling into the internal affairs of their members will unlikely be interpreted as 
a neocolonialism, since the latter characterizes rather the Western interference into the non-
Western countries.  
A problem might arise when the regional organization itself is not interested in the 
protection of human rights, but the multilayer conception avoids that impasse because its very 
meaning is to include many actors with different leverage at different levels. Moreover, it is 
state-decentered because a state can only protect human rights because it is under pressure; 
otherwise it will be for its rational interests. Therefore, because local actors are the binder of a 
human rights practice even when it comes to humanitarian intervention, their call to regional 
organizations has to be accompanied with the interconnection with regional and international 
non-states actors so that they can put pressure to their local governments to act.  
Would such a practice of humanitarian intervention dissipate the doubts expressed by the 
critics about its moral legitimacy? While at this stage it needs more development for concluding 
this question, at least this way of approaching it would require more justification for saying that 
humanitarian intervention is partial because it symbolizes the powers targeting non-Western 
states. Indeed, since it would be regionally decided, it would become difficult to attribute that 
responsibility to external agents. It would also exclude the labelling of some states as ‘rogue’ and 
‘unstable’ waiting for the help of the stable ones to be fixed. As to the question that humanitarian 
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intervention focuses on non-Western crimes because it is only concerned with civil and political 
rights, this humanitarian intervention justified through the multilayer conception recognizes the 
equal qualitative value of all human rights, although not all would require a coercive 
intervention. Once more, the problem is about the tares that undermine the legitimacy of the 
practice when the cases have been judged worth of a military intervention. In this sense, the 
multilayer conception seems to redeem the moral ground for humanitarian intervention. 
However, does it satisfy all other worries?  
b). Agency 
The critics of humanitarian intervention also highlight the ambiguity surrounding 
humanitarian intervention decision-making. Who are in charge of evaluating the situation and 
make decision about a situation that is a moral case for a humanitarian intervention, and who 
carries it out? As Frank asks, “who decides whether a situation has risen to the level of such 
crisis? Who defines the crisis is truly one of extreme necessity? Who decides whether the force 
deployed is appropriate and commensurate with the necessity? Who decides whether the motive 
of the intervener is humanitarian, as distinct from self-aggrandizing?”200 Legally speaking, one 
would think of the UNSC, but we saw that there is no case unanimously agreed upon by scholars 
that the UNSC authorized a humanitarian intervention for the protection of human rights. 
Furthermore, this body relies on the willing and able states to intervene which, in most of the 
cases, are Western powers. Finally, the history of humanitarian intervention shows a pattern that 
Western states intervened in weak states that are mostly non-Western. The human rights era has 
not been able to extirpate such a view, since the debate on humanitarian intervention has also 
opposed Western liberal democracies against non-Western states reluctant to follow such a 
practice. According to Pitts, “debate around humanitarian intervention often occupy the 
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perspective of those powerful states that regard themselves as liberal and democratic, asking 
what ‘we’ liberal democrats should do about the problems out there.”201 
A humanitarian intervention acted according to the multilayer conception seems to defuse 
that tension between the Western liberal democracies and non-Western powers. Indeed, as it 
functions on the subsidiarity principle, the Western states would be solicited only in a larger 
international coalition and even this eventuality would be activated only if the regional initiatives 
have failed. By its very nature, the humanitarian intervention proposed by the practical 
conception of human rights forbids any unilateral intervention, without the mandate of any 
suprastatal institution. This is to avoid any imperialist whims that might reestablish colonialism. 
As to the question of who decides whether a situation is of extreme necessity, the agency is 
restored to the local actors who are in constant contact with those massive violations, in 
collaboration with other actors. Even at this level, decision-making would imply many voices so 
that the interests of the victims be represented by themselves and be included in the designing of 
the solution. Concerning the decision about the forces needed for such an extreme necessity case, 
it would depend on the regional body, before it appeals to a larger coalition. It seems to me that 
such a process would quench the pattern of humanitarian intervention as a task of Western liberal 
democracies against non-Western, because it is regionally decided and involves local and 
regional actors, sometimes with the help of other partners, but only when requested, and not as 
the police of the world.  
It would also reorient the debate about the international community. Indeed, the critics of 
humanitarian intervention as neocolonialism found their claim on the fact that it has been always 
carried in the name of the international community. Ideally, the latter is supposed to be the 
community of all states. Some authors even include regional organizations, civil society and the 
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private sector.202 However, as I have already underlined, the practice of humanitarian 
intervention shows another reality and some proponents of it advocate for only Western liberal 
democracies to endorse it as their responsibility. That is the reason why for critics, the 
international community is synonymous to the West and is opposed to the Third World. In 
Orford’s words, “the Third World has long been imagined as the double or other of the ‘the 
West’, now the international community.”203 With such background, any humanitarian 
intervention carried out by the international community into the non-Western is understood to be 
the West intervening into the Third World, a scenario that is reminiscent of the colonial 
enterprise. 
The multilayer conception admits the international community but only reduced to the 
international institutions created by states, but the latter is not the main agent in the execution of 
the humanitarian intervention. Although ideally, those institutions function through the inter-
cooperation of all states; empirically, they can be manipulated by the powerful states for their 
self-interest. That is why the humanitarian intervention suggested here integrates the 
international community into a web of actors and is to be directly involved only if the subaltern 
initiatives have been exhausted. From that perspective, humanitarian intervention is not supposed 
to be carried out in the name of the so-called international community, as Ayoob argues.204 
Rather, it would be carried out in name of the victims who command it and should be enacted by 
the closest possible level. 
Such a practice of humanitarian intervention would also curb the suspicion that victims 
are only proxies and not the real motives of humanitarian intervention. Indeed, instead of 
external actors defining what is happening to the victims, whether it is a genocide or counter-
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insurgency, in order to intervene, the victims define themselves the evil they are combatting and 
the external agents contribute to help them “help themselves”—to use Mégret’s words. They are 
the first initiator of the resistance against the violation of their rights and the external actors only 
participate in the resistance. Victims are not voiceless, and external actors should listen to them 
instead of imposing a discourse on them. Moreover, while there might be national interests 
involved in such a humanitarian intervention—I believe there cannot be a totally disinterested 
action from a state—these interests are avowed and not hidden. The regional organizations 
pressure their members because they jeopardize their common interests and that is why they can 
have recourse to military intervention in one of their members. In that sense, the state’s interests 
do not overshadow the victims’ voice; rather they presuppose it.  
Decentralizing humanitarian intervention from the international organization to closer 
regional organizations would force those opposing humanitarian intervention as a neocolonialism 
to find another narrative, because the latter is based on the fact that the international community 
is mostly conceived as the West. For instance, China rejected the humanitarian intervention 
principle, arguing that “the Chinese are very familiar with such ‘humanitarian intervention’ in 
their past and see it as a tool that was often used by advanced countries to conquer so-called 
‘barbarous ones’ and to impose ‘civilized standards’.”205 In other words, humanitarian 
intervention is not opposed in principle, but because it recalls a bad memory due to those who 
would carry it out. When regional organizations take responsibility for their military 
intervention, such a historical rhetoric would lose its power and new arguments would have to be 
found if a humanitarian intervention is to be opposed. It might even play a positive role in 
gaining support for humanitarian intervention from states that usually reject it, on that ground 
that they would be involved in the decision-making and in its execution.  
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Scholars such as Ayoob and Mamdani mention the fact that the states usually requiring 
humanitarian intervention are still in a formation stage, as most of them are postcolonial states. 
For these scholars, those moments of violence are part of their maturing process, which might be 
hampered by the humanitarian intervention. That is why those states “are apprehensive of the 
new international activism and the developing norm of humanitarian intervention that could 
potentially threaten their status.”206 While not sharing this claim that postcolonial states have to 
go through egregious human rights violations for their stability, I can understand the fear of 
newly independent states that humanitarian intervention might open a door to a new form of 
colonialism, when it is carried out by the yesterday colonial masters. However, when it is 
planned and executed at the regional level, this fear would disappear, except if the case occurs in 
an area where there have been colonial antecedents—in such a case, the next level steps in. But 
in the normal case of regional organizations formed by states which were all under colonization, 
their participation in a humanitarian intervention might strengthen their formation as they assume 
their destiny and participate in fixing their own problem without involving their former 
colonizers. ECOWAS is again a good example in this, since it has been avant-garde in adopting 
instruments allowing it to deal with crises that might occur and threaten human rights. Sampson 
shows that the Western African Organization has reached a high level of dealing with its local 
problems in a manner more “encompassing and therefore conceive of diverse preventive, 
reactive and reconstructive peace and security objectives.”207 The organization does not wait 
until acts that shock humanity happen; rather “its mechanisms legitimize intervention in any 
conflict that has the potential to threaten the existence or stability of any democratic government 
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in the region.”208 And it has done so in many instances, “such as Sao Tome and Principe (2003), 
Guinea Bissau (2009) and Guinea Conakry (2008-2010)” and Ivory-Cost in 2010 when there 
erupted post-electoral violence.209 Had they been undertaken by the international community, 
these actions would have occasioned an outcry from those who suspect humanitarian 
intervention of neocolonialism when carried out by the international community.  
One can rightly make on observation that these are not thought to be cases of 
humanitarian intervention as narrowly defined by this study, which limits it to a military 
intervention for protecting human rights; for these interventions were conducted as peace 
interventions. While such an objection is appropriate, one would also highlight that to restore a 
democratic government is a human right in human rights doctrine, with other civil and political 
rights related to it. Furthermore, such interventions can also be interpreted as preventive 
interventions since it is in such circumstances that human rights are gravely violated.  
Hence, a humanitarian intervention carried out at the regional level gives better chance to 
answering the question of authors and decision-makers of humanitarian intervention. This is, 
however, only one aspect of the questions raised by humanitarian intervention, and the next 
section takes up some others. 
c). Normative Consequence 
Humanitarian intervention is also denounced because of its selective application, where 
situations almost similar receive different treatment. This is no longer a conflict between the 
great powers and the Third World states; rather it is between states in the same conditions, and 
yet the international community chooses to ignore it, while agitating its power for another. For 
Ayoob, that creates an acute problem “when these ‘representatives’ of the ‘international 
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community’ choose targets for intervention selectively while ignoring human rights violations of 
equal or greater magnitude elsewhere.”210 The examples abound from Rwanda to Iraq through 
Palestine. That leads to doubting the intention of those who decide it. Again, Ayoob observes 
that “the decision in 1991 to create a safe haven for the Kurds in Iraq but not in Turkey, where 
human rights of Kurds were being violated with equal severity, cast grave doubt on the sincerity 
of the intervening powers.”211 
These are facts that can hardly be ignored in considering an alternative justification for 
humanitarian intervention. While the latter arises from a moral ground, its implementation 
depends on pragmatic deliberation, because contexts and actors vary immensely. The political 
will needs to be accompanied with an availability of means to carry it out in a successful way. In 
that sense, one might understand that some cases might require more preparedness than others, 
and others might simply not be carried out because there is no prospect of success. But what 
scholars such as Ayoob denounce is the selectivity in cases of a real possibility of success, in 
which some are enforced and others are neglected because of political interests and diplomatic 
ties.  
This is a hard case also for a humanitarian intervention performed on the subsidiarity 
principle, for even in an organization it is always possible to find countries closer to each other 
than others, or countries in cold diplomatic relations such that the regional organizations do not 
come up with a decision to intervene. Nonetheless, because the practice itself is not limited to a 
sole actor, those are the moments when a higher level has to take over the case. At the least, this 
practice of a humanitarian intervention would remove the suspicion that countries are acting for 
hidden agenda, in that the regional organizations’ members would be motivated by mutual 
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interests, and therefore the decision would be expected to be taken together. In addition, because 
those organizations are usually formed of limited numbers of countries, the cases of intervention 
would be fewer than if only one international organization was in charge, and therefore that 
would minimize the occasion of selectivity.  
The consequence of the selectivity is the double standard in applying humanitarian 
intervention, through which some countries are treated favorably while others are harshly dealt 
with; some countries enjoy stronger diplomatic relations with the same Western powers which 
votes resolutions against human rights violations, without a following action. Some scholars call 
it “interventionism of choice” in which the “so-called Western humanitarian intervention and 
regime change in some countries, while the same Western democracies maintain excellent 
relations with other tyrannical regimes.”212 The humanitarian intervention implemented through 
the subsidiarity principle would avoid such criticism for two reasons. First, the accusation aims 
at the Western powers, which select where to intervene depending on their interests. From the 
subsidiarity principle, unless the humanitarian intervention is happening in the West, the latter 
would not play a leading role. Second, since the authors of the military intervention would be the 
states members deliberating together about a case, and adopting the appropriate measures, that 
process would minimize the occasion whereby double standards apply. Most importantly, local 
actors of the concerned states would be assuming a deciding role, and the contribution of other 
actors in the decision making also would allow more transparency and give hope for overcoming 
this double standard criticism.  
Through the same mechanism, the problem of labelling would take another direction. As 
Mamdani argues, the naming of the crime is important for legal reasons, for some crimes such as 
genocide rise to international responsibility, while the “war and counter-insurgency do not… for 
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they are understood as part of the exercise of sovereignty of states.”213 However, for the victims, 
it does not make a big difference. Taking the example of Darfur and Iraq which received 
different attention internationally, Mamdani observes that “if you were an Iraqi or a Darfuri, 
there was little to choose between the brutality of the violence unleashed in either instance.”214 
As a result, the combination of selectivity, double standards and labeling produce partiality in 
assessing and implementing humanitarian intervention. For not only does the labelling exclude 
some cases from humanitarian intervention, but at the same time it excuses its authors. Again 
from Mamdani’s observation, labelling “isolates and demonizes the perpetrators of one kind of 
mass violence, and at the same time confers impunity on perpetrators of other forms of mass 
violence.”215 
From a humanitarian intervention conceived and carried out by a regional organization, 
the labelling and partiality in assessment take another direction for a number of reasons. First, as 
already said, it is assumed that there would not be many crises occurring at the same time in the 
same organization that they have to decide whether one deserves more than the other a military 
intervention. If it happens, then the upper level would step in because it would mean that at the 
first level, the organization itself is not viable. Second, as it is conceived from the victims’ point 
of view, it would not have to wait for genocide and crimes against humanity to occur in order to 
have reason to intervene. Third, its implementation is pragmatically conceived and justified on 
utilitarian grounds; that is, states might not be more interested by human rights per se rather than 
the threat that such gross human rights violations might inflict to the purpose of the 
organization—most of the time, economic interests. That is the case with ECOWAS whose 
“utilitarian character of its mechanisms’ response to peculiar regional security challenges is 
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amply demonstrated by the Community’s consistent intervention in conflict situations brought 
about by ‘unconstitutional changes of government’.”216 Thus, while the international community 
is concerned with naming the crimes for legal reasons, in order to act or not, it leads to a partial 
assessment and selectivity in implementation of humanitarian intervention, and sometimes it 
comes late. From the victims’ point of view, the regional context offers an advantage as the legal 
context is already into place since human rights violations endanger its purpose. Moreover, as the 
repercussion of those disturbances usually affects neighboring countries, these would be more 
interested than others to see the crisis resolved for their own interest. That is why a humanitarian 
intervention based on the subsidiarity principle might be more timely than the one organized by 
the international community.  
The most challenging case brought to humanitarian intervention is the threat to the 
principle of state sovereignty. The opponents of coercive intervention believe that the classical 
understanding of state sovereignty as absolute abstention from external interference into internal 
state’s affairs, was the founding basis for the decolonization movement. According to Bricmont, 
the non-intervention principle was “the paper shield that the Third World believed could protect 
it from the West at the time of decolonization.”217 Removing that paper shield means reopening a 
door to the former colonizers, since so far, sovereignty “had acted as a restraint on the former’s 
interventionary instincts.”218 In other words, sovereignty understood through the non-
intervention principle functions as a stronghold of weak states against the strong ones. For that 
reason, Ayoob is worried that removing such a barrier would cause havoc internationally as well 
as internally. Internationally, Ayoob claims that the way humanitarian intervention is practiced 
“may end up detracting from the most essential instrument, the principle of sovereignty that has 
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been used for the maintenance of international order during the past four centuries.”219 Internally, 
if internal sovereignty is disturbed, it would engender internal disorder, which in turn, would 
affect human rights and international peace. In other words, humanitarian intervention might 
produce the contrary of the expected result.  
While I believe that a humanitarian intervention based on the principle of subsidiarity 
answers satisfactorily the first claim, it is not the case with the last two consequences. In this first 
case, since the actors would be states in regional contexts, the West would not have a prominent 
role to play, and therefore the fear of opening a floodgate to a neocolonialism would be 
dissipated. However, concerning the role played by state sovereignty in the stability of the 
international community, this is a strong claim that has some historical foundation, at least in the 
West. Ideally, humanitarian intervention in general is not a threat to state sovereignty since it is 
invoked because a state has failed in its mission of protecting the basic interests of its citizenry. 
In that sense, humanitarian intervention does not abolish domestic order, since it is called in to 
deal with an internal disorder. That is why, instead, since humanitarian intervention aims at 
restoring internal stability, it can be argued that it also contributes to the reestablishment of state 
sovereignty. Furthermore, it does not abolish the state sovereignty because after all, it is carried 
out by states. The same argument then holds for the claim that humanitarian intervention might 
destabilize the international order, for if there is internal order in states, there will not be need of 
humanitarian intervention, and therefore, the international order will not be disturbed. But if 
international order depends on the domestic stability of states, then it will be disturbed when 
there are egregious human rights violations in a given state. Humanitarian intervention is not the 
cause of this domestic upheaval; it only comes as a remedy to this state of affairs—whether it is 
efficacious remains an open question.  
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Chandler brings in another argument, though, about the danger of intervention language 
vis-à-vis the state sovereignty, especially as it is spelled out in the R2P emerging norm. 
According to him, as in this context state sovereignty means accountability to one’s population 
internally, and to the international community, externally, “this shift in ‘accountability’ clearly 
has major implications for sovereignty because a power which is ‘accountable’ to another 
external body clearly lacks sovereign authority.”220 Without discussing thoroughly this 
argument—since authority can admit degree—it suffices here to show how a humanitarian 
intervention based on the subsidiarity principle eschew that problem. First, in this model, the 
international community does not assume a tutorial role. On the contrary, states retain their 
independence and intervene in protecting human rights because they are concerned with their 
own interests. Second, the conception, deliberation and execution of humanitarian intervention 
are located at the regional level, in which states members enjoy a formal equality. Such a process 
does not presuppose the abolition of state sovereignty nor does it occasion its death. Actually, 
humanitarian intervention might improve internal sovereignty as it participates in the restoration 
of internal stability, without subduing the state to a supra-power to which it has to be 
accountable.  
Those are some the questions raised by the critics of humanitarian intervention, which 
lead them to qualify it as neocolonialism. The remaining question now is whether the model 
suggested from the multilayer conception of human rights, would not be accused of the same 
stain. 
d). Taking up the Challenge 
The neocolonialism claim is formulated from two directions. On the one hand, the critics 
of humanitarian intervention detect a similarity between the way it is conducted and classical 
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imperialism. As Faeron and Laitin illustrate, “as with classical imperialism, we increasingly see 
the strongest states taking over, in part or whole, the governance of territories where Western-
style politics, economics, and administration are underdeveloped.”221 Furthermore, humanitarian 
intervention is also justified by the protection of “vulnerable groups” from their leaders, the same 
way the colonization was advocated. As Mamdani notes, “when it came to lands not yet 
colonized, such as South Asia and a large part of Africa, they highlighted local atrocities and 
pledged to protect victims against rulers.”222 This aspect of the critique is based on the fact that 
so far the so-called humanitarian intervention has been carried by big powers, a scenario that 
cannot lack to recall the colonial period. However, the parallelism between humanitarian 
intervention and colonial imperialism is worsened by certain justifications that conceive it in the 
same terms as those used to justify colonization, whereby the Westerns-civilized brought 
civilization to the barbarian non-Western. Indeed, proponents of humanitarian intervention such 
as Tesón argue that tyrants are today’s version of uncivilized culture, and Orwin sets Western 
against non-Western when it comes to humanitarian intervention. As he puts it, 
“humanitarianism is a distinctly Western development. With rare exceptions, humanitarian 
intervention is an encounter between Western or Westernized nations and non-Western ones, 
between lands where liberal democracy and technology have triumphed and lands where they 
have not.”223 Add to this speeches of political figures such as former British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair, that humanitarian intervention is a vehicle to spread Western ideology,224 those opposing 
humanitarian intervention have strong reasons to suspect humanitarian intervention as it is 
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practiced as a neocolonialism; that is, a remake of the colonial undertaking. But would it be the 
case with the humanitarian intervention practiced on the principle of subsidiarity? 
As I have shown several times, such a humanitarian intervention would not involve 
Western powers in the first place, unless it takes place in the Western region. Otherwise, it would 
not oppose the Western against non-Western states, as the states members of the closest regional 
organization would be in charge of conceiving and executing it. In that case, it would not be true 
that the strong powers take over the weak ones in the Western colonial style, because the 
motivation would be less to occupy the country for particular interests rather than to stabilize the 
country for its own interest and for the benefit of the whole region. This would then be different 
from spreading Western ideologies as Blair had hoped. At the same time, though, it is inevitable 
that strong countries might contribute more than weaker ones for practical reasons, but I do not 
think it would stain the legitimacy of such a humanitarian intervention.  
Concerning the protection of the victims from their rulers as the purpose of both 
humanitarian intervention and colonialism, it is hard to find another reason for using military 
force in another country unless there are compelling reasons of threatened lives either by the 
state or its unwillingness to protect them. However, the motivation behind the two enterprises 
would be different. While the colonization used humanitarian motives to hide its political and 
economic goals, because it was not factually true that all non-Western territories contained more 
atrocities before colonization than those that the colonial system would inflict on local 
populations, humanitarian intervention based on the subsidiarity principle would be activated 
because victims have asked for it, and it would be decided and executed by regional actors for 
common benefits. In that sense, there would be more transparency in the process, and it would 
not be used ideologically.  
439	  
	  
	  
Following this discussion, it seems that such a humanitarian intervention would not be 
accused of resuming another colonialism. Nonetheless, the critics show another neocolonial face 
of humanitarian intervention, in the sense that it does not deal with socio-economic conditions 
that give rise to its necessity. As it is most of the time carried out in the recently independent 
states, these are postcolonial states left by the former colonial masters to protect their interests. 
Such institutions are maintained through heavy security systems that oppress the populations. 
Hence, for some scholars, instead of rushing to military intervention, they should deal with the 
root causes of economic and social injustices engendered by the international system. In Orford’s 
words, “intellectuals and activists concerned about democratic and human rights issues should 
lobby their government’s representatives and directors to oppose support for this model of 
economic liberalization and marketization,”225 because that is what causes the need for 
humanitarian intervention; and in a way, humanitarian intervention sustains such conditions of 
postcolonial neocolonialism.  
These are hard questions for the humanitarian intervention case inasmuch as, since it is 
narrowly restricted to military intervention, it is supposed to be punctual and of short duration. In 
that sense, these critics are right to highlight that it does not deal with root causes, especially the 
effect of global capitalism. Furthermore, the solution seems to be an institutional reform of the 
postcolonial state so that it becomes a representative institution of the people, instead of being 
protectors of colonial interests. Such projects cannot be an object of humanitarian intervention, 
lest it becomes another paternalistic mode of governance. Rather, as the model is founded on the 
call of local actors, it is their responsibility to fight for such a substantive change in their political 
system. In that perspective, Orford is correct to encourage intellectuals and activists to lobby and 
fight for such changes to happen. As to the humanitarian intervention per se, since it ideally 
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responds to an actual situation of a human rights violation, if its main actors are those states 
themselves trying to resolve internal crises in a member state which threaten human rights and 
their common interests, it seems that claiming that it perpetuates a postcolonial neocolonialism 
would be hard to justify. It is an ad hoc response to the aftermath of the postcolonial state, but it 
is not its cause, and it cannot be its solution. Moreover, the account of humanitarian intervention 
proposed here claims to be normative; therefore it cannot be confined to the mistakes of the 
current practices which undermine its legitimacy. Consequently, it aims at a certain generality 
that goes beyond the postcolonial context, since the presupposition is that human rights challenge 
every culture, and therefore there is potentiality of humanitarian intervention to occur 
everywhere. Taken at such a level of generality, it could be justified as non-neocolonial in that 
neo-colonialism implies the continuing unbalanced colonizers-colonized relationships. But a 
humanitarian intervention based on the subsidiarity principle abolishes these tensions since the 
regional organizations on which is based, are usually contextually based and state members are 
geographically—and even historically—close. That is why, even from this point of view, 
humanitarian intervention founded on the principle of subsidiarity might be a better option for 
the protection of human rights when the national local actors call for it. This can occur without 
reenacting a neocolonialism, because the threat is too big to be contained by their own efforts, 
and the state is unable or unwilling to step in for different reasons (it might be because it is the 
perpetrator or in complicity with the perpetrator).  
Conclusion 
This chapter is suggested as an alternative to the philosophical accounts encountered in 
my third and fourth chapters, in order to respond to the theoretical and practical challenges posed 
by the cultural and political critique of human rights and humanitarian intervention. The 
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suggested alternative is a multilayer conception of human rights, inspired by, yet going beyond 
Beitz’s practical conception of human rights. The effort was then to confront it with those 
challenges. If the arguments deployed up to here make sense, then they suggest another way of 
addressing critiques without subjecting human rights to imperialistic use. They also show that the 
human rights project can be normatively defended without falling into cultural prejudices, and 
another type of humanitarian intervention can be suggested without consecrating a 
neocolonialism. As a new theoretical justification of human rights, the multilayer conception 
would certainly gain from confronting it with other different theories. It is doubtless that such a 
confrontation would yield interesting debate about its strength and its weaknesses. Nevertheless, 
the project of this dissertation is modest: to take seriously the cultural and political critiques of 
human rights because they get to the core of the whole project, and the risk of using human 
rights imperialistically. Hence, if the multilayer conception has sketched a reasonable account in 
such direction—as I hope and believe it does—then the project itself is worthy the efforts.  
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Chap. 6. As a Way of Concluding: Revisiting Old Questions 
6.1. Recapitulation 
The idea of this project takes birth in the encounter with the critique of the human rights 
project as an imperialistic ideology and of its implementation through humanitarian intervention 
as a neocolonialism. To that end, I developed it as a reevaluation and discussion of these 
critiques and, at the same time, a response to the real risk of the imperialistic use of human 
rights. That is why it had to delve into philosophy in order to articulate that response 
philosophically in dialogue with philosophers who have developed an account of human rights. 
Thus, the project is structured around three main parts. The first part comprises the two 
first chapters which elaborate the two critiques—in a rather neutral way—toward the human 
rights project as a whole. Indeed, while the understanding of human rights as an imperialistic 
ideology attacks its normative foundation, viewing humanitarian intervention as a 
neocolonialism undermines the moral basis of the implementation of the human rights goal. 
Hence, the first chapter elaborated in detail this theoretical challenge, starting by defining the 
two components of the critique, that is, ideology and imperialism, since one cannot comprehend 
how this human rights project is another imperialist ideology unless she/he understands what the 
latter means. Hence, following Ricoeur’s study, ideology possesses a positive and a negative 
side. The positive one is its legitimating role of authority, while the negative side characterizes 
its concealing of reality. Thus, saying that human rights are an ideology is to assert that they play 
this double role of legitimating and concealing, offering a moral support to a hidden evil agenda. 
As to imperialism, the dissertation focuses on the high imperialism which corresponds to the 
time of colonialism, that is, the period between 1880s and 1914, during which Europe occupied 
most of the rest of the world. The reason why I limit the focus to this period is the fact that the 
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critics compare human rights with the imperialist ideology operating during this period. The 
question now is: what was that imperialistic ideology? 
The first chapter establishes that the ideology behind the European expansion of the end 
of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries was the “mission civilisatrice”, 
that is, the civilizing mission. It was an ideology because it justified positively the European 
negative endeavor of conquering, occupying and plundering the rest of the world, in order to 
solve its internal political, economic and demographical crises. Founded on racial prejudices of 
racial superiority and comforted by sciences, the civilizing mission was heralded as a duty of a 
superior race—the white—to bring civilization to the inferior ones—the dark races, who are 
uncivilized and savages. It was legally legitimated by the nascent international law, while 
philosophically and morally, it was justified by the liberal belief in the myth of progress.  
Human rights critics claim that the human rights movement assumes the same structure 
and follows the same pattern, except that it has changed the flag-bearer. While Europe carried 
out the civilizing mission, a new form of civilization through human rights is championed by the 
United States, yet with the same goal of spreading liberal culture on the rest of the world, since 
the human rights corpus is a compendium of liberal ideas and values. It is built in the SVS 
metaphor, in which savages are non-Western cultures in which victims are presented helpless in 
need of a savior coming from the West. The critics contend that human rights discourse uses the 
same language of civilized against uncivilized, with a moral duty of the civilized ones to rescue 
the victims of uncivilized cultures by bringing them human rights. Human rights as a new 
imperialist ideology has also integrated a legal form, that is, the international human rights law, 
which provides it with a legal scheme to enforce itself through a legal mechanism. This was also 
a helpful device for the civilizing mission for colonizing the rest of the world. Moreover, like the 
444	  
	  
	  
civilizing mission, the human rights movement also has its liberal proselytizers in the Western 
powers, international institutions and international NGOs, always ready for expeditions for the 
heathen lands. 
In conclusion, human rights discourse is only a new tool for the West to culturally and 
politically dominate the rest of the world. That is how and why it is an ideology in the double 
meaning of the term. It justifies positively the negative practice of domination. This critique is 
theoretically serious because it undermines the normativity of the human rights enterprise, both 
in its scope and content. On the one hand, human rights can no longer pretend to be universal 
since they are just liberal, therefore particular to a certain culture. Their universalization is an 
imposition. On the other hand, by hiding and yet justifying an evil act, the human rights project 
is a lie and liar; and therefore itself is evil. These facts show that the cultural and political 
critiques of human rights as an imperialist ideology are serious and a philosophical account of 
human rights cannot ignore them.  
The second chapter develops the challenge based on the implementation of human rights 
through humanitarian intervention. For the critics of this practice, humanitarian intervention, 
understood as a military intervention without the consent of the targeted state, is a colonialism in 
its contemporary form. The chapter substantiates this claim by retrieving the historical 
background of this practice. Since most of scholars who justify humanitarian intervention ground 
it into the just war theory, the chapter rereads some authoritative voices in the field—Thomas 
Aquinas, Vitoria, Suarez, Walzer—in order to examine whether there is a precedent of such 
practice. The result is that it is not easy to found humanitarian intervention on the just war theory 
in general. Authors such as Vitoria and Suarez identify some instances for humanitarian 
intervention, but it grants rights to Christians rulers to intervene in non-Christian territories, 
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which rather fits into the critics’ claim that humanitarian intervention is a neocolonial practice. 
As to Walzer, he upholds the non-intervention principle, but accepts situations that “shock the 
conscience of human kind” that would require a humanitarian intervention. Nonetheless, when 
one examines the reasons and how such humanitarian intervention would proceed, it is clear that 
even Walzer’s account would not escape from the suspicion that humanitarian intervention is 
another form of colonialism. It is the same finding when one considers international law. Be it 
before or during the human rights era, scholars do not agree that humanitarian intervention is an 
established practice legally founded. When it is justified—such as by Grotius—or carried out, it 
supports Western intervention in non-Western countries. Even the newly coined concept of 
Responsibility to Protect, R2P, is not shielded from the same suspicion.  
Opponents of humanitarian intervention also understand that there can be situations that 
are morally shocking; therefore the call for a humanitarian intervention. However, looking at the 
practice, its authors and the reasons offered, the critics cannot help but see it as a neocolonialism. 
That latter means both an establishment of a local political bourgeoisie that protects the interest 
of former colonialists, and the repetition of the colonial project. According to these critics, 
human rights are just a pretext so that the West can reconquer the non-Western world. It always 
occurs in non-Western states, carried out by Western powers, with a declared intention of 
imposing liberal institutions that sustain Western values. It is done selectively, resorting to 
labelling those they dislike but protecting their allies. They use international institutions and 
manipulate international law in order to topple the non-liberal-democratic governments so that 
they can impose their own rule and rulers. That is why, for the opponents of this practice, it is 
just another neocolonialism because it reassures the Western domination over the rest of the 
world, economically, politically and culturally. That was the outcome of classical colonialism, 
446	  
	  
	  
such is the goal of the neocolonialism under the cloak of humanitarian intervention, contend the 
critics.  
This challenge to human rights practice added to the theoretical challenge hampers the 
entire human rights project for, as Shue rightly observes, if there is no mechanism to ensure that 
people can be protected “against the single most serious threat to their lives—their own states,”1 
it becomes difficult to see its relevance. Thus, a philosophical inquiry concerned with human 
rights has to be able to respond to them. It is in that optic that the second part of this dissertation, 
composed of chapters three and four, is a quest for a philosophical response to these challenges 
through two main figures of contemporary philosophy.  
The third chapter looks at Rawls’s account of human rights and confronts it to these 
challenges. Conceived as necessary conditions for any reasonable system of cooperation and 
drawn from his political liberalism theory free from any comprehensive doctrines, Rawls 
integrates human rights into the list of the features of the Law of Peoples that is to guide the 
liberal foreign policy. Subscribing to the evolution of international law, Rawls assigns two major 
roles to human rights: to restrict the reasons that justify a war and redesign the contours of a 
state’s sovereignty. That is why, for Rawls, gross violations of human rights are a legitimate 
motive for a humanitarian intervention. 
The Rawlsian account does not, however, deal with the challenges satisfactorily for, 
being an offspring of the political liberalism, itself culturally situated, the critics could argue that 
the Law of Peoples seems to be another enterprise to spread a liberal culture, as it is framed in 
liberal values and ideas, and then only extended to other communities. Moreover, as Rawls 
favors liberal culture over others, critics can suspect Rawls of putting liberal civilization as the 
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end of all other cultures. Now, since human rights are part of this Law of Peoples, which is 
inherently liberal and elaborated by only liberal peoples, it is difficult to convince the critics how 
human rights are different from the imperialist ideology of spreading liberal culture, especially 
from the fact that Rawls limits his human rights to the liberal rights—although not all of them.  
Concerning the critique of humanitarian intervention as a neocolonialism, Rawls asserts 
that only well-ordered peoples, that is, liberal and decent peoples, are to carry out the 
humanitarian intervention in the non-liberal world. In addition, they are the ones who determine 
where and when to intervene without consulting those labelled as “outlaw states.” From this 
perspective, it would be, once more, difficult to convince the critics whether such a justification 
and practice of humanitarian intervention is not a neocolonialism, since not only do the well-
ordered peoples follow a liberal-inspired law, but they also aim at furthering their particular 
interests. Moreover, a humanitarian intervention performed on the Rawlsian model allows the 
institutional change, as it wants other states to join the society of well-ordered peoples. This 
assertion would reinforce the critics’ belief that humanitarian intervention is just another form of 
colonialism.  
The fourth chapter turns to Habermas, another major figure with another philosophical 
perspective—critical theory. His view of human rights is complex as it appears in different 
works and from different sources. However, two main articulations seem to be outstanding. On 
the one hand, he develops a theory of human rights based on his discourse theory, and on the 
other hand, he talks about human rights as he deals with the constitutionalization of international 
law. The two are not necessary the same. From his discourse theory, he constructs a system of 
rights containing rights that citizens must accord to each other in a society regulated by positive 
law. That is why such a system fits into a constitutional democracy which secures both private 
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and popular autonomy, and provides the means to exercise those rights. While the private 
autonomy focuses on the classical liberal rights, the popular autonomy ensures the authorship of 
these rights by the addressees of the law. It is worthy observing that, in this system, the social 
rights are conceived instrumentally with regard to rights protecting private and popular 
sovereignty.  
As to his consideration of human rights in the context of international law, Habermas 
assumes the existing human rights corpus and looks at its function as a source of legitimation of 
a globalized society. Now, even when he considers the international human rights corpus, he 
gives priority to the first generation of human rights, while social rights play an instrumental role 
of securing these negative liberties. That is why, despite his acknowledgement that, with the 
concept of dignity, all human rights are connected, he asserts that human rights are juridical in 
nature, since they can only be enjoyed when exercised, and they can be exercised only when they 
are incorporated into a positive law form.  
From his system of rights, it is not easy to address the critique of human rights as 
imperialist ideology, because it is designated for a democratic political community, and its 
extension to other cultural settings would be an imposition. Furthermore, it is construed on the 
background of modern Western societies which no longer accept a metaphysical foundation for 
the social order. Yet, this fact is far from being common in the world today. Therefore, his 
system of rights cannot be a starting point for addressing the theoretical challenge. As to his 
consideration of international human rights, Habermas is clearly against their imperialistic use. 
Nonetheless, he recognizes the liberal origin of the international human rights regime, and yet 
does not address the problem of imposing it on the rest of the world, which is the target of human 
rights critics. In addition, he claims that, as human rights came as a Western response to the 
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crisis of modernity, they should be adopted by other cultures as they face the same problems. 
Yet, modernity itself is multifaceted, and there is no guarantee that a solution particular to a 
given cultural setting would fit in other cultures.  
As for humanitarian intervention, Habermas justifies it through the evolution of 
international law, which was classically built on the fact of war, and now is concerned with 
peace and security ensured by the protection of human rights. However, Habermas notes the risk 
of imperialistic use of human rights through humanitarian intervention, as the UN in charge of 
that mission of securing peace and security through human rights does not have an executive 
power to enforce its decisions. On this point, Habermas agrees with the critics of humanitarian 
intervention. On another side, though, he supported some intervention such as Kosovo and the 
imposition of a liberal order. Furthermore, he endorses the hierarchization of states, accrediting a 
higher legitimacy to liberal democracies, and his justification of humanitarian intervention is 
founded on an international law that follows the pattern of the constitutional democracy.  
Hence chapter four concludes that, from the Habermasian account of human rights, it is 
not easy to respond to the theoretical and practical challenges posed to human rights by the 
critics. Therefore chapter five is an attempt to constructing a conception of human rights that can 
address them more satisfactorily than do the other accounts. Following Beitz’s insight of a 
practical conception that looks at human rights in their international function, my conception 
suggested here goes beyond Beitz as it draws the understanding of human rights from local 
practices which integrates states in a larger web of actors involved in shaping the practice and 
meaning of human rights. These actors are the beneficiaries of human rights activities; local non-
states actors, state and state-sponsored institutions, regional organizations, international non-
states actors and the international community. The interaction among these actors produces a 
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multilayer model of human rights in which the local non-states actors (LNSA) and the 
beneficiaries are key players. They assume the role of protecting their basic interests in their 
local context, using the international human rights discourse. I call this encounter between a local 
situation of human rights violation and the international human rights discourse, domestication 
through translation, because human rights have to be translated both literarily and 
metaphorically to make them relevant to the local struggles for human dignity. On the other 
hand, the local concerns have to be framed into the language of human rights so that they can 
generate an interest from foreign actors. Through that process of domestication, the human rights 
discourse offers new language to channel local grievances, while human rights acquire new 
meanings. That is why from the multilevel model, human rights are conceived as standards 
empowering individuals or groups of individuals socially organized into political entities, in 
order to resist through different levels of influence, any source of threat that endangers their 
basic interests.  
This multilayer conception of human rights presents some advantages. First, instead of 
emphasizing the role of state, it focuses on the emancipatory power of human rights. Second and 
consequently, the first purpose of human rights is not foreign policy, and their first subject is 
individuals or groups of individuals whose basic interests are threatened. Third, it is not 
individualistic. Fourth, because it is founded on the domestication of human rights, the protected 
basic interests protected depend on the context and the urgency. Fifth, human rights thus 
understood empower against every threat and not only those emanating from the state. That is 
why, sixthly, it operates at three levels-national, regional and international working in a lexical 
order in a Rawlsian sense—with a complex combination of actors and strategies for the 
effectiveness of human rights.  
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Confronted to the theoretical challenge, this new conception offers, I believe, a better 
way of addressing it. First, it shifts the discursivity of human rights from the conflictual binary 
West-non-West worlds to the contexts in which human rights are challenged by those who reject 
them and defended by those who appeal to them as means of resistance. Second, the same 
context of contestation disqualifies the civilized-uncivilized opposition, because those involved 
in the discursivity are from the same cultural background. Third, by presenting the LNSA and 
beneficiaries as the main actors of human rights, the multilayer conception offers an alternative 
of the critics of human rights as imperialistic ideology who contend that the human rights 
enterprise is carried by Western powers, International institutions and INGOs. Moreover, this 
practical conception based on local practices does not require a specific form of political 
institutions and it does not rely on one source of justification, because it is inherently pluralistic. 
In this way, the multilayer conception allows the reconsideration of critics’ narrative about 
human rights, taking into account the historicity of human rights and distinguishing the human 
rights project from the civilizing mission. It also allows the deconstruction of the SVS metaphor, 
since it is constructed on the binaries that the multilayer conception avoids. Finally, it responds 
to the proponents of imperialistic use of human rights by insisting on the irreplaceable role of 
local actors, and by showing that those who use human rights in their daily struggles are 
primarily less concerned by their liberal nature than their efficacy in the struggle. Furthermore, it 
allows a pluralistic mode of justification.  
Concerning the critique of humanitarian intervention, the practical conception based on 
local practices shows that victims are no longer proxy, but rather subjects of their own resistance 
against human rights violations, in which external actors intervene only in solidarity with local 
actors. That is why a humanitarian intervention is justified through the subsidiarity principle, 
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which requires that a higher level of power should not get involved in matters that can be 
handled at a lower level. Applied to the case of humanitarian intervention, the victims of human 
rights violations have to take the lead in protecting their rights, and only call upon external actors 
when for solidarity or when they are afraid to lose the battle. Hence, the external actors must not 
replace the LNSA and the beneficiaries. In that sense, from the international law perspective, the 
multilayer conception advocates for an increased role of regional bodies—those created and 
made of states—in enforcing humanitarian intervention. I believe that this fifth chapter argues 
convincingly that a humanitarian intervention carried out following this subsidiarity principle 
would not fall under the critique of being a neocolonialism.  
Such was the project of this dissertation: to respond to the theoretical and practical 
challenges raised by critiques of human rights as an imperialist ideology and humanitarian 
intervention as a neocolonialism. However, these challenges are, most of the time, linked to the 
tension between relativism and universalism, which raises the normative question of human 
rights universality. I touch on these two issues briefly to see whether the multilayer conception 
sheds new light on them.  
6.2. Beyond the Universalism-Relativism Dualism 
The tension between universality and relativism of human rights is as old as the 
contemporary human rights regime, and some of their critics have been labelled relativists. One 
might recall the famous statement of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) 
questioning how the nascent idea of a Universal Declaration of Human Rights could be 
considered universal without being an imposition of Western values.2 At the same time, as many 
were questioning the possibility of human rights universality, others were defending how those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 AAA, ibid. See also, among many others, Pollis and Schwab, “Human Rights: A Western Construct with Limited 
Applicability” in Pollis and Schwab, eds., Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives. Ibid.  
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very Western values were indeed universal.3 Since then, much of the debate about the 
justification of human rights has been about showing how they are not parochially Western.4 In 
other words, the tension between relativity and universality of human rights is not about the 
universality of human rights per se; rather, it opposes those who affirm that human rights, 
notwithstanding their Western origin, are universal, against those who challenge this claim by 
emphasizing that international human rights as currently enshrined in international texts are 
specifically Western and, therefore, cannot be extended to other cultural settings. The question at 
stake now is the multilayer conception’s position on this issue.  
To start with, the practical conception of human rights based on local practices does not 
posit the universality of human rights at the outset. Rather, it assumes the historicity of human 
rights corpus as it is marked by its time, circumstances of emergence, and the reasons for its 
justification. In that context, the multilayer conception of human rights takes seriously the 
historical fact that the contemporary human rights has a Western origin. However, this fact does 
not imply an epistemological stand on the validity of human rights, because such a position can 
only result from an articulated account of human rights. And as we saw, the multilayer 
conception draws its account of human rights from local practices. That is why the entire 
relativism-universalism debate loses its relevance. The main question is not whether human 
rights are universal, since such a question can only be dealt with after one defines what human 
rights are, and one knows what/how they are after looking and analyzing the role they play in 
local circumstances. Along the way, one discovers that universality is not a requirement for 
human rights to perform their function as they are adopted by local actors to resist the threat to 
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their basic interests, without first asking whether or not they are universal. From this perspective, 
to borrow Wilson’s words, the multilayer conception of human rights “takes us beyond the 
polarized approaches of universalists or relativists, and transcends the legalistic and statist 
approaches common in the human field itself.”5 
Indeed, interested as it is in the local practices of human rights discourse in struggles 
against human rights violation, the multilayer model is looking for the emergence of meaning(s) 
of human rights from their practice. It does not disqualify them beforehand, arguing that they are 
not universal, nor does it attribute to them universality in order to see them operating. In other 
words, human rights are not effective because they are universal, nor do they fail because they 
are culturally relative. Philosophically speaking, the practical conception of human rights from 
local practices brings us to the birth of the meaning and signification of human rights, instead of 
imposing them one. In that sense, I concur with Merry that “the universalist/relativist debate 
distracts us from understanding human rights in practice: from examining local political 
struggles which mobilise rights language in a particular situation.”6 That being the case, it is not 
only a distraction from the understanding of human rights; it is also a distraction from the 
practical purpose which dictated their conception. Human rights were conceived to orient 
actions; therefore its meaning has to embody that end. Any debate that splays from this purpose 
loses the focus altogether.  
Hence, the multilayer conception of human rights brings us beneath the 
universalism/relativism dualism and retrieves the emancipatory power of human rights before it 
can raise the question of their universality. As to the question of relativity, it is discarded by the 
affirmation of human rights historicity, since such an assertion entails being context-bound and 
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therefore limited. That is why the next section looks at the question of universality of human 
rights from this conception of human rights based on local practices.  
6.3. Human Rights Universality Revisited 
Donnelly has devoted much of his work on the defense of the universality of human 
rights, as most of the time human rights are understood in the liberal tradition. After exploring 
the dictionary definition of universality, he identifies three kinds of human rights universality. (a) 
the legal universality founded on the fact that all states have ratified human rights instruments; 
(b) the overlapping consensus universality which is based on Rawls’s concept of overlapping 
consensus (Donnelly seems to believe that different cultural backgrounds have embraced human 
rights); and (c) the functional universality based on the view that human rights are a response to 
the modern society dominated by the market and the modern states which bring threats to human 
dignity.7 However, all these modes of universality have been criticized. The legal universality 
has been challenged by the fact that the states ratifying these treaties, some lack legitimacy or 
they do it either under international pressure or for political/economic interests. Concerning the 
overlapping consensus universality, it is not factually true that “the moral equality of all human 
beings is strongly endorsed by most leading comprehensive doctrines in all regions of the 
world.”8 Finally, the functional universality is not convincing because the multiplicity of 
modernity requires a multiplicity of responses rather than only one designed through human 
rights. In the face of this problematic question of human rights universality, what can be the 
contribution of the multilevel conception to this debate? 
From the practical conception of human rights based on their local practices, human 
rights universality can be considered from two perspectives. On the one hand, universality is 
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about the dissemination of human rights beyond their Western place of birth. I call this the 
practical universality. On the other hand, human rights acquire new meanings through local 
practice, to talk about human rights universality is to reflect on their normative validity. As 
Gerhard Ernst observes, this kind of universality is to address their moral validity.9 This section 
now focuses on these two aspects of human rights universality. 
The practical universality is different from Donnelly’s legal universality as well as the 
empirical universality; that is, the mere presence of human rights everywhere. While the 
empirical universality would look at the factual presence of human rights everywhere, the legal 
universality settles for the ratification of human rights by states. The practical universality, on the 
other hand, looks at how human rights are being used in local struggles. In that sense, human 
rights are not considered universal, not even that they are universalizable beforehand, since their 
historicity seals their particularity. Instead, the process itself is seen as a way of universalizing 
them without imposition, as local actors adopt human rights discourse for expressing their 
concerns and grievances. As such, the practical universality cannot be decided a priori; rather it 
is an ongoing process through which a human rights project delivers its promises in different 
cultural settings with hope that it continues to offer an emancipatory tool to those in a situation 
of resistance.  
Seen from that point of view, the practical universality is not theoretical; it is vindicated 
through action and they are invoked for action. As François Jullien asserts, “the universalizing 
character of human rights is in the order, not of knowledge (of the theoretical), but in the order of 
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the operative (or of the practice).”10 This is exactly the thrust of the practical universality: it is 
this capacity of human rights to be summoned in situations where human dignity is under threat, 
and through which their extension occurs. They are not first adopted because they are truer than 
other values and norms; rather, they offer a better means of resistance. They are seen less as a 
credo to which every culture has to adhere, rather than a tool that strengthens resistance against 
oppression anywhere. Thus, their extension “est de l’ordre non de la vérité, mais du recours.”11 
It seems to me that it is such a kind of universality that is expressed in UDHR, as it sets 
the human rights as standards for guiding an action oriented toward securing “their universal and 
effective recognition and observance” for all individuals and in every territory.12 The UDHR’s 
drafters did not first focus on the epistemological validity of human rights, but they did take for 
granted their practical universality. The latter is given as a goal to achieve, and that is why they 
hoped that “every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in 
mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms.”13 
It is in those terms that human rights universality was viewed and it is only through such an 
effort that they envisioned its realization. From this perspective, the practical universality 
promoted by the multilayer conception of human rights seems to fit into the purpose of UDHR 
itself.  
That being the said, does it mean that, from the multilayer conception, human rights lose 
any possibility of asserting their universality, since the practical one is an ongoing process 
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without a predictable end? In other words, what is the status of their normative validity from this 
perspective?  
To answer this question, it is important to observe that the sought universality has to be 
constructed from human rights practice in local contexts. Put in other words, the question is to 
discover how they can be universal after looking at their practice. What does it allow them to be 
used in so diverse contexts? What is common to all those situations in which human rights are 
convoked that can then be universalized? This theorization does not affect, nor is it a requirement 
for the practice of human rights. Rather, it is a consequence of the latter; it is an afterward 
reflection following the practice. Finding that common element would be discovering the 
universalizable piece of human rights, which might then help in the thinking of their universality.  
Recall that, according to the multilayer conception, human rights are means for 
resistance; they are “a practical instrument”14 in the hands of the oppressed for their 
emancipation. This definition is drawn from the analysis of their function in local struggles. 
Now, what is common to all these diverse situations is the negative experience that calls for 
resistance using human rights discourse, both discursively and politically. For that reason, human 
rights come in as a negative response to this negative experience; they are a refusal of it.15 
Hence, the universalizable element of human rights conceived from local practices is that 
absolute refusal to any threat to human dignity. As such, human rights universality can then be 
reformulated as another expression of a universal and a non-institutionalized negation –a NO—
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which challenges every institution. This universality has to be outside the institutional structures 
so that it keeps its critical power and does not itself become oppressive. That is why to preserve 
its emancipatory power which is the foundation of their universality, any human rights discourse 
has to remain open to criticism and be self-critical. Hence, human rights universality resides in 
their negative role of refusing any compromise with any threat to human dignity. As Julien 
rightly asserts, “les Droits de l’homme réussissent à dire exemplairement cette universalité du 
refus.”16 That is it: when one looks at human rights from local practices, their universality is the 
universality of refusal, “universalité du refus.” They are the negation of the negativity; that is 
why they are positive in their effect. The result of their universality is the positive of the 
negative, to paraphrase Hegel, and is always expressed through negation. As such, human rights 
universality joins the common task of any universal, as Julien would argue, a task of breaking 
and entering into any kind of closed totality in order to bring a new inspiration.17 And that is the 
function of human rights universality viewed from local practices.   
6.4. Ending Note 
Since none is a good judge for oneself, I probably cannot see all the imperfections of the 
human rights account presented here. I simply acknowledge that confronting it to other 
philosophical conceptions of human rights, for instance those presented in chapters three and 
four, would prove its proper value instead of being only a response. However, since such a 
project is beyond the goal of this dissertation, I have only presented it as an attempt to 
responding to the theoretical and practical challenges raised against the contemporary human 
rights project by those who view it as an imperialist ideology carried out through a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Julien, ibid., 109. 
17 Ibid., 108. In his own words, he says, « cette fonction négative de la notion… rejoint la fonction la plus générale 
qui fait, à mes yeux, la vocation de l’universel : celle de rouvrir une brèche dans toute totalité clôturante, satisfaite, 
et d’y relancer l’aspiration. » 
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neocolonialism disguised under the so-called humanitarian intervention. As to the last two points 
developed in this conclusion, they are an illustration of the potential of this conception when 
confronted to the old questions raised by the human rights discourse. Nonetheless, the credibility 
of such an illustration as well as of the whole project cannot be granted until it has gone through 
the critical eye of the reader. Nevertheless, I again emphasize that the concept of domestication 
through translation leads to a multilevel model through which human rights are conceived as 
standards empowering resistance. 
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